BY: Dr. Tekeda Alemu

I could not resist the urge to write to you in response to your November 7, 2005, contribution: "Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis". I thought also that my comment should be in the form of an open letter. I have a very simple reason for this -- your contribution which has the potential of misleading many, has had very wide circulation. It could thus have some damaging effect on our country.

Frankly speaking, I would not have selected to respond in this fashion if I did not feel that I had a story to tell which might help readers to put this latest contribution of yours in the proper perspective.

I have known you, Professor Clapham, for many years. In fact, I have known of you, through your first book on Ethiopia -- a sort of a sequel to Margery Perham's work, The Government of Ethiopia. Thus, I regard you, more or less, as my teacher, though we have never been together in the same class. I believe we might have had an opportunity to meet over the last 14 years a few times, I suppose one or two times in my office.

But what I find most memorable --- all the more so now in light of your latest contribution on Ethiopia --- is our encounter in South Africa, in April 2004, specifically at that magnificent desert resort in the Kalahari, South Africa, in connection with the Tswalu Dialogue. I was there representing Prime Minster Meles who could not accept the invitation because of other commitments he had. Since I know you are an honourable man, I have no doubt, you would not attempt to contradict me if I said you wanted Prime Minister Meles to be at the Dialogue as much as the organizers of the meeting did, to comment on the short paper you had prepared on Ethiopia --- "The Challenge of Democratization...." You wanted the Ethiopian Prime Minister to be at the Dialogue so much that, if you recall, that was the only time we ever had communication. We have not had any contact since.

From the vantage point of a little less than two years from that Dialogue, what is important is not that you went out of your way to seek out the Ethiopian Prime Minister to join you at Tswalu to comment on your paper, but rather --- in light of the tone and content of yoour latest contribution --- what you said in the paper you presented at the Dialogue about the EPRDF and about post-1991 Ethiopia.

I would not be surprised if people would find it difficult to believe that the same author would be responsible for the two contributions, the first one written in April 2004, and the second penned in November 2005. With all due respect, Professor Clapham, it is like there are two Professor Claphams --- the first, that of the "The Challenge of Democratization in Ethiopia." Here, I must tell you in all honesty, you were in your best form as a scholar and as an academic. This was the paper that you wanted the Ethiopian Prime Minister to comment on. Despite the very many efforts you made, you could not succeed, and what you had was me as a substitute. I have to admit, I must have mumbled something, but I did not do justice to the wonderful paper you presented on the challenges of democratization in Ethiopia. You were also very generous towards the EPRDF in that paper and though you still retained some scholarly skepticism, you made it clear nonetheless that 1991 was a watershed in the history of Ethiopia and that the EPRDF had brought Ethiopia almost to the doorsteps of democratic governance. I shall return to this theme in a moment, but now to the second Professor Chapham, that of "Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis."

What Professor Clapham II Says

Here, one sees no trace of the scholar with 40 years of concentrated labour on matters relating to Ethiopia. You started out with a sentence whose validity is manifest and which reminded one who the author was. "The place to start trying to understand any political crisis is always with the government in power. Oppositions merely fill the gaps left by the incumbent regime." In all frankness, I thought, that opening remark would for sure be a curtain raiser for an analysis of the current Ethiopian crisis only a writes of the caliber of Professor Clapham I would manage to deliver. But what a disappointment. After that magnificent salvo, you immediately descended into polemics which one would normally expect from partisan scribes of political parties, and not from an academic of your caliber and, I might add, of your integrity as a scholar.

The thrust of your analysis suggests that you simply did not care to try to understand why an election which began with so much hope suddenly degenerated into a bloody and ugly confrontation which ought to be excruciatingly painful, not only for patriotic Ethiopians, but also for friends of Ethiopia like your good self. What I have found the most intriguing is how uncharacteristically you have become downright rude in this piece as when you gratuitously refer to our former Minister of Information as "neurotic" in his "pronouncements". I am sure there is no factual basis for your fulmination, as there is absolutely no basis for another outrageous remark you make in which you claim that "Ethiopia retains one of the longest periods in Africa for establishing a business." The truth, Professor Clapham, as I checked with the head of our Investment Office while reading your paper, is that the opposite is true --- Ethiopia makes available to businessmen and women one of the shortest periods in the world for establishing business firms. You could do it within two hours, Professor Clapham.

For some of the factual errors you make, I do not need corroboration from third parties, for since I myself have been directly involved in these events, it is with regrets that I have to point out to you those unscholarly transgressions. You refer to the expulsion of Dr. Siegfried Pausewang as one of the "worrying signs, even before the election took place." But Professor Clapham, if you had discussed the issue with Dr. Pausewang, you would have discovered that long before the election and before Dr. Pousewang's name was ever proposed as one of the observers of EU, questions had been raised in writing and in the form of a critique of his work, about his neutrality. That judgment was made on the merit of his own behavior. For your information, Professor Clapham, I myself had a long exchange of views with Dr. Pausewang before he left Ethiopia prior to the election. I thought we had a very civilized exchange of views and the position of the Ethiopian Government was explained to him in as frank a manner as possible. The point is, Professor Clapham, even with respect to matters that could be easily verified you have been, in this second paper, rather careless, sloppy, and utterly un academic.

What is most revealing, however, is how you have been so unreasonably harsh on the EPRDF in this paper while you have been so much indefatigable in your effort to find excuses for the shortcomings of the opposition, so much so that at times the whole enterprise looks comical. "The opposition is caught in a bind", you assert in all confidence. "On the one hand, it cannot simply accept election results that it has every reason to believe are fraudulent", you argue. While on the other hand, you tell us, the opposition "has no interest in escalating violence, which would only play into the hands of a government that possesses a monopoly of organized force and has not the slightest hesitation to use it." Not even the best minds from the opposition have managed to come up with an argument lending a plausible cover of reasonableness for the policy of the opposition while in fact that policy was responsible for the post-election mess that the country was forced to get into. "The resort to peaceful demonstrations and boycotts is an obvious compromise" for the opposition to follow, you said, "even though there is an evident danger that these may get out of hand, and result in looting or violence." You know, on the other hand, even in soccer games there are rules administered by referees and you don't change either the rules or the referee in the middle of the game, no matter how bad either the rules or the referee might be. There cannot be the rule of law if this very rudimentary and basic principle is not adhered to, something, which, as a teacher, you should be the first to stand for, and defend. Tell me, Professor Clapham, on the basis of what principle do you justify the assertion you make that the opposition "cannot simply accept election results that it has every reason to believe are fraudulent." Would you have given the same advice to the then U.S. Vice President Al Gore in 2000 in connection with the Florida election fiasco? What if, just as the opposition, the ruling party felt, as it should, that it has every reason to believe that it had won? That is why we all have to leave under the law, and you don't change the law in the middle of the game. On this, Professor Clapham, you are not being a good example.

In contrast, you seem to always be looking for diabolic motives for what you claim has been carried out by the ruling party. You claim that the government "has an interest in presenting" the opposition "as violent, criminal or treasonable, and fomenting the conditions under which it will be able to suppress it by force." This is being said, Professor Clapham, of a ruling party that has made it clear right from the beginning that it was ready to handover the administration of Addis Ababa. It is not that you are not fair to the ruling party or considerate of the fragile democratization process in Ethiopia, but you are also reckless and careless about your own academic credentials, and your scholarly standing.

Your choice of witnesses for your biased position on whether there was "significant rigging" was almost laughable. You tell us that the "EU observer mission, the Ethiopian Human Right Council, and Donald Levine in his correspondence with Ethiopian diplomats in the United States, have convincingly demonstrated that significant rigging took place." For those who have some familiarity with EU-EOM and, its head, with respect to whom the attribute of neutrality is a manifest oxymoron, the judgment you make about the fairness or unfairness of the election based on the sources you have chosen, does not enhance your credibility and constitutes another confirmation of your bias against the ruling party.

What is most revealing about your latest paper is how, unlike the position you took in April 2004, this time around, you harp on the theme that the underlying Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ruling party has been an impediment to the democratization of the country, as well as to its economic progress.

Here, I cannot resist the temptation to make a brief digression. You see, Professor Clapham, for reasons that are rather difficult for me to fathom, you have tried to make so much out of the Marxian background of the EPRDF. You seem to be insinuating that once a Marxist, always a Marxist, and that is what the EPRDF is. But, Professor Clapham, who among members of our generation, has not been a Marxist, unless he was dumb, intellectually lazy, unconcerned about the fate of his country, or unless he was extremely bright, bordering on the genius, almost a demigod. You see, those you talk about in your November paper as if they are trash are people who acted on their conviction and decided to fight for a cause while the rest of us, including your "Western-oriented Sophisticates," chose a less hazardous route for their life experience, some leading, until the Ethiopian political terrain was made ready for safe political participation, lives that were rather frivolous. Please, Professor Clapham, dispense with your Marxist-Leninist bugaboo. The world has changed, and no one will take your insinuation seriously. But if you believe that commitment to social justice, democracy, and equality among peoples, is a proclivity which is a throwback to one's Marxist period, then you have a philosophical problem to resolve.

But what did Professor Clapham I say as close as less than two year ago?

Post-1991 Ethiopia According

To Professor Clapham I

You recall, Professor Clapham, that paper you presented at the Tswalu Dialogue on Friday, 30 April 2004 dealt both with the challenges and the sources of hope for the democratization of Ethiopia. Talking about the challenges, you referred to a number of factors --- of history, structure, culture, among others -- that have contributed to making the achievement of democracy in Ethiopia extremely difficult.

With respect to the challenge of history, you said, though "the past does not determine the future", nonetheless, "history does establish patterns that may guide people's expectations, and make democracy harder or easier to achieve". Then you set forth the following concerning Ethiopia which I thought at the time, and still feel, was very relevant:

In Ethiopia's case, it makes it harder. Throughout the distinguished past that makes it Africa's oldest State, it has never (prior to the accession of the present government in 1991) had any regime with the slightest plausible claim to democracy, and it has lacked much of the basic experience that we tend to take for granted in other parts of the continent.

When it comes to the challenge of structure, you made references to two factors --- the nature of the Ethiopian State and the process of its formation, and the rugged topography of the country. In connection with the dynamics of state formation, what you thought pertinent in terms of the challenges to democratization was, in you own words "The rapid expansion of the country's territory, especially in the late nineteenth century, that led to the incorporation (and in many places, the ruthless exploitation) of other peoples, who were generally regarded as inferior, and had very limited (if any) opportunity to participate in government." You then made the following conclusion which I thought was again relevant and valid:

Ethiopia was therefore dogged by a premise of inequality, in which full incorporation into the State required the abandonment of one's own indigenous culture and identity, and the assumption -- in terms of name, religion, food and dress, language --- of those historically associated with the state. Many individuals made this transition and rose to the highest position in government; but many more were alienated from and oppressed by the state in a way that would inevitably deeply affect political attitudes once they gained the democratic ability to express them.

You then turn to the country's topography as well as to its diversity and argue that:

A number of African countries certainly enjoy a comparable diversity, though few have such rugged topography or such poor communication, but when combined with other factors, this diversity makes the maintenance of consensual political structures considerably more complex.

When you talked about the cultural constraints to the democratization of Ethiopia, you were even more convincing, thus all the more perplexing, why you chose to be so simplistic in your latest contribution. You said in your Tswalu paper less than two years ago, that "Ethiopian state culture" places "enormous emphasis on hierarchy and obedience." On one hand, you argued, this culture of obedience has been responsible for Ethiopia's many achievements, "including the maintenance of effective government over many centuries and over a huge area, the military capacity that ensured the country's independence from colonial rule, and the ability to absorb upheavals that would have shattered a less solidly established state".

Then you make a very interesting remark in terms of the downside of culture as a challenge to the democratization of Ethiopia. You said:

This culture of obedience does however place considerable obstacle in the way of conventional multi-party democracy.

You explain how this cultural background might make it difficult for the average Ethiopian to vote against the government as it might also make many an official unwilling to contemplate votes against the government. Further expanding this theme, you say the following:

The idea of a 'loyal opposition,' seeking to displace the government by peaceful and constitutional means has been equally difficult to grasp from the viewpoint either of the government itself, or of its would be opponents. Nor does Ethiopian attitudes to power readily lend themselves to bargaining and compromise. Levels of interpersonal trust, which have been identified as critical elements in building the institutions on which democracy depends are characteristically low.

It is not of course all doom and gloom as far as the prospect of democracy is concerned in the Ethiopian context, you told us at TSWALU, less than two years ago. You explain this prospect by setting forth four or five factors that you said would contribute to widening the democratic space in Ethiopia. But before you did that, you made the following comment which I feel is rather paradoxical in light of your demonization of the ruling party, now. Professor Clapham, this is what you said at Tswalu less than two years ago:

This may seem a depressing assessment of Ethiopia's prospects for democracy. It is however essential that we should not treat democracy simply as a formula that can be readily and successfully applied, regardless of the circumstances. Different countries, in Africa as elsewhere, come to it with very different experiences that must be fully taken into account. At the same time, there are also elements in the Ethiopian experience, notably since 1991, that have greatly improved the prospects for democracy, and are bringing about important and very largely positive changes in the way in which Ethiopia is governed. (Emphasis mine)

Your refer to five elements as sources of hope for democracy in Ethiopia, and all but one are interestingly embedded in events associated with the post-1991 development in our country.

You argue, quite persuasively, that the removal of the dictatorial rule of the Derge by the EPRDF had broader implications than the mere removal of a government would normally have had. You told us at Tswalu that the Derge, "sought to destroy all those who opposed it". When it failed, you said:

[T]his was more than the defeat of a single repressive regime: it signaled the inadequacy, indeed the impossibility, of attempting to govern Ethiopia from the top down, and left some form of government that ultimately rested on the consent and participation of the governed as the only remaining option. It likewise alerted Ethiopians, in the most traumatic manner, to the dangers of autocracy and the need for some kind of constraint on those in power. Democracy in many countries had developed from a recognition of the failure of dictatorship, and Ethiopia may be no exception.

I do not believe one could imagine a better tribute to the EPRDF for the role that it has played --- no matter its weaknesses, and those are many ---in making the progress towards democracy in Ethiopia irreversible and, as you so eloquently put it, for heralding "the inadequacy, indeed the impossibility, of attempting to govern Ethiopia from the top down."

Professor Clapham, it would have been nearly impossible having read what Professor Clapham I had said in April 2004 about the EPRDF, to predict what Professor Clapham II would say in November 2005. The real Professor Clapham --- the honourable professor with an amaziing insight into the underpinnings of Ethiopian politics --- did not credit the EPRDF merely with making progress towards democracy in Ethiopia more or less irreversible, but he also credited it with having deconstructed "hegemony" in Ethiopia and laying the foundation for a new political system which, while not without potential problems, was nonetheless a system that opened up possibilities for Ethiopians to structure their political relations on the basis of equality. The merit of the new system introduced by the EPRDF in 1991, you said is that:

...[I]t has sought to tackle explicitly the underlying assumption of hegemony on which the Ethiopian State has historically been built, and in the process to lay the foundation for an Ethiopia constructed on the basis of equality between social groups and cultures, not merely between individuals. By far the most important challenge facing Ethiopia is whether this bold experiment will succeed.

This, I suppose, is a very insightful observation which no one can plausibly contest, and this is also what has been confirmed by developments in the post-election period in Ethiopia, though I submit, I do not believe all the problems we have faced are entirely of our own making.

You also told us in Tswalu that for the first time in Ethiopia's history, possibilities were emerging in the country for the emergence of civil society. Democracy, you argued, depends not just on state-level institutions, but also "on a wide range of supportive elements in the society as a whole". During the Derge regime, you told us, "even those feeble organizations that had emerged under the imperial government, were ruthlessly suppressed and subordinated to the ruling power." But things are changing under the EPRDF, you affirmed, and not even once did you mention that the EPRDF leaders were trapped in their Marxist-Leninist past. You said:

One key development since 1991 has been the emergence of a genuinely independent press. This has its deficiencies, to be sure, and is largely restricted to the major cities, but still serves not just as a source of information independent from government, but also (perhaps more important) as a guarantor of independent thought.

The space for civil society and thus for possible progress in fostering democracy, was also expanding in post-1991 Ethiopia in other respects as well, you said a little less than two years ago at our last encounter. Unlike now, when you probably felt that the disturbances of the beginning of November, pointed to the unmaking of the EPRDF, what you said at Tswalu was the following:

...[T]he period since 1991 has seen a burgeoning of independent organizations, including not only the more prominent Addis Ababa-based ones (like the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, or the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association), but extending widely into provincial politics, in which rival parties and associations compete for attention and support at the local level. There has been a considerable expansion likewise in autonomous economic organizations, extending into areas (such as tertiary education) that were previously the preserve of the state. Ethiopia, in short, has developed a level of pluralism that extends well beyond the state's capacity to control. (Emphasis Mine)

All this, of course is under EPRDF's watch. But this you said in 2004. You take all that away for inexplicable reasons in November 2005, and you almost tell us, there is after all not all that much difference between the Derge and the EPRDF. The following is what Professor Clapham II says of the EPRDF in November 2005:

At no time prior to 1991 had any legitimate opposition been permitted in Ethiopia, and even though the EPRDF government was obliged to accept formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance, it has never regarded any opposition movement as legitimate, or as having any right to oust it from power by peaceful electoral means.

By the same logic, one could argue that the EPRDF dismantled the Derge's dictatorship, deconstructed the structure of hegemony in the country and created a space for civil society, to make Europeans and Americans happy, and for some funds to build the EPRDF as an organization. How can, you seem to think, Ethiopians, and Africans, or the poor, be driven by values of equality, justice and democracy?

This is not the first time I hear this being said, but mostly within the context of a not very serious talk among diplomats and non-diplomats, but not by a serious academic whose remarks on fundamental societal and political issues must be weighed carefully lest he ends up conferring validity upon assertions that would have major implications for interpretations of who we are and for how we value our inter-societal relations. If we, as the implication of what you say would lead us to assume, take positions on fundamental issue always after looking at the side of the gallery where you are seated, you would have no cause to take us seriously as independent agents having our own attachments to causes and principles. Professor Clapham, the assertion that "the EPRDF government was obliged to accept formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance", is not inconsequential, and has broader implications than you probably thought possible. I hope it is just part of the glib talk that this latest contribution by Professor Clapham II has been suffused with, and nothing more.

But that was not a sentiment I thought one sensed in Professor Clapham of the Tswalu Dialogue of 2004. Among your many insights from which we all benefited in 2004, was what you said about the "Ambivalent Role of the (Ethiopian) Diaspora." This is what you said then, and I thought it was extremely insightful, all the more so in light of the post-election debacle we have faced here in Ethiopia:

The attitudes of exiled Ethiopians towards developments within the country are also often naive in the extreme; Americo-Ethiopians (sic), in particular, often seem quite unable to understand why politics in their country of origin should not immediately assume the same characteristics as in the United States.

What you said in your conclusion at Tswalu was so true and so valid and, moreover, so reflective of the value of a clinical analysis of how societies function, that no matter how I find your November 2005 contribution utterly despicable, honestly speaking, I shall continue to respect you as a serious scholar. This is what Professor Clapham I said in the concluding part of his presentation at Tswalu in 2004 on "The Challenge of Democratization in Ethiopia":

Deeply entrenched attitudes to power and authority --- on the part of opposition groups and not just the government, and most basically in the population as a whole --- continue to impede the development of attitudes and practices on which democracy must ultimately depend. Ethiopia still lacks an adequate political process, through which its diversity can be accommodated within a set of effective and consensual mechanisms of governance.

It is not necessary to agree with everything you said in your conclusion. I for one believe that though what you say about the attitudinal requirements of democracy are pertinent and also this might go a long way to help us make sense of our post-election tragedy, nonetheless we have also seen in our case how the mundane greed for power of a narrow circle of people could wreak havoc on society even when there are possibilities for overcoming cultural constraints to progress in building democracy. Ethiopia may not have been ready in May 2005 for the most advanced form of democracy, whatever that might look like, but we could have had a reasonable achievement towards a reasonably credible multi-party system that would have surprised the world if hardliners within the opposition had not shown contempt for the rule of law and had not decided to go for broke. It is just not true that Ethiopia lacks "adequate political process" for accommodating diversity. Nor is it true that the average Ethiopian, because of attitudinal factors, is not ready to embrace democracy. As for the ruling party, the EPRDF, notwithstanding what is said by Professor Clapham II, the fact is that it has done almost all that was required to ensure that the May election would be fair and free and, following its defeat in Addis Ababa, has made it clear that it would hand over the administration of the city to the winner. That this did not take place is no fault of the ruling party. And that is the truth which will not go away notwithstanding whatever is said to the contrary by those who wish to get us to fight, not for the future of the country, but for causes that were lost or won in the various battles until 1991.

But still the analysis of Professor Clapham I concerning the challenges and promises of democratization in Ethiopia, is by far superior to the analysis offered by Professor Clapham II with respect to the current crisis. The November 2005 contribution lacks honesty and reflects no seriousness of purpose. The last part of your paper, headed "Possible Outcomes", because it should be regarded as beneath contempt, requires no response. Perhaps, in a way, we deserve it. It is partly because this has been a concern of mine for some time that I said, if you recall, the following in my brief and modest contribution at the closing day of the Dialogue at Tswalu:

The most important partnership for peace and development is that which should pertain to the country level. Africa will have little hope of achieving economic development and ensuring durable peace without strong partnership among governments, civil society and the private sector. There is even a need for partnership between ruling and opposition parties on matters affecting national interest. Without loyal opposition, there can be no meaningful politics.... The problems that we in Africa face in this regard are significant. Often, parties belonging to the same country show greater mutual confidence with foreign parties than they do among themselves.

I suppose it is because we have made ourselves so vulnerable, Dear Professor Clapham, that you can have the temerity to contemplate something for present day Ethiopia, which only a buffoon would believe makes sense. I am not sure, although you have known Ethiopia before, that you know the new Ethiopia. Or there must be something I missed that could explain why you behaved in such a bizarre manner in your latest contribution on Ethiopia.

Tekeda Alemu