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A Week in the Horn 05/09/2008 |
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· The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sir John Holmes, made a three-day official working visit to Ethiopia from 1-3 September to review the humanitarian situation and the responses to the current drought. During the visit, arranged at his request, Sir John Holmes travelled to the Konso Special Zone of the SNNPR, and to Lefeissa and Kebridehar Zones of the Somali Region. He toured drought-affected localities and held discussions with regional authorities as well as meetings with UN agency officials, ambassadors from the major donor/partner countries and international NGO representatives. Sir John also had meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ato Addisu Legesse, the President of the Somali Regional State, and the State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tekeda Alemu. The discussions with Ethiopian officials were described as frank and constructive. In all his meetings, Sir John Holmes underlined his concerns about the humanitarian situation especially in the Somali region. He also noted the situation had much improved from his previous visit nine months ago.
In his latest briefing to the Security Council, last week, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Mr Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, noted the process of political reconciliation had shown progress with the agreement to set up the Joint Security and High Level (political) committees. He urged the Security Council to demonstrate its support for this progress. On recent fighting in Kismayo, Mr. Ould-Abdallah said the reasons for the fighting were social and economic. It was not a clash between the TFG and Al-Shabaab but among factions of the Darod clan to control the city. Mr. Ould-Abdallah called on the Council to deploy a peace-keeping force as soon as possible. He said the people of Somalia would support any such move and that the situation in the country was now positive. The Security Council recently renewed the mandate of AMISOM, and requested the Secretary-General to work with the AU to strengthen UN logistical, political and technical support to help bring AMISOM up to UN standards. However, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Edmond Mulat, who also briefed the Security Council last week, felt the current situation was still not conducive for the deployment of a UN peace-keeping operation. A more possible alternative, he felt, was a stabilization force, made up of a “Coalition of the Willing”, first suggested by the Secretary-General in March. Member states could contribute contingents which would be authorized by the Security Council. Mr. Mulat said that the Secretary-General could report back to the Security Council within 30 days after consulting with possible contributing countries. The Chief of Staff of the Office of the Military Advisor told the Security Council that, considering the operations and attacks taking place in Mogadishu, a force of two well-armed brigades, a naval force and a reserve contingent would be needed. According to reports, this suggestion of a stabilization force appeals to members of the Security Council more than any deployment of a formal UN peace-keeping force. Though it is difficult to confirm it is reported that several countries including France, Britain, Russia, Belgium Costa Rica and Vietnam are against the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, while the US, South Africa, Libya and Burkina Faso reportedly favour speeding up activities to deploy such a force. This week, Dr. Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College, USA, produced a report on Somalia for the NGO Enough: Somalia – A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare. Dr. Menkhaus is a specialist on the Horn of Africa and an advisor to the US State Department, and what he writes on Somalia is always of interest. On this occasion, however, he has allowed himself to be seriously mislead over Ethiopian policy and security dynamics. We will comment on this paper at greater length next week, but some of the errors as so serious as to need to be addressed immediately. Perhaps of most concern is the allegation that Ethiopia has been allowing Mogadishu-based warlords to re-arm in order to make “Mogadishu ungovernable and prevent hard-line Islamists from reasserting control over the capital when Ethiopian forces withdraw”. This is complete and absolute nonsense. Ethiopia fully supports the Djibouti Agreement and the “road map” signed in Addis Ababa last week. None of this lends any support to such claims. Ethiopia’s “motives, interests, strategies and intentions” are really not the most difficult to understand or predict as Dr. Menkhaus says. Far from it. Ethiopia has made it quite clear that it fully supports the peace process. It has always looked for reconciliation in Somalia. This is why, for example, Ethiopia held some eight meetings with the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 in an effort to avoid conflict. More recently, Ethiopia has been involved in a number of efforts in building up the capacity of the TFG. Dr. Menkhaus oddly suggests that supporting the TFG security forces should be seen as emboldening hardliners. Far from this being the case, the hardliners themselves have been weakening the security forces on which the TFG depends. None of this is either mysterious or secret. It is certainly true that Ethiopian policies have not always been coordinated with the Nairobi-based donor community, but that we would remind Dr. Menkhaus is, as he very well knows, not always the fault of Ethiopia.
Over two days a number of papers were presented on Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea relations and on the inter-related security challenges of Kenya and Uganda. Dr. Martin Rupiya identified four parameters for security challenges facing Kenya and Uganda: the pastoral and cross-border communities; the effects of internal political dynamics; the influence of overlapping regional security structures, including IGAD; and the advantages of military co-operation. A paper from Dr. John Young provided an update to the IGAD Peace process in the Sudan, Gerard Prunier considered the current state of the Problem in Darfur, and Professor Rogaia Abusharaf looked at the role of Sudanese Women Waging Peace. Dr. Young was critical of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and gloomy about its prospects arguing that it had failed to deliver on its commitment to deliver a democratic transformation and that it was doubtful that should national elections take place in 2009 that they would advance the process. He outlined the attitudes of the various parties and the doubts about next year elections. He suggested the peace process was only making progress in the narrowest sense. It had not broken down but it was not laying the basis for a united Sudan, not yet producing any democratic transformation and not providing any framework or impetus for resolving the conflict in Darfur. Professor Prunier expanded on what he said was the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement, relating it to the Chadian situation, and, more surprisingly, to the failings of the CPA. He argued that the Darfur Peace Agreement was now dead and that the International Criminal Court’s consideration of indictment of President Al-Bashir had only strengthened Darfur hard line opposition. Any efforts to revive the Darfur Peace Agreement were now merely confusing. In discussion, both papers were criticized for ignoring the Sudanese element, not addressing the vision of Sudan, and concentrating almost exclusively on the view of the victims. No doubt both were unduly pessimistic, and in Professor Prunier’s case almost sensationalist. Professor Medhane Tadesse dealt with “Peace in Somalia and Neighboring Regions: A Distant Prospect”. He raised concerns over the continual concentration by the international community on the top-down approach to Somali peace-building and state building, suggesting it was time to consider the possibilities of a bottom-up approach more closely. He noted that Ethiopia’s successes in 2006 had been vitiated to a large extent by the weaknesses of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) which meant it had not been the decisive factor that had been expected. Clan divisions and Islamist strength today are as much the result of the civil wars and the statelessness as of any Ethiopian presence or of the international failure. Professor Medhane emphasized the weakness and divisions of all political and military forces in Somalia; the imperfections of the TFG were obvious, but, he noted, the opposition lacked even the intent to contribute to peace and state building in Somalia. Of course, recurrent conflict within the TFG, and political fragmentation within the opposition alliance, make peace prospects distant. Among things to be done, Professor Medhane listed support for the peace accord signed in Djibouti, and engagement with the clan leaders in Mogadishu; to ensure the TFG be reconstituted as a genuine government of national unity capable of delivery; to arrange for an orderly and phased withdrawal of Ethiopian forces; to produce a political strategy to contest the appeal of violent groups. Professor Medhane underlined the critical need for large scale emergency and economic aid to enhance the establishment of a functional government, and to spark decentralized political processes. Sally Healy, from Chatham House, identified common characteristics of conflict and other features of a “Regional Security Complex” in the Horn of Africa, underlining the way state interactions sustain conflicts within states by outlining the main developments in the Ethiopia Eritrea dispute before turning to Somalia. She highlighted a number of valuable and interesting points including the prevalance of conflict in the region, describing it as a ‘habit’ of war, and the poverty of governance, even the widespread failure of democratic governance in the region. The formulation makes clear the destabilizing role played by Eritrea though she gives Eritrea’s specific role, as a leading supporter of non-state military action, less emphasis than it prehaps deserves. Sally Healy thought that Eritrea’s contention that it has reason to be apprehensive about Ethiopia was understandable. This is, however, very difficult to accept. After the end of the long Eritrean struggle for independence and the fall of the military regime in 1991, the new government in Ethiopia promptly agreed to independence for Eritrea and did everything it could to assist the newly independent state. It put no difficulties in Eritrea’s way and indeed sponsored it on every occasion possible. As Ethiopia has repeatedly made clear, all it wants to do now is to talk, to hold dialogue, as one of the elements laid out in the Algiers Agreements of 2000. A number of errors and ommissions were corrected in the discussion. It was Eritrea which started the war in 1998 (as the Claims Commission made crystal clear), not Ethiopia, and details of Security Council resolution 1640(2005) were clarified. Equally, more could have been said about the efforts of the OAU and other mediators to prevent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea’s refusal to withdraw from areas previously administered peacefully by Ethiopia or to discuss these issues, left Ethiopia no option than to evict Eritrea forcefully. Ethiopia, of course, has said again and again that it will not return to war unless it is invaded by Eritrea a second time. Sally Healy’s view of Eritrea appears to be rather over-generous and somewhat at odds with reality. Indeed, surprisingly, she even suggested Eritrea appears no less committed than Ethiopia to the Algiers Agreements and continues to affirm its desire to uphold their integrity. Eritrea certainly claims to uphold the Agreements but this claim can hardly be substantiated in the face of its now complete take-over of the Temporary Security Zone and its enforced expulsion of UNMEE, both central elements in the Algiers Agreements. It is indisputable that its actions have been in total violation of the integrity of the Algiers Agreements. It is certainly true that the conflict has had a profound impact on how Ethiopia and Eritrea relate to each other. Indeed they clearly have an entirely different strategic view of the region and their respective places in it. Ethiopia still believes an accommodation with Eritrea can be reached. Eritrea does not. All indications are that Eritrea is now determined never to deal with the present government in Ethiopia, and it continues to devote most of its energy to trying to destabilize it. As Sally Healy notes since 1998 Eritrea has placed strategies designed to weaken Ethiopia politically, domestically or regionally, at the centre of all its policies. This is why it has supported the opposition elements in Somalia, and can be expected to continue to do so. President Issayas recently claimed that “the TPLF regime’s invasion of Somalia” had exposed the Horn region to “further instability”. This incidentally does not mean Ethiopia and Eritrea have been engaged in a proxy war in Somalia. Eritrea, which has no direct national or strategic interest there has perhaps been indulging in a proxy war. Ethiopia, which is engaged there at the request of the Somali government, has its own genuine national security interests in Somalia. Ethiopia is not involved in any proxy conflict with Eritrea in Somalia; it is in Somalia because of Somalis, and its presence has nothing to do with Eritrea. Sally Healy also looks at the regional and security mechanisms of the Horn of Africa, noting that IGAD, the regional organization has been seriously hampered by regional rivalries. IGAD of course played a major role in the CPA in Sudan, and in the Mbgathi peace process which was held under its auspices, and IGAD has supported the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia. Until 2005, IGAD was united in its approach to Somalia, even backing unanimously the idea of IGASOM, an IGAD force to assist. Eritrea specifically voted in favor of IGASOM, though it was opposed by the US and others. Subsequently, however, Eritrea objected to Ethiopia’s role and its response, backed by all others in IGAD, to the TFG’s request for assistance against the Islamic Courts. This put Eritrea at odds with IGAD, deepening Eritrea’s isolation. Eritrea suspended its membership of IGAD in April last year. Despite efforts to encourage its return, including the recent mission by Kenya, Sudan and the IGAD Secretariat, it has persisted in its view that IGAD must be restructured to meet Eritrea’s criteria before it will consider returning. President Issayas’s recent comments, at the end of August, underlined Eritrea’s rejection of IGAD. He said the organization had become the victim of external interference in violation of its lofty objectives and must be restructured before it could make any contribution to the promotion of political and security stability. The conference provided a detailed analysis of the main areas of conflict and of threats to security in the region. It was rather less successful in producing possible answers, though a number of suggestions were made in individual cases including the need for positive action by the international community in support of AMISOM and the TFG in Somalia, and of UNAMID in Sudan. There was general concern about the threat of terrorism, little agreement about how to deal with it. There was consensus on the need to address the conflict in Darfur (even though this had now largely degenerated into low intensity conflict), and on the need to incorporate Darfur into a wider peace process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan may have major problems but it is still the most plausible way forward for the Sudan. Indeed there are no other possibilities for the moment. There was, however, agreement that the solution to conflicts and security threats in the Horn of Africa must be the responsibility of the members states of IGAD as the regional organization. IGAD states may ask for, and need, external aid and assistance, but in the last resort we ourselves must provide for the solutions which will allow us to aim at the far more serious problems that we face, including our war on poverty, and on the way to acquire what we need for development.
The obelisk was taken from Axum on the personal orders of Mussolini to mark his defeat of Ethiopia in 1936 and his revenge for the Ethiopian victory over Italy at the Battle of Adua forty years earlier. Its return now, after 68 years, marks the end of a long campaign, decades of negotiations, and long delays, to get it back from Rome where Mussolini had taken it. Italy first promised to return the monument in 1947 as part of war reparations but little progress was made until November 2004, when the Ethiopian and Italian governments again signed an agreement for the return of the obelisk, and asked for UNESCO’s co-operation. The Italian government funded the dismantling of the obelisk, its transport and its re-erection at Axum, and development of the site under UNESCO auspices. It will add an impressive additional element to Axum which was designated as a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1980. UNESCO Director-General Koichiro Matsuura called it an historic moment with the obelisk “returning to the heart of ancient Ethiopia”. Ethiopia of course had had a unique history as a never colonized independent African state, but it did suffer the attacks of colonial powers. Italy in 1896 and Britain in 1868 when a British army defeated the Emperor Tewodros and after his suicide plundered his fortress of Magdala. Ethiopia has been requesting the return of various precious imperial and religious treasures for years. Among the items stolen by British troops were two imperial crowns, at least 400 manuscripts out of a thousand looted from Magdala ended up in Britain, the “imperial seal”, the icon of the Qwer'ata Re'su, processional crosses and church items including a number of tabots, weapons, jewellery, clothes and two tents of Tewodros. The tents, currently held at London's Museum of Mankind, have seldom if ever been erected. A few specific items have been returned but the bulk remain in Britain, with many manuscripts in the British Museum or in the libraries of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh and other places. Significantly, perhaps one of the few pieces that have been returned was a shield belonging to the Emperor Tewodros, sent back to Ethiopia by the National Museum of Kenya. The obelisk is a symbol of unity, strength and courage and as a sign of the achievements of ancient Ethiopian civilizations and of Ethiopia’s long and proud history of independence. Ethiopia has a rich and varied cultural heritage spread over millennia, back to the early hominids of three and a half million years ago. Its most historic monuments, the obelisks at Axum, the 13th century rock churches of Lalibela and the 17th century castles of Gondar, belong not just to Ethiopia but to Africa as well. Objects of cultural and national heritage significance have been the subject of a number of UN General Assembly resolutions calling for the restitution or return to their countries of origin, starting with the adoption of the convention on their protection adopted in November 1972 by UNESCO. In 1987, the Director-General of UNESCO made a solemn appeal for the return of irreplaceable cultural heritage to the countries of origin. The UN General Assembly (Resolution 56/8) proclaimed 2002 as the UN Year of Cultural Heritage. At Sirte in July 2005, the AU welcomed the agreement on the return of the obelisk as a victory for all African countries and called upon other concerned countries to follow Italy’s example. The cultural wealth of Ethiopia symbolizes its unity, the reality of the concept of Ethiopia, and its national pride. The return of the obelisk recalls the national resistance and the national unity displayed by the patriots who fought so successfully against invaders in the 1890s and again in the 1930s. It demonstrates that a new chapter has been opened in our relations with Italy. The symbolic importance of the return of the obelisk is underlined by the fact that it has taken place during the first year of the New Ethiopian Millennium, the year in which the Ethiopian Renaissance has been launched. The coincidence underlines the obelisk’s place as a symbol of the identity of Ethiopia and of Ethiopia’s long and rich history, and an exceptionally important part of the heritage of Ethiopia and indeed of Africa. There is no disagreement that cultural property constitutes a basic element of civilization and of national culture. As various UN and AU resolutions have underlined many countries of origin attach singular importance to the return of cultural property. In certain cases they are the repository of fundamental spiritual as well as cultural values. In this sense, the return of the Axum Obelisk has been a triumph of hope; and as symbol of the earliest golden age of Ethiopian history it could not have been a more appropriate sign of the New Ethiopian Millennium, of the new Renaissance launched last year as part of the Millennium celebrations, and of Ethiopia's hopes for a new golden age. Over the last five years Ethiopia has achieved exceptional double-figure economic growth raising the very real hope of being able to win the war on poverty and move out of the ranks of the least developed countries, and into those of the middle-income states. This is still a decade or two away and to achieve it we will need to mobilize all our efforts, to unite together behind our national interests, and all the more so because of the present convergence of problems – drought, and international oil and food price rises. This particular set of circumstances is no indication of policy failure, and our overall economic growth is set to continue, but it does underline the need for a united approach, for everyone to be mobilized, in Ethiopia and in the Diaspora, among Ethiopians across the world, for our drive into the future.
The principles of the Ethiopian
Renaissance underline the meaning of Ethiopia's independence, and the role
it has played in Africa, as a symbol of the struggle against external
domination and of its responsibility as a survivor of the colonial era.
Ethiopia's image suffered greatly under the military government becoming a
byword for famine and war. In the last seventeen years that has all changed
as development has begun to take off, though it remains all-too-easy for an
international media to hark back to previous images without bothering to see
the reality of today. Cultural values are of course the responsibility of
the present generation. It is critically important to maintain them.
Without these there is nothing to hand on to the future. For seventeen
years, under the murderous military regime of the Derg, Ethiopia lost its
way, and its dignity, as the Derg's slogan “Everything, [and everybody] to
the war front” demonstrated. The change of government in 1991 began the
process of rebuilding a shattered nation and recovering the hope necessary
to restore our dignity, the dignity of Africa's oldest state. We have done
much towards this, and now with the launch of the Ethiopian Millennium and
Ethiopia's Renaissance we can build on half a decade of spectacular economic
growth to provide the real basis for a much more important war than any of
those fought by the Derg, the war on poverty. It will take time and energy.
It will require determination, and unity, and everybody’s support. It needs
an understanding of what we, in the spirit of Ethiopian unity, can
contribute. This is why the Axum Obelisk remains so significant a symbol of
the sense of Ethiopia’s long history. |
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |