A Week in the Horn

(31.10.2008)

  • Frank criticism of Somali leaders at the IGAD Summit in Nairobi

  • The Djibouti Agreement : ceasefire on November 5

  • Terrorists target Somaliland, and Puntland

  • The US Presidential election and anti-Ethiopian lobbying

  • The meaning of diplomatic immunity and friendship among sovereign states

 
  • The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) held an extraordinary meeting in Nairobi this week, with the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government preceded by an extraordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers. The Assembly was attended by the Presidents of Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, the 1st Vice-president of Sudan and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was in the chair. The subject was the political and security situation in Somalia. Also present was the Burundi Minister of National Defence and Former Combatants, and the Assembly was briefed by Mr. Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union, Mr. Ould-Abdallah, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Somalia, and Senator Rafaelli, the Special Representative of Italy to Somalia, representing the IGAD Partners Forum. Also present in Nairobi was the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer. The Assembly held intensive consultations with the leaders of the Transitional Federal Institutions and Government, and with members of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia. The leading members of the ARS were present during the meeting between the Heads of State and the parliamentarians. In other words, all stakeholders were on board, and virtually all the partners were present all the time. Discussions were very frank and it was made very clear that IGAD leaders and others were extremely disappointed at the way the TFG had been performing. The message was clear: the Somali leadership had failed to establish institutions of governance even though there were no more than ten months of the transitional period left. In sum, the Somali leadership had failed the people of Somalia.

Prime Minister Meles told the summit that it was a meeting that had grown out of a conviction that the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions were in paralysis and the situation needed to be addressed as soon as possible and in all seriousness. He pointed out that Somalia had not been given the required attention either by the United Nations or the international community, and only two regional states had been prepared to come to the support of the Somali people by providing troops. It was, he said, very striking the way the Security Council had found it so difficult to act for an African  country which by all objective considerations could not be more deserving of the need for stabilization of its security situation. This, he stressed was no excuse for the failure of the TFIs and the Somali authorities to discharge their responsibilities, in all areas of governance. The government in Somalia, he underlined, was no more than nominal and one major reason was the absence of harmony within the leadership. Prime Minister Meles commended the Djibouti Agreement, and Mr. Ould-Abdallah for his efforts, but, he added, the continued lack of agreement within the Somali leadership made it difficult to be optimistic about its possibilities.

The previous day, Foreign Minister Seyoum, speaking at the Council of Ministers, welcomed the presence of the AU and of the IGAD Partners, and the support of the European Union for the meetings. He pointed out that the reason for the summit was that the situation in Somalia was “dire” and required urgent attention especially in the political area. The problems, he emphasized, were not issues of security but political. Minister Seyoum noted that IGAD was particularly alarmed by the fact that in ten months time the Transitional Charter comes to an end, and, despite this, all those in positions of authority continued to display an egregious lack of responsible behaviour. He noted the agreements concluded at Djibouti at the weekend and hoped the decisions on the cessation of hostilities and on broadening the basis of government would be adhered to.          

At the end of the summit, the IGAD Heads of State and Government  issued a declaration to the effect that the TFIs should implement a series of actions within very specific timelines. Within 15 days a cabinet should be appointed on the basis of the resolution of the Parliament of 11 October, meaning that the resigned ministers should not be reappointed. There was a consensus that Parliament should return to Baidoa and that a new cabinet should be agreed as soon as possible. It is assumed that a unity government between the TFG and the ARS will also be established within the next three months. The Joint Security Committee set up under the Djibouti Agreement should become operative as of November 10 (and not later than November 25). The Benadir administration as stipulated in the Addis Ababa roadmap should be established within 15 days. The drafting of the Somali Constitution and the enactment of electoral and party laws must be done within six months. Any consideration of an extension for the transitional period could only take place in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and on the basis of progress on the ground. Progress reports of implementation of these activities must be submitted to the IGAD Council of Ministers every two months, and the IGAD Assembly should meet every six months to review progress. A coordination mechanism should be set up to deal with institutional and capacity building. The Declaration also urged the United Nations to expedite the responsibilities itemised in the Djibouti Agreement and in particular respond to the request to provide the financial needs for the police force. One of the major innovations of the Declaration is the appointment of a facilitator who is mandated to monitor progress on a daily basis, and report to the Council of Ministers and the Heads of State and Government. IGAD, which was critical of its own failures to keep a closer eye on TFG activities, will now be taking a much more active role. In paragraph 16 of the Nairobi Declaration, it stresses it is now  the basis, and anchor, of all efforts  to solve the political problems for Somalia. Underlining just how much things have changed, paragraph 17 notes that should the authorities of the TFI default on the provisions of the Declaration, the IGAD Assembly will meet and take action commensurate with the gravity of the lack of compliance. The Heads of State underscored in concrete terms that Somali authorities would not be able to continue “business as usual”. As far as Ethiopia is concerned, if this occurred, there would be no possibility of continuation of support for the security needs of the TFG. The summit commended Uganda and Burundi for sending troops to Somalia, and emphasized the critical role of Ethiopia. 

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  • The IGAD summit in Nairobi followed and, in effect, amplified the meeting of the High Political and the Joint Security Committees of the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia held in Djibouti last weekend. This was the fourth meeting of government and opposition held since their original agreement signed in June. Taking another step forward, the two sides have agreed to stop any hostile propaganda and called upon their supporters, and on the Somali population at large, to support a cessation of hostilities. A ceasefire agreed on Sunday is to become effective as of November 5, and joint TFG/ARS forces to restore peace and security in Mogadishu are to be available within  45 days, from November 10. The Joint Security Committee, of the TFG and ARS, should be operating in Somalia from that date.  The agreement calls for a police force of 10,000 to be prepared by the TFG and ARS to maintain peace and security in Mogadishu and other areas, and asks the UN Political Office to cover the costs of this.  Among the other modalities agreed is for Ethiopian troops to relocate out of certain areas of Belet Weyne and Mogadishu, starting from November 21. To avoid any security vacuum in areas left by Ethiopian troops, security will be the responsibility of AMISOM troops together with the assistance of TFG and ARS forces. The agreement also envisages the subsequent deployment of UN forces. All these are very ambitious goals, and in paragraph 18 of the IGAD Nairobi Declaration, the IGAD Heads of State and Government suggest that there should be flexibility in implementing the timelines and modalities of the Djibouti agreement. Much of it will depend upon the United Nations taking “expeditious measures to fulfill its responsibilities in the Djibouti Agreement”. A joint declaration by the two parties reaffirmed their commitment to reconciliation and political co-operation. It also noted that the Government, “ open to all Somali nationals and based on partnership and respect, with an inclusive parliament” should address political co-operation and joint responsibility  for security as a priority. This is the basis of the reference to the formation of a unity government in paragraph 11 of the Nairobi Declaration.  

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  • On Wednesday, in an apparent, if unsuccessful, attempt to upstage the IGAD summit in Nairobi, three suicide car bombs exploded in Hargeisa and two in Bosasso. The terrorist attacks, which all took place around 10.30 in the morning, appear to have been coordinated. The attacks bear all the hallmarks of Al-Shabaab operations. Al-Shabaab has previously been responsible for nearly a dozen similar suicide car bomb attacks in Somalia over the previous eighteen months,. The three attacks in Hargeisa targeted the Ethiopian Trade Mission, the office of the UNDP, and Somaliland’s Presidential Palace. Four Ethiopian Trade Mission staff were killed but most of the casualties at the Trade Mission were among Somalilanders queuing for visas.  A report from Iran’s Press TV, which often reports Al-Shabaab claims without qualification, alleged that the Ethiopian Trade Commissioner, Ambassador Woubshet Demissie, had been killed; he was not in fact in the building at the time. At the UNDP office, the suicide bomber succeeded in entering the basement before the bomb exploded. The third bomb was targeted at the Presidential Palace. Casualty figures are still unclear as both the Ethiopian Trade Mission and the UNDP office were badly damaged but as of this morning the official count was 25 dead and 31 injured. In Bosasso, the targets were two of the offices of the Puntland Intelligence Services, Puntland’s anti-terrorist force. President Mohamed ‘Adde’ Mussa told a press conference later that there had been two killed and twelve wounded in the attacks. He said the body of one attacker had been recovered; he was known to the Puntland authorities and he came from outside the country. The Week in the Horn would like to express our sincere condolences to the families of all those killed, and to those injured, in these gratuitous terrorist outrages.

Foreign Minister Seyoum told journalists in Nairobi that the attacks were the work of terrorists “desperately trying to create instability”. He assured reporters that the terrorists would not be left to get away with it: they would be brought to justice.” US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, also speaking in  Nairobi, said the senseless attacks “highlighted the determination of violent extremists to undermine peace and stability throughout Somalia and the Horn of Africa.”  Somaliland and Puntland authorities have already made some arrests and more are expected.

Both Somaliland and Puntland, particularly the former, have been largely free from open terrorist activity in recent years. An Al-Shabaab cell was operating in Somaliland in 2003-2004 and was responsible for the murder of several foreigners before being broken up by Somaliland authorities. Somaliland is, of course, currently preparing for next year’s presidential election, and registration of voters has just started. It would be tragic if the relative peace enjoyed by Somaliland since 1991, and this election, was disrupted by the failure of the international community to respond to the danger of international terrorism in the Horn of Africa.   

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  • The US presidential campaign between rival candidates’ Barrack Obama and John McCain is arguably the most fiercely contested in living memory. It is also unique as one of the contenders, and the one the polls favor to win, is an American of African origin – a fact that automatically qualifies as history in its own right no matter what happens next Tuesday. It has drawn sustained interest and curiosity throughout the world as much to the identity of and contrast between the two candidates as to the unprecedented exposure of the world to the campaign by state-of-the-art media outlets. Of course, because this campaign is about who will take over still the most powerful position in the world it is incumbent for politicians and ordinary citizens alike to follow the campaign trail closely. As a nation that has enjoyed decades of friendly ties with the United States of America, Ethiopia is no exception. The support Senator Obama has among Ethiopians both in the Diaspora and at home is palpable. 

The campaign of Senator Obama is, of course, a matter for the domestic policies of the United States and it is not for us to comment on. However, when lobbying undertaken around the campaign involves accusations against the Government of Ethiopia, and inaccurate and unfounded allegations at that, it is a matter of concern. Certain individuals and lobby groups have been working on behalf of and at the behest of the small extreme elements in the Ethiopian Diaspora and the Government of Asmara. Their campaign has little or nothing to do with the presidential campaign but is aimed at influencing potential officials of the next administration against the Government of Ethiopia. These are people attempting to push their own narrow political agenda on Ethiopia as part of Senator Obama’s political platform as Congressman Payne has demonstrated. Indeed, Congressman Donald Payne is some one who has developed a routine of Ethiopia-bashing when campaigning as he demonstrated when speaking at a gathering of Diaspora Ethiopians, purportedly to rally support for Obama in September. His most recent effort has been in a press release in the name of his position as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. In his press release, calling the Ogaden and Somalia “forgotten tragedies”, Congressman Payne  repeats his usual series of accusations against Ethiopia,  claiming that the Ethiopian security forces “are deliberately targeting innocent civilians” in the Ogaden. As usual he offers no evidence to support his allegations. Indeed, there is none. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces have never targeted civilians in the Ogaden or anywhere else. They try hard to avoid any harm to non-combatants. They respect the democratic and human rights of the people wherever they are deployed. From its own experience the Government of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Defence Forces, know very well that the easiest way to lose any counter insurgency effort is to alienate the civilian population. The Ethiopian Defense Forces have, over the last decades, developed a tradition of working closely with the people. This remains a guiding principle for the armed forces of Ethiopia wherever they operate. The Ethiopian Defence Forces have demonstrated their professionalism and discipline in their peacekeeping roles in Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia. By contrast, while Congressman Payne repeats uncritically any and all allegations against Ethiopian forces and Government, he fails to mention, let alone condemn, the acts of a terrorist organization, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which has murdered numerous innocent civilians in the area, repeatedly bombing hotels, open markets, and other public gatherings. The Congressman has never even condemned the ONLF’s brutal massacre in April 2007 when it killed over 70 innocent Ethiopian and Chinese oil workers in cold blood, as they slept. In fact, the Congressman is always remarkably careful not to disparage terrorist organizations. In his latest press release he even uses the benign term “insurgent groups” to refer to Al-Shabaab whose terrorist activities in Somalia have included the widespread slaughter of civilians, assassinations of UN representatives, members of various aid groups, and journalists as well as roadside bombs and suicide operations. Al-Shabaab, as the Congressman is well aware, has been linked to Al-Qaeda and is also listed as an international terrorist organization by his own Government.

Some academics, although their position is far from that of Donald Payne have also been making efforts which cannot be seen as helpful to Ethiopia/US relations, even though their motives may be benign.  A leading member of this group is Professor Donald Levine, who cannot be described as unfriendly to Ethiopia or even to the present government, but who has apparently been trying to influence a would-be Obama administration to take a more confrontational approach towards the Government of Ethiopia on a number of issues. Professor Levine has been a respected Ethiopianist for several decades, authoring a number of books on Ethiopia. He has earned widespread respect for his works. However, some of his more recent critiques have been less than fair and balanced. One of the clearest examples of this is his recent “Five Reasons why ‘President’ Obama is good for Ethiopians”, one of which is of particular concern, that an Obama administration should play a significant role in promoting good governance and human rights in “a more aggressive manner” than its predecessor. No matter how phrased, this is a clear call for a confrontational foreign policy, suggesting the use of arm-twisting tactics against a sovereign state. Professor Levine as an expert should know that Ethiopia and Ethiopians are not prepared to accept pressures of this kind. The person who wrote “Wax and Gold” and “Greater Ethiopia” should certainly be assumed to be knowledgeable about Ethiopia. It is a considerable and surprising disappointment to find him taking this sort of approach. Ethiopians are not submissive and remain prepared to defend their rights. Partners are friends not masters.  

Democracy is to be nurtured and developed at home: it is not a prescription to be pushed down the throats of developing states by powerful nations. A contribution to the development of democratic culture and human rights, should not involve arm-twisting. Imposing democracy from outside is nothing but a contradiction in terms, whether by the next US administration or any other. The Ethiopian government pays special attention to its friendly relations with the United States. It is a relationship that is based on a broad range of interests. It is a relationship we will pursue in the future and in a consistent manner. Ethiopia looks forward to working with the next administration, whoever wins it, in a way that promotes mutual interests.

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  • The law of diplomatic immunity is central to the modern international system of foreign affairs. Diplomatic immunity is one of the areas of international law routinely invoked in the day to day interactions between states. Indeed, it is one of the pillars of international law, going back many centuries. It is an ancient doctrine starting from the time when nations communicated through their envoys who later became resident ambassadors. In discharging their responsibility, as representatives for their own sovereigns, they were accorded respect for their own persons. This practice evolved into a modern system of protection critical for peaceful relations among states. Put it in its current modern form at Vienna in 1961, states and academics have debated whether the special protection accorded to these envoys, of different classes or functions, their families and their missions was primarily to enable them discharge their official function or whether it emanated from the doctrine of sovereignty of states. Either way, it is true that the derivation from the personification of sovereigns is important. Heads of states appoint ambassadors as their personal envoys. This adds specific importance to respect for the immunity of diplomats. Premises of missions and residences of diplomatic agents are also equated with the territory of the agent’s own state. Many countries have enacted separate laws governing diplomatic immunity. Others, like Ethiopia generally apply international law directly and incorporate specific aspects of protection in its own Penal Code. Whatever the difference in approach, all countries make it a point that diplomatic immunity is fully respected and seen as such by the public, nationally and internationally. Even in cases of public outrage over certain acts by diplomatic agents, governments strive to apply the concept of diplomatic immunity.

The efficacy of diplomatic immunity is partly explained by the principle of reciprocity. States do not needlessly abuse the idea or allow it to be abused as they, themselves, desire full protection for their own diplomatic agents and diplomatic archives and assets in the host country. Equally, in large part, states respect diplomatic immunity as the normal behaviour of a state in the conduct of international affairs. Any failure of responsibility by a state could result in international criticism. States that do not respect diplomatic immunity are seen as being in serious dereliction of their international obligations. Normally, states do not yield to local pressure for action against diplomats and foreign missions, even in criminal matters, as they fully understand the critical importance of abiding by this cardinal principle of international law. Even when their own diplomats are being adversely affected, states carefully consider any counter measures, and only as a measure of last resort. To avoid affecting bilateral relations, states have developed different ways of holding diplomatic agents to account for their misdeeds.  Ethiopia,  and many other countries, have developed their own laws to punish offences committed by their own diplomats in other countries. This ensures that diplomatic immunity does not result in impunity.

One important issue that requires special attention is the attitude and acts of state actors against foreign missions and their personnel. Interfering with diplomatic representatives is considered as an act which is deliberately designed to be provocative. Situations may also arise where some elements in a receiving state desire to subvert relations with the sending state and use this sensitive area of international law to plant seeds of distrust and animosity between otherwise friendly states. Although any such unauthorized acts could easily be explained within a country’s specific context,  the responsibility for the protection of the person and the premises of any diplomatic mission rests with the host state. When and if this happens, the purpose of diplomatic representation defeats its core purpose which is to provide bridges between states and peoples. Diplomats in such situations become a point of contention. Rather than safeguarding the interests of their state by nurturing friendly relations, they become the focus of a bilateral dialogue. To avoid any such unnecessary friction, it is imperative to abide by the concept of  diplomatic immunity. Full respect for diplomatic immunity, of course, requires cooperation between the host state, the diplomatic agents and their families. This means the host state must develop mechanisms to handle claims of abuse of diplomatic immunity in a fair and accountable way, safeguarding diplomatic relations between the states concerned. The Week in the Horn might return to this topic in another edition to address the challenges that Ethiopia's diplomats have recently encountered within the region.  

Diplomatic immunity is not a shield for abuse. It is an entitlement that serves the necessary objective of promoting normal international relations and the activity of the representatives of one state in another. Even in situations of political tension, respect for diplomatic immunity allows the states involved to handle sensitive matters in a civilized manner. At the same time for diplomats to play that privileged role, of enhancing friendly relations among states, it is imperative that they are accorded the necessary respect and protection by host states. It is particularly fitting that the United Nations General Assembly regularly considers this matter under the item: “Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives”.  This allows the Assembly to consider reports on the status, ratification, and accession to legal instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as the replies received from States on serious violations involving diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, and actions taken against offenders. With the multiplication of international and regional organizations and other actors, the category of people claiming such special protection from the effect of local laws and local enforcement agencies has multiplied. Most recently, with terrorist threats and the use of more sophisticated equipment for searching travelers, particularly those arriving by air, there have been a number of challenges to diplomatic immunity. It is perhaps time for the United Nations to take a closer look at the obligations of states to respect diplomatic immunity, at the safety and security of diplomats, and at ways to address the new and emerging threats, including the adoption of new mechanisms for monitoring and complying with the concept of diplomatic immunity.