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Continued intransigence of Somali extremists
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam clashes continued this week with fighting between their respective
militias west of Kismayo, control of which has been the aim of much
recent fighting between the two groups. Al-Shabaab is continuing
to try and assert its control of Kismayo and the region around it,
and a spokesman said it had driven off attacks by Hizbul Islam.
Last week, Al-Shabaab said it would attack any aid agencies if they
attempted to restart humanitarian operations in the region. Aid
agencies, said the Al-Shabaab spokesman, using language reminiscent
of statements by President Issayas, were working and spying for
western countries and only came to Somalia to collect information.
Meanwhile over the weekend,
Somali Foreign Minister, Ali Ahmed 'Jengali', said that Al Qaeda
fighters were now arriving in Somalia in order to attack government
bases. Addressing a press conference in Nairobi, he urged African
states to fulfill their pledges to AMISOM in order to help restore
peace and security. If peace wasn't restored, he stressed, Somalia
risked becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The Minister
said the government had been talking to some opponents but emphasized
that talking to Al-Shabaab extremists was impossible. For its part,
Hizbul Islam has recently underlined their total lack of interest
in any discussions. Hizbul Islam's chairman, Sheikh Hassan Dahir
'Aweys', said on Wednesday that Hizbul Islam would fight on until
Somalia had an Islamic government and administration. It does, of
course, have this already and what Sheikh 'Aweys' means is that
he wants an administration under the authority of Hizbul Islam,
Al-Shabaab and himself, not one under President Sheikh Sharif and
the TFG. Sheikh 'Aweys', who alleged members of the TFG were not
working for the peace and security of the country, strongly criticized
the several hundred Hizbul Islam fighters who have surrendered to
the Government in recent weeks. He also attacked the Djibouti Government
for providing facilities for training TFG forces, claiming that
Djibouti was fueling the conflicts in Somalia. He called on the
people of Djibouti to put pressure on its government to stop its
“interference”. Earlier, in Djibouti, Djibouti's Prime Minister,
Mr. Dileita Mohamed Dileita, attended a passing-out ceremony for
615 Somali soldiers at the end of a three month training course.
Another contingent for training is expected to arrive in Djibouti
shortly.
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“It's not true; it's all lies”, claims President
Issayas
Somalia's Foreign Minister,
Mr. Ali Ahmed 'Jengeli' has been speaking out about Eritrea at the
weekend, telling journalists in Nairobi that Eritrea should be punished
for threatening the security of the Horn of Africa region by supporting
Somali rebels: “Enough is enough. Eritrea has defied calls from
the international community and individual countries to play a positive
role”. He added “[It] has to take the right trail or face sanctions
which we hope the Security Council will impose soon”. The Minister
said that while the region had been trying to engage Eritrea constructively,
the Eritrean leadership had been encouraging the enemies of the
TFG by its provision of arms and logistical support to the extremist
opposition groups, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. He noted that Al
Qaeda was waging war in Somalia alongside Al-Shabaab which had appealed
to foreign fighters to come and join in the war in Somalia. The
Somali website, Garowe Online, emphasized the same point in an editorial
this week, arguing that Eritrea was playing a consistently negative
role to keep Somalia embroiled in a devastating war. Garowe Online
suggested that, “The international community should send a strong
signal to Eritrea, that fomenting war in Somalia and supporting
anti-government elements is unacceptable, since Eritrea's negative
role is contrary to international efforts to help restore national
order in Somalia.”
The problem, of course,
is that Eritrea is not prepared to accept the views of the international
community, or of anyone else. It alone has the key to correct policies.
President Issayas Afewerki continues to deny all accusations against
Eritrea saying that sanctions should not be imposed without evidence:
“If you have evidence, come up and show me”. He continues this stance
despite the known facts, including detailed evidence, and in fact,
of course, he has been shown the evidence, frequently. It includes
the depositions of opposition prisoners trained in Eritrea, eyewitness
accounts of Eritrean military trainers active in Somalia, of arms
arriving by dhow in Merka, the manifestos of plane loads of arms
flying into airstrips near Mogadishu, other numerous items in the
very detailed UN Monitoring Group reports and the (undenied) support
given to Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys', chairman of Hizbul Islam from
January 2007, culminating in flying him down to Mogadishu and supplying
him with the arms to try and seize power from the TFG in an attempted
coup together with Al-Shabaab in May this year.
President Issayas, however,
claims “all these accusations have nothing to do with the reality
on the ground”. For him, the reality is very different. He told
Reuters on Wednesday that “a network of [western] intelligence agencies
that serve special interest groups globally” have been “the cause
of all the problems we see all over the world”. They have been persecuting
Eritrea by inventing “lies, rumours and defamatory reports”. President
Issayas said he found it very perplexing why people told all these
lies, why they made up statistics and statements about Eritrea when
they “don't even know what's going on in the country”. He was equally
dismissive of the IMF whose recent mission to Eritrea found the
economy had weakened significantly in the last year. The President
said Eritrea had always been skeptical of any comments or judgements
from the IMF, adding “I personally don't take them very seriously”.
This week, Eritrea was
also highlighted by Reporters Without Borders, being named as the
worst country in the world for press freedom for the third consecutive
year. Eritrea tolerates no independent media of any kind and thirty
journalists are in prison. “The world's largest worldwide prison
for journalists” says the report, based on a detailed question survey
completed by hundreds of media figures around the world. President
Issayas's response remains exactly the same as always. There are
no facts to prove these allegations. They are all lies. Eritrea
is right; everyone else is wrong. Last month the Eritrean government
website, Shabait . com, with its usual calm certainty, said “The
Government of Eritrea is recognized in the world for its uniquely
different views and its courage in openly expressing those views.
The fact that the Eritrean government does not refrain from firmly
opposing commonly accepted but misguided perceptions is a matter
of astonishment for those quarters that are used to meekly conforming
to accepted norms. For any new idea or viewpoint, irrespective of
whether it is true or not, can at first seem frightening and unacceptable....The
Eritrean government's principles and outlook emanate from its independent
and just domestic objective and policy. As a continuation of this
domestic objective, its viewpoints on the international level are
bold and just....And since [its] principles are genuine and not
driven by ulterior motives, it is becoming clear there is no choice
but to accept and adopt such outlook.”
The problem, of course,
is that the evidence is there. President Issayas' views are indeed
“uniquely different” and his continuous refusal to accept facts
known to everyone else is a matter of astonishment. It is simply
unacceptable. Eritrea is carrying its supposed independent thinking
to dangerous levels. Its actions; pose a real threat to international
law, to peace and prosperity in Somalia and the Horn of Africa as
well as to Eritrea itself. Above all, President Issayas' actions
appear to be driven by one single aim, to try to destabilize Ethiopia.
To do this he is apparently prepared to try and destroy the best
chance for peace in Somalia for nearly twenty years, and to threaten
the peace and stability of all Eritrea's neighbours.
In a speech on the occasion
of Eritrea's Independence Day four years ago, President Issayas
spoke of the “times of domination, exploitation, adventurism and
conceit”, of unprovoked acts of conspiracy and the cultivation of
terrorism. He was referring to alleged threats to the sovereignty
of Eritrea, as always apparently the main target of super power
threats, but his words rather more accurately describe Eritrea's
own activities in recent years. Eritrea's meddling in the ongoing
conflict in central and southern Somalia is perhaps the most urgent
crisis being stoked up by President Issayas, but it is not the only
one in the sub-region. As Dr. Pham, Director of the African Project
at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, noted last
week: “In April 2008, Eritrean troops crossed the border into Djibouti
and fortified positions near Ras Doumeira on the Red Sea. Two months
later, Djibouti forces came under fire from the Eritreans.....Of
course, it should come as no surprise that Isaias Afewerki was willing
to pick a fight with Djibouti....Just a decade ago; he was just
as prepared to commence hostilities with Ethiopia... [and] the resulting
two-year war – which an international tribunal, the Ethio-Eritrea
Claims Commission ruled in a 2005 decision to have been due to Eritrea's
violation of international law “by resorting to armed force on May
12, 1998 and the immediately following days to attack and occupy
the town of Badme, then under peaceful administration” by Ethiopia
– left at least 100,000 dead and cost untold billions of dollars
in damages.”
Dr. Pham noted that Africa's
leaders had, unusually, managed to get their act together and appeal
for help to the UN Security Council, asking for sanctions against
Eritrea to stop its current “spoiling” activities in Somalia and
bring an end to the “numerous efforts to destabilize countries throughout
the Horn of Africa”. It was therefore “bitterly disappointing”,
he said, that the AU's efforts were being largely ignored by the
Security Council. The failure to act was seriously “to the detriment
of both the African states immediately bearing the brunt of the
assaults from Asmara and the broader interests of the international
community.”
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The revised figures for those in need of emergency food
assistance
On Thursday, the Government
issued revised figures for humanitarian requirements for emergency
food and non-food assistance for the period October to December.
Following the poor performance of the belg/gu rains and the consequent
continuing food insecurity earlier this year the number of potential
beneficiaries for emergency food aid rose from 4.2 million in January
to 5.3 million in May. Subsequent findings by the multi-agency livelihood
security assessment in June and July and other monitoring showed
a further increase in the numbers needing emergency assistance to
the present total of 6.2 million. About 29% of these are from the
Somali Regional State, 22% for Oromia, 17% from the Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples Region, 16% from Amhara Regional State
and 12% from Tigrai. The increase in numbers follows the delay in
the onset of the main meher rains in June and July and a mid-meher
mission to assess the impact and evaluate the necessary assistance
required. Ethiopia is suffering from drought conditions like the
rest of East Africa, and these are currently affecting more than
23 million people in seven countries.
The cost of the total
net emergency requirement for food and non-food needs for October
to December has now been assessed at US $ 175 million. The net food
requirement amounts to 159,410 tonnes, at a cost of US$121 million
with another US$8.9 million for 11 tonnes of targeted supplementary
food requirements for malnourished children and women and a further
US$45 million for non-food needs – health and nutrition, water and
sanitation, agriculture and livestock.
The food security situation
was weakened by last year's challenges and then exacerbated by the
poor performance of the belg/ganna and gu rains. Food prices, although
down significantly from the previous year, remained above the long-term
average, and as a result the 2008 nutrition emergency spilled over
into the first half of this year. The food situation was also affected
by the reduction in food aid distribution following complications
over the international assistance food chain and the global economic
crisis. Only five of six planned distribution rounds were completed
by the end of September, and with reduced ration sizes due to the
shortage of resources. Substantial funding shortfalls were accompanied
by serious logistical problems at Djibouti port, and a shortage
of trucks for overland transport. The Government managed to arrange
an additional dedicated berth in Djibouti port for relief food shipping,
and used both Port Sudan and Berbera for supplies. It purchased
another 20,000 tonnes of cereals and facilitated the provision of
trucking capacity. It also focused attention on the Outpatient Therapeutic
Programme under the National Nutrition Strategy to achieve full
woreda coverage for the programme. Overall between the periods January
to September, a total of 453,113 tonnes of relief food was despatched
to intended beneficiaries, amounting to 57% of overall requirements.
Of this some 98,000 tonnes (22%) was made available by NGOs. Following
a joint Government/Donor/WFP mission on utilization, a task force
has been set up to establish a food monitoring system and design
a capacity building programme to support it. The Somali Region posed
particular problems of food delivery, following security issues
in 2007 and transport difficulties. WFP in collaboration with the
Somali Regional Government and the Federal Government bodies developed
a new logistical set-up last year including several logistical hubs,
Jijiga being the most recent following the opening of a new transport
corridor to Berbera. This has provided for the pre-positioning of
targeted supplementary feeding and shortened the time of delivery
as well as significantly improved overall food delivery this year.
Certainly, the growth in the number needing emergency food assistance
has been a disappointment but is not entirely a surprise in this,
an El-Nino year, when drought often precedes flooding. As the UN
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction said recently “Africa
and in particular the Horn of Africa suffers more and more from
the impact of climate-induced hazards”. Oxfam calculates drought
costs Ethiopia a billion dollars a year, and in the face of climate
change, longer-term climatic projections predict drought is likely
to increase. This is one reason why a much more co-ordinated approach
to Disaster Risk Management, with all relevant actors, including
donors, cooperating to respond to vulnerability and risk, and linked
especially to climate change, would be critical. This would help
ensure all those affected by humanitarian crises get the right assistance
at the right time, and would encourage donors to assist building
the resilience of communities to problems and produce alternatives
to imported aid through investment in local and regional production,
as well as allow the WFP to consider making its emergency food programmes
contribute more to sustainable development projects in areas of
need.
Ethiopia would like to see more accurate and less alarmist reporting
of the situation, more considered reporting and significantly less
exaggeration. This is a serious challenge but there is no reason
to believe the situation will turn into “a catastrophe”, even though
more assistance may be needed. The Government has made the scope
of the challenge very clear. It detailed on several occasions what
it believes has been needed in terms of emergency food assistance.
There is no reason for exaggeration, and no reason for the BBC to
issue reports contradicting the reality on the ground or to claim
that the drought is “the result of policies designed to keep farmers
on the land” as a way to prevent large-scale unemployment. The State
minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ato Mitiku Kasa,
who yesterday launched the latest Humanitarian Requirements Document
October to December 2009 in Addis Ababa, expressed his disappointment
to state television yesterday that the BBC and some other media
outlets appeared to base their reporting more on their own interests
and objectives than on the reality. They had been listening too
much to players with their own interests, who were more interested
in appealing for more aid to over their operational costs, salaries
and expenses. The Minister also speculated that there might also
be other elements of dependency, politics and economics at work
behind such reports.
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Irresponsible reportage on the current drought
situation
Food security and food
self-sufficiency form one of the important elements of our Agriculture
Led Industrial Development Strategy. The people and government of
Ethiopia approach this agenda from two angles. The first is to address
the immediate emergency requirements. To address these requirements
it has put in place a robust monitoring and surveying mechanism
which is executed in partnership with the international community.
As a result of this exercise, there is a periodic monitoring report
which is made public to all stakeholders. This enables the government
to mobilise in advance its domestic resources as well as appeal
to the international community to fill the gap in food assistance.
This early warning and monitoring mechanism has been working effectively
and have made it possible to address emergency requirements before
the situation worsens. As a result, no life has been lost because
of drought, which manifests itself in an increasing frequent manner.
The drought, which has its genesis in global climate change, has
been impacting negatively on the agricultural potential of Ethiopia
for the last three decades. The international community came to
grips with this fundamental factor of climate change rather late
in the day. It should have been factored into the global development
programme a long time ago so that a lasting solution would be found
to the problem.
The second approach which
the people and government of Ethiopia have continued to implement
for the past ten years, is geared towards finding a lasting solution
to recurring drought through a sustainable agricultural development
strategy. The strategy focuses on strengthening agricultural infrastructure
such as small- and medium-scale irrigation, the provision of improved
agricultural implements and inputs (such as better seeds and fertilisers),
agricultural technology packages and multi-facetted extension services.
This has significantly improved agricultural productivity and extricated
several million farmers from poverty. Due to these multi-pronged
measures taken in the past, Ethiopia is able not only to manage
emergency requirements, but also to ensure a sustainable path to
food self-sufficiency.
The media coverage of the current drought in Ethiopia, as presented
by certain media outlets such as the BBC, does not put the current
situation in the context of these national endeavours. Some of the
BBC coverage is misleading at best and deeply damaging at worst.
It is very difficult to contemplate that a media outlet as big as
the BBC can be largely ignorant of this national endeavour. The
BBC programme refers repeatedly to the 1984 catastrophic situation
which, by no stretch of the imagination, is comparable to the current
situation in Ethiopia. To use the 1984 drought footage to explain
the current situation demonstrates a marked lack of respect for
the Ethiopian people and an ignorance of the negative consequences
it will have on Ethiopia’s overall endeavour to transform itself
into a democratic and poverty-free nation.
There are those who are
hoping to relaunch their professional ambition on the backs of the
1984 famine. This puts their credibility in question at best and
demonstrates a marked disregard for the welfare of many Ethiopians.
They have an obligation to the public to keep to the facts as they
stand and report accordingly, thereby ensuring their journalistic
integrity and credibility.
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Destabilization using the pen
It is not clear why some
scholars find it difficult to exercise sound judgment when they
write about the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopia in particular. It might
appear to be undiplomatic and not all that fair, but it might be
necessary not to mince words when talking about those sorts of experts:
They don’t care for the truth.
Kjetil Trenvoll is a scholar
who appears to have honed up his skills as a scribe by seeking sinister
motives for everything that the EPRDF Government has done over the
last 18 years.
His latest writing co-authored
with Lovise Aalen – The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and
Civil Rights in Ethiopia. – is an example not only of bad scholarship
but also of how much damage could potentially be caused by non-citizens
to a complex and difficult democratization process in developing
countries such as Ethiopia.
It is impossible to deny that the 2005 election in Ethiopia, while
it began with full of promises and with all the indications of being
able to be historic, nonetheless ended up further polarizing Ethiopian
society and failing to fulfill the promises that had appeared within
easy reach until polling day.
Reasonable people could
disagree on what weight should be given to what factor/factors as
major causes for the violence that marred the post election period.
The authors of this article themselves admit that the Government
had no need to rig the election, arguing that it was structurally
determined that the EPRDF would win. Obviously, one of the major
reasons for the post-election violence was, to put it mildly, the
unconstitutional behavior of the opposition, including their refusal
to take the seats in parliament that they had won. It is impossible
to deny that the opposition did, again putting it mildly, try to
make it impossible for the Government to govern and for the results
of the election to be implemented. But Alaen & Trenvoll are
absolutely and mind bogglingly mum on this. Nor do they utter even
a word on whether election monitors might have played some role
– at least a tiny bit – in complicating the post-election period
and even in contributing to the violence. This neglect is not perhaps
without reason, rooted in the fundamental assumptions of the writers
about who is and who is not committed to the democratization of
Ethiopia. The EPRDF cannot, by definition, in their view, be inclined
to be democratic. Accordingly, it cannot be given credit for whatever
positive aspect the pre-polling period of the 2005 election might
have had. Why? Because, for the ruling party “The elections were
… seen as tools not for enhancing democracy in Ethiopia, but for
consolidating EPRDF’s power.” Under this circumstances, it should
not be too surprising if the authors saw no wrong if election monitors
had in fact violated their code of conduct and had behaved in a
dangerously intrusive manner in an election which had a huge meaning
for the democratic destiny of the country. If the ruling party is
defined from the outset as only interested in “consolidating” its
power, it might appear legitimate for non-citizens, in the interest
of democracy, to act as a countervailing force. The authors perhaps
inadvertently betray this hubristic mentality when they describe
in a rather distorted and pessimistic manner the post-election situation
in Ethiopia. The following is what they underline with little shame
and democratic pretence:
The only constituency
left in Ethiopia which may have political leeway to work
as checks-and-balances towards the government’s unaccountable
exercise of power is the international donor assistance
group (DAG), which actively engaged in the 2005 electoral
process.
Then the authors proceed
to argue that even donors have subsequently been silenced. The example
given for the intimidation of donors into silence is the hiccup
that Norway and Ethiopia had in their diplomatic relations. But
the facts relating to the case are presented in such a distorted
and self-serving manner that the renditions have nothing to do with
the truth. Those privy to the case – both from the side of Norway
and Ethiopia – know this to be the truth because they know that
relations between the two sides were normalized in a civilized manner
and in way that highlighted the decency of the Norwegian people
and their democratic culture. And that is the truth about that unfortunate
episode in total dismissal of which the authors build a case for
how the EPRDF Government has obliterated all opposition, including,
paradoxically, in their view, foreign opposition. But how in the
world can foreigners be regarded to have the role as an opposition
in Ethiopian domestic politics? Perhaps it is the slip of the pen
and they don’t mean what they say, but this is what they say:
By suppressing
criticism from the donor assistance group, the Ethiopian
Government has managed to silence or contain all opposition.
The only opposition avenue remaining open appears to be
that of armed struggle. Developments in 2008 seemed to
indicate that this is a possibility that may be pursued
through new organizational frameworks and platforms.
The only example they
adduce for this outrageous conclusion cum incitement to violence
is the behavior one erratic politician from among those prominent
opposition politicians of the 2005 elections. Otherwise, as can
empirically be verified what we see in Ethiopia currently is dialogue
between the ruling party and the opposition – groups that are in
no way entirely united within themselves – on ways and means of
ensuring a fair, free and peaceful election.
At the risk of being called
unfair, the temptation about being frank can hardly be resisted
– the authors appear to be much closer in their sentiments to the
violent Ethiopian opposition than to those who seem to have opted
for a peaceful democratic transformation of Ethiopia. It is therefore
impossible to be surprised by their conclusion:
Interviews conducted
outside Ethiopia with other opposition leaders during
2008 corroborated the impression that initiatives to coordinate
a broader armed struggle against the EPRDE regime may
be under way.
No doubt, Ethiopia has
challenges, including from those that see a democratizing Ethiopia
as a threat, working in tandem with extremist forces in the Horn
of Africa. These are challenges also faced by other countries of
the region. These countries have no problem identifying the sources
of the danger to the peace, stability and democratization of the
Horn of Africa. Nor does the entire Africa have any illusions about
this. All these countries also know what role Ethiopia plays currently
in the region and in Africa as a whole and the staying power of
the country. Sadly, the authors fail to see all this.
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Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy
Two weeks ago, looking
at foreign policy challenges in the coming year, we emphasized that
one of the difficulties facing Ethiopia (and indeed other countries
in the region and in Africa) is one of perception, of how we are
perceived by others and of how such views are reached. Together
this makes up a central element of public diplomacy. In part, of
course, the results may be a reflection of our own failures to inform
others sufficiently clearly of the aims and objectives of our policy
and of our diplomacy, and, equally, important, of our impressive
achievements in the democratization of society and in economic and
social development which together have completely changed the trajectory
of development in Ethiopia. In the absence of such information,
others for political reasons can and will fill the gap with outdated
and inaccurate images, portraying Ethiopia as mired in war, conflict,
and famine. As we have discovered it is difficult to change these
perceptions, even when there is goodwill which is in any case often
unfortunately lacking. It is very clear that many media outlets
and commentators make little effort to discover the realities of
policy and government actions, being all-too-often content to repeat
existing mantras and statements, however improbable or outlandish,
even when these have been comprehensively challenged and corrected.
We have to say elements of the international media and of the advocacy
industry are particularly prone to this.
Ethiopia's overall foreign
policy goals are very clear, centered as they are on the acknowledged
need, indeed the necessity for peace and stability in our sub-region
and in Africa, without which development and the defeat of poverty
cannot succeed. Ethiopia is, of course, the current chair of IGAD,
and the African Union has its headquarters in Addis Ababa. At the
same time foreign and domestic policy goals and aims are becoming
more interdependent, directly and indirectly, with globalization
and the expansion of technological change making this inevitable.
Increased global links and international engagement bring the increased
need to explain and engage with the public here and abroad, both
Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian. There is an obvious need to ensure
our aims and intentions, our policies and actions, really are clear
and intelligible. We also need to understand those of others. Global
issues, like climate change, extremism, terrorism, affect us all,
if in widely different ways, but they can certainly be interpreted
differently. This is where understanding, explanations and indeed
dialogue becomes paramount. We may need to search out the motivations
of others, but they also must look at our interests and policies.
The process of achieving development of solutions to problems requires
genuine engagement by all parties.
Similarly, there is a
very real necessity for the production of accurate and detailed
information and for serious and realistic efforts at analysis based
on this. The point has been underlined in recent years by the growth
of a pattern of politically driven inaccuracy, based on widespread
dissimulation, even outright falsehood, and buttressed by a clear
failure to investigate allegations, either from laziness or a refusal
to spoil a “good story”. Exaggeration, inflation and hyperbole are
used to make political points at the expense of fact. Foreign and
private media collect their information from the propaganda of opposition
sources committed to violence and extremism. They fail to make the
effort to investigate the reality, even to try to question their
sources or even attempt to provide any effort at balance. This rapidly
turns what should be a process of mutual discussion and involvement
into a one-way street based on unacceptable, often false, information.
There is always a need for media outlets, human rights and advocacy
bodies to provide the balanced output necessary for competent analysis.
Nobody doubts the need to listen to informed and relevant criticism,
but the corollary is that it must be both accurate and pertinent.
Nations, like personalities,
acquire reputations whether deserved or not. These then become difficult
to change. Ethiopia is still frequently associated with famine,
war and human rights abuse, images linked to the murderous regime
of Mengistu and the Derg ousted nearly twenty years ago. These are
images that no longer have any validity, but if the word drought
is mentioned, or a humanitarian problem appears, it almost automatic
for any international media outlet to refer back to the famine of
twenty-five years ago; and this is done at the expense of today's
reality. In this they may be encouraged by opposition elements,
both inside and outside Ethiopia, which are quite prepared to use
such outdated images for their own political purposes. In turn they
are frequently encouraged to do this for “the sake of the story”
by some international journalists who know no better and care less.
Some scholars are no better as the earlier item in this edition
of the Week in the Horn has highlighted when reviewing the piece
by Alaen & Trenvoll.
The frequent debates and
discussions on African topics on the websites of western think-tanks
or in western capitals often suffer both in general and in particular
from a severe lack of accurate information from the region in question.
Much of what reaches the international community in Europe and the
US from Somalia, for example, is refracted through the distortions
of media reporting from Nairobi, based on Somali opposition sources,
many linked to extremist groups. Inevitably, given the failure of
alternative information flows, this leads to a failure to understand
the political realities on the ground, or regional concerns. This
has been especially noticeable in comments on the situation in Somalia
over the last couple of years, persistently exaggerating opposition
strength, especially that of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, marginalizing
the TFG and ignoring the role of AMISOM. On the wider geopolitical
level, the result has been a surprising disinterest in the role
of Eritrea in Somalia and in the region and a concomitant exaggeration
about Ethiopia's aims and intentions, or about the dangers of piracy
at the expense of terrorism.
Images, it must be noted,
are in fact remarkably difficult to change. It can take decades
and the efforts to do so must be properly informed by the provision
of a truthful and clear account with accurate facts and figures
and precise details of aims and achievements. Even then it still
remains difficult to get people to read such information. It also
requires the building up and maintenance of networks of contacts
to allow for collective action, internally and externally, to develop
trust and provide for a genuine exchange of views. Assumptions on
all sides need to be considered and tested, and where necessary
corrected. This comes back to the necessity of genuine dialogue
at every level to complement the strategic objectives of government,
as well as the ability to provide an open and listening mind, and
for accurate information. It is a process that must emphasize an
understanding of national interest, of reason and a preparedness
to listen and negotiate. This is what provides the basis for any
evidence-based analysis as nothing else can.
Inevitably Ethiopia's
own interest is on accurate reporting on and about the Horn of Africa,
but any strictures certainly apply very much more widely. Far too
much journalism fails the test of intellectual honesty. Journalists,
academic commentators and analysts so very often write about matters
of which they are simply ignorant, or have failed to consult reliable
sources or indeed any sources at all. The absence of real knowledge
is rapidly filled by the stereotypes on file in old databases, misrepresentations,
misleading and inaccurate claims and simplistic generalizations,
perpetuating outdated fiction. This is often, almost usually, coupled
with a refusal to make corrections or even to admit to errors. Today,
once something gets onto the electronic database of a newspaper
or a media outlet, it often remains unchallenged and unchallengeable.
Indeed, it is extraordinarily difficult to persuade media outlets
to alter items on their database. As a result, errors perpetuate
and continue to gain undeserved credence.
All this is coupled with
a related assumption among media outlets that journalists, however
raw or untrained, know more than genuine academic experts, and indeed
more than the inhabitants of the country concerned. It is, of course,
true they do know more about one thing – what an editor wants and
that is “bad news”. In the US and Europe, Africa is still seen as
a “problem”, and no reports are expected to contradict this basic
premise. Nor do they usually do so. Media correspondents may in
Africa may be highly professional working journalists, but their
view of Africa often owes far more to facile impressions and opinions
formed long ago or far away. Far from helping to produce solutions
for problems, reports often contribute to the difficulties, perpetuating
the errors of the past. The result is that journalistic analyses,
advocacy reports and even academic papers add far more to the lack
of awareness and understanding about Africa and its problems rather
than the opposite. This, of course, is no excuse for our own failures
to respond sufficiently to the challenges posed by the need for
the provision of accurate and detailed information.
Ethiopia is committed
to regional and continental development through IGAD and the AU,
and we believe we, and Africa, have a great deal to offer in terms
of genuine exchange across political and cultural barriers, a process
that can build the long-term mutual trust to underpin real international
relations. Mutual trust and mutual benefits must be the vital factors
to build and maintain links between, and within, states linking
opinion-makers and agents, leaders of change and development. This
allows for the regulated activities of INGOs and NGOs and others
to complement, not undermine, the strategic objectives of government.
This doesn't negate different perceptions of government or evaluations
of government. It does emphasize the need for an open and listening
mind, to allow for credible and constructive links between stakeholders
who are media-neutral.
The briefest look at recent
events in the Horn of Africa makes clear that Ethiopia is a 'status
quo' power, and has always been. In other words it operates on the
basis of the situation as it is, and has been. Its interests are
in resolving the struggle against poverty and the building of a
democratic society. It is committed to the achievement of peace,
security, stability and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa,
a project that needs political will, cooperation and commitment.
Ethiopia has no irredentist claims nor any ambition for aggrandizement
against Eritrea or Somalia as its actions over the last two decades
demonstrate. Last week, the UN Resident Coordinator in Ethiopia,
Mr. Fidele Sarassoro, noted Ethiopia's role in mediating regional
conflicts and its troop contributions to UN peace keeping: its diplomatic
work are widely recognized as positive and constructive, even indispensable,
and its efforts in Somalia and Sudan underline its agenda for the
promotion of peace and stability, the foundation for investment
and sustainable development. Assertions to the contrary simply fly
in the face of all known facts. It was, after all, this government
which encouraged and accepted the independence of Eritrea in 1993,
and which has resolutely refused to respond to continuous provocation
from Eritrea. At the same time, Ethiopians have always discharged
their patriotic duties in defending their country, but as Prime
Minister Meles has underlined again and again, Ethiopia will never
start any conflict with anyone. This contrasts sharply with Eritrea,
which continues with its policy of “creating havoc” in the Horn
of Africa, which has launched aggressive conflicts against Sudan,
Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia, and is still acting as 'spoiler' in
Somalia, is marked. There has been no change in these characteristics,
and the regime in Asmara refuses to make any effort to normalize
relations. It has indeed continued its aggressive activities in
Somalia and Djibouti in deliberate and open defiance of the United
Nations Security Council.
Public diplomacy emphasizes
human intelligence, the importance of accurate advocacy, the strategic
use of the media, of contacts and links with state and non-state
actors alike. It underlines the importance of dialogue, the understanding
of national interests, of reason and the rule of law, the ability
to listen and negotiate as required – creating shared solutions
to shared problems and implementing them through joint, or separate,
actions as required. Mutual trust for mutual benefit. It all adds
up to providing a realistic response to the blurring of international
and domestic issues, and the rise of transnational problems including
climate change, terrorism, and the increasingly obvious links between
development and security.
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