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A Week in the Horn 17.10.2008 |
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The State Minister noted that there had been a lot of talk as to whether this Nairobi meeting was contradictory or complementary to the Djibouti process bringing the TFG and opposition together. He emphasized that the IGAD ministers had made it absolutely clear that they had no interest to undercut the Djibouti process held under UN auspices, but rather to complement the activities of Mr. Ould-Abdullah. Mr. Ould-Abdullah’s office announced yesterday that the UN and the World Bank are organizing an international donor’s conference for Somalia, to take place early in 2009 in Stockholm to raise resources for a one year recovery program. One of the issues raised about the Nairobi meeting was whether or not the opposition would be attending. The State Minister said this had not yet been discussed but he thought it could not be ruled out. He noted that the Djibouti talks between the TFG and the opposition were on-going. So far, they had led to the establishment of joint committees and the process was continuing. A mixed delegation from the High Level Political and Joint Security Committees this week attended a seminar in Cape Town on political and security affairs. Surprisingly, Mr. Ould-Abdallah has now announced that these committees will be holding their third round of talks in Djibouti on October 25 and 26. As all the participants would be expected in Nairobi, it appears UNPOS has made a mistake. It makes no sense for the two meetings to be held back -to-back in different places. No doubt the committee meetings are important but they could certainly take place after Nairobi without difficulty, and keeping Djibouti as a venue would be a sensible course of action. A postponement would also allow for the possibility that Nairobi might include further opportunities for TFG/Opposition talks, though in what form or under what modalities would have to be discussed. The Ethiopian State Minister made clear that the Nairobi meeting would have nothing to do with any extension of the Transitional Charter whatever suppositions might have been made. Any amendments to the Charter could only be made by consensus between the TFG and the opposition. Meanwhile, last weekend and early this week another Burundi battalion of 850 troops for AMISOM finally arrived in Mogadishu. They flew in from Bujumbura to join the other Burundi battalion which has been deployed in southern Mogadishu. This brings the number of Burundi troops to 1,700, and raises the AMISOM force to just over 3,400. This increase in the numbers of AMISOM forces could have led to a real improvement in the security situation but political difficulties have meant these opportunities have not been properly taken. Some two weeks ago Al-Shabaab fighters were driven out of the Bakara market by the local population though latest information suggests some might now be returning. Retreating from there to Medina district, Al-Shabaab units were also ordered out by a population tired of Al-Shabaab excesses and maltreatment of the civilian population. Similarly, last month, an attempt by Yusuf ‘Indhe Adde’, a leading member of the extremist elements, to attack a police station in Karan district of Mogadishu was driven off with heavy casualties, by local militia forces and the local population. When Al-Shabaab attempted to close Mogadishu airport last month, there was strong popular opposition. Within a week or two, when it was obvious that Al-Shabaab was unable to make good its threat and that almost all Mogadishu elders and businessmen were against it, an Al-Shabaab spokesman unconvincingly announced they were thinking again about the idea for humanitarian reasons. It is on the basis of these activities that political progress might have been expected. Unfortunately the TFG has continued to remain paralyzed. It is this which explains why the Nairobi meeting is so critical.
The Prime Minister also referred to Eritrea and the border issue. He noted that the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE, had concluded its withdrawal and the Secretary General was no more expected to deliver periodic reports to the Security Council on the border impasse between the two countries. Ethiopia, he said, had been firm on the need for dialogue and a peaceful solution but that had gone unheeded by the other side. Prime Minister Meles said Ethiopia is of the opinion that Eritrea will make no shift in its position in the foreseeable future, and if these conditions remain unchanged, he said, the status quo will prevail. This could continue for the next few years. “We feel the predicament of the people living in the border areas. We would like to have peace, but the prevailing condition is the second alternative.” The Prime Minister Meles also reiterated plans to reduce the government’s budget deficit and cut on the supply of money in circulation along with efforts to boost production to generate the hard currency needed to keep up the level of imports to increase development. Slackening off the current economic growth would, he said, not help tackle inflation. The Government has now transferred the previous subsidy on oil to food grains. This is because it felt that food was the priority for the lowest income groups of society. Ethiopia, he said, would strive vigorously to implement policies most valuable for improving people’s lives and lift out of poverty those suffering from severe food shortage. In reference to the global economic situation, the Prime Minister noted that since Ethiopia had not liberalized its financial sector, it had not been directly affected. Otherwise, indeed, the results would have been devastating. He said some of the major differences with Ethiopia’s partners, especially financial institutions, were rooted in this refusal to liberalize the economy. “We will continue to stick to that position”, he added. Of course, this did not mean Ethiopia would be immune if the situation continues. Its economy would be affected by lack of investment and markets for its export goods. Again, however, this ought not to be of major significance since Ethiopia’s overall economy still remains so small. Probably for the first time in parliamentary discussions on Somalia, Eritrea and on other matters, there appears to have been a unanimity of views, between government and opposition. The voting on the various motions mainly focused on procedural matters and did not reflect the spirit of parliamentary agreement on the substance of these issues. This is an encouraging development and one that should be nurtured. This sort of mutual understanding between government and opposition is bound to contribute to the development of a political culture of a loyal opposition which is of critical importance in the deepening of democracy.
Discussions also covered regional and global economic issues. On regional issues, the focus was on the ongoing negotiations about the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), while on global issues the focus was on the unfolding international financial crisis. There was agreement on the importance on striking the right balance in the EPA negotiations, between on the one hand the drive towards trade liberalization and, on the other, the need to ensure the developmental impact of the EPA agreement was not neglected. Both sides expressed their grave concern over the uncertainty that the global financial crisis posed, and hailed ongoing efforts to stabilize the system through coordinated action. They called for such action to be strengthened.
The NBI has two sub-programs. One is the Shared Vision Program (SVP), the other a Subsidiary Action Program (SAP). The SVP is Nile basin-wide grant funded program involving collaborative action, exchange of experience, and trust and capacity building. The other sub-program, the SAP, aims to realize multi-country ‘win-win’ investment projects aiming at economic growth, poverty reduction and reversal of environmental degradation. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan make up the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP), while Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda participate in the Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). ENSAP's Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) is headquartered in Addis Ababa; the NELSAP in Kigali. The ENSAP implementing mechanisms include the Eastern Nile Council of Ministers (ENCOM) as the political decision-making body, assisted by the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program Team (ENSAPT) made up of three professionals from each country. ENSAP has the overall goal of developing the water resources of the Eastern Nile in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all. The ENSAP meeting in Cairo considered progress made in implementation of earlier decisions. ENTRO's management gave detailed presentations on the status of programs and projects in the Eastern Nile region. The ministers heard reports on the work plan and budget and agreed a budget of over $10 million for ENTRO. They looked at the progress made in implementation of ENTRO’s strategic plans and at financial and administrative matters, including staff and management turnover. The meeting adopted decisions to consolidate ENSAP's achievements, among them the processing of studies on various projects and programs, and on the modalities to enrich these studies. Meanwhile in Entebbe, the Nile Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) provided a general overview of the NBI's Mid-Year Progress, Institutional Change and Road Map, and at other issues connected with the sustainability of the Nile Basin. The TAC endorsed the objective and scope of study for the institutional design of the Nile Basin Initiative, and in future meetings it is expected to examine the studies now being carried out and chart the way for the future of institutional cooperation on the Nile. It should be noted that representatives of the World Bank also attended the meetings and made presentations on the support the World Bank provides for the NBI. While NBI investment projects now readied for implementation can be expected to yield tangible results, negotiations on the Comprehensive Framework Agreement have, however, yet to be finalized.
Other important legal instruments include the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which is designed to pave the way for meaningful transformation in Africa by institutionalizing democratic governance within member states of the African Union. Among other things this has codified what constitutes unconstitutional changes of Governments. There is also the Algiers Decision AHG (XXXV) of July 1999 and the Lome Declaration of the following year, as well as the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union gives the council the responsibility for dealing with unconstitutional changes of government as well as addressing peace and security matters. It was according to this that under the chairmanship of Ethiopia last month, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the ministerial level meeting in New York discussed the new issue of the problems in Mauritania following the military takeover there in August. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the Peace and Security Council condemned the unconstitutional change of government in Mauritania, and demanded a return to constitutional order. It warned that if the deposed president was not restored by 6 October the coup makers and their supporters could risk sanctions. Earlier the AU had suspended Mauritania from the organization, while the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr. Jean Ping, visited Nouakchott at the end of August to urge General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz to restore constitutional order and democracy and release the ousted president and prime minister. The PSC itself in addition to firmly stressing the unacceptability of unconstitutional changes of government, and protecting the integrity of the various instruments of the AU, also welcomed the consultative coordination meetings initiated by the AU Commission with the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the International Organization of La Francophonie, to help find a solution to the political crisis in Mauritania. In fact, the PSC’s communiqué strongly emphasized the double track approach of the PSC. Its interest in combining political and legal methods to find a pragmatic and consultative solution to the problem in Mauritania is very apparent. On the one hand the text of the communiqué demonstrates Africa's resolve not to compromise its principles and legal instruments. On the other, it underlines the need for international actors, including those not party to the various instruments of the AU, to work together to influence the situation for the better. This is indeed a clear example of the wisdom of conflict resolution and the dilemma surrounding political stability and democratic governance in Africa. Africa has, in fact, made significant headway in terms of resolving most of the conflicts in the continent, though some, particularly in the region of the Horn of Africa, continue to be intractable despite Africa's best efforts. However, despite the commendably positive story coming out of Africa, the challenges ahead and the fragile nature of state systems and institutions, should not be understated. Democratization in many African countries is being undertaken under conditions of extreme poverty and in the absence of any democratic political culture. Poverty and democracy do not make a good mix. This does not mean to suggest that democracy should wait until poverty is overcome, but it does highlight the seriousness of the challenges both pose. This is the basis of the AU position on democratic government and unconstitutional changes of government. The difficulty of reconciling strict adherence to AU principles, and sustaining democracy, with stability is, however, demonstrated by the difficulty some African states have had in sticking to AU principles on this matter. While it is always necessary to be pragmatic and non-dogmatic on these issues (all the more so given the problems referred to earlier), Ethiopia believes it is critical that African states do remain committed to the decisions taken at Lome, based on the Constitutive Act of the AU, to reject unconstitutional changes of government. This is in the interests of both deepening democracy in Africa and of protecting the credibility of the African Union.
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