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Time
for the UN Security Council to listen to Africa, and to act
The
headline to the UN's own report on the Security Council meeting
on Somali last week said it all: “Many challenges still
needing international attention”. High among them is the
issue of sanctions to deal with “spoilers” as requested
by the regional body, IGAD, and the African Union, as long ago
as May. Despite the wealth of detailed evidence available, from
the Somali Government and from the UN's own Monitoring Group,
and the highly public continued activities of the main “spoiler”,
Eritrea, the Security Council still seems unable to make up
its collective mind.
In
the briefings to the Council, the Secretary-General did not
actually name Eritrea though he made clear the essential need
to stabilize the security situation in Mogadishu and for the
international community to redouble its support and rally behind
the TFG,a government which Eritrea has made quite clear it wants
to see removed. The UN Under-Secretary for Political Affairs,
Lynn Pascoe, emphasized the importance of the Djibouti Agreement
as the structure which provided a path for the Government to
follow. Mr. Pascoe told the meeting that the Government has
overcome repeated attacks by foreign-funded and heavily armed
groups. These, of course, included the attempted coup by the
Eritrean-supported Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab in May. Mr. Pascoe
did not refer to Eritrea by name but he noted that targeted
sanctions could be an effective way to deal with “spoilers”
and would allow for a flexible approach.
Some
of the other speakers at the Council meeting were less circumspect.
The Permanent Representative of the UK, expressed concern over
reports that Eritrea had provided support to armed opposition
groups in Somalia and made it clear the UK was prepared to support
the AU's request for sanctions against Eritrea.. The US condemned
continued military offensives against the TFG , described the
issue of “outside actors” as serious. It identified
Eritrean actions as serious and said it was time for the international
community to consider Eritrea's destabilizing effect on the
region. Bourkino Faso and Uganda called for action against “spoilers”.
Mexico, the chair of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia, appealed
to the international community to support the Monitoring Group
in implementing its mandate. The latest report of the Monitoring
Group will be considered by the Sanctions Committee later this
month. Mexico said implementation of sanctions should be consistent
with the approach adopted in the sub-region. Russia condemned
supporters of terrorism and called on regional states to prevent
the flow of foreign mercenaries into Somalia. China condemned
recent attacks on the Government and said that the UN should
not wait passively for conditions to change but should play
a greater role. Other members such as Austria also made constructive
contributions in this important debate by the Security Council.
Eritrea,
predictably, denied everything, continuing apparently to believe
that repeated denials can convince despite the detailed evidence
of arms supplies to Hizbul Islam and open support for Sheikh
Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' and Al-Shabaab which led to the AU's request
to the UN for sanctions. It is the same approach adopted by
Eritrea over its invasion of Djibouti last year, claiming that
any and all evidence against it had been fabricated. Eritrean
Information Minister, Ali Abdu, told Reuters that “the
accusations have no bearing whatsoever with the facts. They
are completely baseless”. He then suggested that Britain
had supported sanctions for “ulterior political motives”
and its action was “unacceptable and illegal”. In
a bid to try and head off sanctions, Eritrea's Foreign Minister
has been criss-crossing the Middle East and Europe apparently
suggesting to all his interlocutors that they each should convene
a peace conference on Somalia. The intention is to appear to
be pro-peace. This would appear more plausible if Eritrea had
not made every effort to scuttle the successful Djibouti peace
and reconciliation process last year by refusing to let Somali
politicians in Asmara attend. Eritrea's open support for Al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam makes Eritrea’s recent attempts at the
diplomatic front nothing but crude deception. The two organizations
have made it very clear they will only talk to those who agree
with them and have refused to deal with any moderate elements
or with the TFG. It is in fact obvious that the Eritrean suggestion
is not intended to be taken seriously. It is no more than a
last desperate attempt to delay Security Council action against
Eritrea.
As
US analyst Dr. Peter Pham noted in a column yesterday (“Eritrea:
Spoiler Exacerbates Crisis in the Horn of Africa and Beyond”)
it is extremely frustrating on one of the rare occasions when
Africa has managed to act together, as they did in calling for
sanctions against Eritrea, that its efforts have been largely
ignored by the UN Security Council, “to the detriment
of both the African states immediately bearing the brunt of
the assaults from Asmara and the broader security interests
of the international community.” Dr. Pham rehearsed the
evidence against Eritrea in detail, adding that while deliveries
of arms and ammunition by small boats originating in Eritrea
continue fairly regularly “a far greater proportion of
Eritrean assistance...now takes the form of contributions in
cash or kind.” Cash is made available from an Eritrean
embassy account in a nearby country or hand-carried from Asmara
by courier. It may then, he said, be sent via Western Union
or hawala agencies to Somalia. The cash may be handed to sympathetic
businessmen who use it to buy food, clothes or electronic goods,
which are then exported to Somalia and sold to finance the “armed
struggle”. Dr. Pham adds that the UN Monitoring Group
believes Eritrea's arms embargo violations take place with the
knowledge and authorization of senior officials in the Eritrean
Government or the ruling PFDJ, and that operational responsibility
lies with Eritrean intelligence services. Dr. Pham concludes
by arguing that President Issayas believes “he [can] stoke
the fires of Islamic extremism and yet maintain control of the
flames, which he [hopes] to direct at his longtime Ethiopian
rival.” He adds : “Before the entire neighborhood
and areas beyond are consumed in the conflagration unleashed
by the increasingly erratic Eritrean despot, the international
community needs to demonstrate in no uncertain terms that his
dangerous gamble is a sure loser.” It is hard to disagree.
It
is indeed true, as the UN suggested, that many challenges still
need international attention in Somalia. One of these is Africa's
request for action against “spoilers” in Somalia
and Eritrea. There is no doubt that this would be one simple
but immensely valuable way to assist the resolution of some
of the problems of the TFG. There is really no further reason
for the Security Council to fail to act.
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Somalia's
Joint Security Committee holds its third meeting
The
third meeting of the Joint Security Committee took place on
Monday, meeting in Nairobi for the benefit of the international
community members attending. The Joint Security Committee was
set up under the Djibouti Agreement to strengthen the security
capacity of the government. Its members include senior representatives
of the TFG security institutions and AMISOM officers as well
as representatives of the AU, the UN and the international community
including the EU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, Norway and
the US. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah told participants that
the security forces needed to be better organized and strengthened:
“ What has been achieved since the May 7th attempted coup
is great, but more needs to be done.” He was referring
to the failure of the extremist, Eritrean- backed, attempt by
Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' and his Hizbul Islam coalition and
Al-Shahaab to seize power in Mogadishu. Mr. Ould-Abdullah told
the meeting to continue their commitment to dialogue and to
working together closely to achieve peace and stability. He
said the international delegates were there to help, not to
study or delay contributions to assist. He urged the international
community to remain focused on key priorities including security,
humanitarian assistance and human rights as well as development.
Mr. Ould-Abdallah thanked the committee members for their dedication,
singling out the AMISOM force commander and his deputy: “The
courage of the AMISOM troops and their heroic conduct will never
be fully appreciated at their true value”, he said.
Meanwhile,
the conflict between the two terror organizations operating
in Somalia, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab continued to unfold
this week. Their disagreement doesn't, of course, stem from
any difference in ideology or any dispute over the means to
be pursued to attain their common objective. They share a similar
objective, which goes beyond Somalia and the region, seeking
to propagate an extremist Jihadist ideology through the use
of violence against innocent civilians. Both have pledged allegiance
to Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, as evidenced yet again
through their pronouncements after the horrific suicide car
attacks of last month against AMISOM. Both have recruited hardcore
foreign fighters bent on deploying the most extreme methods
to pursue their agenda.
Al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam emerged from the ruins of the Islamic Courts
Union. Al-Shabaab was originally the youth wing of the ICU with
its leaders known to have received training in Afghanistan for
the explicit purpose of extending Al Qaeda's war to Somalia
and the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab is the better organized and
more cohesive, both militarily and logistically. Hizbul Islam
was created in early 2009 under the auspices of Eritrea where
Hizbul Islam leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' resided between
January 2007 and April 2009. It is a loose grouping of four
distinct Islamist and clan-based organizations and includes
a number of foreign fighters. The fighting in Kismayo between
Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab has nothing to do with ideological
differences. It is a conflict over ownership of the land and
resources available in Kismayo, a conflict over control. This
explains the reports this week that some fighters from Hizbul
Islam have abandoned their organization and joined the Transitional
Federal Government. But make no mistake. This is not any sort
of indication that Hizbul Islam is more moderate. It just means
that it is less effectively organized.
Al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam do not just pose a threat to Somalia and the
Horn of Africa. They are also a source of security concern for
the rest of the international community as exemplified last
week in a US Senate hearing to consider the evolving terrorist
threat inside the United States. The Washington Post revealed
that the FBI is investigating whether any American of Somali
origin took part in the suicide bomb attacks of 17 September
which killed 21 AMISOM peace keepers. In a written testimony
to the hearing, FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III, said "the
role of returning foreign fighters to the United States changes
the nature of the threat to the homeland". He said that
while Al Qaeda was under more pressure than any time since 2001,
the threat from affiliated groups such as Al-Shabaab was growing.
This is certainly no time for any misguided or wishful thinking
about what can only be described as two organizations devoted
to extremist, terrorist action.
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An IGAD Ministerial meeting to be
held in Kampala
IGAD
member states have decided to hold a Ministerial meeting to
discuss the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan later this
month. It has been scheduled for October 21 and will take place
in Kampala the day before the start of the African Union Special
Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons.
It is expected all IGAD member states will attend. The aim of
IGAD's Ministerial Meeting is to discuss the implementation
of the CPA and more specifically look at ways and means to strengthen
mutual confidence between the parties, between the National
Government in Khartoum and the Government of South Sudan. In
recent months, a number of concerns have arisen over the implementation
of the CPA and it has become apparent that the timetable has
slipped badly. The National Census was supposed to have been
held by July 2007. It was conducted in 2008 and the results
were only released earlier this year, and were promptly rejected
by the Government of South Sudan. The census is a necessary
pre-condition of the elections supposed to have been held in
2008, then postponed to July 2009, and still not held. The Referendum
Bill to govern the process by which South Sudan will exercise
the right to self-determination under the CPA should have been
enacted by July 2008. It hasn't yet been enacted. Other issues
have also contributed to the growing concern about the prospect
of peace in Sudan unless the current trend is corrected. It
is generally agreed there is no alternative to the CPA and if
it is to work, it must be fully implemented by both signatories,
and fully supported by the international community. IGAD states
are deeply involved in the whole CPA process, and any threat
to the CPA is a threat to all of IGAD and to peace and security
in the sub-region. IGAD member states have decided to organize
this ministerial meeting with a view to assist in ensuring successful
implementation of the CPA and to help maintain the peace process
on the right track.
*****
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AU/EU Consultative Meeting in Addis
Ababa
The
Second Joint Consultative Meeting of the AU Peace and Security
Council and the EU Political And Security Committee took place
in Addis Ababa on Monday at AU Headquarters. The meeting took
place in the overall context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy
and the Joint Partnership on Peace and Security. Ambassador
Nkozi Yoyo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria and current
chair of the AU Peace and Security Council, and Ambassador Olof
Skoog of Sweden, which currently holds the EU Presidency and
chairs the EU Political and Security Committee, co-chaired the
meeting in which the two sides agreed to work together on regional
peace-making efforts in Africa. On Somalia, the two sides agreed
to renewed co-operation over AMISOM as well as improved support
for the TFG as well as making further efforts to address the
humanitarian situation in Somalia. Their final communique noted
the need for a comprehensive approach to include an inclusive
dialogue within the framework of the Djibouti process as well
as co-operation on anti-piracy efforts, and the necessity to
address the issue of the sources of supply to the opposition
to the TFG. On Sudan, the AU and the EU agreed to promote peace,
reconciliation and justice. They welcomed the renewed AU efforts
in Sudan and the work of the AU's High Level Panel for Darfur.
Its report will be presented to the AU's Peace and Security
Council at the special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally
Displaced Persons, in Kampala later this month. The two parties
agreed to support the CPA and the aim of free and fair elections
in 2010 and the referendum in 2011. More generally, the AU and
the EU reiterated their concern about what is seen as a growing
phenomenon of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.
They also agreed to explore more ways to work together in the
context of different international contact groups and the legal
framework of the Lome Declaration and the Cotonou Agreement.
Meanwhile,
it was announced this week at a workshop in Kampala that the
process of formulation of the East African Stand-by Brigade
would be complete next month, and by 2010 the force, one of
the five brigades for Africa, would be ready for operation.
The brigade will have 7,000 military personnel and a civilian
component of 360 for technical and decision-making matters.
The countries contributing to EASBRIG are Burundi, Comoros,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania and Uganda. The workshop in Kampala has been focusing
on the role of defense forces, regional and international co-operation,
and peace support operations as well as areas of conflict management
and conflicts over natural resources and borders. It aims to
harmonize the training curriculum for military forces and create
standard operating procedures for civilian and peace operations.
*****
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Chatham
House and the ISS look at threats to democracy in Somaliland
Chatham
House's briefing notes and papers on the Horn of Africa have
not always managed to produce the kind of balance and authority
that we would expect of such a prestigious organization. Its
latest briefing note entitled 'Somaliland: Democracy Threatened'
is, however, an impressive, detailed and balanced look at the
constitutional and political dilemma that Somaliland has been
facing in recent months and the dangers that this has posed.
As we noted last week, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
signed in Hargeisa on September 30th produced the necessary
renewed commitment of Somaliland's political parties to free
and fair elections, providing for the depolitization of the
date of presidential election and for the appointment of a new,
credible, National Electoral Commission to provide for a refined
voter's list and fix a new election date.
Michael
Walls, of Chatham House, has given a detailed and accurate background
of the political problems which led to the recent crisis and
the agreed MoU. He underlines the point that the difficulties
that arose over the failures of the National Electoral Commission's
technical abilities could not be resolved by any direct constitutional
actions but only by application of the wording of Article 9
(1) of the Somaliland constitution: “The political system
of the Republic of Somaliland is based on power, consultation,
democracy and multiplicity of the political parties.”
In other words, the Somali tradition of dialogue and consensus-building
was the only real avenue for resolution of the crisis. It was
this, assisted by the actions of Somaliland's friends, notably
Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, which allowed for the MoU to
be signed by all three parties recently. Mr. Walls notes that
the MoU has now established the conditions under which dialogue
and consensus-building can take place as happened in 1993 and
1996. This is, of course, a very significant step but equally
a number of very hard decisions have yet to be made. These include
the reformation of the National Electoral Commission and the
necessary steps for acceptable voter registration before the
election can take place. The remaining challenges are not therefore
easy to address. They require the same level of wisdom and vision
on the part of Somaliland politicians which was evident in the
negotiation over the MoU and in the success they eventually
achieved in that regard.
Mr.
Walls concludes his paper by underlining the regional importance
of Somaliland's continued progress down the 'path of stability
and democracy'. Those involved in Somaliland politics, he says,
need to work together in the Somaliland traditions of dialogue
and consensus-building. Equally, the international community
in general needs to pay much greater attention to the successes
that Somaliland has achieved. As Ethiopia has consistently argued,
continued refusal to acknowledge Somaliland's real achievements
and the remarkable degree of stability it has reached runs the
risk of contributing to the instability in the region. The international
community still fails to understand the urgency of supporting
the agents of stability within the Horn of Africa and the need
to act, and act now, to prevent those supporting instability
and destabilization from continuing their work. In the mean
time, friends of Somaliland continue to hope that the remaining
obstacles to a successful progress towards the next election
will be jointly removed by Somaliland politicians with the same
resolve to protecting the peace and security of Somaliland which
has been a legacy they have preserved over the last decade and
a half.
*****
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Indices
of Governance and Misconceptions
There
has been a proliferation of government assessment tools and
government related indices in recent years. They include the
World Bank Institute's Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI),
UNDP's Governance Indicators Project (GIP), and the OECD Metagor
Project. Among bilateral indices are USAID's Democracy and Governance
Assessment Framework, the Netherlands Strategic Governance and
Corruption Assessment (SGACA) and the UK/DFID's Country Governance
Assessment, (CGA). There are many more. Latest additions are
the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Harvard Index
of African Governance. These are worth additional comment as
they are direct rivals. The Harvard Index is produced by Professor
Rotberg, head of a program on conflict studies at the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard. Over the previous two years
he collaborated with the Foundation of Sudanese philanthropist
and businessman, Mo Ibrahim, to produce the Ibrahim Index. Now
they have gone their separate ways to produce rival lists. According
to Mr. Ibrahim, the split came over Professor Rotberg's resistance
to increasing input from African researchers and institutions.
Professor Rotberg says the issue is one of academic freedom
as against foundation control. Both, however, end up with much
the same variables and largely similar conclusions even if details
differ.
There
is certainly a need for assessments of government performance,
and indices of this kind can be very relevant to monitor and
evaluate governance programs. They can have real value especially
at a time of global economic crisis. The question that obviously
arises is why are there so many assessment methodologies and
how far they can be trusted, or to put it another way, what
values are attached to these assessments. The aims and assessors
differ, often wildly, and the methodologies involved are seldom
comparable. According to an ODI study, "the [indices] use
different approaches, but most are completely or largely external
to the country for which the assessment is carried out. Further
many governance indices and assessments are closely tied to
(particular) donor agencies, which can present problems of credibility
and legitimacy." Indeed, the issues of credibility and
legitimacy are critical. Certainly, it can be argued that donor
agencies, for example, might need indices to target their areas
of intervention in a particular country, but the weight they
give to the various parameters used and categories chosen reflect
the values and realities of the donor. They are by definition
detached from the values and realities of the targeted country
and their relevance to governance may be minimal.
As
mentioned, methodologies also differ. The inclusion or the exclusion
of development indicators in governance indices is only one
such variant. More serious in consideration of any use in government
planning is the time gap often apparent. The Ibrahim Index is
based on data available in 2007. In effect, the index is therefore
almost two years out of date, failing to cover any recent progress
in development and governance related issues. This is not a
minor issue. In the last two years we have witnessed extraordinary
world-wide economic changes. It has been a period in which agriculture
development has been taken as a major contributor to poverty
reduction, in which the obsession with a minimalist state has
given way to emphasis on the developmental/interventionist model,
where the world has had a financial and economic crisis from
which it is now starting to recover. Indices based on the realities
of 2007 can, at best, provide no more than an historical record.
They certainly cannot necessarily be used as guidelines for
current or future development.
Most
governance indicators are based on perception surveys, and this
raises a number of questions. Professor Joseph Stiglitz, Professor
Amartya Sen and Professor Jean-Paul Fitoussi are the authors
of the report produced last month by the Commission on the Measurement
of Economic Performance and Social Progress set up by French
President Nicholas Sarkozy early last year. They note that:
"... There often seems to be a marked difference between
standard measures of important socio-economic variables like
economic growth, inflation, and unemployment etc and widespread
perceptions. The standard measures may suggest for instance
there is less inflation or more growth than individuals perceive
to be the case, and the gap is so large and so universal that
it cannot be explained [by reference] to money illusion or to
human psychology."
Whether
statistics give us the right “signals” or not, in
our efforts to revive the world economy while simultaneously
responding to the global climate crisis, measurement, in our
performance-oriented world, takes on increased importance. What
we measure affects what we do. Leaving aside the detail of assessments
based on perception surveys, there is a huge gap between statistically
supported information and people's perception. Information based
on perception surveys depends on various factors including availability
of information to the general public on governance issues, the
knowledge of respondents and misinformation from various sources
on different governance agenda items. Governance indicators
based on perception survey can only be perceptions and do not
necessarily reflect the reality of the situation in any given
area or at any specific time.
Nobody
doubts the need for governance assessment. Equally, these must
be based on the values and the realities of the country being
assessed if they are intended to serve the country rather than
the needs of donors or NGOs. The Paris Declaration, rightly,
demands country ownership of governance issues. In this respect,
it should be noted that African states have endorsed NEPAD as
an African Program; and that they have also included the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a way forward for governance
assessment of African States. This process is inclusive. The
reports contain the views of the government, the ruling and
the opposition parties, the labour unions, manufacturers associations
and chambers, NGOs and the public at large. Under the APRM,
the information gathered is then submitted to a group of African
eminent personalities for intense scrutiny. Their conclusions
and recommendations are then widely publicized.
The
APRM is country owned, subjected to evaluation by eminent personalities
whose values do not markedly differ from the values and realities
of the country. In addition, unlike most other assessments and
indices, the APRM provides clear and implementable recommendations.
Governance is not a beauty contest with competitive rankings,
however much the international media try to make it so. But
it is a challenge, and a challenging one, so its assessors should
come up with implementable recommendations.
It
is perhaps invidious after these strictures to recommend any
of these governance assessments, but it has to be said that
the Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi
is well worth reading. It provides the basis for a better understanding
of the use of statistics and some guidance for creating a broader
set of indicators to evaluate well-being and sustainability
and to improve assessment of the performance of the economy
and of society more generally. We would benefit from both.
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