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President Girma addresses Parliament On Monday, President Girma Wolde Giorgis, President of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia opened the new session of Parliament, addressing a joint meeting of the House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representatives. The President outlined the Government's aims for the current Ethiopian year (2002) after briefly looking at last year's achievements, most notably a continued growth rate of over 10%, for the sixth consecutive year, coupled with control of inflation. This, he noted, had been achieved in the environment of a global economic crisis coupled with a power shortage which had put a severe strain on industry. Continued growth in such difficult global and domestic circumstances was a tribute, the President said, to Government policies and strategies designed to speed up development. Exports had been less successful, failing to reach the 25% annual growth of the previous two years, because of the limitations of marketing systems together with falling global trade and commodity prices, and had fallen by about 10%. Imports had continued to grow substantially but government measures, including devaluation, avoided the serious crisis that might have developed from foreign currency shortages. This year, the president emphasized, the Government would work to achieve another year of more than 10% economic growth while keeping inflation to less than 10% and lifting exports back to the level of 25% growth or more. With the completion of ongoing power projects within the next few months, the Government was confident the problems of power shortages would be resolved, and industrial development speeded up. The Government would make all-out efforts to speed up infrastructural development, and ensure continued growth in the agricultural sector to alleviate the problems arising from the late start and early end of the kremt rains in some areas. Building on last year's successful policies, the Government would enforce strict control on government budget deficits and balance the growth of money supply to control inflation. Measures would be taken to correct some of last year's market failures and utilize the improved global trade environment to reach export goals. The Government was confident that despite the challenges it would be able to register continued growth. In the area of social development, the primary focus would be on ensuring quality education in regular, technical, vocational and higher education, making all out efforts to engage and mobilize those in the education sector, and scale up the expansion of educational services. In the health sector, emphasis would focus on the expansion and improved quality of basic health services. Federal and Regional Governments would continue to implement civil service reform programs as part of the good governance program with special emphasis given to bring about fundamental changes in tax collection and the system of administration of city land, to institute a modern, transparent and accountable system of taxation to help remove such challenges to good governance as corruption and rent-seeking activities. This would provide major economic benefits. The Government would present the bills to achieve these and other Government objectives to the House of Peoples’ Representatives. The President said the Government was determined the fourth national election next year would be conducted in a peaceful, democratic and credible manner. It would give the highest priority to getting informed and active participation from the public. All participating parties would abide by an internationally recognized election code of conduct, and a mechanism for dialogue between the parties would be set up to resolve any problems that might arise in the election process. All parties would have the opportunity to use the government media and would be given budget subsidies in accordance with the law. National and international observers would participate in the election process. The Government would make sure the election will be democratic and in accordance with the law. It would also be prepared to take any necessary legal measures to prevent unlawful or unconstitutional acts occurring during the election process. The President noted that the House of Federation would prepare a new formula for the Federal Government’s subsidy for the regions, as well as the formula for sharing the joint resource revenues for the Federal and Regional Governments. During the year, it would coordinate the Fourth Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Festival. For the first time this would be organized jointly with Regional States. The House of Federation would also be involved in the extensive preparatory works for the Fifth World Federalism Conference to be held in Ethiopia in November next year.
************** On Somalia: Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and Ban ki-Moon's latest Report Fighting between extremist opposition forces in Somalia continued this week. The terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, apparently seized control of Kismayo port last Friday from another terrorist group, Hizbul Islam, with dozens killed and wounded in series of fightings. There have been a number of suggestions in recent months that Hizbul Islam is somehow a more moderate political organization than Al-Shabaab which has open links to Al Qaeda and international terrorism. Therefore, the argument runs, it might be possible to persuade Hizbul Islam to join in a peaceful political struggle if the right incentives were on offer. Some analysts have even seen the current fighting in Kismayo as a demonstration of these supposed differences, confirming that Hizbul is more indigenous, more moderate than Al-Shabaab. There is, of course, no evidence of this. Less than a month ago Hizbul Islam's chairman, Sheikh 'Aweys', whose record of terrorist activity goes back to the mid-1990s when his previous organization Al-Itihaad Al Islam was carrying out a terrorist bombing and assassination campaign in Ethiopia, was welcoming the suicide bomb attacks on AMISOM's headquarters and calling for more such atrocities. The assaults on the TFG in Mogadishu in May and June this year were the work of an Al-Shabaab/Hizbul alliance which had been armed by plane loads of weaponry sent from Eritrea where Sheikh 'Aweys' has spent the previous fifteen months. The fighting between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in Kismayo has, indeed, nothing to do with any ideological or religious differences. It is a conflict over the resources available in Kismayo and over their control, and it has certainly nothing to do with any disagreement over the use of terrorism to which both remain committed. Both Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam remain committed to their terrorist agendas and the overthrow of the TFG. The President of the TFG, President Sheikh Sharif, has been in the US over the last two weeks, visiting Somali communities in a number of US cities, including Minnesota where there are over 35,000 Somalis. In the Minneapolis area, from where US authorities believe at least 20 youngsters may have been recruited by extremists to fight in Somalia, he condemned terrorist recruiting, saying it was “wrong [and] ...against our faith, our culture and against religion. He was warmly welcomed everywhere and upbeat in his speeches: “I believe that solving Somalia's problem is not as difficult as it looks. It only requires that we confront it with unshakeable resolve”. Equally, he warned that a solution was also needed with assistance of the international community. This was a point also made by Interior Minister, Abdulkadir Ali Omar in an interview in Nairobi on Sunday when he said Somalia alone was not capable of confronting Al Qaeda-linked militant groups: “We need international assistance to strengthen our security forces....and that aid has to be more than words”, adding that it was important to amend AMISOM's rules of engagement so it could play a more active role. President Sheikh Sharif was also interviewed on the Riz Khan show on Al Jazeera this week despite the Deputy Speaker of the Somali Parliament accusing it of continued bias in its reporting on Somalia. Professor Mahammed Umar Dalha said Al Jazeera failed to report accurately on the fighting between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, and routinely exaggerated attacks on Government or AMISOM bases, placing them as first item in the international headlines even if the attack lasted no more than a few minutes. The President told Riz Khan he thought his job must be the hardest in the world. He said the presence of Al Qaeda was a danger to Somalia and to the region. Somalia needed the international community to stand up with it. He stressed that reconciliation was an Islamic principle, and that the Government had agreed to implement Sharia law, but he also spoke of the need to fight terrorism. There was, he said, no way Al Qaeda could carry out its aims. He saw piracy as no more than an extension of the security problem on land. Meanwhile, earlier this week, UN Secretary-General, Ban ki-Moon, provided his latest six-monthly report on Somalia to the Security Council indicating, perhaps expressing more optimism than the situation justified, that the Somali Government had made some encouraging progress in political and security areas, in fostering reconciliation and building a national security apparatus. It deserved, he said, continued support from the international community whose sustained backing constituted “a key contribution.” He urged the TFG to “stay the course” and appealed to the international community to redouble its support. The UN, he said, would stand firmly by AMISOM and he noted the UN provision of equipment and support for living conditions as well as planning and operational assistance to the mission. “Two particular points arise from the report. One is that despite the phrases used and the progress made, there is still no apparent sense of urgency apparent in UN activities as planned so far. The Secretary-General said the UN was carrying out the first stage of its incremental approach to Somalia's problems through specified mandated activities in the country and more frequent visits by international staff, averaging two visits per week in July and August. He said planning continued for the second stage – the deployment of a 'light footprint' in Mogadishu – though this remained dependent upon the security situation. In the light of the Government's current security problems, this is hardly sufficient. As usual he made only fleeting reference to the possibility of the deployment of UN peace keeping forces to replace AMISOM if the security situation permitted and the Council so decided. Secondly, and even more surprisingly, the Secretary-General, although referring to both the opposition and criminal activities, says nothing about actions of external 'spoilers' of the Djibouti process, apart from noticing the AU's call for immediate sanctions against all 'spoilers'. The Secretary-General makes no reference to the main 'spoiler', Eritrea, nor does he recommend any endorsement of the AU call, merely expressing his concern over criminal activities including arms smuggling and calling for “the international community to find ways to address illegal activities that threaten peace in Somalia and the wider region.” In light of the suicide bomb attacks on AMISOM headquarters on September 17, which the Secretary-General deplored, this is particularly surprising. In fact, this aspect once again underlined the theoretical elements in the Secretary-General's reports. However, the meeting of the Security Council yesterday created some hope that the Council might now be prepared to consider taking strong measures against those who continued to create obstacles to peace in Somalia.
************** Omission and commission in Somali analysis In the context of Somalia, analysis and analysts have a poor record. It seems never too difficult to find those who have committed sins of omission and commission in their efforts to look at recent events, or tried to twist and select facts to fit a pre-conceived argument, illustrating once again the unfortunate effects of such manipulation. Indeed, there have been three recent efforts which illustrate all too obviously the dangers of attempting to analyse Somalia without genuinely making a real effort to be inclusive, balanced and unprejudiced. All have failed. Dr. Ken Menkhaus produced his 'Somalia: What went wrong' for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal in August. This is particularly disappointing as Dr. Menkhaus, looking at events over the last year, inexplicably fails to mention the activities of Eritrea, despite its role as the main external supporter of extremism and terrorism in Somalia. Dr. Menkhaus also fails to understand the aims of Ethiopia's military involvement in Somalia between December 2006 and January 2008, though he does accept that one of these was setting the scene and moving the Djibouti process forward to success and revitalizing the TFG. Dr. Menkhaus feels that since January and the election of President Sheikh Sharif, the new TFG leadership has made a number of missteps, making appointments without sufficient consultation, producing an unbalanced cabinet, travelling too much abroad and failing to revive the local administrative structures, including Sharia Courts that appeared in 2006 when President Sheikh Sharif was chair of the ICU. Perhaps more reasonably, Dr. Menkhaus castigates the policies of the UN and the donors for falling short of what was needed in support for AMISOM, for a state-building agenda for the TFG and for reconciliation talks. Indeed, he noted that the international community preferred to concentrate on a response to piracy, useful for grabbing headlines in donor countries but having little impact on events in Somalia. This was, of course, of much less importance than what was, and still is, the more worrisome threat posed by Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda on shore. The problem with Dr. Menkhaus' effort at analysis is less what he includes than what he omits. Crucially, and indeed surprisingly, although he mentions the insistence of Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' on 'no compromise', he ignores where Sheikh 'Aweys' had based himself before his arrival in Mogadishu in April, and the aid Eritrea provided him for the attempted seizure of power in Mogadishu by Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam a month later. Dr. Menkhaus doesn't even refer to the presence of Sheikh 'Aweys' in Asmara between early 2007 and April 2008. In fact, Dr. Menkhaus , despite asking the question 'what went wrong' in Somalia makes no reference to Eritrea's involvement in Somalia or its efforts to destabilize the TFG which most analysts might consider a real factor in answering any such question. All he does is to suggest that “external actors have a long record of injecting arms and funds into Somalia”, adding that they seldom get the success they hope for. That may be the case, but to attempt to analyse recent events in Somalia without any mention of Eritrea can only be described as perverse at the very least. Similarly, although Dr. Menkhaus does notice that Al-Shabaab has growing difficulties with its 'fractious' partners, he fails to identify either Hizbul Islam or Al-Shabaab as extremist, or the latter as terrorist. Missing out such central elements in the current political equation in Somalia today makes it difficult to accept any of Dr. Menkhaus' suggestions, and indeed, renders his efforts at analysis essentially null and void. This sort of failure is unfortunately all-too-common in attempts to look at the situation of Somalia and the TFG. Analysts frequently appear to come from a very particular viewpoint, still refracted through the prism of extremism held up by Al-Shabaab supporters whether among journalists in Nairobi or elsewhere, and making no effort to produce balanced analysis. Last month, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, published “The Somalia Conflict – Implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts” by Solomon A. Dersso. This is a lengthy, and often reasonable, even detailed effort to look at the root causes and dynamics of the conflicts in Somalia, including the social and political causes of the state collapse, at militarization, clan conflicts, the lack of identifiable political objectives, the emergency of criminality and piracy and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as major factors. It considers internal actors, concentrating on the TFG and on the ICU/ARS/Al-Shabaab, and identifies Eritrean involvement with Al-Shabaab, but then, oddly, does not mention Eritrea under external actors, merely looking at Ethiopia and the US. It does, however, correctly identify Ethiopia's involvement in 2006-2009 as intervention, not invasion. There are in fact major lacunae in addition to the omission of Eritrea in the list of the external actors and its role as a 'spoiler' hardly gets the emphasis it deserves. Hizbul Islam is not mentioned at all, and there is no effort to look at the Eritrean-backed attempt by Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab to overthrow the TFG in Mogadishu by a coup in May this year. Indeed, the report, although published last month, gives the impression of being written some months ago. The report prefers to concentrate on Al-Shabaab suggesting it “seems determined and capable of taking control of the whole of Somalia”, and claiming Al-Shabaab has demonstrated it will not allow AMISOM to stay nor will it participate in the Djibouti process. This means, according to the report that no military solution is possible and the international community should therefore do everything to stop Al-Shabaab targeting AMISOM and encourage it to negotiate. As is frequently the case, such a call for negotiation takes no notice of Al-Shabaab aims and actions, or indeed of its own statements. Al-Shabaab has not hidden its terrorist agenda and the idea of discussion of any kind is clearly very far from its mind. It is impossible that any functional policy of peace and reconciliation could operate in conjunction with Al-Shabaab. It might be noted that the ISS view of Al-Shabaab does, in fact, seem to be at odds with recent developments. It is also noticeable that the report makes no mention of the extensive moderate Islamic opposition to Al-Shabaab such as Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'ah, nor of the divisions within Al-Shabaab itself based on its policies of clan recruitment. Al-Shabaab, despite its denials of clan organization, has been operating essentially on the basis of clan recruitment for the last year or more. It might be added that the report does not even manage to make any mention of Hizbul Islam. In fact, the ISS report's concluding recommendations bear little relationship to the reality of Somalia today despite arguing that it is necessary to consider all aspects of the Somali situation for an analysis to have meaning. Indeed, this report, and its conclusions and recommendations, unfortunately, fail its own test comprehensively. As already mentioned it is not alone in failing to take a wider, balanced, or comprehensive view. Foreign Policy Magazine which prides itself on the authority of its writing and its writers, and its influence in Washington, claims to take its readers beyond the facts to understand how the world works. It's a noble aspiration, and frequently succeeds, but not always and it is regrettable that the concept sometimes outruns factual reality. An article in the most recent issue, September/October 2009 which seriously fails to demonstrate understanding of recent events in Somalia is a case in point. To be fair, none of the three authors (David Axe, Malou Innocent and Jason Reich) are specialists in Somalia or the Horn of Africa, and they are writing essentially about US policy in Afghanistan “Defining victory to win a war”. This is no excuse, however, for some of their comments about the ICU and events in Somalia over the last three years. It is clear that none of the authors has taken the trouble to investigate the reality of events there, to look at the make up of the ICU, its divisions and splits, or the relationship between extremist elements formerly in the ICU and now making up Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab. Leaving aside their now discredited (and consistently denied) allegation that the US provided key support for Ethiopia's intervention, not invasion, in December 2006, the authors claim: “...the ICU and other insurgent groups fought off the Ethiopians. The resurgent ICU subsequently subsumed a U.S.-backed secular "transitional government" this January. The ICU is now back and in charge in Somalia, albeit under the transitional government's name, and has regained some of the momentum it had before the Ethiopian invasion.” This is a parody of what actually happened. It ignores the Djibouti process launched with full Ethiopian support in 2008 and leading to the election of President Sheikh Sharif in January 2009. It ignores the earlier divisions within the ICU in 2006 (on which current events depend), the takeover of the movement in June 2006 by extremists headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys', the declaration of jihad against Ethiopia, the appearance of Al-Shabaab and its links with Al Qaeda, the creation of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia from hard line ICU elements by Eritrea, and the setting up of Hizbul Islam and Eritrean support for it and for its attempted take-over of Mogadishu in May. Almost everything of relevance is simply left out. In fact, the references to Somalia in this article amount to a classic case of externally-based analysts ignoring the realities of the situation in Somalia and the Horn of Africa in the interests of pushing specific criticisms of US policy in Afghanistan. This is, perhaps, understandable, if hardly useful or helpful to analyses of the situation in Somalia. It might be noted that any alleged parallels between US policies in Afghanistan and in Somalia, where there are no US troops, can scarcely be obvious to any objective observer. More serious, the inaccuracies involved often have an impact, even if unintended by their authors. They can be dangerous, and used to make dangerously fallacious claims which can only weaken the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia, and the efforts to defeat terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam.
************** Eritrea and the Security Council: the road to sanctions Addressing the UN General Assembly a couple of weeks ago, Foreign Minister Seyoum reminded his listeners of the challenge facing the international community in Somalia, a challenge underlined by the murderous terrorist bombings at the headquarters of the African peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu in mid-September when over 20 peacekeepers died. He stressed that the crisis, aided and abetted by rogue states, was fuelling extremism and terrorism. Minister Seyoum also noted that it was the IGAD states that had first called for sanctions against Eritrea for its actions against the Government of Somalia and for its support for the extremist groups in Somalia. That was back in May and IGAD's stance had promptly been endorsed by the African Union's Peace and Security Council asking the United Nations Security Council to adopt punitive measures against Eritrea for its active involvement in support of terrorist elements in Somalia against the TFG and the African Union Peacekeeping force, AMISOM. This was an unprecedented call by the regional bodies against one of their own. It was a clear indication that both IGAD and the African Union had exhausted their patience with Eritrea, losing hope that it might return to peaceful ways of its own accord. Five weeks later at the 13th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Sirte, Libya, July 1st to 3rd, the Summit formally called for sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, and especially Eritrea, that were providing support to the armed groups engaged in destabilization activities in Somalia, attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM, as well as against the Somali individuals and entities working towards undermining the peace and reconciliation efforts and regional stability. All the delegations which took the floor on the issue emphasized that the regime in Asmara should be seen as the 'spoiler' in the Horn of Africa, continuously provoking conflict with its neighbours. No delegation spoke in defence of Eritrea. Just over eight weeks later at the end of August, the African Union Special Summit on Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, again endorsed the call for the speedy implementation of sanctions for a no-fly zone and a naval blockade to prevent the flow of arms to insurgents in Somalia. Eritrea's response to this flow of condemnation, to the wealth of evidence and criticism against it, has been predictably dismissive, calling it “outrageous”, “illegal”, “irresponsible”, “deplorable” and “symptomatic of the fundamental structural malaise that has gripped the AU right from its inception.” It has not produced any evidence to support increasingly threadbare denials in the face of the detail produced by the UN Monitoring Group and the Government of Somalia including specifics of arms flights and the support provided to Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys', the head of Hizbul Islam and ally of Al-Shabaab in the attempt to overthrow the TFG in Mogadishu in May and June. Sheikh 'Aweys' was, of course, based in Asmara from January 2007 until April 2009, and has himself made no secret of the fact that Eritrea has helped the extremist opposition groups in Somalia. The Security Council should be well placed to understand the need to respond to the activities of Eritrea in Somalia as it has had experience of Eritrea's activities in other areas and its negative responses to criticism before. Indeed, it's mystifying that any member of the Security Council could find itself in any doubt over Eritrean aims and intentions, or see the persistent Eritrean response to UN resolutions as acceptable in any way. Eritrea has ignored a whole series of UN Security Council resolutions over a number of years, on the issue of the UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia, over arms supplies and support to extremists and terrorists in Somalia, and over its invasion of Djibouti in June last year. Its stubborn refusal to respond to Security Council resolutions is a serious reflection on the position and authority of the Council, and on the future of UN peacekeeping operations, flouted so egregiously by Eritrea with UNMEE being illegally expelled from the Temporary Security Zone in Eritrea. This, of course, was a step that unilaterally abrogated the Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000. Eritrea has equally prevaricated over, or simply ignored, Security Council demands to withdraw from Djibouti, to allow a fact-finding mission or even try to resolve the issue diplomatically. It has been more than four months since the issue of sanctions against Eritrea for its actions over Somalia was first raised by IGAD, and over three since the AU as a body requested action from the UN Security Council. The evidence is definitive, the need is undeniable. Every day the crisis worsens. Neither the region as a whole, nor Somalia in particular, can afford the consequences of failure. Peace and security issues affect domestic as well as regional considerations and all the IGAD states need a solution in Somalia, and quickly. Every additional day's delay means Somalia, already the worst humanitarian problem in the world, is liable to sink deeper into confusion. And yesterday, it seemed the UN Security Council might finally be preparing to take action to heed the call of the African continent for the implementation of sanctions against a regime in Asmara now widely regarded as an embarrassment and a disgrace to our continent. In the meeting yesterday to consider the Secretary-General's latest report on Somalia, Britain's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Sawers said the UK was concerned by the evidence of Eritrean support for opponents of the Somali Government: “The Council will need to give serious consideration to the AU's requests [for sanctions] over the coming weeks”. Britain, he said, stands ready to support such action”. The US Deputy Representative to the UN, Rosemary di Carlo said: “It is time for the international community to consider ways to address Eritrea's destabilizing impact on Somalia and the region.” The Russian representative at the meeting, who called for states in the region not to allow foreign mercenaries and arms into Somalia, said firmly: “We believe that there is a need to take additional steps to strengthen this regime [in Mogadishu]”. The UN's Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, who told the Council that the humanitarian situation had worsened dramatically following the recent fighting said national and external spoilers must be neutralized, adding: “Targeted sanctions can be one effective way to deal with the spoilers.” Indeed, it looks today as if there is no other alternative for the maintenance of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. Action cannot come soon enough for the people of Somalia.
************** The Challenges of Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy: As We start the New Ethiopian Year
I. Diplomacy, Development & Democratization Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin in his recent address to the GA has outlined the major Challenges Ethiopia has faced over the last 18 years. These challenges are also Challenges of our foreign Policy. The philosophy behind our foreign policy is that our diplomatic activities have to serve the country’s economic agenda and the objective the country has in advancing democracy. As has clearly been indicated in our Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy, it is not just the normal type of economic development that we need, but a rapid one. That, we have said, is an imperative necessity for maintaining the very viability of Ethiopia as a country. The same applies with respect to the work we have in connection with our democratization agenda. For a country as diverse as Ethiopia, its survival also hinges on the strengthening and deepening of democracy in our country. Ethiopia’s foreign policy has to serve these twin objectives --- rapid economic development which aims at ensuring all members of society benefit at every stage, and speeded up democratization. It is in light of this that we have said that the vocation of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry is economic diplomacy. That is why we have, over the last years, made the major attention of our diplomatic activities, the promotion of trade, encouraging investment and tourism. That has also been how we have been evaluating the performance of our Ministry and that of each of our staff members, in the country, or abroad in Ethiopia’s diplomatic Missions. We have made some progress, but it is the conviction of the Ministry that we need to do more; and we could have done more. This is the spirit with which we enter the new Ethiopian year. The broad objective we have in our diplomatic activity is to make sure that our economic ties and co-operation with our traditional partners should be further expanded and deepened while we leave no stone unturned to ensure that our growing ties, in the same area, with our new partners would grow as rapidly and as practically possible. The overall approach here, and the philosophy that underpins our policy, is that those parties whose partnership with us facilitates the achievement of the objectives of the rapid economic development we have, are cherished friends whose partnership would have enormous significance for Ethiopia’s viability as a nation. Relations between countries, it seems to us, would have little opportunity for durability if they have little value in the economic area. This is the principle that will govern our foreign policy in the course of the year, and beyond. Our diplomacy has to contribute to the achievement of the economic target that the Government has set for the budget year. Over all, the facilitation of the achievement of a double-digit economic growth set as a target by the Government will be our broad sign post. But economic development requires the right environment. Context matters. In this regard, though the major focus of our diplomacy is economic, it does not mean that political diplomacy has no place in the activities of the Foreign Ministry. In fact, the nexus between our political diplomacy and economic diplomacy ought to be rather strong. It might perhaps be conceptualized in terms of political diplomacy serving the needs of our economic policy; and our political diplomacy needing to be customized to serve our economic objectives. Then there are Challenges that our country faces—challenges that have a bearing on the context within which our work in the economic area and the process of our democratization takes place. This has to do with issues of peace and security in our region, particularly in Somalia, and in Sudan as well. II. Where Are the Partners For Peace in the Horn? Ethiopia has no option than to do whatever it can, and sometimes even stretching itself to do more than its share of responsibility would demand, for peace in the Horn of Africa. But the challenges are enormous, requiring Herculean efforts. This is most evident with respect to the situation in Somalia. But the situation in Sudan is not all that behind; in fact with consequences, if matters went wrong, much more destabilizing and dangerous. First, on the Challenge in Somalia: We are starting the Ethiopian year with little hope in the horizon for the situation in Somalia to get better. The only silver lining in a situation which is otherwise bleak is the readiness among the countries of the region to work for peace in Somalia. That is indeed heartening and more than makes up for the damaging role that Eritrea plays in stoking conflict in our region and in encouraging extremism in Somalia. The tragedy in Somalia is not only related to the suffering of the people of Somalia; no less tragic has been the missed opportunities for peace in the country. The political class in Somalia is not blameless, but nor has the international Community been as effective as it could have been in assisting in the creation of peace in Somalia. It is with this in mind that Foreign Minister Seyoum referred, in his recent speech to the GA, to the greater support that the extremists in Somalia are getting from their supporters than the TFG receives from those who profess support to it. The situation on the ground in Somalia today is in no way a function of al Shabaab’s popularity, but is rather the result of many factors, among which the resolve and determination of those non-Somalis who encourage terrorism and extremism in Somalia, is perhaps the most potent one. The paradox is that those who do this are states that are by common logic considered beyond this kind of activity. The situation in Somalia cannot be put right by the efforts of the IGAD countries alone, or by those of the African Union. Putting things right in Somalia requires the broadest possible coalition for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. No doubt, the implication of the victory of the extremists in Somalia would not be limited to the Horn of Africa. There might be those who continue to entertain the illusion that extremism could be tamed; that some within al Shabaab or Hizbul-Islam could be made peace partners; and that, in particular, one can win the friendship of those extremists whose ambition is limited to the region and thus do not qualify to be called international. Our diplomatic plate is full for the year ahead of us. Within IGAD, the work that we have begun for peace in Somalia needs to be consolidated and strengthened. The same is true with respect to the responsibility we have within the AU, which is all the more critical in light of our membership of the Peace and Security Council. We need, by working both within IGAD, of which we are the Chair, and the AU, to push and prod the international community to stop, even at this late hour, the hijacking of Somalia by non-Somali terrorists who continue to count on the support of those who are normally assumed as having nothing to do with extremism. The answer to this conundrum is not the responsibility of Ethiopian diplomacy to figure out. Trying to remove the Challenge, in co-operation with others, is. This, and other activities, designed to help the effort to secure peace in Somalia are responsibilities that we have to carry out in the following months as part of the work we need to do so that there would be the proper context, and conducive situation, for the successful implementation of the economic programs we have at home. (With respect to the response of the international community to the role of foreign fighters in Somalia, there appears to be some encouraging developments at the Security Council as this is being penned. It is nonetheless too soon to be more hopeful than before.) The year in front of us is also critical from the point of view of peace in Sudan, most particularly with respect to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). From the vantage point of where we are today, there are more reasons for concern than for great optimism. Mutual confidence between the two parties has not been all that great, recently. Most of the work necessary for the Referendum to be carried out awaits the consensus of the two parties. With each passing day, the trust between the two parties continues to dwindle, rather than being strengthened. Ethiopia does not have the master key to peace in Sudan. But it is a country which is close to both parties. This is an asset that we want to use to make a difference for peace in Sudan and for the peaceful implementation of the CPA. Accordingly, the following months will keep us busy in the diplomatic arena --- within IGAD and with those who might be in a position to exercise even greater leverage than us --- trying to contribute for ensuring peace in Sudan. The 2010 election in Ethiopia is also a major event ahead of us. Political diplomacy has to bring its influence to bear on the course of events leading to the election and beyond so that non-democratic impulses, originating from whatever source, would not deny the people of Ethiopia the opportunity to have a fair, free and peaceful election and a post-election situation conducive for expediting economic development and the further strengthening of a democratic culture necessary for ensuring the viability of Ethiopia in the 21st century. Our task is both simple and complex at the same time. It is simple because what we need to do is tell the truth and amplify the same. It is complex because, as it must be obvious to those who would have keen interest to scrutinize the Horn of Africa below the surface, Ethiopia’s democracy has too many adversaries. As Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Ato seyoum, said to the General Assembly, it is not all that easy to build democracy in the kind of neighborhood that the Horn of Africa is; nor is that exercise rendered less daunting given Ethiopia’s proximity to a dictatorial regime for whom Ethiopia’s democracy is a threat by the fact of mere existence. III. The Changed Nature of Diplomacy The development of ICT has brought about radical changes in how diplomacy is conducted; non-state actors have been able to bring their influence to bear, for good or ill, on diplomatic practice and on relations among nations; and all these have had major impact on the capacity of states to protect their interest, including their peace and stability and their chances for making their societies viable. This is particularly true with respect to the developing world. Not that the influence of ICT on diplomacy is, on balance, negative when it comes to countries such as Ethiopia. On the contrary, ICT has opened up new vistas of opportunities for access to information and knowledge for those who are behind in those areas and in the development of their human resources. On the other hand, it is impossible to overlook the fact that those in the developing world are less prepared to withstand some of the negative consequences of the means that a mere individual, including the politically lunatic, may have to cause harm to entire societies. These developments together with the growth of non-state actors have made public diplomacy an important part of the work that states do to promote their national interest. Ethiopia is no exception. The Foreign Ministry has been according due importance to this aspect of diplomacy over the last few years. We don’t claim to have done enough in this area as well as in public relations, which, many contend, has never been our forte. Public diplomacy and public relations are areas in our diplomatic activities that we need to be more effective and productive on in the course of the year and beyond. That our vulnerability in these areas was manifest during the 2005 election cannot be denied. It was impossible for Ethiopians in the diaspora to get a reasonably balanced assessment of the situation in their home country. Enemies of democracy had the opportunity to masquerade as fighters for freedom. Mendacity triumphed. The truth could not see the light of day. Non-Ethiopians claimed the right to decide on the destiny of the nation; an election which had initially all the marks of being historic ended creating the impression for some that Ethiopia had lost the momentum in its drive towards making democratization irreversible. Our diplomacy must, in the course of the year, play its proper role to ensure that the enemies of democracy --- states or non-state actors--- would not succeed, once again, to create the conditions for the crafting of a narrative which is inimical, not only to the development of democracy in Ethiopia, but also to the preservation of the country’s stability and security. In public relations, we have to go a long way. In the first instance, our own public deserves to be informed better about the objectives of Ethiopia’s diplomacy and the nature of our relations with various countries. At a time when the creation of falsehood has been developed into an art, and those who claim to be defenders of human rights engage in it with little equanimity, the challenge to ensure that the truth does come out is not so easy, all the more so for those like us for whom public relations is an Achilles' heel. The problem is even more compounded when some, not all, in the private print media seem to think that non-Ethiopians are better placed to know about what is good for Ethiopia than citizens of the country. One of those wrote recently about how in New York the Ethiopian Prime Minister avoided to take a note taker to a meeting with the head of the Africa Bureau at the U.S. State Department because, according to the paper, the Prime Minister did not want the note taker to hear what the Ethiopians were expecting at the meeting: a dressing down from the U.S official. How an Ethiopian would think that this would be within the realm of possibility for an Ethiopian leader to accept --- any Ethiopian leader --- is impossible to comprehend. The factual error about the identity of those who took part in the meeting aside, the suggestion that an Ethiopian leader would accept insult so long as it is done in private is evidence to how much national pride might be in danger of being undermined. Incidentally, this story was recounted in a widely read Amharic paper whose reporters take pride in their ability to have access to scientific truth even in the social sphere. The work is cut out for us in the area of public relations. We have much work to do to ensure that the public is well informed about Ethiopia’s diplomatic activities and the challenge the country faces in various areas. CONCLUSION What is presented in the foregoing does not exhaust all that we plan to do in our foreign policy activities during the Ethiopian year we just begun. Within the AU, there are important issues to which we will continue to devote attention. We would like to see the AU to continue to be taken seriously by the international community as an effective and viable partner for peace, security and for critical challenges that are common to all humanity such as climate change. At the level of IGAD, there is a need for us to do more towards the realization of the promised revitalization of the organization which admittedly has been rather slow. Going beyond Africa, -- still at the multilateral front --- we intend to continue with our active involvement in the works of the UN. We happen to be one of the biggest contributers to UN peacekeeping. This will continue to be strengthened. All in all, the following months are going to be busy for Ethiopian diplomacy --- diplomatic activities which are anchored in the commitment to rapid economic development of the country and the further deepening of its democratic transformation.
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs