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A Week in the Horn 28.11.2008 |
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In fact, the team in its
on-the-ground investigations found no trace of serious and widespread human
rights violations let alone war crimes or crimes against humanity committed
during the security measures taken against the ONLF following its slaughter of
over seventy workers in April last year. It did, however, find a mass of
evidence of further systematic abuses committed by the ONLF none reported by HRW.
HRW indeed admits that it had relied totally on hearsay and secondary sources
for its accusations. Adding a dramatic if absurd touch, it even went so far as
claim that satellite imagery could identify responsibility for the burning of
villages. "Flawed Methodology, Unsubstantiated Allegations" demonstrated clearly
that HRW, perhaps unwittingly, allowed itself to be used as a propaganda tool by
the ONLF, which despite its terrorist credentials, HRW seems to have
romanticized. The investigation found that HRW's report was filled with
fabrication and misrepresentation, and that it appeared HRW had made no effort
to understand the realities of the situation inside the Somali Regional State.
It completely failed to use first-hand on-the-ground evidence. Its conduct in
the production and dissemination of its report was a virtual betrayal of its
professional objectives.
"Flawed Methodology,
Unsubstantiated Allegations" was launched on Wednesday at a press conference in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which commissioned the report. Most of the
questions came from international journalists who wanted further details on the
report's own methodology, the names of the investigation team which was headed
by Ato. Lissane Yohannes, and their knowledge of Somali which was in fact
excellent, as the accompanying video made clear. The investigation team had
taken a camera crew with them, and the video provided the evidence of a number of
examples of villages that had not been burnt, of interviews with named village
residents and elders, prisoners and former ONLF members. Possibly as a result of
this evidence there were fewer questions on the specific content of the report.
The Government made it clear that it now hopes the results of this investigation
will encourage HRW to reconsider its methodology and re-commit itself to the
necessity of basing its work on verifiable fact, not anonymous hearsay. It hopes
that HRW might, in the future, try to reflect the reality of human rights
progress in Ethiopia, including the extensive training on human rights, and
treatment of civilians, given to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and other
security organizations. It was made clear at the press conference that the
Government believes it should be possible to have a meaningful relationship with
HRW, if HRW is prepared to aim for a balanced and constructive engagement.
Yesterday, Human Rights Watch
responded to "Flawed Methodology; Unsubstantiated Allegations". As might be
expected, HRW said it stood by its claims, but it made no effort to reply to the
substantive criticisms that "Flawed Methodology; Unsubstantiated Allegations"
makes of HRW's June document "Collective Punishment" or of the incontrovertible
evidence, including photographic material available on video, of the numerous
and significant errors identified. Instead, HRW attempted to deprecate "Flawed
Methodology; Unsubstantiated Allegations" by innuendo, saying that it did not
specify who participated in the report and by implication suggesting it could
therefore not be considered independent. One might note that HRW in "Collective
Punishment" gives no indication of who participated in its June report. In fact,
the names of those involved in "Flawed Methodology; Unsubstantiated Allegations"
were given at the press conference launching the document on Wednesday. One
might also note that "Flawed Methodology; Unsubstantiated Allegations" carefully
identifies all its sources by name, and often photographically. HRW claimed
security considerations prevented it from naming any of the sources in its
report. This is, to say the least, implausible given that virtually all its
sources, as HRW admits, were and are outside Ethiopia. Inevitably, this
reinforces the suggestion that HRW failed to investigate its sources properly in
this case despite its long expertise in human rights activity. The Government has noted HRW's suggestion that the international media and human rights organizations should be given immediate access to the Ogaden area of the Somali Regional State. The Government has never, despite HRW's claims, prevented access to the Regional State, though there have been occasions, for short periods last year, when security considerations, resulting from ONLF terrorist activity, precluded visits to parts of some zones. It should be added, however, that the government can hardly consider HRW, given its past record of inaccurate reporting on Ethiopia and its indiscriminate use of propaganda sources, to be fair. This is something it could expect HRW to improve. The Government also deplores the implication of HRW's statement that investigations cannot be labeled "independent" if they come from Ethiopia. Ethiopia's recent experience with inaccurate and even dishonest reporting by some journalists, and by some human rights groups, is hardy conducive to acceptance of this sort of argument. As it frequently repeated, the Government is certainly prepared to allow independent investigations but, not unreasonably, it reserves the right to define "independent" itself. It does not believe it is appropriate for Human Rights Watch to impose its own definitions. Equally, as it has said on a number of occasions, the Government remains more than ready to keep the door open for constructive engagement. **********
The Ethiopian Government,
whose major interest is building peace in the region and having a partner for
peace and development, has sent a dozen missions to Somalia and held several
meetings with Somali leaders in Addis Ababa to underline the need to focus on
Somalia's national interests, and bridge the rifts in the leadership. Most
recently, the IGAD Nairobi Summit at the end of October, underscored the need to
implement the Djibouti peace process and agreement, and urged the resolution of
disputes among the leadership, the formation of a new cabinet, the acceptance by
the executive of parliamentary decisions, and the establishment of a new
administration for Mogadishu. It called on the AU to bring AMISOM up to full
strength and the UN to provide logistics to facilitate the mission of a
peacekeeping force. The Minister emphasized that while the Ethiopian Defense
Forces would not go on paying sacrifices in Somalia indefinitely, any withdrawal
would not be from pressure from Al-Shabaab but because of the paralysis of the
Somali Government. Responding to a question about national security, Minister
Seyoum said the Ethiopian Defense Forces had the capacity to quell any attack,
and whatever happened they would remain on alert on the Ethiopian side of the
border. Any threats arising from any part of Somalia would be dealt with
accordingly. The Minister made a parallel with the recent up-surge in piracy along the Somali coasts. The root cause, he said, was the reluctance to help on the part of those with the necessary resources. There was a plan by the EU and NATO to deploy naval forces in response, but their approach wasn't sufficiently holistic and far-reaching. It was far-fetched to try and clamp-down on piracy while failing to control the situation on the Somali mainland. Similarly, the Security Council had done no more than express its concerns. It had failed to take the necessary serious actions to lead to a resolution of the problem in Somalia. The Minister, speaking quite frankly, said that he did not think that this would change in the near future. Equally, however, he felt the case was still not entirely hopeless. Residents of Mogadishu were now setting up their local administration; the Djibouti peace processes were continuing. He hoped these opportunities would be used. At the end of the day, however, the future of Somalia will be in the hands of the political leadership and the Somali people. They must act responsibly and the international community should also act promptly to provide all necessary support. Unless they did Somalia could end up being a safe haven for terrorists.
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Last week, the UN
Secretary-General issued his latest report on Somalia (S/2008/709 17.11.2008).
This outlined recent developments in Somalia and the progress achieved under the
Djibouti peace process. The report also included the Secretary-General's
response to the Security Council's requests for a description of a feasible
multi-national force for Somalia, a possible mandate and identifiable
contributors. The Secretary-General suggested this might consist of two
brigades, one possibly a reinforced AMISOM unit, under a unified command with a
mandate to provide support for the Djibouti process in Mogadishu, securing
strategic installations, monitoring the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, and the
ceasefire in conjunction with the envisaged joint Somali security force. This
would allow the TFG to consolidate its position. Subject to political progress
and security improvements, this multi-national stabilization force would then
become a UN peacekeeping force. This multi-national force would have a quick
reaction component and, under a unified command, would operate alongside AMISOM.
For a peacekeeping force, the Secretary-General suggested a force of 22,500
would be needed to operate in southern and central Somalia to take over from the
stabilization force and provide for a safe environment for rebuilding and
restoring Somalia's state institutions. The Secretary-General repeated that a
comprehensive technical assessment mission for a peacekeeping force could only
make a proper evaluation after the situation in Mogadishu had been stabilized by
an international stabilization force. The Secretary-General had contacted some
50 states, identified by the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) as
having the capacity to contribute to a multi-national stabilization force,
providing a lead contingent, troops, funding or equipment. Response had been
poor. The Secretary-General had had only seven formal responses. One offered to
provide equipment, airlift capacity or funding but not troops. Four said no
troops were possible, but two organizations said funding was possible. The DPKO
provided further information to the states approached at a meeting on November
17. This was a very disappointing response indeed, nothing to give any
confidence to countries which have troops in Somalia.
The Secretary-General noted
that AMISOM would need some US $200 million to reach its mandated level of nine
battalions next year. He called on the international community to provide
financial and logistical support to AMISOM and renewed his call to member states
to implement pledged troop units for AMISOM without further delay. The
Secretary-General also pointed out it was imperative for the on-going
anti-piracy operations, AMISOM and the envisaged multinational force to
co-ordinate efforts. In the briefings to the Security Council, Haile Menkerios, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who introduced the Secretary-General's report, suggested the central problem in Somalia was the lack of security though he agreed the TFG was seriously affected by lack of resources and the failure of the international community to provide support. He said the TFG leadership could overcome the current constitutional crisis by exercising leadership and wisdom. It was clear from the subsequent discussion that there was no consensus on the action to take. While most speakers encouraged support for AMISOM, the reaction to calls for contributions to a multi-national force was disappointing. Several states noted that dealing with piracy required resolving the situation in Somalia itself. As we noted last week, the Security Council's subsequent resolution (Res.1844, 2008) only covered the strengthening of the arms embargo on Somalia, specified sanctions, including an asset freeze and travel restrictions against those threatening the peace processes in Somalia or the Djibouti Agreement, the TFIs or AMISOM, and expressed its grave concern over the recent increase in piracy. ****
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Following presentations and discussion the Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué welcoming the progress achieved since 2007, including the creation of the National Electoral Commission (NEC); the carrying out of the fifth national population census; some redeployment of forces, and the signing, on 8 June this year, of the Abyei Road Map, and the steps subsequently taken to implement it. The Council, however, also noted with concern the delays in implementation of crucial components of the CPA including the demarcation of the North-South border, the remaining legislation for the elections next year, the release of the census results, and the full redeployment of forces. It urged the parties to move swiftly towards the early and full implementation of these issues, and encouraged them to continue their dialogue to resolve these. Taking into consideration the significance of CPA for the peace of Sudan, the region and the continent, and bearing in mind the challenges still facing implementation of the agreement, the Council underscored the need to follow the process closely. It therefore decided to review the status of the implementation of the CPA at least once every six months. The Council also appealed to the international community to cancel Sudan's debts and lift any economic and commercial sanctions in order to help facilitate the implementation of the CPA.
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Piracy has been
much in the headlines recently, emerging as a major security concern, with a
dramatic escalation in the frequency and scale of the attacks along the Somali
coasts. The seizure of the Sirius Star, one of the largest tankers in the world,
and carrying $100 million of Saudi Arabian oil generated intense media coverage,
as did the takeover of a Ukranian ship with its cargo of 33 tanks. This has
suddenly led to a sharp increase in the interest of the major powers, and of
European states, to patrol the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coasts. But piracy is
not by any means a recent phenomenon; only the increase in the flurry of
anti-piracy patrols by major maritime powers is new. In fact, piracy has been
emerging as a significant security issue over a number of years, especially
along the Malacca Straits and off the coasts of Somalia. Pirates have regularly
demanded and obtained substantial ransom payments. Nevertheless, the response of
the international community has, until very recently, been far from the kind of
concerted effort that the seriousness and the magnitude of the problem
warranted. Despite repeated calls for action by
governments in the sub-region, the international response has been one of benign
neglect at best. Even when action has been taken it has almost invariably been a
unilateral initiative by a state acting on behalf of one of its own ships.
Equally, the attention piracy received in the international media has been
almost marginal for a long time. For every incident that did receive publicity,
five or more would go unmentioned. There are still numerous ships marooned in
Somali ports that scarcely rate a mention. There was also a tendency for the
media to concentrate on the adventurous or even the romantic aspects of piracy.
Modern films still see pirates as glamorous.
The media have in fact barely recognized that piracy
is responsible for rising economic and financial damage, to countries as well as
to the international shipping industry, not to mention the increasing number of
victims it claims. The danger it poses to regional security and peace is real
enough. Piracy is not carried out just by rogue criminals. It often has
political or terrorist connections. There is evidence that this is the case with
terrorist groups in Somalia. On the wider level there is a growing trend of
piracy to be politicized, a trend that should be of extreme concern to the
international community. It is hardly a surprise. Piracy may begin as no more
than an economic phenomenon, but even then it has political consequences. This
is exactly what transpired in Somalia. Piracy has been fueling the insurgency,
supporting terrorism, with money from ransom of
ships going to pay for conflict in Somalia, and supplying funds to the US
terror-listed Al-Shabaab. The lack of support or indeed interest on the
part of the international community to help peace and stability further helped
to precipitate the crisis in Somalia.
In the past, the problem of piracy would have been
quickly dealt with. During the Cold War either the US or the USSR would have
reacted promptly if any of its allies had been affected by piracy, or indeed
terrorism. Indeed, before the Iraq war, the US would have been quick to respond.
Now it finds itself being criticized in the recent Cairo conference on piracy
for not sending an aircraft carrier to the Gulf of Aden and taking control of
the international effort to uproot piracy, described as "scattered" and "without
clear landmarks". Indeed, the slow response to piracy, indeed the virtual
failure, underlines just how far the international community has fallen into
disarray. Neither the International Maritime Organization, nor the UN, have been
able to act even now when the seizure of the Sirius Star has galvanized
interest. The European task force now en route to the area is unlikely to do
much more. A French general recently speaking in Djibouti claimed piracy could
not be dealt with militarily because there was a lack of international law to
fully support military action against it. That seems hard to believe, but
certainly no one has managed to do very much.
Piracy, like terrorism, has serious economic
implications and poses a significant security threat to the world. In the case
of Somalia, its causes lie firmly in the neglect of what was going on there.
Piracy, like terrorism, has been there for years. Both have been frequently
classified as of no more than local, domestic interest and therefore of no great
importance. What is happening now is certainly a case of chickens coming home to
roost. The international community must really now
be aware of the dangers that Somali pirates could become even more destructive
if they take up a role as agents of international terrorist networks. The international community has a number of options but ignoring the problem as a Somali or a regional problem alone is no longer one. It must work together with regional governments to counter the threat. The extent of the challenge and the limitations on regional governmental resources means that it is the international community that must deal with the increasing threat of maritime piracy and terrorism and invest in highly coordinated, multilateral and collaborative intervention. Unilateral initiatives by individual governments have consistently proved ineffective. There are, for example, U.S. Navy ships and marines deployed in piracy-prone areas such as Yemen, Djibouti, and Kenya. However, if past experience is any guide, little, if any, success will be achieved. The US must co-ordinate with other forces and with local authorities on a substantial scale to improve capabilities. Eventually, it is all about resources. No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Piracy is a growing menace. Ignored for years as no more than a threat to local or regional governments, it has been allowed, by the international community's double standards to grow steadily. Gradually, like terrorism, it reached epidemic proportions. Now it's time for the international community to drop its double standards, and produce the concerted international efforts needed to deal with piracy, and with terrorism, which first of all entails dealing with the problem of Somalia itself. As Foreign Minister Seyoum has said it may be possible to reduce incidents of piracy on the high seas, but no lasting solution is possible without addressing the root causes inside Somalia. ********* |