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The Saudi
Arabia - East African Forum, which aims at forging closer economic
cooperation between countries of eastern Africa and the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, kicked off on November 14th with the opening of an
exhibition staged by 50 Saudi and 20 Ethiopian companies. The
product range of Saudi exhibitors covered fruit juices, plastic
goods, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, and other items, while
the main attraction on the stands of Ethiopian exhibitors were
agricultural and horticultural products as well as traditional
clothing in modern fashion designs. The services of high profile
companies including Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Electric Power
Corporation and Dashen Bank were also on display. The exhibition,
the first of its kind, was attended by Prime Minister Meles, Ato
Kuma Demeksa, Mayor of Addis Ababa, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Saudi
Minister of Finance, Dr. Fahd Balghniam, Saudi Minister of
Agriculture, and Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Ali, President of the Islamic
Development Bank Group, as well as Mr. Bernard Makuza, the Prime
Minister of Rwanda.
The central
element of the forum was the investment conference opened by Prime
Minister Meles the next day at the UN Convention Center. The forum
was attended by the Presidents of Djibouti and Somalia, the Prime
Minster of Rwanda and the Deputy Prime Ministers of Kenya and
Uganda, together with the Ministers of Finance, Trade and
Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and Transportation of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Communication, Trade and Industry and Finance of Ethiopia as well
as other senior government officials, diplomats and business
leaders from Saudi Arabia and the Eastern African region and the
Director-General of the Tanzanian Investment Centre, were also
present.
Opening the
Forum, Prime Minister Meles expressed his appreciation to King
Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and his government for the
initiative and for the vision behind the project to build a solid
link between Saudi Arabia and the countries of East Africa. He
welcomed the Saudi Ministers and other officials and members of
their delegation for associating themselves with an historic
initiative which he said would prove a trial-blazer in the
consolidation and deepening of ties between Saudi Arabia and East
Africa. The Prime Minister also acknowledged the role of Sheikh
Mohammed Al-Amoudi ─ a Saudi and an East African ─ for his efforts
to bring this event about. The Prime Minister underlined the fact
that the potential for economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia
and the eastern African region was grossly under-utilized. He
emphasized the need to take advantage of the complementary nature
of the economies of the countries of eastern Africa and Saudi
Arabia. Other East Africa leaders also expressed their desire to
strengthen economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia, providing
details of existing economic potential in their respective
countries and inviting Saudi investors to be part of their
development efforts.
The
Saudi-East African Forum envisages increased investment in the
agricultural sector of Eastern African countries with a view to
combining Saudi financial capital and technological know-how with
the natural resources of Eastern African countries. The aim is to
help ensure food security for all concerned as well as maximize
the economic benefits to be gained from the development of the
agricultural sector of the region. The Eastern African region has
a combined population of 300 million people and has been one of
the fastest growing regions in Africa. It possess abundant natural
resources, especially in the agricultural sector, waiting to be
tapped by investors.
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The
Committee of African Heads of State and Government on
Climate Change (CAHOSCC), also known as the "Committee of
Ten", convened on November 17th at the Headquarters of the
African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, under a mandate
from 13th Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government at Sirte in July. Three countries were
represented at Heads of State and Government level, with
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, President Mwai Kibaki, and
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni present. Algeria,
Mozambique, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and South Africa
were represented at Ministerial level, and Libya and
Mauritius by their Permanent Representatives to the African
Union. The Meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Meles in
his capacity as Coordinator of CAHOSCC.
Opening
the session, Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union
Commission, emphasized that the future of Africa was at
stake. He stressed the entire continent expected concrete
results from the negotiations in Copenhagen, something far
beyond any mere declarations of good-will. Prime Minister
Meles touched upon the historic decisions made by the
African Union on this issue: the establishment of a single
delegation to represent Africa in the negotiations and the
preparation of a common African position. He noted that
Africa would engage in Copenhagen with one voice and in a
constructive manner looking for a robust, fair and practical
agreement. He emphasized that Africa had virtually
contributed nothing to global warming, but was nonetheless
placed to lose the most and to be hit first by its effects.
This is what made it imperative that Africa and its Group of
10 should do their utmost to make Copenhagen a
success.
The meeting
focused on the following key issues:
To finalize a
common position towards the global climate change negotiations
scheduled for next month in Copenhagen, within the context of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account recent developments.
To devise an
institutional mechanism for consultation among members of CAHOSCC.
While Africa's
preference at Copenhagen is, of course, to agree on a comprehensive
treaty, it should nevertheless be prepared to engage with the rest
of the international community to adopt a binding political
agreement so long as this will address all the key issues identified
in the Bali Roadmap and is consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, and
as long as any political agreement is to be followed by immediate
negotiations to provide for a comprehensive treaty. Mitigation and
adaptation were highlighted as key concerns to Africa. On
mitigation, Africa insists that the increase in global temperature
does not go beyond 2 degrees centigrade, and that global carbon
emissions should peak by 2020 at the latest. On adaptation Africa
insists that it must be compensated for the damage caused by
developed countries to the prospects of growth by African countries.
It requires that substantial funds in the form of adaptation
resources should be made available early and that Africans should
have an adequate say in the management of these funds. The funds
must be devoted to the most vulnerable regions and countries of the
world of which Africa has the largest share. A study by the UK
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change has calculated global
warming could cost Africa around 30 billion dollars by 2015; and
that the figure could rise to between 50 billion and 100 billion by
2020 because of the increasing costs of dealing with climate change.
The meeting
ended by reaffirming that AU states will be speaking with one voice
at Copenhagen next month. At the Summit level, Ethiopia will have
the responsibility of putting Africa's position, while a mechanism
will be established to coordinate ministerial activity with Nigeria
leading the expert team and Algeria the ministerial level. The
meeting noted that the African delegation will use the common
position adopted by the AU assembly in July 2009 as its basis while
taking into account any current developments in the negotiation
process.
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The
First Ethio-Djibouti High-level Joint Commission and the
10th Joint Ministerial Commission meetings were concluded
last weekend after extensive week-long bilateral discussions
and negotiations. The High-Level Joint Commission was
presided over Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President
Ismail Omar Guelleh of the Republic of Djibouti. This was
the first time the bilateral mechanism between Ethiopia and
Djibouti had been upgraded to this level and it emphasized
the depth and width of bilateral cooperation between the two
states. The only other country with which Ethiopia has this
level of bilateral mechanism is Sudan. Bilateral mechanisms
need to be commensurate with existing levels of cooperation.
The
co-operation between Djibouti and Ethiopia covers almost all
areas and the focus of the meetings was to evaluate the
implementation of existing cooperation and to address any
impediments which might have appeared in the processes. In
this regard, the joint follow-up mechanism was revitalised
and a number of new agreements were reached to allow
existing cooperation to deepen and expand. The level of
cooperation and coordination in foreign relations especially
with reference to regional peace and stability was
commended. It was agreed to enhance the level of
consultation by maintaining the regular consultation between
the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Both countries
stressed the need to revitalize IGAD as a vehicle for
regional integration as well as a mechanism to combat
illegal migration and human trafficking, both threats to
regional security.
Delegations
from both countries appreciated the growing dynamism in the areas of
economic cooperation and infrastructural development. The Power and
Fibre Optic interconnection project will be finalized soon. The
Ethio-Djibouti Railway is due to be transformed with a new standard
gauge railway envisaged. The road connections to the borders will be
upgraded. The trade relations between the two countries are strong
with people, goods and capital moving freely. It might be noted that
the flow of investment appreciated sharply after the signing of an
agreement on preferential investment and acquisition of property.
The meeting can
be seen as a milestone in our bilateral relations. Guided by the
pursuit of mutual interest it underlined the complimentary nature of
the economic interests of Djibouti and Ethiopia. The attending
delegations were guided by this spirit of mutuality and
interdependence which will help to further expand cooperation.
Ethiopia and Djibouti will continue to be pillars of stability and
prosperity and to offer a model of regional integration. In
strengthening their relations, they also contribute to the
resolution of intra- and inter-state conflicts in the region,
displaying the benefits of mutual cooperation and good
neighborliness.
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On Thursday
this week a resolution was tabled in the UN Security Council
calling for sanction on Eritrea for its activities and support of
the extremist and terrorist opposition to the TFG on Somalia. The
Resolution was immediately referred to the experts without further
discussion. It is unlikely to come up for a vote or for further
consideration before next month.
It is in
this circumstances that the track record of Eritrea suggests that
now would be the time for Asmara to resort to sweet talk.
The Eritrean leadership has never ever responded positively to
reasonable approaches and to those who are open to compromise.
Prudent approaches and flexibility in the interest of the search
for a win-win outcome are viewed by Asmara as signs of weakness.
What one should expect from Eritrea under these circumstances
is intransigence and incomprehensible stubbornness.
Unreasonableness is the signature behavior of the Eritrean
leadership. But not always and this is where many have been
making mistakes. Under this mistaken assumption many have taken
positions in the past which have not been helpful for peace in the
Horn of Africa. Assuming that the Eritrean leadership would not
budge, many have been ready to abandon principles even when it was
manifest that the position being taken by Eritrea was
unreasonable.
Many seem
to have short memories. The only time that the current Eritrean
leadership has shown some level of civility in the past was when
it was convinced that it was at the edge of the precipice looking
down into the abyss. Two episodes come to mind, both tragic
and avoidable, but which the Eritrean leadership made ineluctable.
The first event took place on a Saturday, February 27, 1999 on
the morrow of Isaias' Badme debacle. The Eritrean President
had refused to accept the OAU Framework Agreement starting from
the first week of November 1998, when the Agreement was
tabled by the OAU at Ouagadougou in the presence of both leaders
of Eritrea and Ethiopia, until February 1999. Prime Minister
Meles accepted the proposal for peace immediately ad referendum
and subsequently officially confirmed Ethiopia's acceptance within
few days after he came back to Addis Ababa from Burkina Faso.
The Eritrean
President continued to refuse to accept the OAU proposal for peace
until the liberation of Badme. Within 24 hours of that event,
perhaps mistakenly believing that the Ethiopian army would march
past Badme, the Eritrean President wrote to President Clinton, not
to the OAU Secretary-General, expressing readiness to accept the
peace proposal and appealing for a ceasefire. The Eritrean
Ambassador in New York began pestering the OAU on the need for an
urgent ceasefire.
Within a few
days, it became clear to the Eritrean President that the Ethiopian
military strategy did not intend to advance past Badme.
Immediately that became apparent Asmara reverted to its
intransigent mode. What Eritrea did at Badme, Asmara said, was a
deliberate and purposeful withdrawal in compliance with the
request made by the OAU peace proposal and since the proposal did
not require Eritrea to withdraw from the rest of occupied
Ethiopian territory, Eritrea would not pull out from those areas.
At this point, the Eritrean leadership saw no further immediate
danger; thus a new phase of intransigence and arrogance by Eritrea
began, making the later May 2000 military confrontation
unavoidable.
What happened
then was essentially a replay of February 1999 but this time many
were prepared to give Isaias a cover for his retreat. We don't
intend to get into those details but anyone interested can go back
to the three Communiques, by the UN, the OAU and by Asmara, put
out on the same day, May 24, 2000, in a well calibrated manner and
in a way which made it appear that Isaias was withdrawing his
troops in response to requests by the OAU and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The irony was that
Isaias had no troops to withdraw. They had all been defeated and
were rapidly falling back in retreat and indeed were already
back in their own territory. The tacit message sent to Ethiopia
by the UN and the OAU was that since Eritrea had already agreed to
withdraw, there was no point in continuation of Ethiopian military
activity, that is unless Addis Ababa had other ambitions. This
should be looked at in tandem with the sanctions resolution that
had already been adopted by the Security Council.
All this is
food for thought for those who continue to question the policy of
the Government with respect to how the war ended and how the
decision was made to proceed to Algiers. There are many things
that should remain unsaid for now and for some time, but in the
meantime what we should at least do is draw lessons from those
events about the behavior of the leadership in Eritrea. Both in
February 1999 and May 2000, it acted in the same predictable
manner, succumbing under duress while, in both cases,
demonstrating absolute intransigence until the last minute, and an
inability to consider what the most reasonable course of action
might be, to the point of betraying a mindset almost bordering on
the pathological.
Now, Eritrea
is, once again, being made to read the writing on the wall, but
this time not in a theater of war, rather on the diplomatic front,
at a forum which is essentially the pinnacle of international
diplomacy --- the Security Council. Should one be surprised now
if one sees a change of language in Asmara, or if the Eritrean
President begins to appear to be less arrogant than months ago?
The historical record provides the answer. But the Eritrean
leadership is not a bunch of fools. They know what is a bluff when
they see one. They are not yet absolutely convinced that what is
going on now in New York is serious business. But they cannot
rule out the possibility. So what is now happening is a reflection
of the state of mind in Asmara: a slight change in language
without any change of substance. Any real attempt at changing
policy will only come when the Security Council proves to Eritrea
that it means business. It is then that the Horn of Africa will
have moved one step forward, towards the goals of keeping
extremism at bay and defending the rule of law.
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On November
9th and 10th in Brussels, a Belgian NGO, Europe External Policy
Advisers (EEPA), organized a conference to discuss EU and US
policy on Eritrea and the Horn of Africa. Invitees included the
Italian Institute for Political Science, regional ambassadors, EU
and US officials, and Eritrean civil society leaders from the
Diaspora, but a failure to include significant Eritrean opposition
elements from the Diaspora caused considerable controversy. One
opposition group called the conference “divisive, discriminatory
and an interference in Eritrean internal affairs”. According to
EEPA’s account of the conference a wide range of issues were
covered including: an overview of Eritrea’s history in the Horn,
an analysis of EU and US policy approaches towards Eritrea and the
region, human rights concerns in Eritrea, the opening of Eritrea
to democracy, empowerment of non-state actors, the plight of
refugees, respect for the rights of ethnic and minority groups,
and respect for the freedom of religion. The conference’s focus on
Eritrea was underlined by the choice of speakers who included the
former Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Bondevik, the head of the
Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which has just produced a
devastating and detailed expose of human rights in Eritrea;
Professor Bereket Habte Selassie, the former Chairman of the
Constitutional Committee of Eritrea, in absentia, and Dan Connell,
Professor at Simmons College, Boston whose paper was entitled
“Eritrea and the US: towards a new US policy”.
As was
apparent in its conclusions and recommendations, the conference
emphasized the wider remit to cover the whole of the Horn of
Africa, raising serious questions about the intended aim of the
conference, and its methodology. In fact, the conference did make
a number of specific recommendations about human rights and
governance in Eritrea, as well as various other recommendations,
but most were carefully phrased to extend the intent from Eritrea
to the whole of the Horn of Africa, and surprisingly (and
inaccurately) making no distinctions in a number of areas between
Eritrea and other states. There were calls to strengthen non-state
actors, for the international community to put democracy and the
promotion of human rights higher on their agenda, for EU
development aid to be implemented more strictly in accordance with
the Cotonou Agreement, for the UN to appoint international
commissions of enquiry for human rights in Ethiopia and Somalia as
well as Eritrea, to work with IGAD to promote economic cooperation
and integration over food security in the Horn of Africa, to
actively support the transition to democracy in the Horn
countries, or promote civil society in Djibouti, Ethiopia and
Somalia as well as Eritrea.
Many of these
may be sensible recommendations, and all relevant to Eritrea, but
it is hard to see why the organizers diluted the focus on Eritrea
by referring to other countries, and not always applicably. The
impression left is that this was a deliberate attempt to water
down the emphasis on Eritrea and the criticisms of its present
government and leadership. This is underlined by the fact, most
surprisingly, that the conference recommendations make no
reference to Eritrea’s foreign policy activities, including the
recent detailed evidence of Eritrea’s admitted support for
terrorist and extremist organizations operating against Somalia’s
internationally recognized government, and its present efforts,
and again undisguised, to destabilize Ethiopia, Djibouti and,
reportedly, and most recently Yemen. Reports this week suggest
that arms have been reaching Yemeni opposition forces through
Eritrea. It has to be said that it is difficult to see how any
conference on Eritrea and the Horn of Africa could possibly avoid
consideration of Eritrea’s policies of external aggression.
One
recommendation deserves particular comment as it is a further
attempt to divert attention away from the activities of the
Eritrean Government. It is the first of the recommendations listed
by the EEPA: “the unconditional implementation of the final and
binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)”.
The implication of this of course is to put pressure on Ethiopia,
and the fact that this issue was raised at all in any conference
intended to consider the internal activities of the Eritrean
Government and its human rights policies, suggests the organizers
had been listening to Eritrean Government propaganda rather than
trying to fulfill the role suggested by the conference title.
The boundary
issue was the subject that formed the central element in Dan
Connell’s paper, “Eritrea and the US: towards a new US policy”.
Professor Connell was once a highly committed supporter of
President Issayas, but he now argues that the US and the EU should
support Eritrean opposition forces in exile to prepare for a
transition to a democratic government while attempting to break
down the way President Issayas supports himself in power by his
claims that Eritrea’s existence is threatened and by isolating the
population from all alternative sources of information.
Preparation for this will take a long time and Professor Connell
believes the Eritrean opposition has a long way to go before it is
ready. Where it becomes difficult to follow Professor Connell is
when he suddenly suggests that democratization either in Eritrea
or among Eritrean opposition in the Diaspora must be linked to the
border dispute. He says that the US and the EU should move
“aggressively” to pressure Ethiopia to implement the Boundary
Commission Decisions. Interestingly one of the Eritrean
commentators on the conference thought that the real aim of the
meeting was for the Eritrean government, through the EEPA, to
emphasize just this point, to loosen the diplomatic siege that
Eritrea is currently facing.
Exactly how
Mr. Connell can reach this conclusion is difficult to say as he
also notes, quite correctly, that the war in 1998 was an attempt
by President Issayas to dominate the politics of the Horn, and
admits that a resolution of the boundary question will not resolve
this. He also calls for pressure on Eritrea to implement its
constitution, release political prisoners, and protect religious
groups. This would provide the ground work for free and fair
elections, but he then adds that it would be extremely unlikely
for the government to act on any such reforms while President
Issayas remains in power.
There are two
issues here, one of fact, the other of intent. The Boundary
Commission’s Decisions on the Eritrea Ethiopia border were
announced in 2002. Ethiopia, despite some serious reservations,
accepted them in full in 2004, making it clear it was prepared to
hold an immediate dialogue with Eritrea to implement the decisions
and normalize relations. The Eritrean Government refused any
discussions as it has done consistently since, or to consider any
approach to normalization. Rather, it set about systematically
dismantling the peace process, taking over the Temporary Security
Zone created by the Algiers Peace Agreements in 2000 to divide the
two armies, and in 2008 forcing the UN Mission to Eritrea and
Ethiopia (UNMEE) to leave the TSZ whose security UNMEE was
supposed to guarantee. In effect, these actions tore up the
Algiers Agreement and despite all efforts by Ethiopia, by others
countries, and by the UN, Eritrea has consistently refused to hold
any dialogue with Ethiopia, to make any effort to normalize
relations, to restore the status quo ante in the TSZ or to
reactivate the Algiers Agreements. Rather, it has systematically
made efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and now
Yemen, claiming to be “frustrated” over the failure of the
international community to enforce implementation of the Boundary
Commission's decisions, a failure for which it has itself been
largely responsible.
There is in
fact no link between the resolution of the Boundary Commission’s
Decisions and Eritrea’s continual regional aggression and support
for extremist and opposition elements in neighboring countries.
Nor has there ever been, except in Eritrean propaganda claims.
Eritrean foreign policy is dictated by its own hegemonic
aspirations and by internal considerations, which have no direct
relevance to the Boundary Commission Decisions. As numerous
observers have noted, the Eritrean Government’s refusal to
implement the Decisions or normalize relations means the regime
can consistently claim it is in a state of war with Ethiopia. In
this context it is worth repeating that it was Eritrea which
started the conflict in May 1998 by invading Ethiopia, as the
Claims Commission has emphasized, and it has been Eritrea which
has refused to implement the peace process and normalize
relations. This has provided the Government of Eritrea with its
excuses to refuse to implement the Eritrean Constitution, approved
by the National Assembly in 1997, to refuse to allow political
parties, or elections, to close down all independent media in the
country (Eritrea currently holds bottom place on the World Press
Freedom Index), and to continue with conscription for all 18-50
year olds (with virtually no demobilization since 1997), putting
the vast majority of the population under military law, and giving
President Issayas carte blanche to destroy the organs of civil
society.
The other
aspect of this argument is that, whether intended or not, it would
give the Eritrean Government and President Issayas what he wants
and would encourage Eritrea in its policies of belligerence and
his efforts to acquire regional hegemony. As even Professor
Connell admits President Issayas will not change his character.
Deliberately pandering to the remote possibility that he might do
so, can only be seen as unhelpful to regional peace and security.
The first stage in looking for this must be to control the
destabilizing activities of Eritrea. The current policies of the
EU and the US which essentially ignore this must be changed. An
obvious start would be to support the requests of IGAD, the
regional organization, and of the AU, the continental
organization, for targeted sanctions. Eritrea’s ability to cause
damage in the region must first be limited before it will be
possible to encourage even limited engagement with Eritrea or work
towards the construction of a stable and democratic regime in
Eritrea. A very good place to start would be for the US and the EU
to intensify the pressure on Eritrea, to act in a civilized and
peaceful manner.
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Common
sense, based on empirical facts, not wishful thinking,
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the establishment of
sustainable peace and security in Somalia requires three
things. One is a viable central government that is the
outcome of an inclusive and legitimate political process and
is capable of delivering the basic services that any
citizenry can reasonably expect from its government.
Secondly, such a government needs international support for
its financial and security needs to deal with the activities
of those bent on violence to try and spread their extremist
ideology, and enable it to gradually establish its authority
over the territory of the country. The third requirement is
that the international community should be prepared to take
a firm stand and act against those acting as ‘spoilers’.
The
facts, and the needs of government, are clear enough.
Unfortunately, common sense doesn’t always seem to prevail
among academic circles, particularly those who try to
elaborate sophisticated analyses and look for trendy “out of
the box” solutions which ignore historical facts and the
reality on the ground. A typical example of this was the
recent article on Somalia by Ms. Bronwyn Bruton in the
November/December issue of Foreign Relations. Using faulty
assumptions and avoiding much of the evidence about the
situation on the ground, Ms. Bruton’s latest piece suggests
the US should make certain highly speculative policy shifts.
If applied, all the indications are that these would
actually shatter any prospect of sustainable peace and
security in Somalia.
In essence, Ms.
Bruton advocates two things. The first is a so-called policy of
"constructive disengagement". This would involve abandoning the idea
of a central government authority and concentrating any (minimal)
assistance on a bottom-up governance strategy through support to
community-based development efforts. The second element would be a
de-listing of specific individuals and organizations, including Al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam, from the list of international terrorists as part
of a campaign to entice them away from conflict and extremism to
join the process of peace and reconciliation. Ms. Bruton argues that
Washington must learn to co-exist with Al-Shabaab as this movement
is “a coalition of fortune” and is therefore susceptible to
realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest way to
create these conditions is to open the door to co-existence with
western powers. The basic problem of this proposed shift is of
course that there is absolutely no evidence from present activities
or past history that provides any reason to suppose these
organizations or individuals might consider seriously this idea for
a moment. In fact, all indications are entirely to the contrary.
Most recently, Al –Shabaab for example declared its intention of
carrying out terrorist activities in Uganda and Burundi, in South
Africa, Kenya, Djibouti, Ghana, the United States and Israel; it has
already extended its activities to Somaliland and Puntland. It is
very obvious that any such effort would certainly encourage these
groups and worsen the situation in Somalia, probably to a point of
no return.
In fact, the
recommendations put forward by Ms. Bruton appear premised on the
idea that Somalis are somehow different from everyone else and
unlike others do not want or need a functional government, at least
for the time being, because they disagree about questions as
fundamental as the form of the State, whether it should be unitary,
federal or confederal, and about the nature of the judicial system,
whether it should be wholly Islamic or remain a hybrid of Shari’a
and secular justice. Frankly, the suggestion that Somalis are unlike
others and are apparently incapable of working out their differences
of finding a political solution that can accommodate their
differences, is insulting to say the least. Ms. Bruton ought to be
aware that the current Transitional Federal Government is the result
of a long, arduous and inclusive political process, which brought
together all sections of Somali society under the auspices of the
international community. The most recent extension of the process
was the Djibouti Agreement of last year. Neither the legitimacy nor
the all-inclusive and representative nature of the TFG is not in
doubt.
Ms. Bruton’s
second set of recommendations is based on the argument that, under
current conditions, any efforts to create a viable central
government by supporting the TFG and rejecting extremism is a recipe
for prolonging the conflict. Ms. Bruton suggests that the effect of
resisting extremism and terrorism is to radicalize and unite groups
and individuals who would otherwise be competing against each other
or who could, with the right incentive, be persuaded to follow a
peaceful path and support the Government. This is apparently based
on the erroneous and naive belief that these hardened terrorists,
some of whom have received training in Afghanistan, can be somehow
be appeased and be persuaded to cast aside their extremism and their
religious beliefs. To characterize someone like Sheikh Dahir Aweys
in these terms as a pragmatic political figure seems exceptionally
reckless. This is a man who participated in the Al Qaeda bombings of
the U.S. Embassies of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, which left
scores of innocent civilians dead, and who praised the suicide car
bombings of September 2009 in Mogadishu in which 21 peacekeepers
were killed and who called for more of the same. His background in
terrorism goes back to the terrorist activities of Al-Itihaad Al
Islamiya in Ethiopia in the 1990s. Putting the blame for this sort
of unjustifiable terrorism on the involvement of the international
community in Somalia, rather than on the actual criminals who
actually boast of their actions, does seem to be perverse at the
very least.
The policy
shift that Ms. Bruton is recommending is based on the idea that the
threat posed and the violence perpetrated by extremists in Somalia
is actually hyped up more than it deserves. She, and others, suggest
that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign Jihadists, and
that the acknowledged presence of Al Qaeda operatives in Somalia,
though alarming, does not mean that transnational terrorism is
really present or will spread. These arguments are simply untenable.
They are obviously contrary to the actual situation on the ground
and denied by all credible intelligence reports. Indeed,
intelligence reports suggest that in Somalia today there are
currently thousands of foreign jihadist fighters under the banner of
Al Qaeda including large numbers in the eight training camps run by
Al-Shabaab. According to a senior Al-Shabaab commander, Sheikh
Mohamed Sheikh Abdullah, who defected earlier this month, many come
from Kenya as well as hundreds from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chechnya,
Sudan and Tanzania.
One only has to
look at publicly available records including the testimony of
intelligence experts to the US Congress or listen to the tape
recordings of Al Qaeda's number two, Sheikh Zawaheri, expressing
support to these fighters and instructing them to continue their
actions. Similarly, the pledge of allegiance by these groups in
Somalia to Al Qaeda is a matter of public record. The last recording
issued by Al Shabaab under the explicit title "At your service
Osama" speaks for itself. This is a very clear repudiation all the
arguments that Somalia is somehow inhospitable to Al Qaeda and that
it could not possibly become a safe haven for terrorist groups.
The fact is
that Somalia will become more and more safe and acceptable for Al
Qaeda so long as its ‘foot-soldiers’, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam,
remain undefeated and able to operate. But they can be defeated. It
has happened before as in 1996/1997 when the parent organization of
these groups, Al-Itihaad Al Islamiya was soundly defeated and
collapsed. It can certainly happen again but it needs concrete
action and firm resolution from the international community not Ms.
Bruton’s allegedly “constructive disengagement”.
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