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A
hopeful sign in Somalia, but the need for urgent international
action remains paramount
The
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations for Somalia, Mr. Charles Petrie visited Mogadishu
this week. The UN representative met with Prime Minister Omar
Sharma'arke and other TFG ministers, pledging to open the UN
Office in Mogadishu as soon as possible. He said the international
contact group for Somalia and the UN Security Council would
be meeting soon to discuss how to disburse the funds pledged
by the international community at the Brussels Conference in
April, quickly. This can only be characterized as a positive
development, but the need for urgent and concrete action remains.
Recent
events have underlined the point. In central Somalia, in the
Hiiraan region, the town of Belet Weyne has again changed hands
with one of the extremist opposition groups, Hizbul Islam, retaking
control. Hizbul Islam's presence has, however, not been welcomed
by the local population with elders and a local MP, Hussein
Haji Mohamed "Gagale" speaking out publicly against
the presence of Hizbul Islam in Belet Weyne. There have been
reports that the previous governor of Hiiraan region, Sheikh
Abdirahman Ma'ow, who had been linked to Hizbul Islam has now
joined Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a which has been fighting successfully
against Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab terrorists in neighbouring
regions. The government in Mogadishu this week reported the
defection of a prominent Al-Shabaab commander, Sheikh Mohamed
Sheikh Abdullahi “Pakistan” to the government. At
a welcoming ceremony in the Prime Minister's office, Sheikh
Mohamed said he had left Al-Shabaab because the organization
had committed anti-Islamic activities, including the beheading
of innocent people. Al-Shabaab this week distributed a document
demanding any aid organization operating in the areas of Bat
and Bakool regions should follow a list of eleven strict rules.
These include a ban on promoting democracy, a requirement to
fire all women and replace them with men within three months,
a refusal to allow Sunday as a day off and a ban on celebrating
Christmas as well as a ban on alcohol and movies, and the removal
of all logos from vehicles. The agencies will also have to pay
fees of $40,000 a year.
The
events in Hiiraan clearly demonstrate the need for the international
community to make good on its promises to the TFG, in terms
of economic and security assistance, so that the TFG can reinvigorate
its fight against those 'spoilers' driven by a jihadist ideology
and bent on causing havoc. The UN Security Council needs to
act with the greatest sense of urgency to curb the activities
of these 'spoilers' intent on destabilizing Mogadishu and other
parts of Somalia by imposing sanctions against Al-Shabaab and
Hizbul Islam, and their backers.
Meanwhile
it is just over a year since five terrorist bombs hit Hargeisa
in Somaliland, and Bosasso in Puntland. Among the targets, which
included the Ethiopian Trade Office and the presidential Palace,
was a UN facility in Hargeisa where the explosion of car bombs
caused the death of two UN staff members and the injury of six
others. On 29 October 2009, the UN held a commemoration ceremony
in Hargeisa. The attacks serve as a stark reminder of the need
to remain constantly vigilant about activities of extremists.
Although Somaliland has been, by and large, peaceful and stable,
the threats persist from groups such as Al Shabaab, whose agenda
as part of the global jihadist movement, goes far beyond Somalia.
A number of Al-Shabaab come from Somaliland, including its leaders.
A number of recent terrorist operations, including assassinations
in Puntland this week, emphasize the problem.
It
underlines once again the need for urgent action by the international
community without further delay and the necessity for active
support for governance wherever it is effective, through the
TFG, in Somaliland and Puntland or through local committees
and civil society structures. It is this which will provide
for the political and administrative reconstruction necessary,
provide the resources for reconciliation and for incentives
to help local communities counter the threats posed by terrorist
organizations.
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This
week's Ethio-Djibouti Joint Commission meeting
The
Ethiopian Djibouti Joint Ministerial Commission held its 10th
meeting this week in Addis Ababa with Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Minister
of Foreign Affairs leading the Ethiopian delegations and Djibouti's
delegation headed by Mr. Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic
of Djibouti. The relations and interests of Ethiopia and Djibouti
are intertwined in numerous ways. They are ties together by
history, geography and kinship as well as having mutually interdependent
interests in trade and communication which necessitates close
and sustainable cooperation. Both countries also face a common
problem in their neighbour, Eritrea. It is in light of these
links that Ethiopia and Djibouti have been holding regular meetings
of the Joint Ministerial Commission. The Commission provides
a mechanism for the coordination of cooperation and allows for
reviews of the status of the implementation of their ongoing
cooperation. It also offers the opportunity to explore further
areas for cooperation.
In
advance of the Ministerial level meeting, senior officials and
experts reviewed the current status of cooperation and present
levels of implementation in political and security areas, in
the economic, trade, transport, infrastructure, and social spheres.
The Ministerial meeting deliberated on the report and recommendations
presented by senior officials, and devised ways and means to
deepen existing friendly relations and to ensure full implementation
of the existing bilateral agreements. Both sides agreed to exert
all possible efforts to strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation
and to revitalize all the bilateral committees at every level.
The ministers emphasized the need to synchronize efforts to
strengthen cooperation for the mutual benefit of the two peoples
and for the peace and stability of the region. To expand the
areas of cooperation, agreements covering education and health
sectors were signed. Minister Seyoum and Mr. Mohamoud Ali Youssouf
also took the opportunity to exchange views on the political
and security situation of the region.
As this week in the Horn is going to press, the two delegations
were having their last session at which the leaders of the two
countries are present. It is expected that the two leaders will
approve the recommendation by the joint ministerial commission
to raise the level of the commission into a high level forum
to be led by the two leaders. This is a demonstration of the
readiness of the two countries to promote the cooperation between
the two countries to a higher level. A communiqué from
the joint commission will be issued in the following hours.
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Eritrea’s greatest
fear: the peace, democracy and unity of Ethiopia
The
regime in Eritrea talks endlessly about Ethiopia. One of the
favourite pastimes on Dehai and other official websites is to
give publicity to what it claims are Ethiopia's political or
economic difficulties. Negative reports are told and retold
to the Eritrean public and any Ethiopians who watch Eritrean
TV. Not surprisingly, given the Eritrean government's media
reputation, such aimless propaganda is viewed with disdain.
The public in both countries are fully aware of the situation
in Eritrea, and know that these stories emanate from a group
of people who are actually responsible for holding its own public
as hostages and in complete isolation from neighbours and from
the rest of the world.
Indeed,
the regime in Asmara is now in the dock of world public opinion
and before the United Nations Security Council for repeated
acts of destabilization threatening international peace and
security in the Horn of Africa. Its repeated attacks against
its neighbours with Djibouti being the latest victim, has shown
the regime’s propensity for violent and unprovoked attacks
on others. The reckless group running Eritrea has for far too
long been excused as a new country with little international
experience. However, after 16 years patience has finally begun
to run out. This was first apparent in the Horn of Africa in
the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Then
the entire African continent stood together against a regime
and a group that is only prepared to acknowledge force as the
means to resolve disputes. It operates as the antithesis to
peace. Worse, Eritrea openly supports terrorist groups. The
regime's gravest fear is that peace in the region would remove
its last lame excuse for postponing constitutional government
in Eritrea. It is afraid that with peace, and an army finally
demobilized, the Eritrean people would demand immediate changes
in their situation. It would no longer continue to accept, however
unwillingly, the forced conscription and the slave-like labours
of the country's youth, depriving them of educational opportunities.
The
Eritrean regime has been long on record that it does not consider
democracy to be applicable to the people of Eritrea. It appears
to have the extraordinary notion that as long as the government
considers the country to have foreign foes, it can refuse to
allow any system of free political expression or divergent views.
It has repeatedly said that multi-party democracy, freedom of
expression and indeed most other human and democratic rights,
are not necessarily the best ways to ensure good governance
in the country. Eritrea, of course, has neither a free press
nor any opposition. Both are forbidden. All those who dare to
express critical views are dealt with utmost severity. The latest
report on human rights in Eritrea claims there are at least
ten thousand political prisoners. As a result, democracy in
Ethiopia is viewed by the regime in Eritrea as a grave threat,
with Eritrea's immediate neighbour setting an “unfortunate”
example. In fact, the success of democratization in Ethiopia
is viewed by the regime in Eritrea as a very real threat to
its own tight grip on power. Moreover, with democracy taking
firm root in Ethiopia the possibilities of subversion lessen
sharply as the system makes it far less likely that any discontented
group would be prepared to serve as agents for Eritrea’s
efforts of destabilization.
The
most laughable aspect of current Eritrean propaganda is the
claim that the Eritrean regime stands for Ethiopia’s unity.
Eritrea is making this ridiculous declaration while it simultaneously
organizes and arms terrorist elements against Ethiopia. It is
supporting such elements with the intention of trying to install
puppets to implement its aim of gaining illegal economic advantages.
Gullible groups among Ethiopians abroad and others espousing
extremist views have allowed themselves to be used as pawns
by the regime in Asmara in efforts to destabilize Ethiopia.
It has continued in such policies despite the repeated evidence
of failure. The fact is that the federal constitutional system
in Ethiopia, about which Eritrea is so critical, has strengthened
the unity of the country. Unity is now built on the full recognition
of the history, culture, language and political status of each
of the peoples and nations in the country.
These
differences in attitude towards democracy, peace and unity in
fact largely explain Eritrea's attack on Ethiopia in May 1998,
an unprovoked attack concealed as a boundary dispute. It's a
technique Eritrea has used again and again. A boundary issue
was used by Eritrea to wage war against Djibouti and others
as well as Ethiopia. At the same time it has been an issue used
by the apologists of Eritrea to try to justify Eritrea’s
flagrant and consistent breaches of the UN Charter. It does
of course provide nothing of the kind. Eritrea's aggression
towards its neighbours and its support for terrorism and destabilization
has no relationship to any boundary dispute, and even less to
its internal repression. It is high time, indeed long overdue,
and essential for the people of Eritrea and the Horn of Africa,
for the international community to finally hold Eritrea to account,
to push the Eritrean regime to allow the people of Eritrea to
exercise the basic human and democratic rights they have been
denied so long, and provide for a peaceful future for the Horn
of Africa.
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The Fourth Ministerial Conference
of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
The
Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) was held on Monday and Tuesday this week in Sharm-El-Sheikh,
Egypt, and its opening session was attended by 15 Heads of State
and Government from invited countries and the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission. Participants included Foreign
Ministers and Economic Cooperation Ministers from 49 African
states. The Ethiopian delegation was led by Prime Minister Meles,
invited to the conference in his capacity as the chair of IGAD.
Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ato Sufian
Ahmed, Minister of Finance participated in the Ministerial Conference.
During
the conference, Mr. Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of the Peoples
Republic of China, announced eight new measures to be implemented
over the next three years to strengthen China-Africa Cooperation.
These included proposals to foster China Africa partnerships
in such areas as climate change, science and technology, financing
capacity, trade, agriculture, health, human resources development
and the expansion of people to people and cultural exchanges.
China will build one hundred clean energy projects involving
solar power, bio-gas and small hydro power, carry out a hundred
joint demonstration projects on scientific and technological
research, and provide US $10 billion in concessional loans to
African countries to help build up their financing capacity
as well as providing zero-tariff treatment to 95% of the products
from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of Africa. It has
further pledged to increase the number of agricultural technological
demonstration centers in Africa to twenty, provide medical equipment
and anti-malaria materials worth RMB 500 million, and train
at least 20,000 professionals.
At
the conclusion of the conference two documents were adopted.
These were the Declaration of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Sharm
El-Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) for FOCAC. The Declaration
is a document in which China and Africa affirmed their commitment
to deepen their partnership in a spirit of political equality,
mutual trust and economic win-win cooperation. The Action Plan
spells out agreed areas of cooperation between the two sides,
and covers political and international affairs, economic cooperation
and development as well as cultural and people to people exchanges
and cooperation.
The
fourth FOCAC Ministerial conference was a complete success.
It demonstrated once again that China's practical and concrete
support to Africa's development has continued in full swing.
As Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in his remarks at the opening
of the conference, the "golden era" of our partnership
is beginning. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, further stated that
the vibrant partnership between Africa and China is based on
two fundamental principles which are the principle of solidarity
between Africa and China and the principle of seeking win-win
solutions. The principle of solidarity which had been abundantly
manifested during the anti colonial struggle of Africa is, the
Prime Minister continued, the basic structure through which
Africa-China partnership is expressed. He said that the principle
of seeking win-win solutions operates within the framework of
solidarity and reflects the commitment of the two sides to ensure
mutual benefit in each other's engagement rather than the maximization
of benefits to one or the other side.
Prime
Minister Meles further said that there are some who worry that
in the current gloomy international environment of economic
and financial crisis that this uniquely successful partnership
might falter. He stressed that he has no such worry and that
the best days of Africa-China partnership are ahead of us. In
this connection, he said "the continued success of China
makes it possible for us to guide our partnership to a new and
even higher level." He also said that the continued growth
of China and the accelerated improvement in the income of Chinese
workers mean that because of higher labor costs, some industries
in China would become less competitive and may necessitate their
relocation to places such as Africa. African leaders should
take necessary measures to benefit from such opportunities and
seek win-win solutions. Hence, his conclusion that he believes
"the golden era of China-Africa partnership is just beginning."
The
FOCAC was launched in October 2000 as a platform for collective
consultation, dialogue and partnership to strengthen friendly
relations and jointly meet the challenges of the Millennium
Development Goals. The first Ministerial Conference was held
in Beijing that month adopting the Beijing Declaration and the
Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social
Development to provide a framework for the establishment of
a new type of long-term stable partnership based on equality
and mutual benefit between Africa and China, and a blueprint
for cooperation. Subsequent ministerial meetings were held in
Addis Ababa in December 2003 and in Beijing in November 2006,
preceding the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC which adopted an action
plan aiming to boost bilateral cooperation to a higher level
and strengthen cooperation in politics, economy, international
affairs and social development.
During
his stay in Sharm El-Sheikh, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also
held talks with the President of Egypt, Mr. Mohammed Hosny Mubarak,
and discussed bilateral, regional and international issues of
common concern. The Prime Minister also exchanged views with
Mr. Wen Jiabao on bilateral issues specifically on the further
strengthening of existing economic cooperation between China
and Ethiopia in infrastructure, hydro electric power projects,
telecom development, road construction and in new areas of cooperation,
including the sugar industry.
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US
Policy in Somalia: She gets it wrong again
Articles
in Foreign Policy magazine carry a certain cachet. The magazine
believes, no doubt correctly, that it has influence on Congressional
deliberations and on administration policy makers. Inevitably
there will be interest with an article beginning “The
US Government needs to change its Somalia policy – and
fast” (“In the Quick sands of Somalia”, Bronwyn
Bruton, Foreign Affairs Vol.88 no.6 November/December 2009).
Interest becomes concern, however, when the argument is based
on serious distortions and numerous inaccuracies. There is a
pattern of error, exaggeration and simplification, even a sublime
disregard for inconsistencies and contradiction. These start
on the first page. Al-Shabaab is not “a radical youth
militia” (as indeed the article makes clear later) nor
are its terrorist actions “isolated incidents”.
Ms. Bruton, showing an exaggerated respect for the rhetoric
of TFG opponents, claims any international action in Somalia
will reinforce an “anti-Western culture in Somalia”,
even adding that boosting AMISOM's strength is “a fool's
errand”. This is a view drawn directly from the output
of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam who wish to see the withdrawal
of support from the TFG and from the AU peacekeeping force,
AMISOM. It was AMISOM which prevented their Eritrean-backed
effort to seize power in May in Mogadishu. It is also a view
propagated by some Somali intellectuals in the Diaspora and
certain clan leaders dissatisfied with President Sheikh Sharif's
division of ministries and offices to their clan, or themselves.
In
August, Ms. Bruton wrote a very similar piece for the Council
for Foreign Relations “The US Policy shift needed in the
Horn of Africa”. We drew attention then to a number of
the errors in A Week in the Horn (“Rethink US policy perhaps,
but forget the analysts”, 14.8.2009 www.mfa.gov.et). In
this, as in earlier pieces for the CFR, and this latest article
in Foreign Affairs, the central problem of Ms. Bruton's analysis
is her unquestioning acceptance of opposition claims with no
apparent effort at verification or investigation, repeatedly
seeing events through the prism of opposition to the TFG from
the supporters of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, even using these
sources to explain US policies.
Ms.
Bruton is certainly raising issues of concern in looking at
questions over how to confront terrorism in Somalia and on how
to deal with the issue of governance in Somalia. Her solution,
however, is both drastic and implausible, and hardly likely
to improve stability in either Somalia or the region: the US
should withdraw support from the TFG, but promote development
without regard to governance, limiting counter-terrorist efforts
to monitoring and “de-radicalisation” in co-operation
with local populations. Ms. Bruton admits the results might
not be palatable to Washington. Indeed, she might have pointed
out that her suggestions appear to be aimed directly at giving
the extremist factions a victory and leaving an Al Qaeda-linked
Al-Shabaab in control, with increased numbers of active terrorist
training bases, and terrorist activities spreading in the region,
and indeed more widely.
It
might be noted that Fazul Mohammed, the Al Qaeda operative who
planned the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 2008
with over 200 dead, has just been appointed head of Al Qaeda
in East Africa at a ceremony held in Kismayo, the southern Somali
port controlled by Al-Shabaab. This gives added point to the
latest Al-Shabaab threats to expand its activities outside Somalia,
to attack Uganda and Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti, as well as
South Africa, Ghana, Israel and the US. Al-Shabaab, of course,
attempted to bomb an army base in Australia earlier this year,
and carried out bombings in Somaliland and Puntland in October
last year, following these up with other operations more recently.
Rather unconvincingly, Al-Shabaab recently included Eritrea
in its list of potential target: unconvincing because Eritrea,
as part of its persistent efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, is
the main supporter of attempts by Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
extremist forces to overthrow the TFG as it demonstrated in
May, and has been the main external 'spoiler' of international
efforts to resolve Somalia's problems. Eritrea's significant
role in Somalia's chaos and confusion is totally ignored by
Ms. Bruton here and her failure to consider the role of Eritrea
in the region is one of the major lacunae in this and in her
previous papers for the Council for Foreign Relations.
Ms.
Bruton's analysis is based on numerous errors, many propagated
by opposition to the TFG and supporters of extremism in Somalia.
The ICU did not bring “unparalleled stability” to
Mogadishu in 2006 as was demonstrated by the immediate and total
rejection of the movement by the general population and by a
majority of clan leaders and the business community at the end
of December. She seriously exaggerates its support in Mogadishu,
the degree of order it generated and entirely fails to mention
that the replication of sharia courts outside Mogadishu was
largely imposed by military force. She ignores Eritrea's role
in trying to build up the ICU forces as a threat to Ethiopia,
the ICU's call for a jihad against Ethiopia or the resurrection
of Somali irredentist claims against Ethiopia, Djibouti and
Kenya. Incidentally, far from selling the idea of an Al Qaeda
controlled ICU to the US in 2006, Ethiopia made every effort
to open talks with ICU leaders during 2006, a total of eight
meetings were held, the last only days before the ICU's declaration
of war.
Ms.
Bruton's account of events after December 2006 is simplistic
and exaggerated as well as frequently inaccurate. TFG and Ethiopian
forces made significant headway against Al-Shabaab and extremist
forces in Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008. It would have required
minimum effort to check this in independent sources. It is a
pity Ms. Bruton did not do so. Reconciliation efforts have been
at the center of TFG efforts at governance since its inception,
and more particularly since early 2007. One might also note
the continued involvement of Ethiopia in such efforts in Mogadishu
throughout 2007-2009, something of which Ms. Bruton appears
unaware. She suggests human rights abuse, allegedly confined
to TFG and Ethiopian forces and US air strikes, led to jihadists
from the Middle East pouring into Somalia and forcing Ethiopia
to withdraw its forces in early 2009. She ignores the clan dimensions
of the conflict, the tactics of Al-Shabaab and other extremist
elements in Mogadishu and their widespread tactics of human
rights abuse including their admitted targeting of civilians,
and the political developments in the Djibouti peace process
which allowed Ethiopia to withdraw its troops in January this
year when President Sheikh Sharif was elected President. One
might add that Sheikh Sharif's willingness to engage with Ethiopia
has only damaged him with a very small ideological minority
not in the eyes of the general public.
Incidentally,
it is deeply disturbing to see a reputable academic publication
continuing to allow references to Ethiopia's “invasion”
of Somalia or its “occupation” of Mogadishu. Ethiopia
was involved in Somalia at the invitation of the TFG and helped
in security issues in Mogadishu but most of the action against
Al-Shabaab and extremists in Mogadishu was carried out by the
TFG with Ethiopian support. It was not an occupation by any
stretch of the imagination. Nor, despite Ms. Bruton's claims,
did Ethiopian forces engage in “rampant human rights abuses”
whether firing of mortars at hospitals or indiscriminate shelling
of civilians. At no point did Ethiopian forces deliberately
aim at civilians.
Al-Shabaab
did not appear in 2002. The original impetus behind its formulation
came from former Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya leaders and it might
be noted that the core elements were a group who had gone to
fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan, several sent by Sheikh
'Aweys' in the early 2000s. Ms. Burton, ignoring the numerous
claims of abuse committed by Al-Shabaab and other extremist
forces, even suggests most excessive actions have been carried
out by “illiterate children” rather than by “radical
leaders”. This is a claim for which there is no evidence
and no probability, and there is absolutely no reason to designate
Al-Shabaab as no more than “ a brutal local political
movement” as Ms. Bruton would apparently like us to do.
Al-Shabaab didn't recruit “a host of angry, desperate,
young fighters” radicalised by US and Ethiopian atrocities,
though it did raise some of its forces from ordinary clan militias
through its ability to pay its fighters and by calling on clan
alliances. More significantly, it also brought in some outsiders,
experienced terrorists, through its links with Al Qaeda.
It
wasn't the Bush administration which made Somalia a front against
terrorism. Terrorism in Somalia, and the region, goes back a
lot further. Ms. Bruton claims Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya was defunct
by the mid 1990s, but her view of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya is
almost entirely wrong. “Most of the country” did
not fall under its control at any stage and its capacity for
external terrorist activity was largely destroyed by Ethiopia's
cross-border operations into Gedo region in 1996 and 1997, after
Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya carried out a whole series of terrorist
bombings in eastern Ethiopia and in Addis Ababa in the mid-1990s.
Equally, Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya did not become “essentially
defunct” nor disappear though it was forced to leave Gedo
region. Elements of it participated in the Islamic Courts and
subsequently reappeared in Hizbul Islam, chaired by Sheikh Hassan
Dahir 'Aweys', Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya's military commander in
the 1990s. Hizbul Islam also includes the Ras Kamboni brigade,
headed by Sheikh Hussein 'Turki', another Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya
military leader in the 1990s. These are the people that Ms.
Bruton suggests are interested in accommodation with the TFG
in Somalia today, despite their own repeated statements to the
contrary. It shouldn't be necessary to remind her that Sheikh
'Aweys', after two years in Eritrea, arrived back in Mogadishu
in April this year with a couple of plane loads of arms to launch,
together with Al-Shabaab, an attempted overthrow of the TFG.
Ms.
Bruton makes virtually no mention of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a apart
from repeating an Al-Shabaab claim that it had been given support
by Ethiopia. It hasn't, as any reference to Ahlu Sunna would
confirm. It might also be noted that far from playing the disruptive
religious role Ms. Bruton suggests, the role of Ahlu Sunna has
been one of moderation and mediation, of stabilization in contrast
to Al-Shabaab. Ms. Burton seriously underestimates its influence,
its numbers and the extent of its support.
Of
greatest concern perhaps, is the superstructure that Ms. Burton
has built upon these errors, and the use she wishes to which
she wants to put it. She claims Al-Shabaab is part of a “coalition
of fortune [and] susceptible to re-alignment” and that
therefore the US should live with it. Ms. Bruton tries to disassociates
Sheikh 'Aweys' from Al-Shabaab ideologically, arguing that he
is an opportunist who would be prepared to de-link Hizbul Islam
from Al-Shabaab if the US would take him off its terrorist list.
Her assertion that Sheikh 'Aweys' has “expressed a keen
desire to be taken off the [terrorist] list” may be true
but the views consistently expressed by Sheikh 'Aweys' paint
a very different picture of his aims and intentions. Ms. Bruton
claims it is in the US interest to distinguish between the different
extremist elements arguing that “this would mean not taking
all pro-Al-Shabaab rhetoric at face value” but this is
exactly what she has already done in suggesting that the US
should support the removal of AMISOM, disband the TFG or most
bizarrely relocate it outside Somalia. These proposals arise
from the belief of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam that it is only
AMISOM which prevents their successful takeover of power in
Mogadishu. It is a rather obvious attempt to achieve their own
agenda by other than military means.
Ms.
Bruton claims it is accepted wisdom that “almost any international
action is likely to reinforce the Somalis' anti-western posture”.
It is not. It is a view that might provide ammunition for the
propaganda of Al-Shabaab and its supporters outside Somalia,
but it bears little relationship to the reality on the ground
and the views of a majority of Somalis. The anti-US sentiment
to which Ms. Bruton refers is not the product of a majority
of ordinary feeling in Somalia so much as the views of an ideological
and intellectual leadership among small, if highly vocal extremist
factions in Somalia and in the Diaspora. Ms. Burton's attempt
to pick up on Chester Croker's apposite phrase “constructive
engagement”, with her “constructive disengagement”
is clever but amounts to no more than a synonym for abandoning
Somalia and the TFG, a policy which would have widespread ramifications
in the region, in Africa and among US allies globally. Ms. Bruton's
failure to consider any of the possible repercussions indicates
her suggestions are, to put it mildly, useless and even dangerous.
No doubt, it is useful to try to think out of the box, if indeed
there is a need to re-evaluate the policy of the international
community toward Somalia. We say the policy of the international
community because, the policy the US is following in Somalia
at present is more or less in line with the consensus within
the international community. It is a position supported by IGAD,
the AU, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference and the UN.
While the possibility might not be ruled out, it is unlikely
for all these to be wrong. What Ms. Bruton is suggesting is
adopting an irresponsible stance which will have no possibility
of advancing the cause of peace and stability in Somalia, nor
of promoting US interest.
What
is most striking about Ms. Bruton’s approach is how she
continues to run away from facts that do not support her major
thesis. The fact that the Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya was defeated
and, to all intents and purposes, was destroyed as a fighting
force by Ethiopian troops in 1996 is a historical fact which
might serve as an inspiration in terms of the challenge which
Al Shebab and other extremist groups now pose to the international
community. The defeat of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya in 1996 demonstrates
that these groups are not invincible, contrary to the conclusion
that Ms. Bruton wants us to draw by avoiding considering critical
historical facts.
As
we suggested last time when we took up another piece on Somalia
by Ms. Bruton hers is a narrative which is embraced by some
including by those, like Eritrea, who continue to try to make
us believe that the sources of the problem in Somalia are AMISOM,
Ethiopia and those who stand firmly behind the Djibouti process
and the TFG. Ms. Bruton’s analysis this time is more sophisticated
but it is as unhelpful and as dangerous as her previous piece.
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