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A Week in the Horn 02/05/2008 |
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In fact, the United Nations committed itself under the Algiers Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities to guarantee respect for the security commitments entered into by both Ethiopia and Eritrea in June 2000. These included acceptance of the sanctity of the Temporary Security Zone and the mandate of the Peacekeeping Mission (UNMEE) to monitor the compliance of both Ethiopia and Eritrea with their obligations. This guarantee specifically includes “…measures to be taken by the international community should one or both of the Parties violate this commitment, including appropriate measures to be taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the UN Security Council.” In this sense, the recent actions of the Security Council are not just an abdication of responsibility towards a UN Mission, leaving illegal actions largely unchallenged. It is also a failure with a number of consequences. Eritrea has not merely been preventing the discharge of UNMEE’s mandate. The Eritrean government took a number of deliberate steps over several years to restrict UNMEE activities and, in the last resort, forcing UNMEE personnel to flee for their lives. The refusal to allow fuel to UNMEE put safety and lives at risk. Eritrea claimed that there was a national shortage of fuel. This might have been believable had not Eritrea also refused to allow UNMEE to import its own supplies. At one point UNMEE was even prevented from getting food supplies. It was these actions, on top of Eritrea’s military occupation of the Temporary Security Zone, which shocked the Council into issuing its 15 February Presidential Statement which did firmly condemn Eritrea and promise punitive measures. Eritrean supporters in the Council have claimed sanctions might result in Eritrea harming the remaining UN troops in Eritrea. They have argued that Eritrea’s persistent refusal to respond to external pressures also means any such measures would have little impact. It would therefore be sufficient to merely refer to the Council’s previous condemnation. The Security Council’s continued lack of leadership on this matter has at least three major consequences. The first and most obvious is the impact of Eritrea’s actions for UN peacekeeping in general. It sends the very dangerous message that countries can defy the Council with impunity, mistreat UN Peacekeepers and chase them out by intimidation. Eritrea’s own claim on Wednesday that it maintained good co-operation with UNMEE is of course total rubbish. There is an implication that countries can coerce the Council to accept all these sorts of activity as no more than an ‘obstruction’ of the mandate. At some point, this will, of course, have to be rectified by the Council if only to reassure troop-providing countries that it can be serious about the safety and mandate of its own Peacekeepers from wherever they come. The second consequence is even more dangerous. Eritrea now seems to believe it can take any action against any neighboring country and get away with it. Its belligerence is not, of course, new and does not come as any surprise to any of Eritrea’s neighbors. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s hesitations and half measures have certainly had a direct bearing on Eritrea’s recent actions against Djibouti. Eritrea seems to have become emboldened to cross Djibouti’s borders following what amounts to a profession of immunity over international legality. A third consequence of this weak, and inadequate, Security Council Presidential Statement is to give Eritrea another false excuse to claim that there is no legal or political dispute outstanding between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Council therefore should terminate UNMEE’s mandate. However, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made clear in a statement today, under these circumstances, it is difficult to expect Ethiopia will be able to continue to pretend that the Algiers Agreements remain intact. They do not. It is true that the Security Council did demonstrate that it is believed that the Algiers Agreements remain valid, that the Temporary Security Zone remains valid if currently occupied illegally by Eritrea, and that physical demarcation of the border remains an imperative, and, most particularly, Ethiopia and Eritrea have the primary responsibility for the full implementation of the Algiers Agreements. Nevertheless, the Security Council made no effort to address directly the necessity for returning to full implementation of the Algiers Agreements. We would remind the Council that appeasement of Eritrea has never shown any indication of working in the past. There is no reason to suppose it will work in the future. It is incumbent upon the Council to take punitive measures under Chapter VII in accordance with Article 14 (a) of the Algiers Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
According to a chronology released by the Djibouti government, in February this year Eritrean officials said they were planning to build a road from Assab, through Raheyta, near the border with Djibouti, and along the coast to Obock in Djibouti. On April 4, Eritrean civil engineering units, together with military forces, crossed the border to take over Ras Doumeira mountain. The Administrator of Obock and the army commander from Obock went to Ras Doumeira to see what was happening. Eritrean military units which had taken over the mountain refused to allow them on the site. A series of diplomatic representations led to the telephone contact between President Ismail and President Issayas, and a meeting between Djibouti and Eritrean foreign ministers in Djibouti on April 21. Following the apparent lack of any Eritrean interest in looking for a settlement, President Ismail and a ministerial delegation visited Ras Doumeira the next day where they were able to see Eritrean forces had occupied the whole mountain, building huts, trenches and fortifications. Djibouti forces were moved into the area and have re-occupied some areas of Ras Doumeira mountain. Since then, Eritrea has categorically refused any further diplomatic discussions, thus obliging Djibouti to appeal to the international community.
Aden Hashi ‘Ayro’ seems to have received little formal education, either secular or religious, before joining the militia of Ifka Halane Islamic court in the mid-1990s. There he appears to have been adopted as a protégé of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and was selected for further training in Afghanistan. By one account he traveled with Aweys to Afghanistan on the eve of the American offensive, returning to Somalia several months later. ‘Ayro'’s training prepared him to serve as an instructor for the Islamic Court’s militia in a variety of subjects including explosives. During the course of 2003, ‘Ayro'’s path began to diverge from the courts, and he was increasingly perceived as a militia commander in his own right, albeit still in Aweys’s shadow. He also appears to have been given the job of organizing a domestic jihadi network. This was responsible for several murders in 2003, including two British teachers and an Italian NGO worker in Somaliland. At least two of the Somaliland assassins were trained in al-Qaeda’s Afghan camps. There were other killings of foreigners elsewhere in Somalia, including an Italian nun and a BBC journalist, and most recently two British and two Kenyan teachers in Belet Weyne. In January 2005, ‘Ayro' emerged from the shadows and into the public limelight when militia under his command desecrated a colonial-era Italian cemetery in Mogadishu, shocking Somalis and international communities alike. Al-Shabaab has also been responsible for the parading of dead bodies of soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu, beheading people, and a variety of other terrorist actions, including bombs designed to kill civilians, and women and children. Over all, Al-Shabaab has been credited with the deaths of dozens of TFG officials, and at least 150 foreigners, as well as two to three hundred moderate politicians and religious leaders who disagreed with 'Ayro'’s Salafi-Jihadi orientation, his violence, and his irredentist ideology. Given the climate of fear ‘Ayro’ inspired, he will be missed by very few.
Ethiopian reports on what happened at the Mosque are based on numerous cross-checked independent sources including independent observers of the fighting in the area, local people living around the Mosque, as well as witnesses in the Mosque, among them some of the students studying there. Several of these were eyewitnesses of the execution of Sheikh Sa’iid Yahya and of others killed in the Mosque. In addition, Ethiopian and TFG troops involved in the very successful operation against Al-Shabaab on April 19 and 20 provided information. All their accounts differ significantly from that given by Amnesty International. Originally, a single Al-Shabaab fighter arrived at the Mosque at 3.30 pm, and demanded to enter the building. Sheikh Sa’iid refused, and was immediately shot and killed. Other Al-Shababb fighters arrived and dragged Sheikh Sa’iid’s body into the Mosque, where another seven members of the Mosque were found. They were also killed. Two witnesses in the Mosque who survived the killings say they observed throats being cut by Al-Shabaab fighters at this point, though they believe the people concerned, including at least two Sheikhs, may have been already dead. Al Shabaab fighters then brought a number of other bodies into the Mosque, whether of civilians killed in earlier fighting or bodies of their own fighters was unclear to the witnesses. The Mosque has a large compound around it and some of the surrounding buildings were hit by mortar fire during the fighting. At this point, Ethiopian and TFG troops began to approach the area and the Al-Shabaab unit abandoned the Mosque and retreated. The forces, under the command of Colonel Yohanis Abate entered the Mosque and found a total of 21 bodies as well as 41 students and others hiding in the basement. Inevitably, in the circumstances, there was concern over their presence, even suspicions. They were taken to a place of safety and questioned about their activities. The majority, including all the younger students were promptly released, though some were held for further questioning. All have now been released as has been reported in the local media – to which Amnesty International, despite its claimed local contacts, apparently has no access. On discovering the deaths at the Mosque, TFG officials launched an immediate investigation, questioning survivors in the Mosque, including those Sheikhs who survived and the students, and people living in the surrounding area. A number were briefly held for questioning. The Ethiopian government would be perfectly happy for an independent investigation of events at the Al Hidaya Mosque, and of the conduct of Ethiopian troops. Such an enquiry is, of course, for the Government of Somalia to organize. Equally, given the outrageous and deliberate lies peddled by Amnesty International in suggesting that throat cutting is a form of execution practiced by Ethiopian forces in Somalia, it would be totally unacceptable for this to include any involvement of Amnesty International or its sources. Amnesty International has no evidence that Ethiopian troops have ever cut the throats of anyone in Somalia, or indeed anywhere else. In making such an allegation, Amnesty International knows perfectly well that it is repeating claims deliberately made by Al-Shabaab members/supporters as part of its propaganda. There have been numerous similar allegations of other human rights abuses, none of which have been, or indeed can be, substantiated by independent sources. In the context of the conflict in Mogadishu, Amnesty International is, at best, extraordinarily naïve in its acceptance of all the allegations made against TFG or Ethiopian forces without bothering or attempting to check the origin of the allegations, or the political or religious allegiance of its sources. Ethiopia entirely agrees that the deliberate killing of civilians is a war crime. Its troops do not commit war crimes, nor do they commit extra-judicial executions by the cutting of throats. Ethiopia accepts that civilians may have been killed during security operations in Mogadishu. It deeply regrets any such deaths. None of these were deliberate. Ethiopian operations contrast sharply with those of Al-Shabaab which has made no secret of its deliberate targeting of civilians. Amnesty International knows perfectly well that Al-Shabaab has a long record of murder and slaughter of both Muslims and non-Muslims in recent years. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated total opposition to moderate Muslim elements in Mogadishu, including, among others, members of the Tabliq sect and similar bodies. This opposition has been displayed again and again in the murder of moderate politicians and religious leaders going back over several years, by its desecration of the dead, both Christian and Muslim, by the cutting off of heads, the ruthless targeting of civilians in houses and public places, and by the indiscriminate use of roadside bombs which have all too frequently murdered women and children. None of this is in dispute, nor indeed is it denied by Al-Shabaab. None of this rates a mention by Amnesty International. Exactly why Amnesty International should display such a single-minded and one-sided approach to criticism of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, and why it so obviously ignores the atrocities of the terrorists of Al-Shabaab, is difficult to understand. Certainly, Amnesty International operates primarily as a government watchdog, tending to ignore non-government activities. Equally, however, if it is to continue to uphold its claimed role as an effective defender of global human rights in the modern world, it must expand its coverage into non-governmental areas, as this is where the most significant failures in human rights usually now occur. It is time Amnesty International took stock of this very extensive and serious gap in its coverage of human rights abuse. Amnesty International has frequently been criticized for bias in its selection of material and for ideological bias. The bias in selection of sources on which it has drawn in this particular case is abundantly clear. Amnesty International always claims its critics are attempting to silence it. This is not the case. Many are actually as concerned about human rights as Amnesty International aims to be. The critics, however, are rather more anxious that the organization should get it right. It is no coincidence that many of its most vociferous critics are former members or employees of Amnesty International. A somewhat humbler response to criticism, even an acknowledgment that sources might at times make mistakes, even be partial, would not be amiss in light of some of AI’s most egregious errors. It is appropriate to conclude from a recent report investigating and analyzing the work of Amnesty International (and Human Rights Watch) over 16 years about Columbia. The report, complied by four impartial academics from the University of London and from Columbia itelf, is damning: “We find that both organizations have substantive problems in their handling of quantitative information. Problems include failure to specify sources, unclear definitions, an erratic reporting template and a distorted portrayal of conflict dynamics….We do find some evidence of anti-government bias…the quantitative human rights information and conflict information produced by these organizations for other countries must be viewed with skepticism along with cross-county and time series human rights data based on Amnesty International reports.” Amnesty International’s recent work on Somalia displays all these problems and more.
Both Mr. Prendergast and Mr. Gettleman displayed a partial and highly misleading view of Mogadishu under the Islamic Courts in 2006, and one bearing little resemblance to reality. Despite numerous reports at the time emphasizing the Courts’ failure to create any viable administration, they talk of the peace and security established by the Courts. They do not mention the children executed for watching world cup-football, of boys shot in the legs for attending a cinema and for parents beaten up for failing to stop their children’s involvement in such activities as swimming or failing to cut hair. Nor did the Courts’ continuous military activities (led by warlords like Sheikh Yusuf ‘Indhe Adde’, Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, or the late Aden Hashi ‘Ayro’) get a mention or their forcible occupation of Kismayo and other towns. In his paper, Mr. Prendergast makes little mention of the murderous terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab, responsible for hundreds of assassinations of moderate religious political leaders before and after the Islamic Courts came to power, or of the killing of foreign aid workers and journalists, the desecration of graves and bodies and of the continued and deliberate killings of women and children. Mr. Prendergast prefers to accept highly contentious claims that Ethiopia was recently responsible for cutting throats in a mosque, without given any consideration to the accuracy or sources for such allegations. Neither Mr. Prendergast nor Mr. Gettleman appear to have any real knowledge of the state of security in Mogadishu today or of the involvement of Eritrea in assistance to the Courts, to Al-Shabaab and to the ONLF, though Mr. Prendergast did refer to Eritrea as “the Islamic Courts’ closest ally and largest arms supplier”. Mr. Prendergast’ recent interests have been largely concentrated on Dafur and Sudan. He seems unaware of many recent developments in Somalia, and has little understanding of the role Ethiopia has played. In his paper, he makes a number of recommendations, most of which appear to be drawn from activities long started. He seems unaware that there is a road map for Somalia’s transition process, there is a reconciliation and peace process in operation, and that the UN has an active involvement through the Secretary-General’s Special Representative. In this sense, this paper, like Mr. Prendergast’s and Mr. Gettleman’s comments on Al Jazeera, can only do more harm than good, because of the failures of knowledge and understanding, and because neither Mr. Prendergast nor Mr. Gettleman can be considered as men of high integrity, something of which Ethiopia has ample evidence. Another recent report which suffers from the same problems is a report by the Senlis Council: Chronic Failures in the War on Terror – From Afghanistan to Somalia. The Senlis Council is an European NGO/think tank with a record of interest in Afghanistan narcotics. A project of the Network of European Foundations it was founded by a Canadian lawyer, Norine MacDonald, who is a member of the advisory council of the International Crisis Group. Senlis reports have been criticized in the past for “[tugging] on the heartstrings of its audience without addressing the realities …on the ground”. Its suggestions for the licensing of opium farming in Afghanistan led to questions whether the group had connections with large pharmaceutical companies. Its latest report, the Senlis Council’s first indication of any interest in Somalia, suffers, like Mr. Prendergast, from a serious lack of appreciation of the actuality of the situation in Somalia. The Senlis Council’s main aim in fact appears to be to criticize US policies, claiming that the war on terror has backfired, merely strengthening extremists in both Afghanistan and Somalia, with a “lack of strategic acumen…enabling the spread of the insurgencies present throughout both countries”. There is some understanding of Somali conflict dynamics, though its support for a fast track recognition of Somaliland by the US indicates this is limited. There is an almost total failure to understand Ethiopian aims and the significant progress actually made by the TFG. Senlis also displays an all-too-common acceptance of all allegations, however doubtful or controversial, made by opposition forces in Somalia without any effort to evaluate their accuracy or the reliability of sources. The result is a repeat of numerous errors. These journalistic/academic papers all have something in common: their analyses are flawed, sometimes seriously, because they fail to base themselves on adequate factual knowledge. They ignore huge chunks of available evidence from what they decide, in advance, will be unacceptable sources. Indeed, it is very clear the framework of their analysis has been worked out in advance. The authors therefore rely significantly on single acceptable sources and make little or no effort to investigate the origin, accuracy, or allegiance of their sources. Superficiality and lack of knowledge lead inevitably to assumptions, and subsequent accusations of bias. Despite, often glaring, errors, mistakes get perpetuated. Authors, and publishers, refuse to correct errors even when they are pointed out. They may be the result of poor scholarship, often born of simple ignorance rather than deliberate bias, but almost always they include a reluctance to admit to error. As always, the vacuum left by the absence of real knowledge is filled by stereotypes. Journalists are not alone in being quick to accept the mechanisms that lead to certain misrepresentations. There are perhaps excuses for journalists. They have to write fast and express themselves in few words. They have to attract the attention of a large public, and keep it interested. So produce a catchy headline, stick to stereotypes and simplistic generalizations. This is understandable, if deplorable. What is much less acceptable is the blank refusal to make corrections or admit to errors. There is an assumption of arrogance, that even recently arrived journalists, or “expert firemen” parachuted in for a week without any knowledge or expertise are to be preferred automatically to people who live in a place, who have studied closely for many years and really do know something about it and its politics. The visiting “fireman” knows what his editor wants, and reporters in the US and Europe have grown up in a culture that sees Africa as a problem. They usually don’t bother to go any further. There may be other reasons for the failure of journalistic accuracy and integrity. Some recent research into German speaking correspondents (TV, radio and print) working in Nairobi found that on average one correspondent covered 33 countries, and would never be able to visit a third of them. Only a few African countries are actually of interest to Europe, usually South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Congo, Zimbabwe with Somalia and Ethiopia on occasions. The most influential press agency in Germany (dpa) has only one correspondent for East, Central and West Africa. More than half of the German correspondents had no Africa experiences before they came to work in Nairobi. This is true of correspondents for the English-speaking media as well. A common pattern of ignorance was found on the editorial side where African news is almost always automatically downgraded. Africa, in fact, does not “sell”. In fact, news about or from Africa tells us more about western storytelling or Africa’s lack of competence than any objective newsworthiness or political reality. Correspondents may be highly professional working journalists but their view of Africa nearly always owes far more to superficial impressions and opinion than anything else. More specifically, the international media still continues with its negative reporting on Somalia and what has been achieved in terms of institution building from scratch for the last few years after the removal of the ICU. This media campaign on Somalia is not only negative and unhelpful; it creates anxiety among Somalis and the international community, encouraging them to limit efforts of reconciliation and peace making. More deliberately, Al Jazeera continues with its extreme propaganda efforts, apparently designed to undermine the relative peace and stability that Somalia has achieved in this difficult time. While Somalis are struggling with creating an environment of stability and peace, the media largely continues to undermine what is certainly an uphill struggle. It is obvious that human rights abuses should be taken seriously and those who are involved in any abuse should be brought to justice, but undermining efforts of state formation in Somalia, in the name of human rights abuse, is not the way to achieve it. |
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |