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A Week in
the Horn |
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On Wednesday, following the upsurge of fighting, the UN Security Council expressed its “serious concern at continuing attempts by Al-Shabaab fighters to destabilize the situation in Mogadishu and some other areas”. The Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, who stressed “now is not the time to analyse and discuss, but to provide concrete help while it can still make a difference,” though the Council showed no sign of urgency in its actions. In his briefing, Mr. Pascoe said the situation might be fragile but there were reasons for hope. A broad-based Government has emerged from the Djibouti peace process and it had significant popular support as well as backing from IGAD. It was reaching out to opposition groups to forge national reconciliation; negotiations, persuasion and inclusion were the core of the Government’s strategy. Mr. Pascoe said establishing effective governance inside Somalia was a key to bringing law and order to Somalia’s coasts. The Government must be backed by credible security forces and be able to demonstrate clear dividends of peace and reconciliation. Mr. Pascoe and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, detailed the Secretary-General’s three-phrased approach to peacekeeping in Somalia. The Secretary-General’s fourth option, his Option D, now appears to be dropped. This allowed for total UN and international disengagement from Somalia which would have meant the total abandonment of the country to the hands of the extremists and spoilers who already threaten the peace and stability of the entire region. Despite this, there was apparently no mention in the Council briefing of the role played by Eritrea or of the arms it has supplied to the opposition, even though Mr. Pascoe also referred to the role being played by Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ since he had arrived in Mogadishu from Asmara. Mr. Le Roy provided details of the planned three-stage approach. The UN would maintain its current support of AMISOM, and then assess progress, and, security conditions permitting, move to the establishment of a ‘light UN footprint”, with elements of UNPOS deploying in Mogadishu and full support for AMISOM. The Council would then take a decision as to whether to replace AMISOM with a UN peacekeeping operation but this should depend upon certain preconditions, a lasting ceasefire, consent by all Somali actors, adequate troop pledges and requisite military capacity. It was, Mr. Le Roy noted, an incremental and flexible strategy. He said some progress had been made in getting troop pledges for a potential UN peacekeeping force. Bangladesh has said it was willing to contribute naval and air assets, Pakistan maritime assets and Uruguay military observers. Indonesia had verbally said it would provide troops and take a lead role in any peacekeeping operation. The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, told the Council that fulfilment of pledges made at Brussels must be accelerated. Some support had been delivered to AMISOM, and equipment from the now ended UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea had been deployed in Mogadishu. A comprehensive funding proposal for 2009- 2010 would be before the General Assembly shortly, and a draft memorandum of understanding of UN support for AMISOM had been finalized. Neither Mr. Le Roy nor Ms. Malcorra gave any indication of the critical need for urgent action. In Addis Ababa this week another consultative meeting was held of the AU Peace and Security Council, Ministers of Defence of the AMISOM troop contributing countries, representatives of IGAD and others. Ethiopia was present in its capacity as current chair of IGAD and Libya as current chair of the AU. The meeting strongly condemned the recent aggression against the TFG and expressed concern at the reports of the support provided by external actors. It stressed the need to conduct a full investigation to identify all those involved in these destabilization activities with a view to imposing appropriate sanctions by the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council. The meeting welcomed the expansion of the mandate of the UN Monitoring Group to include reporting of attacks against AMISOM, the TFG and humanitarian operations and acts undermining the peace process. The meeting stressed that any action aimed at undermining the TFG would be seen as an unconstitutional means to change a government contrary to the principles of the AU. The meeting welcomed the pledges made at Brussels, calling for their speedy disbursement, and called on all AU member states to provide support for the TFG’s security forces. It reaffirmed the determination of the AU to sustain the ongoing peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia. It expressed satisfaction with the offer of a battalion for AMISOM from Sierra Leone and of a third battalion from Burundi, hoping they would be able to deploy quickly. The meeting also welcomed efforts to strengthen the police component of AMISOM and Ghana’s decision to provide police mentors and training. Two points should be emphasized about the situation in Mogadishu and the threats to the TFG. One is the reports of increasing numbers of foreign ‘jihadist’ fighters reportedly being deployed in the streets of Mogadishu. The second is the full backing being given by Eritrea to the extremist operations in Somalia. Extremist elements in Somalia appear to have closed ranks following Sheikh ‘Aweys’ return to Mogadishu from Eritrea in a combined effort to try to force AMISOM out and overrun the Government. Al-Shabaab and Sheikh ‘Aweys’ are poised to promote an international extremist agenda to the danger of the whole region. There are now finally signs that the international community has become concerned, but the discussions at the UN and the AU PSC, as at Brussels recently, appear to offer little of the immediate practical assistance that the TFG urgently requires. If the UN Security Council, or its members, fails to take immediate action in support of the TFG or against those supporting extremist elements, the possibilities of disaster remain high. Yesterday, a US State Department spokesman said that Eritrea’s support for anti-government forces in Somalia must “cease immediately”, and it should stop fanning “the flames of violence”. The spokesman called on all parties to implement an immediate ceasefire and allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered safely. Today, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning those trying to destabilize Somalia and commending the AU and member states that are supporting the Government. The statement urged the international community to actively support the efforts of the Somali authorities to stabilize the country. It appealed to all countries in the region to disassociate themselves from the extremists’ actions. It urged everyone to support the UN-led Djibouti process which had helped put in place the “broadest parliamentary representation and the most inclusive government [Somalia] has ever had.” In all this, what needs to be reiterated again and again is the fact that the apparent progress the extremists are making in Mogadishu is not the function of strength. Strong they are not. Nor do they have the support of residents of Mogadishu. They make progress for only one major reason. They are being supported while the Government is not. Until the eve of the current onslaught by extremists the Government was consistently being told that any support would be contingent upon its efforts to try to bring on board all Somali groups - including those who are now trying to remove it. **************
With the 16th anniversary of Eritrea’s formal independence on Sunday next week, May 24, President Issayas has been on something of a media offensive in the Middle East in the last week or two, giving interviews to a whole series of Arabic newspapers, in Egypt, Sudan, the Gulf and Qatar. He’s also given interviews to Iranian Al-Alam TV, and to Sudanese TV, as well as Somalia’s Shabelle Radio and TV. As on other occasions, President Issayas had much to say in criticism of US policies, and of its strategy of domination through creating problems and crises, through military and technological superiority, through inciting sedition among peoples and states. It was, he said, a strategy to strengthen US influence in the region “by provoking crises which did not exist.” He said he didn’t believe the present US administration had a specific policy towards Eritrea (though its predecessor had made efforts to place Eritrea on the list of “states’ sponsoring terrorism”) but he launched a vigorous attack on the CIA for “encouraging and sponsoring” human trafficking activities. He didn’t spell out details, but he was presumably referring to the hundreds of Eritreans crossing the borders into both Sudan and Ethiopia every month to avoid what the most recent human rights report on Eritrea called “State Repression and Indefinite Conscription”. **************
The UN-CTED delegation also met with Ato Desalegn Alemu, Director-General for International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other MFA officials. Issues discussed included Somalia and the dangers faced by the location of the Horn of Africa and its porous inter-state borders. Ministry officials made a number of points about the failure to provide a uniform international response to terrorism, the lack of an agreed definition and the unwarranted distinctions drawn between “domestic” and “international” terrorism. The UN-CTED delegation noted these points and appreciated Ethiopia’s record in fighting terrorism. Following its visit to Ethiopia, the delegation travelled to Kampala to participate in an IGAD-ICPAT sponsored discussion forum for IGAD and its member states. *************
Bilateral and regional issues were also discussed between Ms. Gry Larson and Dr. Tekeda. The State Secretary disclosed that Norway was sending a naval warship to assist in the monitoring of pirates along the Somali coast. Dr. Tekeda briefed Ms. Larson on the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia’s role in resolving conflict. They took note of the importance of providing support to the Government of President Sheikh Sharif and of demanding that those supporting extremists should refrain from doing so. With regard to Sudan, the two officials agreed on the need to focus on supporting the implementation of the CPA, regardless of the outcome in 2011. In discussions with Minister Solheim, the two officials exchanged views on the forthcoming conference on climate change in Copenhagen. Minister Solheim said he was convinced Prime Minister Meles will continue to represent Africa during the negotiations on climate change. He hoped Ethiopia would support Norwegian proposals at the conference. During his visit, May 11- May 13, Dr. Tekeda gave a lecture on Ethiopia’s foreign policy at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, focusing on the Horn. **************
The Nile-TAC meeting agenda contained a number of matters arising from its previous meeting, as well as updates and progress reports on various programs and projects, and other activities. The meeting held extensive discussions and provided guidance on the future of the Shared Vision Program projects. It also reviewed progress in the preparation on the Nile Basin Sustainability Framework (NBSF) Draft Concept. The Framework is being designed to guide the future activities of the NBI, and will be used as a platform to encapsulate the achievements and challenges of the NBI as a transitional arrangement, and lay down the necessary tools to institutionalize cooperation on a more sustainable basis. The meeting provided guidance on modes of consultation and the adoption of this Framework. The other critical issue that commanded the attention of the meeting was the preparation of the preliminary study on a NBI Benefit Sharing Framework. As the central aspect of the NBI Vision is equitable utilization and sharing benefit, the study was closely examined by the Nile-TAC. It was decided the study should continue. The meeting provided guidance for consideration for the Framework which is aimed to assist riparian states concretize Benefit Sharing as a central factor in the sustainable and equitable utilization of the Nile River. The meeting was also briefed on the progress made in the preparation and the start up of key Institutional Design Studies (IDS). These studies fall under the Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP) adopted by the NBI with the support of the donors represented by the World Bank. As part of this meeting, the Nile-TAC also made preparation for the Strategic Dialogue with the donors under the umbrella of the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF). The periodic dialogue with the donors who are involved in sustaining cooperation over the Nile River provides for an exchange of views on the progress made and on channelling assistance to strategically important areas of cooperation. The dialogue, on Wednesday, focused on benefit sharing for the NBI, and on coordination and communication issues. Presentations on these subjects were made and roundtable discussions conducted. The Nile-Technical Advisory Committee reports to the regular meeting of the Nile-Council Ministers. The next Nile-COM meeting is expected to be held in Egypt in June/July 2009. ***********
“Enough” as it has several times in the past, also returns to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. In an apparent reference to Eritrea’s defence of its cross-border incursion into Djibouti, and its assistance to Somali opposition groups, as caused by what Eritrea claims is Ethiopia’s refusal to demarcate the border, it argues the “simmering tensions” between the two destabilize the sub-region and undermine Somalia’s state-building efforts. “Enough” suggests the US should resume serious efforts to implement the Algiers Agreements, demarcate the border and normalize relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The way “Enough” outlines its suggestions make it clear that it has seriously misunderstood the present issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Several other advocacy organizations share this failure including the authors of the recent highly critical report on Eritrea human rights: “Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea” which advocates normalization of relations without in any way clarifying where the problem actually lies, that is in the behaviour of Eritrea. This reluctance to specify Eritrea’s responsibility, as we have pointed out before, is apparently, and regrettably, shared by a few others, though their number is dwindling by the day. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to reiterate exactly what has happened in the Ethiopia Eritrea peace process since the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in June 2000, and the Algiers Agreement in December that year. No matter what might have happened initially there is little doubt that after November 2004 Ethiopia has continued to be meticulous in its readiness to proceed to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Agreement in such a way that the process makes it clear that nothing could be left to undermine sustainable and durable peace between the two countries, and that demarcation outside the framework of normalization of relations would lead nowhere. It soon became obvious that Eritrea had no interest in actual demarcation or in normalization of relations. It launched a number of constraints on UNMEE, effectively preventing it from carrying out its job of monitoring the TSZ, and at the same time, began to interfere in the TSZ even infiltrating some of its military forces, thus beginning a process of undermining the Algiers Agreements. Following the imposition of fuel restrictions on UNMEE and its personnel, UNMEE was forced to leave Eritrea and the Temporary Security Zone in February 2008. Humiliatingly, the Security Council was then obliged to terminate UNMEE’s mandate last July, despite the threat this posed to the whole UN approach to peace-keeping, and despite its own earlier threat of sanctions against Eritrea’s behavior in Resolution 1640 (2005). Faced by continuous Eritrean intransigence, and a total refusal to stop its actions against UNMEE or its infiltration into the TSZ, or even compromise, the EEBC announced in November 2006 that it would implement a “virtual” demarcation based on map-coordinates in November 2007. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea immediately denounced this as an infringement of the EEBC’s mandate. Ethiopia took legal opinion that it could not be substantiated in international law. Eritrea subsequently changed its mind and announced its acceptance of “virtual” demarcation, apparently to try and embarrass Ethiopia; and to distract attention from the results being announced by the Claims Commission which completed the liability stage of its work with the conclusion that Eritrea had violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter when it invaded areas peacefully administered by Ethiopia. The situation now is that Eritrea has refused to respond to a whole series of UN Security Council resolutions, most recently 1827 (30 July 2008) when the Security Council, “recalling [its] previous condemnation of Eritrea's lack of cooperation”, demanded the “full and expeditious implementation” of the Algiers Agreements “as the basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea”, and reaffirmed the integrity of the TSZ. Eritrea has a habit of claiming all these actions have been caused by its frustrations over Ethiopia’s refusal to demarcate. In fact, the destruction of the Algiers Agreements long post-dates Ethiopia’s acceptance of the EEBC Decisions and can never have had anything to do with any supposed “frustration” over Ethiopia’s refusal to demarcate. Similarly, Eritrea’s claims that its aggression towards Djibouti or Somalia is also the result of its frustration rings hollow when it is realized that Eritrea attacked all its other neighbors before it invaded Ethiopia in 1998. Regrettably, it can only be assumed that Eritrea, in defiance of the United Nations, is determined to continue with its policies of active destabilization in the region, in Somalia and elsewhere. If “Enough” or other advocacy organizations really want to help implement the December 2000 Algiers Agreements, they need to identify the problem exactly: Eritrea’s refusal to co-operate. If that can be resolved, progress can very easily be made. It does not help to try to exculpate a party that having initially been the cause of the conflict also continues to be the only impediment to its final resolution. |
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
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