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A week in the Horn May 08, 2009 |
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The leaders of Ginbot 7 were quick to get themselves on media outlets, attempting to portray themselves as capable of organizing such activity in Ethiopia despite the fact they and most of their supporters reside outside. One, a British citizen, claimed over the BBC that Ginbot 7 had networks throughout the country and that the group would continue to work hard to overthrow the government in Ethiopia “by any means”. Another, who resides in the US, went on VOA to declare his group would employ “any means” to ensure the overthrow of the "illegal" Ethiopian Government and tried to use the opportunity to encourage people to support him. These reckless ambitions have been demonstrated on a number of other occasions. These broadcasts were certainly irrelevant politically (Ginbot 7 can hardly be regarded as a serious political force) but they do call for some reflection on the norms and rules governing inter-state relations. These two individuals were using UK and US state-funded media outlets to label the elected government of Ethiopia "illegal" and calling for its violent overthrow by any means. They may not have the capacity to do so but they have expressed the intent to try to wreck the peace and stability of Ethiopia, and are openly allied with other organizations, some based in Eritrea, which are dedicated to armed struggle. This raises an issue of whether friendly states, such as the UK and the USA, should open their state-funded media outlets to individuals and groups whose declared objective is the overthrow of an elected government “by any means”. It is hardly an action to be explained in the context of the friendly inter-state relations between Ethiopia and the US and the UK. It is an all-too-frequent example of the double standards so often applied to Africa. A similar double standard is visible in a statement put out this week by Amnesty International about those arrested in connection with the plot, making it clear the organization had been listening almost exclusively to Ginbot 7 leaders and had hardly bothered to see the actual details of the arrests and the evidence available. Amnesty’s statement, quoting Michelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director of its Africa Program, specified that “peaceful opposition to the government is not a crime”, and spoke of the “secret nature of their detention” because of which it claimed the detainees would be at significant risk of torture and ill-treatment. In fact, the statement does also admit that all those detained appeared in court within a day or two of their arrest and were remanded in custody for 14 days. They are therefore due to appear in court again on May 12. This is all quite normal legal procedure, and it is difficult to see what is secret about it or why Amnesty should be so concerned. Similarly, the emphasis on peaceful opposition sits uneasily with the guns and other weaponry seized at the time of the arrests, and even more doubtfully with the repeated calls for violence by Ginbot 7 leaders. It is not easy to see how Amnesty International can justify the repetition of such statements from an organization which appears dedicated to violence and which is linked to several others involved in armed struggle and terrorism. The double standards of some western media, and of international human rights organizations, appear to be clearly at work here once again. None of this can be considered appropriate or acceptable in terms of the norms and rules governing inter-state relations based on the principles of sovereign equality and mutual respect and governed by the principles of international law. It is not clear that the allegedly sacrosanct notion of the “freedom of the press” should override this. Freedom of the press involves responsibility and it is clear that any states, large or small, developed or developing, have a responsibility to prevent individuals or groups trying to undermine sovereign and legitimate state institutions, whether their own or those of another country. This responsibility deserves to be respected and protected by all for the sake of civilized interaction. It should not be subject to this sort of double-standard. All the more so when the news outlets of these countries are used as platforms by people whose intentions are manifestly dangerous irrespective of whether they have the capacity to implement their decisions. Let it be emphasized once again that Ginbot 7 does not have the capacity to damage the process of democratization of our country or its peace and stability. But in the context of the relations of Ethiopia and the US or the UK, it could, perhaps cause un-necessary suspicions. **********
Again and again the investigation uncovered examples of cases where the State Department’s claims of a political dimension to arrests, beatings, disappearances and natural deaths were simply untrue. On every occasion when the State Department report claims someone was killed because of membership of an opposition political party, friends and relatives knew nothing of this supposed political activity. Welelaw Muche’s father, brothers and neighbors all deny any political relevance in his death; Aschalew Taye’s sister and his boss are clear he had no political interest of any kind; he died in a brawl; of ten people allegedly killed in Gue because they supposedly belonged to opposition parties, one died of natural causes, seven others were entirely fictitious and unknown in the town even among the opposition parties active there, and in the case of two students who were killed, the local security head was arrested and given a fifteen year sentence in March last year for authorizing excessive use of force. Fellow inmates of Ayana Chere testify he was not beaten in jail; regional MP, Wegayehu Dejene, specifically denies he was beaten; MP Gutu Mulisa never filed a complaint with his local police that he had been beaten. One could go on at length. Time and again, it is clear that the authors of the State Department report made absolutely no effort to check the information they were being given by opposition political organizations or other bodies. Again and again people who had allegedly been arrested denied they had been detained, or had been released long before. Cases of supposedly arbitrary arrest proved to have appeared in court, been sentenced or released long ago. Even where, as in the trial of Daniel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie, members of the US embassy were present as observers throughout the trial, the report still managed to get it wrong over the charges on which they were convicted. In the case of Birtukan Mideksa, the report willfully misrepresents her case, downplaying the legal issues involved for what it alleged, without evidence, are political issues. The report even claims the 2008 elections was an example of denying the right of citizens to elect a government of their choice. Given that these were local elections only this is a bizarre comment. It might be added they were peaceful, multi-party and democratic elections with no constraints on registration and all parties had a more than proportional media access. There certainly were significant differences in the numbers of nominated candidates for these local kebele and woreda elections, and the opposition parties put up far less candidates. But, whatever the State Department might think, the fairness of any election cannot be calculated on the basis of the success or failure of opposition parties alone, however annoyed those parties might be at their level of support. It might be noted that the EPRDF is not the first party to get virtually 100% in council elections. The opposition CUD did almost exactly that in the elections for the Addis Ababa city council in 2005. The State Department made no claim that this was a denial of citizen's rights on that occasion or that it represented an abuse of human rights. The Government’s statement noted that Ethiopia had normally ignored reports in the past from the State Department, Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International because of their propensity to repeat unverified and unverifiable, even invented, allegations, their refusal to attempt any verification, to investigate the political affiliation of their sources, or make any effort to consult with the Government over even the wildest claims. However, since opposition sources have discovered just how easy it is to get away with invented claims and manage to get these published by human right organizations with little or no contact with the country concerned, these have proliferated. It has become routine to repeat such fabrications without further investigation. The reports often copy from each other as well as from their own earlier reports without bothering to update or incorporate Government responses where available. Last year, the Government felt it necessary to reply to the numerous fictitious claims of burning villages, assassinations and other alleged Government abuses in a report by Human Rights Watch on the Somali Regional State. It now believes it is time to respond to the more outrageous errors in the State Department’s report for 2009. It is not just direct factual mistakes, it is wild and implausible interpretations for which no evidence is offered. In the section on ‘Unlawful killings and disappearances’, extraordinarily, the State Department manages to suggest that Ethiopia should share the blame for the ONLF’s attack on the Abole oil camp when 74 Chinese and Ethiopians were slaughtered in cold-blood, many asleep in their beds. The report even appears to try and cast doubt on recent terrorist incidents in Ethiopia, suggesting that no one had claimed responsibility, and by implication throwing doubt on them. At the same time the statement also noted that in most cases perpetrators had been arrested, tried and convicted. In fact, there was no secret of the political allegiance of these terrorists, as members of the OLF or the ONLF, or of the support they obtained from Eritrea. It was all widely publicized in various court cases. The US State Department’s report managed to avoid noticing any of the details. The Government’s statement makes very clear that Ethiopia believes human rights must not be politicized. The struggle to promote human rights must be based on truth and reality and on real values. Campaigns for particular political or economic interests, launched under cover of the umbrella of human rights, can only discredit the ideals. By now, the State Department should be very aware of the dangers of this, given the dubious sources of so many of the report’s claims and allegations. It should be added that the Government of Ethiopia has made it clear it is very willing to co-operate with anyone who is prepared to offer a positive commitment to the promotion of human rights on the basis of real and accurate facts, and to all issues relating to democratic rights, without bias or prejudice. The Government statement concludes by pointing out that of the many critical conclusions on which the Government’s investigation focused, it wanted to make two major points. First that the State Department’s report relied largely on unsubstantiated and, all too often, entirely baseless evidence. It made no effort to verify any information with the Government or any other bodies or to use readily available information that might confirm incidents or not as the case might be. This occurred so often that it could only be deliberate. It could not be due to any lack of information or any failure of understanding. Secondly, the State Department relied almost exclusively on opposition groups, individuals, and non-governmental organizations, domestic and international, with a substantial record of defamation and anti-government campaigning. The relationship between these organizations and the US Government is seriously unhealthy. A culture of dependence has been created, the organizations and groups being dependent upon the US for material needs. They have every incentive to exaggerate and provide politically motivated reports in return for financial gain, direct or indirect. The US government knows very well these organizations do not have the capacity to function independently, but it continues to ensure their survival in return for information irrespective of its accuracy or its intent. This is the methodology and approach on which the State Department’s report is based. As the Government statement concludes: “It is on these grounds that the Government of Ethiopia must label this report as seriously flawed. It is wildly inaccurate, highly unreliable both in its facts and its interpretations, and careless in presentation. It should be used, if at all, with extreme caution.” It should be emphasized that this statement was issued by the Government in response to a report from the US State Department written under the previous administration. To put it into context, the intention is not to undermine the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States, or cause it damage in anyway. It is the result of a conviction that honest and frank dialogue is necessary to strengthen and deepen the ties between Ethiopia and the US and to avoid mutual suspicion and misunderstandings. Reports such as the one just put out by the State Department cannot contribute to good relations. It can be expected that the Government will in future respond regularly to reports of this kind, in a similar manner, objectively and fairly to address any mistakes they might contain. Any speculation to the contrary should be set aside. **********
Eritrea’s persistent response to these incontrovertible facts is based on its dispute with Ethiopia. Eritrea not only dismisses its supply of arms to extremists offhand, it goes on to blame others, normally Ethiopia, for ‘forcing’ it into all its actions. At the same time it has often shown off terrorist elements at public gatherings in Asmara and openly pledged its support to them. Some apologists have tried to link Eritrea’s regional acts of destabilization to its dispute with Ethiopia. That is exactly what the Government in Asmara has tried to make people believe ever since it has refused to accept Ethiopia’s offer of dialogue over the border issue. It is, of course, nonsense. The fact is Eritrea’s record has always been that of a state practically at loggerheads with all its neighbours, and this began long before Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in 1998 or the delays in demarcation after 2002. Eritrea now remains defiant in the face of Security Council resolutions demanding its withdrawal from the areas of Djibouti it has forcefully occupied. Its acts of destabilization in Somalia are now a well-documented public record. Its crisis-level relationships with all its other neighbours are equally well-known. It may be that those still deluded by Eritrea’s claims and machinations are fewer and less vocal than they used to be. Overwhelmingly, the international community is beginning to understand the true nature of the regime in Asmara. The latest report by the United Nations Secretary General on possible international engagement in Somalia and its assessment is one example of suggestions that certainly run counter to Eritrea’s prescriptions for Somali destabilization. Nevertheless, the international community is still demonstrating a serious lack of urgency over the need to bring Eritrean involvement in Somalia, or more broadly in the region, to a sharp halt, and has so far failed to react to the appeals of Somalia’s ministers to act against Eritrea’s continued efforts at destabilization in Somalia. **********
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There is a real danger of further violent confrontation, and to make matters worse external forces, including the Government of Eritrea, foreign extremists and various government and non-government actors in the Middle East, have been increasing their flow of finance, weapons and ideological guidance to extremist elements. In the last two weeks, since Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ return to Mogadishu from Asmara, Eritrea has sent four plane loads of weapons, two to the airstrip at K50 and two to Ballidogle airfield. Last weekend further fighting broke out in Mogadishu between Al-Shabaab and Government forces with AMISOM also being targeted. At this critical time, the international community, including the UN, is once again underlining its essential indifference towards Somalia despite the promises made at Brussels a couple of weeks ago. Delegates certainly spoke of brighter futures and new chapters, and promised more money than expected, but even that amounted to no more than US $250 million, scarcely impressive considering Somalia’s needs. There was plenty of reference to the need to strengthen AMISOM but nothing offered towards providing the resources needed to allow the three other African countries that have pledged troops to AMISOM to deploy their promised forces. Indeed, it was clear that was major lack of co-ordination between the needs of the Somali Government on the ground and the pledges made to the Somali Government by the international community. Despite the presence of an impressive number of representatives from all interested parties, including the UN, AU, EU, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and of course, the Somali Government, major questions were left over just how soon any of the pledges made would be redeemed. In fact, the Brussels meeting also showed no interest in facing up to the urgency of the immediate challenges facing the TFG, totally ignoring, for example, the dangers posed by Eritrea and its reactivation of, and arms support for, Al Shabaab. It is an absolute necessity that there should be a firm stand and extensive and quick support from the international community if the legitimate Government of Somalia is to come out victorious against its extremist enemies and their foreign backers. If it fails, the alternative will be dire for Somalia, the region and more widely. Nevertheless, the Brussels meeting emphasized all too clearly that international support is not going to reach the necessary levels of assistance either at local or international level. The last report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2009/210 16.4.2009) demonstrates this all too clearly as well. The Secretary-General does welcome the tangible steps taken by the Government to reach out to opposition groups outside the Djibouti peace process, but he doesn’t make the logical connection with the need to prevent the continuous terrorist efforts by those outside the Djibouti process or the need to act decisively against such ‘spoilers’ and their external supporters. The Secretary-General’s Report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1863 does not give the impression that much progress is being made. Arrangements are still only being finalized to enhance the operational capacity of the security forces through professionalization of existing units, the creation of civilian police, the planning of future needs and the full implementation of Joint Security Committee. The report shows a marked lack of urgency suggesting its author and the international community are seriously out of touch with the reality on the ground. It was only as recently as April 7 that the first phase of UN support package for AMISOM was approved and the work to conclude the memorandum of understanding between the UN and AMISOM was still only in progress when the Secretary-General produced his report. The central element of the report were the four options put forward in response to the Security Council’s January request to develop a mandate for a UN force in Somalia. The first is classified as high risk: it allows for the transition from AMISOM to a full UN peacekeeping operation, with a force of 22,500 troops with air and naval components in support. A second option is to continue with the current process of strengthening AMISOM and building up Somalia's security institutions. The Secretary General regards this as a more plausible option though he continues to question the viability of the sustainability of the Somali national security forces implying that they might not get essential support. The Secretary-General suggested this process might last three or four months and then be followed by the third option which allowed for a “light UN footprint” in Mogadishu with some direct UN assistance and presence with the UN Political Office for Somalia. This, the Secretary-General describes as “a prudent option.” It would allow for a subsequent reference back to the Security Council and then, and only then, the Secretary-General would be prepared to propose a fully-fledged peace keeping operation to replace AMISOM. In fact neither of these would appear to propose any real change on the ground for the time being. Significantly, the Secretary-General describes the latter as a looser and more flexible configuration that “avoids provoking negative reactions from spoilers”. This suggests the UN Secretary-General has no real understanding of the role played by spoilers and the absolute necessity for controlling their action if Somalia is ever to have a functional government again. The Secretary-General’s final option, Option D, underlines this interpretation. He suggests the possibility of total UN and international disengagement from Somalia, and a contingency plan is under way to carry this out. Obviously Eritrea, Al-Shabaab and the extremists are working to ensure that this is the most likely outcome. Option D is frightening. It would mean the total abandonment of the country and leaving it in the hands of the extremists and spoilers who already threaten the peace and stability of the entire region, not just Somalia. To reiterate: Option D remains the most dangerous of the options offered by the Secretary-General. The Government of Ethiopia has been particularly saddened by this Option D. The countries of the region cannot accept the possibility of total disengagement. The UN should not do so either. ********** |
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
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