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Another
round of TFG and ASWJ talks in Mogadishu
This week the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ)
concluded their second round of talks in Mogadishu with the
discussions covering security, administrative and political issues.
TFG Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and ASWJ Chairman,
Sheikh Mohammed ‘Heefow’ participated, and both leaders openly
declared they had formally concluded the second phase of the
agreement between the two sides. Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid said
that they had agreed to collaborate on policy issues and on uniting
the troops of the TFG and of ASWJ. He added that the government was
committed to fully implement the agreement. Sheikh Mohammed
emphasized that the meeting has been long awaited. He noted that
both sides had now agreed to sign additional articles which would
help the practical implementation of the agreement the two sides had
signed last month in Addis Ababa. They have now appointed three
committees to finalize the deals reached. Both delegations met with
President Sheikh Sharif to discuss further consolidation of the
understandings reached between the two sides. The president has now
announced the appointment of General Abdulkarim Yusuf, a senior and
experienced ASWJ commander, as the new deputy commander of TFG
forces. On Monday, TFG and ASWJ forces were involved in fighting in
Hodan and Hawl-Wadag districts in Mogadishu as ASWJ began to
participate in government efforts to expand its areas of control in
the city.
Meanwhile, there has been
universal condemnation of the twin explosions at the Abdalle Shidaye
mosque in Mogadishu’s Bakaraha market last Saturday. The blasts
killed nearly fifty people and wounded dozens more. The TFG
Information Minister, Dahir Mohamud Gelle, called the attack
barbaric, and said it showed a total lack of wisdom and a disrespect
of holy places. Ambassador Boubacar Gasoussou Diarra, the special
representative of the AU Commission chairman, on behalf of the AU
said “indiscriminate attacks on public places could not be
condoned.” He called on all warring parties to stop such “barbaric
attacks on innocent civilian population.” Local journalists said two
high ranking Al-Shabaab officials died. Sheikh Fu’ad Muhamad ‘Shongolo’,
Al-Shabaab’s head of mobilization, who often preaches at the mosque
was among those wounded. He was quoted as calling for serious
retaliation for the attack. “The Muslim people must fight the
African Union troops of the occupying force using all means at their
disposal including suicide attacks.” He urged people to “go to their
compounds and make all the necessary sacrifices”.
No one has claimed
responsibility for the attacks, and Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ head
of Hizbul Islam denied his organization had carried out the
bombings. The Somali Government Minister of State for Defense,
Sheikh Yusuf Muhammad Siyad ‘Indha Adde’, however suggested that the
explosions were the result of a rift among high-ranking officials of
Al-Shabaab. Sheikh Yusuf said that differences among senior
officials of Al-Shabaab had resulted in the mosque bombings. He said
that the government knew that members of Al-Shabaab had carried out
the explosion though he gave no details of the nature of the rift
within the group or what had led to the bombings. There have been
two other attacks on Al-Shabaab controlled mosques recently. A
landmine exploded outside the Aby Hureya mosque in the Bakaraha
market on Tuesday last week, and on Sunday May 2nd a
mosque in Kismayo was bombed.
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Foreign Minister
Seyoum accepts an honorary degree from Kisumu
On Monday this week,
Foreign Minister Seyoum was awarded an Honorary Doctorate Degree of
Letters by the Great Lakes University of Kisumu, in Kenya. Another
being honored at the same time was Mama Sarah Obama. In his speech
of acceptance Minister Seyoum thanked the Senate and University
Council for this recognition and underlined that he saw it as an
honor not just for himself but for Ethiopia, as a source of
encouragement for the IGAD region and as an acknowledgement of the
collective effort that IGAD, and the peoples of the region, had been
making in the search for peace and stability. Minister Seyoum
emphasized just how pro-active IGAD had been, to the point where,
ironically, the United Nations was still waiting for IGAD to create
peace in Somalia so it could then deploy a peace support mission to
protect that peace.
The Minister said that
Africa and the sub-region were at a very critical point. In the last
few years, it had become clear that Africa, though not completely
out of the woods economically, could no longer be seen as of only
marginal importance. Africa now mattered. Its future was far from
bleak even if it had not yet made full use of available
opportunities. The major critical impediment to the achievement of
its economic objectives was related to the failure to establish
durable and sustainable peace, security and stability, in Africa and
in IGAD. This was always precarious in a situation of poverty, but
it was quite possible to have a sufficient level of peace and
stability for economic development even when fighting poverty. The
Minister pointed out that it was on this basis that Ethiopia,
together with its partners in the IGAD region, had been doing its
level best for peace in Somalia and the Sudan. He noted Ethiopia’s
activity hadn’t been limited to the Horn of Africa. Peacekeepers had
been sent to Rwanda in the time of great tragedy there in 1994, and
subsequently deployed in Burundi, Liberia and Sudan. These
commitments were the expression of a vision which attached critical
importance to peace as a condition for the restoration of African
dignity and for development.
The Minister said that the
most difficult conflict in the sub-region was in Somalia, but by the
same token, although its intractability was a subject of much talk,
it was one of the most neglected by the international community;
indeed the one to which the UN had given the least priority.
Equally, given the role of external extremist forces and their
supporters, it was no longer a crisis to be viewed as a conflict
among Somalis alone. Indeed, the international community had
acknowledged this when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1907 imposing sanctions on Eritrea for its role as a direct actor
and as a conduit for external forces who wanted to add fuel to the
fire. IGAD, with the AU, the Minister noted, had done what it could
for peace in Somalia, but it wasn’t sufficient to help Somalia out
of its nightmare. One reason was because there was greater
coordination among the external forces assisting extremism than
there was among the international community despite its professed
support for the internationally recognized Transitional Government
of Somalia. It was therefore becoming harder and harder to see a
light at the end of the tunnel. That didn’t mean giving up hope in
Somalia so far as prospects of peace and national reconciliation
were concerned. The alternative would amount to allowing extremists,
most particularly foreign elements, to prevail. What it did mean,
however, was that Somalia was likely to be an exception to the AU’s
promise to make this year, 2010, a Year of Peace in Africa. This, he
added, was no fault of the AU, which was the only organization
prepared to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia; the Minister
took the opportunity to pay tribute to Uganda and Burundi for
carrying the burden of AMISOM in Mogadishu.
The other regional area of
major concern was the situation in Sudan and more particularly the
relationship between the South and the North in the context of the
Referendum scheduled for January 2011. This was critical both for
the future of Sudan and for peace and stability in the sub-region,
and indeed for Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Any
failure of the peace process would have the gravest implications.
There was no alternative to encouraging the two parties to proceed
in good faith toward the full implementation of the CPA. The two
parties held the key to sustainable peace and stability in Sudan,
and the Minister emphasized their capacity to ensure the realization
of those goals. The recent elections, and the results achieved, had
created a much stronger basis for the co-operation of the two
parties as they approached the Referendum. IGAD, he said, had a
clear perspective on what it needed to do to help the two parties
overcome the immense challenges they were now facing. It was
determined to assist the efforts of the Implementation Panel, led by
former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, charged by the AU to
lead the African effort for the effective implementation of the CPA.
The Minister accepted that IGAD could have been even more proactive
to help expedite the implementation of the CPA, but he emphasized
that the basis of the CPA was initially outlined by IGAD in the
Declaration of Principles. In addition, the fact that the CPA was
signed in Kenya highlighted the key role that Kenya had played for
peace in Sudan.
The Minister repeated that
peace and stability were critical for the major economic challenges
IGAD faced. It was a prospect others were finally beginning to
notice. He could say with full confidence that Africa was no longer
ignored, no longer treated as of only marginal importance in the
world. There was therefore no basis for pessimism about Africa's
future. There was still along way to go, but the continent indeed
had a bright future. But to realize this required individual and
collective effort. The Minister noted the decisions to embark on
some major projects to bring the countries of the sub-region
together. It would not be long before Ethiopia would be connected by
rail with Sudan and Kenya; before these three countries and Djibouti
would be linked by a hydropower grid; and road links enhanced and
upgraded. This was a strategy to which Ethiopia accorded the highest
priority. The Minister emphasized that these developments needed
partners prepared to engage on the basis of commitment to mutual
advantage. But, he added, the region had to be taken seriously by
potential partners, and this could only happen when the sub-region
managed have an acceptable level of peace and stability, and
governance which was truly representative, democratic and
inclusive. This, he said, was why the democratic process as a
matter of first priority for Ethiopia; and he had no doubt this
would be strengthened further by the election taking place later in
the month.
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The
30th Meeting of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)
The
30th meeting of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee was
held in Entebbe, Uganda on 26th April. Members from all
nine Nile Basin countries participated. The next day, the Nile-TAC
also held an informal Strategic Dialogue meeting with the
Development Partners of the Nile Basin Initiative. The Nile-TAC
meeting was preceded by a session of the Nile-TAC Technical
Sub-Committee which discussed, among other things, the Nile Basin
Sustainability Framework, development of the Nile Secretariat
Strategic Planning and NBI Strategic Plan of 2011-2015, a Climate
Change Strategy and Proposal and the Memorandum of Collaboration
with Ramsar Convention Secretariat. The Technical Sub-committee
produced a report for the Nile-TAC which was then adopted.
The Nile-TAC also discussed
and evaluated reports from the organs of the NBI, the Eastern Nile
Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) and Nile Equatorial Lakes Region
Subsidiary Action Program, on implementation of investment projects.
The meeting, taking into account the national elections in Burundi
and Democratic Republic of Congo, proposed the next meeting of the
Nile Council of Ministers should be held before 25 June in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia. The Nile-TAC members also discussed the topics
proposed by the Development Partners for strategic dialogue. A
number of draft agenda items were proposed: the Institutional Design
Study; Financing Nile Cooperation post-2012; Managing for Results;
and Addressing Climate Change in the context of the Nile.
The Nile-TAC held its 4th
informal strategic dialogue meeting with Development Partners on
April 27th. The Nile-TAC and Development Partners
Strategic Dialogue is a practical mechanism of engagement between
the Nile Basin countries and the Development Partners. The objective
has been for Development Partners and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
to engage in a relaxed dialogue relating to critical NBI issues and
to provide guidance and strategic direction for the Nile Basin
cooperative process. The dialogue reached a common understanding on
the expected outcome of the Institutional Design Study and the
sources of funding for the continuation of Nile cooperation after
the closure of the Nile Trust Fund in 2012, the share and role of
the Nile Basin countries and the Development Partners, as well as
other measures to be taken in this connection. The meeting also
emphasized that water resource development projects for the Nile
Basin cooperative process should take into account concerns over
climate change.
In the Strategic Dialogue
meeting, Egypt and Sudan repeatedly raised concerns regarding the
Nile Council of Ministers’ recent decision at Sharm el Sheikh to
sign the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) of the Nile on May
14th in Uganda. They asked the Development Partners to
intervene and exert pressure on the upper riparian states which have
decided to sign the CFA next week. Egypt and Sudan indicated that if
the upper riparian countries sign the CFA they will withdraw from
the NBI. The meeting, however, remained focused on its agenda,
indicating that the issues of negotiation and signature of the CFA
were outside the agenda and the mandate of the Nile-TAC and
Development Partners Strategic Dialogue.
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Eritrea’s continuing
diplomatic offensive but no policy changes
As we noted last week,
President Isaias has been working hard to try and minimize the
effects of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council last
December (UNSC Resolution 1907 (2009)). He has coupled an extensive,
if largely unconvincing media blitz, with trying to suggest Eritrea
might now be willing to give diplomacy a chance if only the world
would listen to him, hinting that Eritrea might finally be prepared
to show good faith towards the international community. Indeed, the
attitude the Eritrean government is apparently trying to portray is
that it is now prepared to co-operate with the international
community, though it has given no indication that it is actually
prepared to take any specific or practical steps in this direction.
There have been no indications that it is prepared to withdraw its
troops from Djibouti territory, stop its support for extremist
elements in Somalia and halt its destabilization efforts in
Ethiopia. Equally, there has also been one very clear exception to
this alleged change of heart towards the international community:
the exception is the United States, towards which Eritrea has made
no effort to minimize its continued and raucous criticisms.
This ‘diplomatic’ approach
is one element of a two pronged policy of which the other element
has been rather less publicized by the Eritrean Government. This is
its deliberate continuation of all previous regional destabilization
efforts, and indeed, an intensification of these aggressive efforts.
Two groups, originating in Eritrea, were intercepted by security
forces trying to cross into Ethiopia only this week. Eritrea, in
fact, has been ratcheting up its activities especially with respect
to Ethiopia where the election is now only two weeks away, and in
Somalia. Its regional activities have shown no sign of any
diminution of support for terrorist and extremist elements. Nor has
the Eritrean Government made any effort to change its regional
policies, or join in the regional efforts of IGAD and others to
encourage peace in Somalia and elsewhere. Its regional policies have
remained entirely unchanged and there is every indication that this
will continue.
This is what the
international community apparently fails to understand. There are,
in fact, no indications of any kind that the Government of Eritrea
and its leadership have seriously, or even minimally, considered
changing any of their policies within the region of the Horn of
Africa. There should, therefore, be no thought within the
international community of considering any change of policy towards
Eritrea. The sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council
(resolution 1907, 2009) have already had some impact. Eritrea’s
sudden flurry of media and diplomatic efforts make clear just how
worried the Eritrean leadership has been becoming. The Security
Council’s policy has been beginning to bear fruit. What is needed
now is the firm implementation of the sanctions policy, the need to
exert more pressure on Eritrea. Now is the time to make sure
Eritrea’s efforts to hoodwink the international community are
nullified, to demonstrate that the international community is not
impressed by Eritrea’s efforts; it is not fooled by Eritrea’s
attempt to be too smarter by half.
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Ensuring
the Integrity of the upcoming elections: a constructive role for the
Diaspora
With only two weeks to go
before polling day, election day, 2010, promises to be historic in
more ways than one. The campaign of the contending parties is
getting warmer by the day, and there are clear indications that the
momentum will continue. Citizens are gearing up for polling day to
cast their ballots for favored candidates. Observer missions, both
from abroad and within, are either fully deployed or in the process
of being deployed to various parts of the country. The preparations
made so far and the feeling in the air seems to suggest that this is
indeed going to be an election to remember. In contrast to the last
national election, the conduct of most of the contending parties is
encouraging. The role of other stakeholders is equally promising.
The Electoral Board appears to be a lot more organized in terms of
human resource and logistics than previously.
This positive assessment of
the electoral process is not shared by everyone. In what has become
an almost obsessive campaign to sabotage the elections, the Eritrean
government has more than doubled its subversive activities by
deploying terrorists to try to scuttle the process by any means. The
who’s who of ‘Ethiopian’ terrorist groups have been busy trying to
carry out Asmara’s cross-border attacks. The rejectionist elements
among the Ethiopian Diaspora have also been trying to rally behind
the Government of Eritrea as part of the effort to undermine the
credibility of the election. They seem prepared to stop at nothing
to create a semblance of chaos in the country. They won’t succeed.
The vigilance of the people and the security forces have already
nipped many of these plots in the bud. There is even less likelihood
that the noisy campaign by the rejectionist elements of the
Diaspora-based opposition will have any impact. These particular
elements have been in even more disarray than ever. In fact, it
appears, at long last, that the silent majority in the Diaspora has
begun to prevail over the prophets of doom who have so long
dominated opposition Diaspora politics.
We have again and again
reiterated that the building of democracy is a domestic affair, the
success or failure of which largely depends upon the commitment of
the peoples of the country and the extent to which they take the
process seriously. The democratization process in Ethiopia is no
exception. This doesn’t mean that others cannot play a role.
Ethiopians in the Diaspora and foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin
are among those who can, and should, be involved. Under normal
circumstances, the participation of any Diaspora-based groups will
be largely economic, whether in the form of investing in their home
country or helping to create networks that facilitate trade between
their host country and their country of origin. Ethiopia’s
experience in this regard has been somewhat mixed. On the positive
side, the number of Ethiopians residing abroad who have been willing
to play a constructive role in the economic endeavors of the country
has been steadily increasing. Equally, a lot more remains to be done
both by the Government and by Ethiopians in the Diaspora.
All-too-often for the wrong reasons, the political activities of a
minority have proved more prominent than the economic role of
Ethiopians in the Diaspora. The last eighteen years have seen an
unhealthy plethora of Diaspora-based opposition groups with
undemocratic proclivities which have steadily tried to undermine the
democratization process in the country. These groups have been
characterized largely by a rejectionist tendency long on rhetoric
and short on substance. They have done everything they can to nip
the democratization process in the bud. Campaigns have been waged to
lobby development partners to deny development aid to Ethiopia.
Demonstrations have been staged to demand cuts in humanitarian aid
for the needy or even the starving in Ethiopia. Western politicians
and parliamentarians have been lobbied to enact bills that aim to
punish the Government and peoples of Ethiopia for not submitting to
the irrational demands of rejectionists and their benefactors and
supporters. Even worse, these groups have often sought support and
partnership with sworn enemies of the country, to synchronize their
destructive campaigns against democratization in Ethiopia. The
numerous alliances and fronts concocted together with the Government
of Eritrea, and the terrorist campaigns they have financed, indicate
just how sinister these elements have become.
Apart from these directly
subversive activities, rejectionist elements in the Diaspora have
also contributed to stirring up politics in a number of more
insidious ways. They frequently prey on financial needs of domestic
opposition elements trying to use legally registered groups as
Trojan horses. Far from recognizing the independence of such
organizations, they insist on dictating terms as to what they should
do or not do in respect of domestic political activities. The role
that these groups played during the last election vividly
illustrated the extent to which such deals between Diaspora-based
rejectionists and their internal contacts could threaten the
political foundations. Unable to carry out their mission last time
round, these groups have continued to dream up scheme after scheme
to try and discredit the Government of Ethiopia by any means. They
have become even more determined now the election is just around the
corner, but there is little they can do to derail the process now.
The failure of recent efforts to drum up support for their cause
clearly shows that the previously silent majority in the Diaspora
has said enough is enough. The turn-out for their latest series of
meetings has been so low as to suggest that even their once hardcore
supporters have given up. Their dalliance with the Eritrean
government can hardly go further. Opposition calls to previously
generous supporters for financial support has been falling on deaf
ears.
By contrast, the level of
participation by Ethiopians in the Diaspora in meetings with
government officials in recent weeks has demonstrated that the great
majority are not interested in the kind of violence preached by
rejectionists and are even less inclined to offer to bank-roll their
destructive activities. There is a growing readiness on the part of
many Ethiopians abroad to organize themselves and work in
cooperation with the government on projects covering various areas.
There’s a real understanding that greater dialogue and more
constructive engagement is the way that Ethiopians in the Diaspora
can play a meaningful role in the ongoing democratization process
and growing economic development in the country. It all suggests
that the upcoming election is indeed going to see the triumph of
reason and moderation over that of rejection and violence, and that
it will indeed provide a demonstration that the ‘silent majority’
have prevailed over the ‘rowdy elements’.
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