A Week in the Horn

(21.3.2008)

  • President Girma Woldegiorghis in Germany,

  • Foreign Minister Seyoum visits South Africa; the Minister of State in Yemen

  • The UN Secretary-General recommends UN peacekeepers for Somalia

  • The SGSR for Somalia slams partisan and inaccurate news reports.

  • The US declares al-Shabaab a terrorist organization.

  • Will the Security Council take realistic action against Eritrea next week?

  • The Prime Minister’s latest report to Parliament.

  • EASBRIG takes another step forward

President Girma also visited the city of Leipzig which has a city twinning agreement with Addis Ababa. On arrival in Leipzig, President Girma was received by the Prime Minister of the State of Saxonia and the Mayor of the City of Leipzig.  He visited the ethnological Museum of Leipzig city where there is a significant Ethiopian collection, and the City Zoo. This contains a lions' enclosure which the City of Leipzig plans to replicate in Addis Ababa.  In his remarks during the visit, President Girma thanked the people of Leipzig for their friendship and underlined the importance of such twinning schemes in encouraging people-to-people relationships. He said the Ethiopian government will do whatever is necessary to facilitate such programs. While in Germany, President Girma gave interviews to various media outlets, including Sud-Deutsch Zeitung news paper, the Lo-Nan magazine and the Leipziger Volk Szeitung.

Meanwhile, an eight-person delegation of the Parliamentary Friendship Group for Eastern Africa of the German Bundestag are visiting Ethiopia this week. The aim of the visit is to contribute to closer Ethio-German relations during the Millennium Year. The group, which represents all political parties in the German Bundestag, will meet with President Girma following his return from Germany as well as Prime Minister Meles and various Parliamentary officials during their visit. They will also be visiting projects of Ethio-German cooperation.

The two Foreign Ministers also held bilateral talks. Minister Seyoum briefed Dr. Zuma on preparations for next month’s local elections, and Ethiopia’s role in Somalia, and on the current impasse over the Ethiopia Eritrea border. Minister Zuma urged both parties to remain committed to the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement. Both countries confirmed their commitment to strengthening of the African Union, to the consolidation of the African Agenda and to the centrality of NEPAD in Africa’s efforts to deal with poverty and underdevelopment. Foreign Minister Seyoum also had an audience with President Mbeki at which Foreign Minister Zuma was also present. 

The Secretary-General said AMISOM’s strength (as of 20.1.2008) stood at 2,613 and discussions for deployment of pledged Ghanaian and Nigerian troops continued. Ten Nigerian officers arrived in Mogadishu yesterday to assess conditions prior to the planned Nigerian deployment. The Government of Sweden has pledged a hospital. The Secretary-General noted that on February 20, he had received a request from the Chairperson of the AU asking for the UN to provide a financial, technical and logistical support package for AMISOM, totally some 885 million dollars. The UN Secretariat is reviewing the request to identify possible responses.

During the period under review, the UN sent two missions to Somalia, one headed by the Department of Political Affairs, the other by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, both of which the Secretary-General largely endorsed. The Department of Political Affairs suggested a three track approach to attain peace and stability: a political process leading to dialogue between the TFG and the opposition, strengthening the emerging will for peace; an improved  security presence, while avoiding any security vacuum; and thirdly, effective delivery of humanitarian and increased development activities. Preliminary activities in all these three areas have already been launched by Prime Minister Nur Hussein ‘Adde’, the TFG and Ethiopian forces, but any major progress will depend upon real assistance from the international community. The Secretary-General reiterated his call for implementation of the National Reconciliation Congress, including the development of the road map to establish a functional local administration, the constitutional process, preparation for a national census and the elections of 2009, and implementation of a National Security and Stabilization Plan.   

The second mission was that by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to produce contingency plans for a possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. This identified four scenarios identifying increased security and improvements in the political process which the Secretary-General saw as potentially sequential. These would allow the relocation of UN staff from Nairobi to Somalia; the relocation of the UN Political Office for Somalia to Mogadishu; the deployment of an impartial stabilization force, made up of a Coalition of the Willing and AMISOM, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops after a broad-based political agreement; and finally the installation of a UN force after far-reaching political and security agreements had been reached. The UN Secretariat is in the process of updating its contingency plans for a possible integrated UN force peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM. The report suggests any UN force would need to be between 15 and 21 infantry battalions, that is up to 27,000 troops with a possible police component of 1,500. This is a far higher number than ever envisaged by the AU, and far greater than the forces currently deployed by the Government, and by Ethiopia.

The DPKO Mission incidentally noted that hostilities in Mogadishu appeared generally to be confined to the five districts of Yaqshid, Wardhigley, Hawl-Wadag, Hodan and Bondhere. In other areas the mission visited, districts were “seen to be populated: stores were open, transport was moving and the port was active”. The mission did not make its own estimate of the numbers fleeing Mogadishu; the Secretary-General appeared content to accept the inflated UN figures for the numbers displaced from the city despite evidence to the contrary, and the counting carried out by the UN and the TFG in November.                         

In his own observations the Secretary-General, endorsed the mission reports. He also called for further support for AMISOM, which he commended, for a reliable and visible human rights capacity, and expressed his concern over the lack of access and operational problems that affected the distribution of humanitarian assistance, noting that the number of checkpoints had increased in the last quarter. He regretted the ongoing skirmishes between Somaliland and Puntland. The Secretary-General reiterated his earlier recommendation to the Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the UN’s Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and give it the necessary resources to implement an integrated UN approach to Somalia’s problems.  

The same point was emphasized by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Amadou Ould-Abdallah who briefed the Security Council yesterday. He outlined his efforts to continue his regular contacts with all parties, and referred to the conference he had organized in January, of Somalis and international business contacts to discuss how the private sector could help move from a war-time to a peace-time economy. He is convening a larger follow-up summit next week. It will be opened by Prime Minister Nur Hussein ‘Adde’. Mr. Ould-Abdallah stressed the need for greater international engagement in support of simultaneous action on the political and security fronts. AMISOM, he said, was doing an excellent job, but he said a strong interim multi-national presence should also be an option. He suggested a UN naval task force to protect humanitarian supplies, deter people smuggling, reduce piracy and support the arms embargo. Mr. Ould-Abdallah called for a greater UN presence in the country, suggesting the UN Security Council should visit the country later this year. This, he noted, would need acceleration of security sector and police training. Ethiopia is currently planning to start the training of 10,000 military and police for the TFG, to add to over two thousand already in process, and several hundred others whose training has been completed. Mr. Ould-Abdalah concluded by saying that Somalis themselves had to change their approach, dropping their winner-takes-all attitude and be prepared to compromise. He also underlined that any analysis of Somalia must not be based upon the work of partisan and inaccurate news reports so popular with computer users.

Eritrea’s demolishment of the Temporary Security Zone and its humiliating treatment of UNMEE also violate obligations that Eritrea as well as Ethiopia assumed under the Algiers Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Under the Agreement the two sides agreed that punitive measures should be taken if either or both violated these obligations. The two parties agreed that these are fundamental obligations and constitute the foundation for the Algiers Agreements. Accordingly, the Agreement allows for invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and calls for the Security Council to take the necessary enforcement measures.

Eritrean commentators frequently put a whole series of inaccurate ulterior motives and claims into Ethiopia’s mouth. One earlier this week, usually rather more objective, is the author of “No War, No Peace, Just Proxy War Masks” (Awate.com 18.3.2008). He argues that Ethiopia’s priorities for the peace were to acquire a return to the status quo ante, the permanent removal of any threat from Eritrea and return to the Ethiopian Eritrean relationship of the period 1991-1997. This is not quite the case. Ethiopia, as it has repeatedly made clear, has been ready to demarcate the boundary according to international norms through dialogue, to make sure that the end of the process would not be the beginning of another crisis. Ethiopia’s main objective is to bring closure and finality to the dispute, to allow for the restoration of cross-border trade, movement of people, mutual ties, all good neighborly links. This does not appear to be the aim of Eritrea. Indeed, Eritrea appears firmly opposed to any normalization of relations as it has repeatedly made clear in recent months. It’s hardly necessary to underline the point for Eritreans, but the Government of Eritrea hardly ever sees eye-to-eye with anyone. It’s not just Ethiopia. It has firmly rejected all those who have tried to talk to it, offered to mediate or proffered their good offices as most recently UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has done. 

The author also claims that the creation of the TSZ was an alternative to destroying or disarming Eritrea, and Ethiopia somehow saw the TSZ as Ethiopian. This is hardly the case. The TSZ’s importance lies entirely in the fact that it was meant to ensure the separation of forces and thus secure a conducive environment for a lasting settlement of the dispute between the two countries, including the demarcation of the boundary. Incidentally, the author even alleges that Ethiopia occupies Eritrean territory. In fact, as long as demarcation is not completed, neither can be said to be occupying the territory of the other, even though at the moment both sides are controlling what would otherwise be each other’s territory. The author makes a number of similarly inaccurate remarks even denigrating Ethiopia's record of UN peacekeeping missions as far back as the Korean war, and more recently consistently since 1994 when there were few ready to contribute to the stabilization of Rwanda after the genocide there. There is a contrast to be drawn here with the activities of Eritrea, which in Somalia have been the very antithesis of peacekeeping, as have its well-authenticated support for terrorism in the region.

Whatever the situation in the past may have been, today Ethiopia is ready to accept third party facilitation, whether by the Secretary-General or anyone else he might suggest. Since November 2004, Ethiopia has very clearly stated its full commitment to the EEBC Decisions. By contrast, as the author of “No War, No Peace, Just Proxy War Masks” very well knows, Eritrea has steadily been violating fundamental obligations of the Algiers Agreement and thwarting all initiatives for peaceful resolution of the conflict, including the latest effort at mediation by the UN Secretary General over several years. Eritrea’s belligerent behavior, and its illegal actions, are not merely grave violations of a bilateral agreement but also of the United Nations Charter. A failure to punish Eritrea sets a dangerous precedent for the Security Council. It is no excuse to say that the Council rarely takes punitive measures. Implications of inaction are far reaching, and will leave a lasting imprint on international peacekeeping. Hence, the need to take action before it is too late.  The Council should consider Eritrean actions as a clear rejection of peaceful resolution of all disputes with Ethiopia, including demarcation of the border in the context of what amounts to normalization of relations.  Eritrea’s acts also amount to an obvious effort to destabilize the region.

Last week’s Chief of Staff’s meeting was largely technical dealing with this year’s Command Post Exercise which is already underway in member states, and with the development of the force generation concept, which the Brigade Commander is expected to finalize in the near future. The budget was proposed, and passed by the Council of Ministers. There was animated discussion on a policy framework document produced after last year’s Seychelles workshop suggesting the creation of an East African Peace and Security Secretariat with a number of different directorates to replace current structures. The Council of Ministers agreed this needed further study. EASBRIG Member States including Ethiopia have already committed the necessary troops and equipment for the realization of its objectives; and EASBRIG now plans to have a fully operational and multi-dimensional integrated brigade by 2010 to fulfill East Africa’s requirements in the AU’s proposed African Standby Force.