·        On Saturday, last week, the 12^th ordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) reviewed the political and security situation in the region. It received briefings on the situation in Sudan, Somalia and on the border area between   Eritrea and Djibouti. The summit, after assessing the situation in Somalia, noted with grave concern continued violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, underlining the need to bring the culprits to justice. It called on all parties and armed groups to take appropriate steps to protect civilians, and to ensure the safety and security of the African Union Mission to Somalia(AMISOM) as well as UN and humanitarian personnel, and allow unhindered access for the delivery of aid to those in need. IGAD has accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1814 in which the Security Council calls for further contingency planning for possible deployment of UN peace keepers to Somalia, as well as the relocation of the UN political office for Somalia from Nairobi to Mogadishu. The IGAD summit appreciated the efforts made by the President and Prime Minister of the TFG, and by the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) to advance the political process through reconciliation. It commended AMISOM troops and Ethiopian forces for the sacrifice they paid to bring peace and stability to Somalia. It called on countries which had pledged troops to AMISOM to deploy their contingents without further delay and urged the international community to raise the required financial and logistical support. The summit emphasized its support for the efforts being made by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to reconcile the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). In this connection, the summit welcomed the recent agreement reached between the Somali parties, and called on all parties to respect the terms of the agreement. It requested the Security Council to make preparations urgently for a quick deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to Somalia, and expressed its appreciation to Djibouti for hosting the Somali peace talks.
 

The border row between Djibouti and Eritrea was another of the issues reviewed by the summit. IGAD Heads of State and Government expressed serious concern about the recent attack by Eritrean troops across the border between Eritrea and Djibouti. Member states condemned the action of Eritrean troops and “called on the parties, in particular the government of Eritrea, to heed the call for restraint by the United Nations, the African Union and the League of Arab States and to allow fact finding missions to ascertain the situation on the ground”. In a communiqué, the IGAD summit “deplored” the use of force in settling disputes between states. Concerning the suspended membership of Eritrea in IGAD, the summit set up a ministerial delegation under the chairmanship of Kenya along with Sudan and the IGAD Secretariat. The delegation has been tasked to engage with Eritrea on the sidelines of the forthcoming AU summit at Sharm-Al-Sheikh, and seek to convince it to reconsider its decision to suspend its IGAD membership.
 

On Sudan, the summit commended the continued implementation of the CPA by the two parties. It appreciated the conduct of the national census,and encouraged the parties to continue to implement all aspects of the CPA. It also called on Ethiopia and Kenya, to appoint Special Envoys to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and reiterated IGAD's commitment to follow the implementation of the CPA closely. The summit appreciated the agreement of the parties to submit the issue of Abyei to arbitration and abide by the award of the arbitration tribunal. It recalled the UN Security Council decision on the conflict in Darfur,and welcomed the deployment of the hybrid force of the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), while urging the international community to provide the required resources for its full deployment. IGAD member states deplored the recent attack on Omdurman by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and called on JEM, and all opposition groups, to resolve the conflict in Darfur through dialogue and negotiation.
 

On the revitalization of IGAD, the summit directed the Secretariat to undertake an inventory of what IGAD has already achieved in terms of harmonization and regional integration, and to make recommendations on the way forward. The Secretariat is also to develop and carry out policies of regional integration and programs to make IGAD fully relevant as a building block of the AU. The summit also endorsed the EU-Horn of Africa strategy as a vital contribution towards the development and integration of the IGAD region, while emphasizing that the Initiative should fit into the priorities that IGAD has already identified. IGAD members, while paying tribute to the out-going Executive Secretary Dr. Attalla Bashir, appointed Eng. Mahboub M. Maalim as his successor. No doubt Ethiopia, in its capacity as Chair of IGAD, will have major responsibility in the planned revitalization.

·        Representatives of the EU, US, Norway, League of Arab States, African Union and the UN are meeting in Nairobi, Kenya to discuss the mobilization of resources necessary for implementing the agreement signed in Djibouti between the TFG and the ARS on 9^th June. The international community was a stakeholder in the negotiations and has therefore assumed some responsibility to ensure that the peace agreement is implemented as expeditiously as possible. To realize this, however, and to strengthen the institutions of governance, Somalia needs significant financial support. Some donors have already contributed financially, but during the discussions Prime Minister Nur Adde gave an extensive briefing on the current situation and on the need for the international community to contribute substantially to realize implementation of the agreement. The ARS leadership, represented by Sheikh Sharif and former speaker Sharif Ahmed, underlined their commitment to the process and also requested the international community to continue its coordinated efforts in supporting Somalis to sort out their problems. In the past, the international community has not always coordinated its activities successfully, even at times working at cross purposes. This current meeting is an encouraging sign and should be fully supported.
 

In the meantime, clan elders and political leaders in the Kismayo area, in particular representatives of Marehan, Harti and Ogaden clans, have been holding consultations in Nairobi on how best to work together to establish a regional administration in Kismayo to provide equitable representation for all clans in the region. The stakeholders have agreed to establish four committees, for institutional building, political and security, to consider a regional constitution, and for reconciliation. Each committee will have a chairperson and a vice chairperson, but the membership will be distributed equitably among the clans residing in Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba regions. Possible members of committees will be put forward by clans, nominated by the Prime Minister and endorsed by the President. The process will further strengthen institutions of governance in the region and contribute to peace and stability, but the committees will certainly need full support from the donor community.

In another development, the people of Puntland have expressed opposition to Eritrean aggression against Djibouti. In a demonstration this week in Garowe, the capital of Puntland regional state, people shouted anti-Eritrean slogans and burnt the Eritrean flag. They also arranged for contributions in kind to be sent to the Djibouti armed forces. Somaliland has also expressed its solidarity with the people and Government of Djibouti. Eritrean activities are being taken seriously by Somalis across the board. Some clans whose members have been linked with the Al-Shabaab, and the splinter group of ARS still in Asmara, have started to take action. The Ayr recently met as a community and decided that Sheikh Yusuf 'Indha Adde' should be told to support the peace process and to stop cooperating with the group in Asmara. The Ogaden have taken similar action against Sheikh Hassan Turki. Sheikh Hassan Turki has recently been credited with responsibility for the murder of three prominent clan personalities whom he accused of cooperation with his enemies. There is speculation Sheikh Hassan may now be forced to leave his hideouts in the south west because of the mounting pressure from his clan. The Leysan (Merifle/Rahenweyne) have also sent a message to Sheikh Muktar Robow, spokesman for Al-Shabaab, telling him to stop from his terrorist activities and support the on-going peace effort.

·    The unprovoked attack by Eritrean forces on Djibouti troops at Ras Doumeira has left a nasty taste. Africa's youngest state has had a number of confrontations with its neighbors. Its latest effort has been to attack Djiboutian positions inside Djibouti in what Djibouti's Foreign Minister described as “pure provocation”. Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali Youssouf said the situation had calmed after fighting that had apparently been sparked off when Eritrean troops in pursuit of a deserter opened fire on Djibouti positions. Eritrea, in a statement, dismissed the episode calling it “a fabricated problem”, and diplomatic efforts have proved futile because Eritrea refused to “engage in any diplomatic activity” with Djibouti. Djibouti's leading newspaper, La Nation, in an editorial entitled “The cancer of the Horn”, highlighted the battle of Doumeira speculating that it might be “perhaps the beginning of the end” for the regime in Asmara. It described what it called the “Eritrean dictator” as “a sort of cancer of the Horn”. Eritrea, the paper continued, occupied a prominent place in the list of states that prided themselves on their support for terrorism. It recalled how the Eritrean President backed attacks in the Somali region and attempted to sabotage the inter-Somalia peace conference. According to the paper, observers believe that the international community should acknowledge the problem of Eritrea and help countries in the region to “get rid of this dangerous phenomenon”.
 

·     Deputy Prime Minister, Addisu Legesse, visited children affected by the food shortages in Shashemene area of Western Arsi Zone on Friday last week. The Deputy Premier who is also Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, commended ongoing efforts to provide care and support for children suffering from malnutrition following the failure of belg rains in various areas. He underlined the importance of carrying out awareness-raising activities on child nutrition, and noted that international media reports on the situation were very different from what he has seen that day. Dr. Tewodros Adhanom, Minister of Health, and several other ministers as well as federal and regional government officials accompanied the Deputy Prime Minister to areas in need of emergency food assistance. Ato Addisu subsequently briefed the press on the numbers in need, on the affected regions and on the causes of the drought.
 

The Early Warning Working Group, chaired by Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) is scheduled to start its next round field assessment on 24 June. This is part of the DPPA's regular assessments covering regions affected by the Belg rains, and pastoral areas. The visit by the Early Warning Working Group is expected to take about twenty days. The field assessment, according to the Groups schedules will start on the 24^th of June for pastoral areas of Afar and Somali regions and on the 27^th of June in Belg rains dependent areas of the country.  Based on the findings of the field assessment, the current revised humanitarian requirement, which was issued on 12 June 2008, will be readjusted.
 

Meanwhile, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund Secretariat is considering allocating US$20 million to Ethiopia from its Rapid Response Window, to strengthen efforts to address the current humanitarian situation in the country effectively. This allocation will be aimed particularly at addressing life-threatening situations. The Norwegian Government has also allocated 25 million kroner for additional humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia.

·        This week the International Crisis Group (ICG) has produced another of its reports on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue: Beyond the fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War. This time the ICG is talking of 'averting' war. Previous reports in December 2005 and November 2007 have spoken of 'Preventing war' and 'Stopping the slide to war'. Regrettably, as previously, this report demonstrates the serious lack of accuracy and of balance displayed in earlier efforts. This report, however, is particular in that it was publicly introduced by the senior advisor of the ICG's Africa Program, Ambassador Amdebrhan Giorghis. Ambassador Amdebrhan was Eritrea's ambassador to the EU for many years. He was also Eritrea's Commissioner for Co-ordination with UNMEE for three years, and for many years previously had the reputation of a fixer for President Issayas. He has officially resigned from the Eritrean Government, but, unlike many of his contemporaries, he has made no criticisms of the government nor indicated any support for opposition groups or for his old friends now in jail or exile. Unfortunately, Ambassador Amdebrhan's skills have not been utilized to produce a neutral or a veracious report. Indeed, its errors, both dangerous and extensive, suggest frivolity rather than veracity.
 

It is of course impossible under these circumstances to expect the report to be fair, balanced and constructive.  In fact, the ICG has been exceedingly predictable in this regard.  One can go back and look at the various reports by the ICG on Ethiopia and Eritrea since 2001.  All the reports have been partial to a fault in favour of Eritrea.  Of course, that is perhaps the reason why the ICG saw no problem with appointing a former senior official of Eritrea to evaluate the adherence of the two parties to the provisions of the Algiers Agreement and their commitment to peace.  No doubt, the former Eritrean official is using the opportunity given to him in a most shameless manner.  Both governments are authoritarian, the report says, therefore they both "have interest in keeping the conflict at a law simmer rather than resolving it."
 

But of course, the ICG knows and the whole world realizes, that Ethiopia has always said that it would leave no stone unturned to contribute more than its share for peace with Eritrea.  It has responded favourably to all initiatives to bring the two countries together to seek possibilities for making progress towards normalizing relations.

One of the most central errors is the claim that Ethiopia has failed to accept the demarcation of the Boundary Commission. This is simply not true. Ethiopia has made it quite clear, publicly, repeatedly and loudly, since November 2004 that it fully accepts the delimitation of the boundary by the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The ICG appears to have swallowed Eritrea's belief that constantly repeating lies will finally lead to their acceptance.
 

Nor is it true that Eritrea began deploying its army in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) only in January 2008. In fact, as soon as Ethiopia made it clear it accepted the demarcation in 2004, Eritrea began to interfere in the operations of the United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) and began the process of violating the TSZ. Over the last four years, Eritrea has systematically and consistently interfered with the operations of UNMEE and violated the TSZ to the point where earlier this year, it took over the whole zone, forcing UNMEE to withdraw. It is very obvious that this had nothing to do with alleged Eritrean frustration with the speed of the demarcation process and everything to do with Eritrea's desire to avoid a settlement of the issue. President Issayas has made it clear he does not want a settlement of the border issue apparently in order to avoid demobilizing his army, allow an independent press or hold elections. Ambassador Amdebrhan knows this perfectly well. It is very clear that Eritrea continues to regard the border issue as another method of putting pressure on Ethiopia, a way of continuing its destabilisation efforts against the Government of Ethiopia.
 

Over the last couple of years, the central element of the boundary issue has become Eritrea's steadily increasing violations of the TSZ, and of UNMEE activities, and of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 2000. The Agreement and the TSZ and the actions of UNMEE together make up the core of the Algiers peace process, the Algiers Agreements. Although numerous UN Security Council Resolutions have repeatedly criticised Eritrea over its activities, little of this is apparent in the ICG report. In fact, the whole ICG report is based on its fundamental misconception about alleged Ethiopia's non-acceptance of the EEBC's Demarcation Decisions, rather than concentrating on the real problem since November 2004, Eritrea's persistent infiltrations, and eventual takeover, of the TSZ and its pressures on UNMEE. The attempt to equate the actions of Ethiopia and Eritrea with respect to the Algiers Agreements makes it impossible to take ICG suggestions seriously, even though the ICG does insist that the Algiers Agreement must be the core of any progress. That is one of the few sensible points the ICG makes, though it fails to underline the fact this can only be done if and when Eritrea returns to full compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the Algiers Agreements.
 

Attempting to equate the likelihood of Ethiopia and Eritrea starting another conflict displays an extraordinary ignorance of recent and current politics in the Horn of Africa. As a former Eritrean ambassador must be aware, the record of President Issayas and of Eritrea for unprovoked aggression is unequalled in the region (or indeed more widely). In the mid-1990s Eritrean troops were involved across the Sudan border, working hard to overthrow the Government of Sudan. Eritrea went to war with Yemen in 1996 to try and seize the Hannish Islands, and in 1995/6 threatened Djibouti with its claim to 30 kilometres of Djibouti's coastline. This is the area it now appears to be trying to take over in the current invasion of northern Djibouti. In 1998, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia. To argue that Eritrea has been merely trying to acquire recognised boundaries is hardly acceptable in light of all these activities, let alone the sending of Eritrean troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the assistance for numerous armed anti-government opposition movements in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia, a number of them with significant terrorist credentials. By contrast, Ethiopia has, at the request of Somalia's legitimate government, sent troops into Somalia to help it against Eritrean-backed efforts at destabilization, and has allowed Eritrean opposition movements to hold meetings inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia has made it clear it will not start any conflict against Eritrea. On the other hand, the ICG would be hard pressed to find Eritrea making similar commitment.
 

The report claims that the Security Council and the international community “have not adequately pushed both parties to uphold their side of the Algiers deal”. At best, this is simply misleading. Ethiopia has been trying to implement the Algiers Agreements since November 2004. Eritrea, has as consistently, been steadily undermining the Agreements by the continuous violations of the TSZ and the pressures on UNMEE. The report also suggests that the international community should make it clear that there would be high costs if Ethiopia broke the Algiers Agreements. If so, it might be noticed that Eritrea has already virtually torn up the Algiers Agreements with no more than a feeble slap on the wrist. Some sign of awareness of this, even a limited attempt at balance, would have increased the credibility of ICG's report. But this has become impossible for the Group because of its consistent anti-Ethiopian bias which has now become legendary.
 

Nobody doubts that breaking the initial stalemate would allow a broader peace process to address demobilization and regional confidence-building mechanisms, explore ways to build mutually beneficial economic relations, including regional electricity, access to ports, and cross-border links. These are all very obvious and simplistic suggestions made frequently before. As ICG very well knows, President Issayas has consistently refused to make any efforts in this or any other direction. One recent commentator likened him to a spoilt child demanding sweets before he would agree todo anything. This might be understandable, even acceptable in a ten year old. It is not acceptable in a President, though it is hardly surprising given his insistence on total and personal control. This, after all is something Ambassador Amdebrhan knows better that most. It is a pity he has not been prepared to use his insights for this report.
 

Further progress with the parties does not as the ICG suggest require changes of attitude on the part of both parties. It requires Eritrea to return to full compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and the Algiers Agreements. That is all. ICG might have noticed it. Issues like the state collapse in Somalia (which took place long before in 1991), human rights issues in Eritrea, or Eritrea's involvement in Sudan's conflicts, or even the latest Eritrean invasion of Djibouti, have nothing to do with the EEBC decisions or the border.

The real problem with this report is not its failure to understand Ethiopia's actions (though that is bad enough), but what appears to be its deliberate misinterpretations and its basic failure to understand Eritrean policy. Given the role of Ambassador Amdebrhan in the production of this report it is hard to regard this as anything other than deliberate. Ethiopia has made it very clear it will not initiate any conflict with Eritrea, though, not surprisingly, it refuses to rule out a response if attacked. Eritrea has not, and its record over the past fifteen years makes it clear it is likely to launch an attack whenever President Issayas thinks it appropriate irrespective of legality, argument, even rationality. An obvious example was the aggression launched against Djibouti a few weeks ago, in April, and the subsequent clashes early this month. It is a very clear case of aggression, condemned by the African Union, the Arab League or the UN, none of whom have been able to discern any rational cause for the entirely unprovoked attack. To suggest, as ICG does, that this, like the enforced expulsion of UNMEE, is merely a demonstration of President Issayas' frustration and anger at the lack of international support for “virtual demarcation” is absurd.
 

There are plenty of other minor inaccuracies and what one can only consider as attempts to mislead. Nobody threatens Eritrean independence, though its regime, perhaps the worst for human rights in Africa, has got many enemies. With Eritrea's population haemorrhaging at well over a thousand a month across the border into Sudan and Ethiopia, President Issayas has been reduced to claiming this is all a CIA plot. But no one needs to bribe Eritrean youngsters to leave Eritrea these days. They are only too glad to get out. Whatsoever makes ICG suggest President Issayas wants better relations with the West? He has shown absolutely no interest in this whatever. All his recent utterances have revolved around the idea that he and Eritrea are the only ones in step; the rest of the world has got it wrong. The ICG argues that Somalia is becoming ever more troubled. No, it isn't; indeed, quite the reverse, but it is undeniable that Eritrea's efforts in support of terrorist opposition in Somalia has clearly been intended to have just that effect. Ethiopia has got legitimate national security issues and concerns in Somalia. Eritrea has not, and there is no inevitability that it should be linked to insecurity in Somalia. This report even repeats long exploded Eritrean mantras about self-sufficiency, now known to have always been grossly exaggerated. The claim that Eritrea's incursions into Djibouti is “another example of its desire to attract international attention and force movement on the border crisis” is quite simply a joke. There is no evidence of anything of the kind. The attempt to continue seeking mitigating circumstances for Eritrea’s misconduct does not enhance ICG’s credibility. The report makes a habit of quoting controversial, and frequently wrong claims by Human Rights Watch, without looking for alternative sources or information or attempting to check these with the Government of Ethiopia, or to Ethiopian government statements. Incidentally, to categorize the launching of the invasion of Ethiopia in May 1998 (an invasion which led to perhaps thousands dead on both sides) as “seizing” a disputed village, is outrageous.
 

Another main point to make about the ICG report is the sheer improbability of its recommendations. One, for example, is a call for Eritrea to withdraw from the TSZ. It is, of course, an excellent idea and is an essential element in the implementation of the Algiers Agreements. Eritrea has consistently refused to withdraw from the TSZ, nor can such a move be considered likely. Similarly, the possibility of persuading Eritrea to change its policies towards UNMEE, or to stop the support for armed opposition movements in Ethiopia, or Somalia, a country in which it has no strategic or national interest except as an attempt to destabilize Ethiopia, or to open a dialogue or talk to UN envoys of any kind, are absolutely nil.
 

In fact, all the ICG recommendations immediately fall foul of Eritrea's consistent refusals to consider any of them. There is no EEBC Demarcation line on the ground, nor can there be unless and until demarcation is carried out under the auspices of UNMEE with a properly demilitarized TSZ, not one under Eritrean military occupation. There certainly have been delays in taking the process forward since April 2002. Ethiopia was reluctant to accept the original EEBC's Decisions and asked for clarification. Since November 2004 , however, the delays have all been on Eritrea's side as it steadily infiltrated the TSZ, violated the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and effectively started the process of tearing up the Algiers Agreements. This can only have been deliberate. Any possible way forward now has to take this into account. The ICG has, to all intents and purposes, totally ignored all this. Until it does take it into account, the report is not worth the paper it is written on.
 

The problem is not that so many issues have been left un-addressed in the peace process by the narrow focus of the border issue, as ICG claims. It is quite simply that Eritrea has consistently refused to discuss anything at all. Apparently piqued by, and indeed in denial of Eritrea's defeat in June 2000, President Issayas has simply sulked, refusing to talk about specific demarcation details, let alone the problems of displaced populations, cross-border links, militarized regional relationships, Eritrean aggression, or Eritrea's anti-Ethiopian policies, or even the future economic inter-dependence from which both Eritrea and Ethiopia would benefit.
 

Eritrea was forced to leave Ethiopian territory in May 2000.  It was forced to talk peace in June and to agree to the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, to the creation of the TSZ and of UNMEE. All these Eritrea is now in the process of reversing.  Regrettably, the ICG is applauding this unhelpful Eritrean approach.
 

It is in the recommendations of the report that the ICG proves, once again, that it is far from being an asset for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.  Some of the recommendations could in fact be ignored as almost laughable if they were not dangerous and were not meant to mislead the international community.   The Eritrean President has continued to insist that there is no need for completing the demarcation process, because, as he insists, that has already been taken care of by the EEBC's virtual demarcation.  The road to peace, he says, is via the removal of Ethiopia's occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory.  The ICG, perhaps following the advise of the former Eritrean official, says in its very first recommendation that the United Nations Security Council should endorse "formally the EEBC's virtual demarcation of the border and declare  it legally binding."  Of course, the ICG knows that Ethiopia has said, with strong support from the international legal community, that virtual demarcation is a legal nonsense.  The ICG appears to have convinced itself that Ethiopia might be compelled to change its position under duress.  A dangerous miscalculation. 

• A few weeks ago we questioned whether an Economist correspondent had been in Ethiopia before writing a piece. This time, one may have been in the country but, unfortunately, it appears to have had little impact on the quality of his work or on his approach to his subject. It remains extraordinarily sloppy. Apportioning blame for food shortages is always a fun game for a reporter. It is usually the government which gets the criticism. It may deserve it but one expects the criticisms at least to be based on reality. To suggest that life in Ethiopia is akin to 'serfdom minus a tsarist order' simply because farmers in some areas till the soil by hand, is neither hardly clever nor accurate. Of course, it is always possible to find specific cases to highlight. That's a typical journalistic technique, and the Economist, despite criticising some agencies for “seizing crudely on images of emaciated infants to secure extra funding”, manages to do the same with the emaciated child at the head of its story: “Will [Ethiopia] ever be able to stave off starvation?” The report does, rather grudgingly, admit that a famine on the scale of 1983/84 is unlikely. Actually, it's more than unlikely, and no one, not even the most pessimistic of NGO critics, has even hinted at such a possibility. So why bring it up? It is hard to resist the idea that the mention of the idea is deliberately intended to be alarmist, and, as so often, denigrate the subject, to reinforce the poor image that the author wants to emphasize.

Ethiopia has made major progress since 1991, a point almost entirely ignored by this report which dismisses the growth achieved as “virtually non-existent aside from coffee, qat… horticulture and a little tourism.” It then adds, gratuitously and inaccurately, “almost ¾ of the population may be under or unemployed”. This comment involves a typical Economist trick. Something “may” be true, equally it may not. In fact, this sort of statistic is obvious nonsense. To suggest that unemployment is so rife in a country in which much of the population is involved in farming, and subsistence farming at that, demonstrates a quite extraordinary lack of understanding of Third World farming practices. One would expect an Economist correspondent in Africa to know better.

Of course, we'd like to see more development, but a lot has been happening especially in the regional capitals like Dire Dawa, Bahr Dahr, Makelle and Awassa. Indeed, almost every regional capital, including the Somali Region's Jijiga despite claims by the Ogaden National Liberation Front, seen exceptionally impressive development in the last year or two – as the briefest of visits would demonstrate.

The Economist does acknowledge that Prime Minister Meles cannot be blamed for record international oil prices or for the rising costs of world food, but it then slips in an allegation that he is responsible for failing to increase Ethiopia's hard-currency supplies. It is a pity that the Economist correspondent in Nairobi doesn't bother to read the work of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). This would have given a different, and rather more accurate, picture of the current economic situation and its outlook over the next year: “Sustained growth in agriculture, horticulture and services will keep real GDP growth robust, at 9.5 %in 2008 and 8.6% in 2009, supported by healthy inflows of donor aid and foreign direct investment.” The IMF in May, on its annual Article IV consultations, commended Ethiopia's “impressive” recent growth record, the fastest non-oil producing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF also welcomed the Government's anti-inflation package, based on food tax cuts, targeted subsidies and tighter monetary policy. The IMF made it clear it believed Ethiopia is well placed to receive additional donor help, “given its good record of policy implementation and anti-poverty initiatives.” The World Bank has recently announced a new country assistance strategy and the UK's DfID approved record funding of US$264 million in May. This will be channelled through the multi-donor protection of basic services program. Last week, the World Bank's chief economist also noted that Ethiopia had registered “commendable economic growth over the last three or four years”.

Despite Economist claims, Ethiopia is not particularly sensitive to talk of famine, but it does prefer to see accuracy in the comment and the reporting. The Economist fails on both counts. There is a very severe humanitarian crisis. Nobody has attempted to deny it. Indeed, the Government has taken the lead in appealing for help following poor belg (short) rains and the effects of international food and fuel price rises. It is, however, sensitive to inaccurate and unnecessary exaggerations. Take the way the international media twisted a UNICEF press conference to claim there were six million children suffering from acute malnutrition. UNICEF actually said there were six million children under five who were living in impoverished and drought-prone districts. It then added that 175,000 might be suffering from severe malnutrition, though this itself appears to have been considerably exaggerated. Certainly, other reports indicate the figure for severely malnourished children should be 75,000.

Another case recently was the announcement in the budget presentation to the House of Peoples Representatives that the military budget would be increased by $50 million, from $350 million to $400 million. Some media, including the BBC,managed to report that the military budget had been increased from $50 million to $400, that is by 800%. This may not have been deliberate in either case, but when we see such respected organizations as the Economist and the BBC repeatedly making wild errors of this kind it is of considerable concern, and inevitably raises doubts about the rest of their reporting.

To suggest that the Government's attitude to the current humanitarian crisis comes close to denial is a similar error, as well as an almost typical Economist slur. Anyone who has been following the Government's statements on the recent drought can see this is rubbish. It has been the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency (DPPA) which has been leading the calls for assistance and responsible for itemizing the problem. The Early Warning System has worked well, but the situation was intensified by the rising international food and fuel prices which were unforeseen by Ethiopia as well as the rest of the world. Look at the regular Humanitarian Bulletins and other statements over the last few months. The Economist loves to try and parade a clever phrase. It's happy not to let accuracy stand in its way: “Mr. Zenawi has already splintered the ineffectual opposition parties with the liberal use of torture and imprisonment.” The Government actually has had nothing to do with the splintering of the opposition parties as the most superficial glance at the disputes and accusations within the opposition over the last year would reveal. The opposition have managed to split and fracture without any government assistance.

Time and again the Economist pulls out allegations, carefully crediting others, while happily repeating claims it knows perfectly well cannot be substantiated. No allegations that Ethiopian troops have been burning villages in the Somali Regional State can possibly be substantiated by satellite imagery, as even a moment's thought would acknowledge. We should not have to point out that satellite pictures of a burnt village cannot under any circumstances indicate who was responsible. Human Rights Watch knows perfectly well that the ONLF regularly burn villages, as do pastoralists when they move on. The Economist knows this too, but it apparently prefers to phrase its comments with considerable care to provide the worst possible interpretation. Of course, problems remain, in dealing with the current humanitarian problems, with the distribution of food and extra assistance for the severely malnourished; development remains slower than we like. Equally, it is deeply dispiriting to see international correspondents regularly failing to make any effort to be accurate, not bothering to spend the time to investigate properly, or try to understand the realities and problems of development.

·          The Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Ato Sufian Ahmed, presented the House of Peoples Representatives with a 54.2 billion Birr budget request for 2008/09 on 10 June 2008. The House referred the budget, already approved by the Council of Ministers, to its Budget and Finance Standing Committee for further examination. The 2008/09 budget was prepared as an important tool to stabilize and balance the macro economy and mitigate the impact of inflation as well as mobilize the necessary resources from domestic and external sources, and implement the Five-Year Development Plan as encapsulated in PASDEP, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, 2005/06-2009/10. It takes into account a continuation of the recent impressive economic growth, the track-record of the recent budget performances, the measures being implemented to deal with inflation, continued efforts to improve revenue collection and administration, stronger resource inflows from external sources, continued expenditure on poverty-oriented socio-economic development sectors, and continued efforts to modernize and streamline administration and control of expenditure.
 

In terms of revenue, it is envisaged that in 2008/09 the Federal government will mobilize Birr 45.4 billion in revenue of which Birr 32 billion (70%) will be from domestic sources, and the balance from external sources of which Birr 6.7 billion (14.8%) will be in the form of support for the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) and Birr 6.6 billion (14.6%) in the form of project grants. It is expected that total Federal government expenditure for 2008/09 will be Birr 54.2 billion of which Birr 13.4 billion (24.7%) will go to recurrent expenditure. The lion's share of the budget, however, will go to capital expenditure and transfer to the regions, to finance development activities. Birr 23.4 billion (43.2%) will cover capital expenditure and Birr 17.6 billion (22.2%) will be transferred to the regional governments.
 

In terms of sectoral allocation, out of Birr 36.8 billion of the Federal Government's combined recurrent and capital budget, 19.8% goes to the road sector, 18.4% to education and capacity building, 13.5% to agricultural and rural development, 4.9 % to health sector, 4.6% to water and sanitations, 3.4 %to rural electrification, and 15.5% to others. In fact, 64.5% of the budget is taken by agriculture, water, rural electrification, roads, education and health sectors demonstrating that poverty-oriented sectors and infrastructural expansion absorb much of the budget. Similarly, out of transfers to the regional governments, most goes to the expansion of rural infrastructure, capacity building and poverty-oriented sectors. From the total Federal government budget, 10.9% goes to defense and 9% to debt servicing. Although defense expenditure this year is raised by US$50 million, from US$350 million to US$400 million, defense expenditure in fact has actually fallen continuously from a level of 11.2% of the GDP in 1999/00 to 1.5 % of GDP in this budget. The ratio is well below the 2% of GDP generally recommended by the Bretton Woods Institutions. It's a clear demonstration of the government's continued commitment to channel the country's resources to social and economic development.
 

The budgetary data reveals that in 2008/09 there will be a resource gap of about Birr 8.8 billion. The government envisages financing this gap through external loans, external debt relief and domestic borrowing, mainly from non-bank sources. Past budgets have focused on poverty-oriented sectors and on the building and expansion of infrastructure. As a result there has been significant progress in agriculture, water, road, education, health, and rural electrification. Nevertheless, there is a long way to go before all Ethiopians can achieve a sound standard of living. The gap between available and required resources remains huge. The government is leaving no stone unturned to mobilize domestically available resources, but it is also calling on development partners to bolster its efforts through enhanced allocation and timely disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The level of ODA that Ethiopia currently receives (US$14 per capita) is substantially lower than other low income countries, including many with higher average per capita incomes and better indicators of human development. In the global context of increased aid commitments after Gleneagles, the case for increasing aid flows to Ethiopia is very strong. The Government’s commitment to spending on poverty-reducing programs, and its track record of sound financial management and implementation, serve to strengthen the case. Equally, the wide range of institutional and structural reforms that have been taking place help to enhance the transparency of government expenditure management and accountability of the public sector. All this is expected to encourage development actors, including Ethiopia's development partners, to mobilize resources towards a common goal of poverty reduction and eradication.