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The Bombings in
Kampala and `Constructive Disengagement`
The recent terrorist
bombings in Kampala have once again highlighted the enormity of the
challenge posed by terrorism not only in Somalia but also throughout
the region. The nature of the attack as well as the sheer cruelty of
the choice of targets clearly shows how far the perpetrators are
ready to take their terrorist campaign. The reaction of the
international community was largely one of shock and surprise for
few would have thought the extremists in Somalia were inclined to
carry out such a campaign outside of Somalia and with such
cold-blooded savagery. It is rather saddening to realize that only
heinous attacks such as these could bring the attention of the
international community back into the harrowing experiences of the
peoples of the region.
In fact, the countries
of the region have always been warning the international community
that enough was not being done to contain the scourge of terrorism
that has long since become a threat not only to the peoples of
Somalia and its neighbors but also to the international community at
large with the ever great internationalization of Jihad in the
country. There has been incontrovertible evidence that the war in
Somalia was not a war among factions in Somalia but a war between
the peoples of Somalia and international terrorists. Nor have these
forces ever minced their words about promoting the destructive
agenda of Al Qaeda in the region and even threatening to take their
terrorist violence farther. It is an open secret that Al Shabab has
been recruiting hundreds of terrorists from as far away as North
America, Australia and West Europe in the name and as part of a
global Jihad. Against this background however, the international
community’s reaction against such a growing threat has been largely
lukewarm at best. To the extent that there was any sustained
interest on the part of the international community in the stability
of the region, it is mostly expressed in terms of a surfeit of
recommendations which have all too often fallen short of
articulating much less addressing effectively the fundamental causes
of the problem.
It does not require a
genius to realize that the proliferation of terrorist groups in this
part of Africa has largely to do with the fact that there is an
acute lack of functioning state institutions in Somalia. Somalia
today is a safe haven for the who-is-who of international terrorists
simply because there is a security and governance vacuum that lends
itself to the mushrooming of terrorist elements that pry on the
sense of despondency of a population left to its own means. Any
effort to rein in the growth of extremism in Somalia must therefore
begin with addressing the deficit in a functioning central authority
capable of exerting a meaningful control over a significant portion
of the country. Today the Transitional Federal Government and
institutions under it offer the only viable alternative to build on
if the quest for bringing together a semblance of functioning
governance is to be achieved. But it is doubtful whether the
international community—or the key players within it—have a clear
understanding of how critical a role the strengthening of the TFG
and its institutions can play in addressing the plight of the people
of Somalia and the contribution this would have in holding in check
the proliferation of terrorist elements in this part of the world
and beyond. As the bombings in Kampala made it abundantly clear,
addressing what at first appears to be a localized crisis will also
go a long way in preventing the kind of large-scale mayhem
extremists are so keen to inflict on civilians by way of promoting
their unwholesome agendas.
Another reason—also
closely linked with the first—why the likes of Al Shabab are allowed
a measure of impunity to wreak unmitigated terror on civilians both
within Somalia and beyond is the presence of a number of
actors—state and non-state alike—that are actively involved in
arming, financing or otherwise supporting these terrorist elements
in their effort to perpetrate acts of terror without running a
significant risk of being held to account for it. Al Shabab today
enjoys a great deal of support from both like-minded terrorist
outfits such as Al Qaeda and irresponsible regimes hell bent on
promoting belligerent agendas throughout the region.
This all underlines
the centrality of effectively and immediately addressing both
factors that have contributed to the growing threat of terrorism as
excruciatingly exemplified by the heinous acts in Kampala. To begin
with the second factor, there have been a couple of attempts—belated
though they were—by the international community to take practical
steps to address the role of both state and non-state actors
actively involved in arming and financing the extremists in Somalia.
More particularly, the United Nations Security Council has taken a
few steps towards ensuring that such actors change their behaviors
and stop their destructive roles both in Somalia and within the
whole region. But there is no reason to believe that these efforts
have been paying off. If anything, the fact that the whole process
is punctuated by a number of false starts and duplicitous diplomatic
overtures on the part of some of the actors has all but neutralized
the possible efficacy of the measures taken thus far. It is
therefore imperative that no such efforts be left to chance in order
to make sure that the international community conveys an unequivocal
message to all spoilers that are steadfastly standing in the way of
peace and stability in the region.
But more importantly,
the lack of meaningful engagement on the part of the international
community at large—and the key players in it particularly—in
extending a practical support to the elements of peace and stability
in Somalia has yet to be fully addressed. As we have reiterated
several times before, the Djibouti framework and the Transitional
Federal Institutions established under its auspices are the best
opportunity yet to seek a lasting solution to the conflict in
Somalia which has far-reaching consequences for international peace
and stability. This is not however to suggest that the TFG and its
institutions have been playing their part as effectively as they
ought to have. In fact, there is much to be desired in that regard.
But one has also to realize that the political configuration
obtaining in Somalia today is so chaotic that the TFG remains the
best alternative to the decidedly zero-sum calculations of the
coterie of extremist elements promoting a destructive agenda that
knows no borders. In all fairness, it is not entirely correct to
blame the TFG and its institutions for all that has gone wrong
either. Despite a flurry of resolutions and series of promises, what
the international community has thus far offered by way of practical
support is a far cry from the kind of affirmative intervention that
could have gone a long way towards sorting out the problem in
Somalia.
As if the lack of such
a practical support was not bad enough, however, there also are
nonetheless other factors that are playing havoc with the effort to
strengthen the elements of peace and stability in Somalia
thereby—inadvertently perhaps—emboldening extremists and terrorists
in their quest to wreak havoc in the entire region. As of late, a
plethora of seemingly academic works have been appearing in various
forums capable of informing policy decisions of some of the key
players among the international community. Although they come in
many forms and from different corners, the main thrust of these
purportedly academic pieces is that what little support is being
currently given to the TFG needs to be stopped because the latter
has failed to deliver. This approach, deceptively referred to as
‘constructive disengagement’ by its advocates has been gaining some
traction among a sizable section of policy-making circles in some
key-players among the international community. Constructive
disengagement, as a notion, is something of an oxymoron, but more
worryingly, woefully bereft of any workable alternative, perhaps
except offering—as it were—a thinly-veiled fig-leaf for shirking
international responsibility. This is what the arch-sponsor of Al-Shabab
in the region, the regime in Asmara, has all along been pushing.
Unfortunately, what Al
Shabab did in Kampala was an anti-thesis of ‘constructive
disengagement’—whatever its merits. It is a stark reminder of the
cost at which reluctance to act against terrorists would often come.
Even more so, because this is happening at the cost of innocent
civilians. As Prime Minister Meles said after these attacks, what
the international community has to do is not to negotiate, but
defeat these forces. If there still are those who cling to the naïve
notion that it is still possible to make peace with Al Shabab,
Kampala has made it abundantly clear that this is a mere exercise in
futility. Action, and more action, is what is needed; this would,
first and foremost, require recognizing that much of the job can be
done within Somalia and by the Somalis—with support from the
international community even if this was a fraction of what is being
done elsewhere. As for constructive disengagement, it only
represents the height of irresponsibility, nothing more, and nothing
less.
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