• The 11th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union was held 30 June to 1 July in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt. The theme of the two day summit, hosted  by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek, was " Meeting Millennium Development Goals on Water and Sanitation" but other important items on the summit agenda included African Union Government, conflict, and the situation in Zimbabwe. It was attended by an unprecedented number of Heads of State and Government; among the few absentees was President Issayas Aferwerki of Eritrea.  

Presentations on the summit theme highlighted the fact that only 62 per cent of Africans have access to clean water and only 40 per cent to basic sanitation. To achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on water and sanitation by the target date of 2015, 33 million have to get access to clean water annually and 55 million to basic sanitation every year. The relevance of these MDGs to the achievement of the reduction of infant, child and maternal mortality rates was noted. In discussions, particular emphasis was given to the equitable sharing of water resources, a point underlined by the Declaration of the Assembly. The Heads of State and Government also made commitments to develop and update national water management policies, regulatory frameworks and programs, and to prepare national strategies and action plans for achieving the MDGs targets for water and sanitation. Attention was drawn to the importance of Africa’s huge hydro-energy potential, 94 per cent undeveloped. Also highlighted was the need for a holistic approach especially on agriculture, water, health education and infrastructure, and for bold national plans. These will need to be supported by financing from partners which has, so far, proved grossly inadequate.  

The Assembly deliberated at length on Africa Union Government. President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairperson of the Union, Jakaya Kikwete, presented the discussions and recommendations of the Meeting of the Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government on the Union Government held in Arusha on 22 and 23 May 2008. In his presentation, the Chairperson noted that the Committee had recommended that the Union Government should be established through a gradual process, and that a number of benchmarks, including free movement of peoples, development of infrastructure, and the establishment of African financial institutions, should form the basis of the roadmap. Regional Economic Communities, as the building blocks of the Union Government, needed to be rationalized and harmonized, and the African Union Commission as the epicenter of the Union's activities should be strengthened. The Committee had also endorsed the recommendations of the Extraordinary session of the Executive Council on the Audit of the Union, including on the issue of finding alternative/additional sources of financing for the Union.  

The issue of Union Government has been on the agenda of the organization for a decade and two options have become apparent to resolve the debate. One is to recognize the divergence of opinion and take a vote. Under the rules of the African Union, the majority would carry the day. However, each member state of the AU is sovereign and the second option would be to adopt a variable geometric approach with each country moving at its own chosen pace. Countries that wished to establish a Union Government could do so and in a manner that would not disrupt the common endeavors of the states of the African Union. In debate there was little support for the immediate establishment of a Union Government or for an extraordinary summit of the Assembly to be devoted exclusively to this issue, but there was agreement that the recommendations of the Committee provided a sound basis for moving the integration process forward. In conclusion, the Chairperson stated that there was a need for more clarity on timelines and that the Commission should study the matter further. The Assembly decided that there was no need for an extraordinary session but agreed to devote a full day to the issue during the next ordinary session in January 2009 in Addis Ababa.  It was the consensus of the Summit that the next session of the Assembly in Addis Ababa should bring finality to this interminable debate. This was a point underlined by Prime Minister Meles and several other Heads of State.   

The Summit also deliberated on the State of Peace and Security of Africa, discussing among other topics the border situation between Djibouti and Eritrea, Somalia and the Ethiopia Eritrea dispute. The Assembly was briefed by Djibouti Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita in detail about Eritrea’s violation of Djibouti territory and its refusal to respond to any mediation attempts. The Assembly expressed its deep concern over the situation at the Djibouti Eritrea border, and at the tense relations between the two countries. Strongly endorsing the communique of the Peace and Security Councl at Summit Level, the Assembly condemned Eritrea’s military action against Djibouti, demanding that Eritrea withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the Djibouti territories it occupied, and called for the immediate withdrawal of all forces to positions held before 4 February 2008. It welcomed the initiatives taken by the Peace and Security Council and the Commission of the Union, including the dispatch of an investigative mission to Djibouti, from 5 to 9 June. It expressed its sincere appreciation to the Djiboutian authorities for their cooperation, and deep concern at the refusal of the Eritrean authorities to receive the mission. It urgently appealed to the Eritrean authorities to extend its full cooperation to the efforts of the AU to reach a peaceful solution.  

On Somalia the Assembly welcomed the progress made in the promotion of an all-inclusive political process in Somalia, and in particular the agreement on June 9 between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. It strongly urged all Somali stakeholders to join the process and commit themselves to a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the conflicts in Somalia. The Assembly condemned all attempts to undermine the ongoing peace and reconciliation process. It called upon the international community to increase support to the efforts to bring an end to the violence in Somalia, including an early deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to take over from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia. AMISOM’s mandate was extended for a further six months. There are now hopes that Nigerian troops and the second battalion from Burundi will deploy shortly. Nigeria said last week that a battalion was ready to go as soon as the Government gave its final approval, while US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, said Washington was ready to support deployment, but the immediate priority was procuring armored personnel carriers for the Burundi battalion which was trained and ready to leave for Somalia. Rwanda has also now indicated its readiness to send troops to Somalia, though an army spokesperson emphasized there were still logistical problems that needed to be solved.   

Following the presentation of the Commission’s report on conflict and post-conflict situations in Africa, the delegation of Eritrea said that Ethiopia continued to occupy Eritrean territory even though the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea had been demarcated by the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC). This was against the spirit of the Algiers agreement. Eritrea also complained of the failure of the African Union to influence Ethiopia to accept the decision of the boundary commission. Ethiopia, while reiterating its unconditional acceptance of the delimitation decision of the EEBC, made it clear that according to international practice, demarcation must made on the ground and not on paper. The EEBC had merely issued a demarcation on paper, a "virtual” boundary demarcation. The Ethiopian delegation noted its proposals to demarcate the boundary through normal procedures was, for example, the method that Nigeria and Cameroon had followed. It said that the Eritrean Government had refused this proposal. The Ethiopian delegation explained that neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia could be said to occupy any of each other’s territory unlawfully. Some villages that belong to Ethiopia according to the EEBC delimitation were being administered by Eritrea and visa-versa. This would continue to be the case until demarcation on the ground was undertaken. The Ethiopian delegation emphasized the invaluable contribution made by the AU. The cause for the stalemate was lack of cooperation on the part of Eritrea and there was no failure as far as the AU was concerned. 

Eritrea also complained to the Assembly that Ethiopia was being obstructive with regard to Eritrea's participation in the A.U. It alleged that one Eritrean ambassador to the AU had been deported by Ethiopia, another in charge of the Eritrean mission had been harassed and forced to leave the country and a third, although assigned by the Eritrean Government, had been denied entry. As a result, the Eritrean delegation said, Eritrea had been unable to participate in the AU for the last decade. Ethiopia made it clear this was simply not true. There were no constraints on any AU member country to be represented in Addis Ababa irrespective of  bilateral relationships with Ethiopia. Eritrea’s head of delegation, the Foreign Minister or other Eritrean officials could come to Addis Ababa any time for AU  business. Eritrea’s failure to respond to the invitation by the AU Peace and Security Council to present its case to the Summit at Sharm El Sheikh was its own choice. It clearly had nothing to do with Ethiopia, merely demonstrating Eritrea's lack of interest in AU activities.  

Zimbabwe was also considered by the Heads of State and Government. There was an agreement that the present status quo in Zimbabwe was not tenable, that there was grave disenchantment in Zimbabwe and this must be taken into account, and that there was a need to find real solutions. The deep malaise that gripped Zimbabwe could only be solved if it was fully understood and remedial actions were taken to that end. The key to any solution must be for both sides to listen and work with each other. Only then could Zimbabwe move forward. This was a point, among others, which Prime Minister Meles also underlined.  

Meanwhile during the Summit, the AU Peace and Security Commission signed an agreement with the Italian Government for the funding of five new projects through the Italian Africa Peace Facility, set up in December last year with a 40 million dollar budget to support the AU peace and security agenda. The new projects, welcomed by the AU’s Peace and Security Commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, and costing 9 million dollars, include support for the AU Panel of the Wise and the functioning of the Secretariat; support for the AU Liaison Offices in Khartoum and Juba for assisting in the CPA; implementation of the AU Border Program to assist in capacity building, border delimitation and demarcation, and cross-border cooperation; strengthening the AU Commission’s capacity in prevention and combating of terrorism; and support for the African Stand-By Force by financing part of the training plan. In March the IAPF and the AU agreed on three projects to enhance the capacity of elements of the TFG in Somalia, including the police force. 

• The NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee and the African Peer Review Forum, both chaired by Prime Minister Meles, met on 29 June, in Sharm el Sheikh, on the margin of the 11^th African Union Summit. The Committee discussions included the outcome of the NEPAD Review Summit held in Dakar in April, progress on the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the African Union and preparations for the 2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaido Japan. The meeting welcomed the continued efforts and the progress being made to implement NEPAD sectoral priorities, and in particular the joint AU/NEPAD policy proposals to address current global high food prices, and the need to promote Public-Private Partnership and resources to support the African agenda on climate change and industrial and infrastructural development.   

The committee commended, once again, Senegal’s initiatives on the revitalization of the NEPAD program, recalling the consensus reached at the April Review Summit to recommit to enduring NEPAD values and principles. The committee urged other member states to contribute their viewpoint on the structure and profile of the new NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Authority. The Summit. NEPAD’s 19th, welcomed the inauguration of the Coordinating Unit as a significant step toward implementing AU Assembly decisions on the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the African Union. It concluded that the processes for integration of NEPAD into the African Union should be completed before the next NEPAD Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2009.

The NEPAD Summit also considered possible guidelines for engagement with G8 leaders at the Hokkaido Summit. It agreed on three key messages:  the Africa Action Plan remains the basis for Africa's engagement with the G8; on the revival of the G8/NEPAD follow-up mechanism (as agreed at the G8 Heiligendamm Summit of 2007) to ensure prompt and effective fulfillment of all G8 commitments and pledges to Africa; and the need to facilitate better access to concessional loans by African countries for the purpose of economic growth within the context of prudent macro-economic management and as part of the process of reviewing the issues of Financing for Development. This is all the more important in view of the burden of the recent rises in oil and food prices faced by oil importing countries. The NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee also emphasized that Africa should make sure that any G8 discussion on climate change at Hokkaido does not compromise or undermine Africa's positions and strategies on climate change currently being canvassed at the international level through the Kyoto and post-Kyoto processes.   

The Committee also received the report of the Chairperson on progress in the Peer Review Forum since the previous meeting in January 2008. Reviews of three countries, Uganda, Nigeria and Burkina Faso were ready, and the Republic of Togo was admitted as the 29th Member State of the African Peer Review Forum.

• Somali Prime Minister Nur Hassan ‘Adde’ arrived in Addis Ababa yesterday for consultations following the signing of the agreement in Djibouti on June 9 between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Prime Minister Nur ‘Adde’ will be meeting Prime Minister Meles and other senior government officials. He has made it clear that the question now in the peace process is whether the Djibouti agreement will be implemented fully. There are still a lot of challenges to be faced. There are fears that the international community may be dragging its feet over assistance to the process. It remains a vital necessity for the international community to ensure that both parties live up to their committments. It is unclear why the third stage of the TFG/ARS negotiations, originally scheduled for the end of June, has been delayed. The two parties were expected to meet with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.  

In advance of the planned visit to Saudi Arabia, President Ali Abdullahi Salah of Yemen invited Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the few ARS members still in Asmara to Sana’a. The ARS split over the issue of participating in the peace process and talking to the TFG. A majority of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and Sharif Hassan who signed with the TFG on June 9 have accepted the agreement. A very small minority of the ARS, headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ and still based in Asmara, has remained strongly opposed to the Djibiuti Agreement.

Meanwhile, with Al-Shabaab continuing to reiterate its opposition to peace, sporadic clashes in Somalia have continued. This week fighters from Al-Shabaab made an attempt to ambush Ethiopian troops en route from Guura’el where they had been carrying out search operations over the weekend, towards Mataban. They were however themselves taken by surprise by the Ethiopian forces, losing a total of 71 fighters killed , including 16 senior figures, among  them the overall commander of the attack, Moalim Farhan, and Abdullahi Ali Afrah ‘Sheikh Aspro’, a Canadian citizen and one time second deputy chairman of the ICU’s Shura council in 2006. These Ethiopian operations in and around Guura’el and Mataban were designed to interrupt Al-Shabaab plans to launch a series of attacks, and they were successful.  

• A delegation of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, led by Commissioner Catherine Dupe Atoki, paid a week-long visit to Ethiopia June 24 to July 1. The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights is the premier human rights treaty body in Africa. It is an organ of the African Union, established in 1987 for the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in Africa in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The visit of the Commissioner was intended to promote the charter, evaluate problems faced by signatory countries and hold discussions with relevant bodies on future direction, to help solve identified problems. The Commissioner was also intending to develop cooperative and constructive dialogue with state organs and other stakeholders involved in the promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia.  During the visit, the delegation has an audience with President Girma, and held discussions with a number of ministers and officials: Ato Tefera Walwa, Minister of Capacity Building; Ato Assefa Kesito, Minister of Justice, Wo. Hirut Delebo, Minister of Women’s Affairs; Ato Hassan Abdella, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs; Dr. Sentayehu Wolde-Mikael, Minister of Education; Dr. Tekeda Alemu, State Minister for Foreign Affairs; Dr. Kebede Worku, State Minister of Health; Ambassador Kassa Gabre Hiwot, Commissioner of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission; Ato Abay Tekle, Chief of the Ombudsman Institution; Ato Tamiru Wondimagegne, President of the Ethiopian Bar Association, and Ambassador Teshome Toga, the Speaker of the House of People’s Representatives. It also held meetings with half a dozen local NGOs, and media organizations. At the end of their visit, the Commissioner said she had a fruitful visit. Ethiopia, she said, was in good standing in its human rights protection.  
   

• On Tuesday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) issued a joint statement calling on the Ethiopian Government to “immediately abandon plans to impose strict government controls and draconian criminal penalties on non-governmental organizations”. They were referring to the Charities and Societies Bill currently being considered prior to discussion by the Council of Ministers and then Parliament.

In their comments on the bill, HRW and AI make a significant number of misinterpretations. Using the same sort of uncorroborated and politically partisan sources as they have done in recent flawed reports they perpetuate a whole series of errors about the bill. It is symbolic of their approach that neither organization appears to have realized that many of their claims and comments have been outdated by the second draft of the bill, a draft that neither appears to have bothered to read.

In fact, both HRW and AI make clear in their separate comments on the draft that their interest is political rather than human rights. HRW, managing to insult the many civil society organizations that operate freely as well as a significant number of regional and national political parties, speaks of the narrowing of political space, the silencing the “few remaining independent civil society voices” and “the evaporation of formal political opposition”, as well as parroting the claims of opposition groups in the Diaspora with allegations of patterns of government repression, harassment and human rights abuse since 2005. AI talks of ongoing conflict with, and repression of, NGOs and humanitarian organizations, a history of government repression and increasing intolerance of human rights organizations. 

HRW and AI for several years have produced a continuous pattern of misrepresentation and inaccuracy, apparently piqued that the Government has failed to respond adequately to their reports and even had the temerity to criticize them. Both organizations have always refused to admit to any errors, demanding that everything they say must be accepted, irrespective of the source, simply because it carries their imprimatur. Indeed HRW appears to believe it is infallible, and that it only has to make an allegation for that allegation to become true. This is of particular concern when most of the sources for such claims are terrorist organizations and sympathizers as has been the case in recent HRW reports on Somalia and on Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State and when no effort is made to made to obtain any response to the accusations. This means HRW is taking up allegations made by a political organization for overt and admitted political purposes. This acknowledged political dimension should surely lead AI and HRW to consider their sources with particular care and not simply repeat propaganda without making some effort to assess its validity.  

Given the record of NGOs (seventeen had to be closed last year in Ethiopia) and the way some have taken privileges to which they had no entitlement, it is hard to believe that any reasonable person could object to (re)-registration, or to a bill which allows refusal of registration of any body that is used for unlawful purposes or threatens peace. To allow deregulation of an organization if it has been acting contrary to national or public safety or interest is surely reasonable. These are just the sort of provisions any sensible government might take, as indeed most European or American governments actually do.  

HRW and AI has complained that the Government of Ethiopia has made no effort to engage in constructive dialogue about any of the issues they raise. It is far from clear why the Government of Ethiopia should engage with organizations which produce such flawed reports, which demonstrate clear political bias, and make no effort to involve Ethiopian government sources or bother to ask for comment on allegations. Both organizations have consistently ignored, over several years, Ethiopia’s own human rights organizations and offices. They have clearly made no effort to read, or even acquire, the regular reports submitted to Parliament by the Human Rights Commission or the Office of the Ombudsman, or of following the discussions of these reports in Parliament. These should certainly be the first port of call for any serious effort to evaluate the state of human rights in Ethiopia.  

HRW has accused the Government of Ethiopia of rejecting “even measured criticism” of its human rights record with “sweeping contemptuous denials”. The fact is that a great deal of the criticism is far from measured, and one might well categorize HRW’s refusal to accept any criticisms of its reports as sweeping and contemptuous. Ethiopia has convincingly demonstrated that much of the claims made by HRW are anything but measured. In fact, HRW makes no secret of the fact that its allegations of abuse in the Somali Regional State are based almost exclusively on interviews with terrorists and are the product of armed political opposition to the government. Earlier this year, Al Jazeera put out a series of TV programs on the Ogaden. These failed to interview any independent observers or visit the area. Most embarrassingly, it has now been shown that the programmes also filmed civilians posing as ONLF fighters. HRW’s report on the Somali Regional State has followed the same approach failing to talk to any independent witnesses or visit the area. It is likely to prove an equal embarrassment. 

It is hardly sweeping or contemptuous to note that the reporting by HRW is simplistic, flawed and based on political considerations. HRW has even tried to use its reports for political ends in the US, claiming its conclusions should encourage Congressional action agaisnt Ethiopia. It has allowed human rights to be turned into a political football by its reliance on claims of political opponents of the government, including a number of  Asmara-based organizations committed to armed struggle, whose independence and accuracy must be questionable. HRW is itself becoming a major impediment to democratization and the whole process of national building in Ethiopia. It could eventually become more than a purely Ethiopian issue. Its almost vindictive approach has potential ramifications for all states. It indeed raises the issue of whether HRW actually wants effective states in Africa, or elsewhere.  

• On Monday, last week, Chatham House launched the latest report of its Horn of Africa Group: “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa - How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel”. This is a study of three peace agreements – the Algiers Agreements of December 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea; the Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Process at the Mbagathi conference which ended in October/November 2004; and Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005. The report looks at the background and context of all three agreements and at developments since they were signed, and attempts to evaluate how far they have achieved their aims. It identifies a number of common structural features for conflict in the region including the prevalence of identity politics and the processes of state formation, and attempts to isolate the ways in which state interactions sustain regional conflicts. It concludes with four very broad, and one has to say banal, conclusions: it is necessary to take account of the long history of enmity within the region; it is necessary to appreciate the problematic nature of the state in the region; there is a need to see the region as a Regional Security Complex where the different conflicts interlock; and finally it suggests attention must be given to the effect of global terrorism.  

This report wants to be seen as a bold attempt to provide a broad analysis of the challenges to peace and security in the region, attempting to provide an historical perspective to current political realities and suggestions for future policy engagements. This indeed may have been the intention. If so, it fails, and fails comprehensively. The report all-to-often glosses over, or underestimates, a significant number of  key facts, and as a result completely fails to produce the sort of policy guidelines and suggestions, taking into account the realities of the region, that one might have hoped to see. Disappointingly, it has also ducked the sort of criticisms that might have been expected and certainly failed to provide the depth of analysis to be expected of Chatham House. It has shied away from imputing blame even where this is undisputed, even acknowledged, and as a result it ends up doing nothing more than recommending a policy approach that is even-handed, prioritizes human security and favours local partners. This adds nothing to possible solutions for the Horn of Africa's problems. 

There are a significant number of points of emphasis that need correction. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia was in response to an official invitation from the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. It had the full support of IGAD member countries as well as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the UN Security Council. There is no dispute that Ethiopia, which shares more than 1,500 kms of border with Somalia has legitimate security concerns in Somalia; Eritrea has no such common boundary and no legitimate security concerns in Somalia. Eritrea has no reason to be involved in Somalia except to wage a proxy war focused on undermining Ethiopia's peace and stability. Because of current problems in Eritrea and Somalia, research for this report was inevitably curtailed. As a result there is significant reliance on doubtful and politically partisan sources, particularly marked with reference to the Somali peace process. The Djibouti conference came too late to be included properly but its success throws some considerable doubt on the over-cautious comments on the peace process. More might have been said on the role of IGAD. Certainly IGAD has had its problems, not least Eritrea's suspension of its membership when the organization backed Somalia's request for Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, but its role in both Somalia and Sudan has been rather more impressive than it is given credit for here. It might be added that Ethiopia's foreign policy is not an extension of US concerns, though Ethiopia enjoys a partnership with the United States, as it does with many other countries. It is a close partnership, but it is no more and no less than that, though Ethiopia has, of course, suffered from regional terrorist activity as has the US.

Among the more significant lacunae is any realistic consideration of Ethiopia’s security concerns and of the dangers posed by extremist groups like Al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI) since the early 1990’s. AIAI's leaders in the Islamic Courts Union were responsible for declaring open war against Ethiopia, as well as supporting insurgents bent on undermining the peace and stability of Ethiopia. No mention is made of the series of attacks in Ethiopia or Somalia, carried out by AIAI or its associates in the ICU, Al-Shabaab and the ONLF, ranging from assassinations of government officials, the killing of innocent civilians and the destruction of public and private property. Equally, the role of Eritrea in organizing, arming, training and financing these and other anti-Ethiopian elements is largely ignored. Indeed, Eritrea's direct or indirect role in many of the conflicts of the region gets little mention and no critical evaluation. If this is part of the effort to be even-handed, Eritrea's continued aggression, including its latest efforts in Djibouti, suggests it is unlikely to be helpful in any search for solutions to regional conflicts.

There are a considerable number of specific errors about the Eritrean conflict with Ethiopia which need correction. There is no doubt that Eritrea had actually planned its actions in May 1998 when its troops crossed the border. Within a matter of days it had 60,000 troops involved across the border, quite clearly demonstrating prior planning. The report does not even mention the ruling of the Ethiopia Eritrea Claims Commission that Eritrea had committed aggression against Ethiopia in defiance of the UN Charter, Article 2, paragraph 4. To suggest the bilateral Ethiopian-Eritrean boundary commission was non-functional is quite simply wrong. Its Eritrean members were in Addis Ababa for a meeting until a few hours before the Eritrean invasion. Ethiopia believed, as it was no doubt meant to, that it was working effectively. Prime Minister Meles did not summon parliament and declare war. The Ethiopian government made several efforts to talk to the Eritrean leadership, just as it accepted the efforts at US/Rwanda facilitation, which demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces, not those of Ethiopia, and the OAU negotiations before the conflict entered a decisive stage.  Ethiopia only took counter-offensive measures after its own unilateral initiatives and two facilitation efforts had failed. The economic issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea deserve greater consideration. After Eritrea's independence Ethiopia emphasized the need to conduct economic relations on the basis of internationally accepted principles and standards. Ethiopia’s position angered the Eritrean government which had tried to insist economic relations should continue as if Ethiopia and Eritrea were still one and the same state. Eritrea wanted the best of both worlds, to be independent of Ethiopia and yet to continue to take advantage of economic opportunities. Ethiopia did not, incidentally, oppose Eritrea’s introduction of its new currency, the nakfa.

The report makes surprisingly little of the way Eritrea consistently violated the Algiers Agreements after 2004, concentrating rather more on Eritrean arguments about delays in demarcation. In fact, as Ethiopia has repeatedly spelt out, border delimitation and demarcation are not just about drawing a line on a map and putting in pillars. For Ethiopia, border demarcation should be carried out in a responsible manner to ensure sustainable peace, stability and cooperation and the normalization of relations between the two states. Neither the actions of the Boundary Commission, nor of Eritrea, have lived up to this responsibility. Ethiopia, despite its expressed concerns over delimitation, confirmed its acceptance of the delimitation decision four years ago and has consistently invited Eritrea to move the demarcation process forward. The only response has been increasing violations of the Temporary Security Zone and repeated attempts to undermine the operational ability of UNMEE. Most surprisingly, the report appears to accept Eritrea’s claim over the highly dubious and controversial, indeed unacceptable, issue of 'virtual' demarcation. It makes no mention of the doubts expressed by international lawyers, and little of Ethiopia’s concerns about the idea, nor its proposals, submitted to the Security Council, offering a way forward. It also appears rather more responsive to Eritrean claims in its almost visible lack of interest in Eritrea's violations of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and its actions against UNMEE, which are clearly indefensible, and underline Eritrea's lack of interest in producing a settlement. It should not still be necessary to remind the Chatham House Horn of Africa Group that the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which established the TSZ and the deployment of UNMEE are an absolutely central and integral part of the Algiers Agreement. To claim that the Algiers Agreements could work while the central and key components are violated is unrealistic, unreasonable and unworkable. In this context, it might be noted that the TSZ is not a transitional security zone, as it is consistently referred to throughout the report. It is, and always has been, a Temporary Security Zone. Another example of carelessness unbecoming to a Chatham House report is the suggestion that the TSZ was ever demarcated. Demarcation is a highly technical term and should be properly used. 

The report talks about the problematic nature of the state in the region, even suggesting a state building approach needs to be applied. To raise this issue without reference to the radical changes that have taken place in the Ethiopian state since 1991 does seem to be perverse. Some of these may still be considered controversial, but the establishment of a federal structure to provide democratic space for so many nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, to make radical advances in poverty reduction, and in access to health and education, and to devolve authority down to district even kebele level, against the background of a 10% plus economic growth rate over the last five years, might surely be expected to deserve some evaluation in the context of the regional problems which this report claims to be investigating and analyzing.

In conclusion, one point must be emphasized again. For any unprejudiced observer, one state has been largely responsible for most of the efforts at destabilization in the Horn of Africa in the last decade. The aggressive posture of Eritrea is abundantly clear from its wars of aggression against all neighbouring countries in the region, Djibouti, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and now Djibouti once again, and for its support for terrorist and armed opposition groups in Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan. Eritrean aggression against Djibouti is the current major preoccupation of IGAD member countries, the African Union, the Arab League and the UN Security Council. It is hard to see how any critical analysis of regional peace and stability in the Horn of Africa could avoid concentrating on Eritrea, and more specifically on the leadership of Eritrea, yet, most disappointingly, this report manages to do just that. It is impossible to make much progress in defining and resolving regional problems unless everybody, including Chatham House, faces up to the realities on the ground.