·The
sixth summit of the Sana'a Forum for cooperation was held in the Sudanese
capital, Khartoum on 30 December 2008. In attendance at the summit were
President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al- Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan, Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the
outgoing Chair of the Forum, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the Republic
of Yemen, Prime Minister Nur Hassen Hussein 'Adde' of the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia, and President Ismail Omar Geulleh of the
Republic of Djibouti, who took part at the summit as an observer.
Following the opening ceremony, the program of work and the agenda was
adopted and a progress report by the specialized committees was presented
on the activities of the Forum since the 10th Executive Committee Meeting.
The progress report dealt with a host of issues, including principal
regional issues of mutual interest, such as the situation in Somalia and
the piracy off shore, the problem in the Sudan, the Ethio-Eritrea border
dispute, Eritrea-Djibouti dispute, the problem of terrorism and the
current conflict between Hamas and Israel.
The Executive Committee of the
Forum exchanged views on the aforementioned regional issues of mutual
concern and adopted a joint communiqué at the conclusion of the summit. An
opening speech was made by President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al- Bashir of the
Republic of the Sudan, the host country, and incoming Chair of the Forum.
In the course of deliberations, the outgoing Chairperson, Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia made a
statement in which he welcomed the President of Djibouti saying his
presence "… is a source of satisfaction for us all and I have no doubt it
will enrich our deliberation and will help make the Forum an even more
effective instrument for regional peace and security and for a far more
strengthened economic cooperation among member states." He went on to say
that since the last summit in February 2007 Forum member states have
coordinated their positions on vital security and political matters of the
region. On Somalia, they managed to send the same message to the various
Somali parties with the view to helping them move forward in the peace
process under difficult circumstances. The fact that Djibouti, Sudan and
Ethiopia are members of IGAD has afforded the Forum members the
opportunity to synchronize their positions as was amply demonstrated at
the last IGAD Summit as well as at the Extra-ordinary session of IGAD
council of Ministers on 21 December 2008 in Addis Ababa. Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi noted that member states have the obligation to be
more, not less politically engaged to help the Somalis achieve peace and
national reconciliation that has eluded them for too long. On Ethiopia's
decision to withdraw its troops from Somalia. Prime Minister Meless said
“We came to the conclusion that no good would be served by the continuing
presence of our troops in Somalia. But this should in no way be
interpreted as meaning that we have decided to wash our hands of Somalia.
That neither, Ethiopia, nor other members of the Forum, nor the forum in
general, can afford to do that should be obvious. But whatever we do has
to be based on an approach that would encourage the Somalis to take the
lead and to own the process of national reconciliation in their country.
This is a matter that can not be emphasized too strongly." He emphasized
the need to immediately beef up AMISOM troops and provide financial
support to the TFG. In response, the Yemeni leader has pledged USD 1.5
million as the Sudan and Yemen together also pledged to offer military
uniforms and provide other logistical support while Ethiopia and Djibouti
are expected to provide training for TFG security personnel. The signing
of the Djibouti peace Agreements between the TFG and ARS was welcomed and
calls were made for their speedy implementation. Member states appreciated
Ethiopia's invaluable contribution in the search for peace and
reconciliation in Somalia.
With respect to economic,
trade and social matters the report of the Summit admitted that the Forum
has not registered sufficient progress. It was nonetheless emphasized
there in no lack of commitment in the members states, as can be gleaned
from the more than a dozen agreements, protocols and MOUs that the members
of the Forum have signed. It was indeed, it was noted members of the Forum
have made significant progress in developing cooperation in the hydropower
sector and in other areas. Among other matters on which decisions were
taken include the crises between Israel and Hamas, as well as matter
relating to the designation of the Secretary General of the Forum. In
general it is widely believed that both the Executive Committee meeting
and the Summit were a success.
* * *
*
··The
sixth Summit of the Sana'a Forum for Co-operation took place on Tuesday,
30 December, 2008, in Khartoum. Apart from Prime Minister Meles who was
the Chairman of the 5th Summit which was convened in Addis
Ababa in February 2007, four other Heads of State and Government of the
region took part at the Summit: Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir, President of
the Republic of Sudan and Chairman of the sixth Summit of Sana'a Forum for
Co-operation, Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of the Republic of Yemen,
Isamil Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti and Hassan
Hussien 'Nur Adde', Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia.
Prime Minister Meles spoke in
his capacity as chair of the Forum Since February 2007 at the opening of
the Summit. To be precise, it was a report on the activities of the Forum
since February 2007 that the Ethiopian Prime Minister Submitted to his
colleagues. It was a frank report that he presented. There was no
concealing of weaknesses. He underlined the fact that even though the
Sana'a Forum for cooperation has a "long agenda items in the economic,
trade and social areas," that it has "not moved as rapidly as it "ought to
in these areas." This does not, he emphasized, demonstrate that member
states have no commitment to the Forum. That member states do have
commitment to the process "can be gleaned" he told his colleagues" from
the more than a dozen agreements, protocols and MOUs that….have [been]
signed." "Indeed," he went on, "we have made significant progress in
developing co-operation in the hydropower sector and towards
interconnecting our electric power systems. Highlighting the critical
importance of hydropower in bringing the countries of the region together,
he said that this " is an area that can be expanded even further to be a
firm basis for integrating our region."
The Ethiopian Prime Minister
used the occasion also to say a few words on what the Forum stands for,
and what it is not, "Sectarian", it is not, he said. It is not " designed
to exclude some" and "embrace others selectively," he told the regional
leaders and other participants of the summit. He explained that the
"Forum has no parochial objectives and that it is " open to all", to all
those who share those prepositions which have brought members of the Forum
together -- a secure and stable Horn of Africa-Southern Red Sea Region;
conviction that the countries of the region have a common destiny which
makes it imperative that they strengthen their co-operation in all areas
of economic activities for whose achievement the fostering of mutual trust
and confidence is indispensable; and devotion to principles of
international law governing inter-state relations and to treating each
other with decency and constructive attitude."
With Djibouti having now joined
the Forum, though as an observer, the Sana'a Forum for cooperation has now
come to embrace all the countries of the Horn of Africa and Southern Red
Sea, that is apart from Eritrea which is conspicuously but, not
surprisingly, absent from the Khartoum Summit.
Eritrea is absent from the
Forum, not because it is excluded. As Prime Minister Meles emphasized at
the opening Session of the Summit, the Sana'a Forum does not exclude
anyone and it is open to all countries of the region. The Forum, as he
said, is not sectarian, and is not selective. The Sana'a Forum embraces
all those who subscribe to the tenets that member states adhere to.
Obviously, what Eritrea has been committed to in practice is the
destabilization of the whole region, though no doubt its primary focus is
Ethiopia. That is why the Ethiopian Prime Minister told the Summit that
as far as the problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea is concerned, that
"there is little new to report." "Eritrea" he underlined "has continued
to be more, not less, bellicose." No doubt, he emphasized, Eritrea's
"proclivity for being a menace to peace in our region including in
Ethiopia, has not been matched by its capacity to act on its belligerent
desire". But still, he went on, "the damage being wrought by Eritrea
cannot be underestimated" This is true, the Ethiopian Prime Minister
said" whether in Ethiopia, Somalia, or in Djibouti, the latest victim of
Eritrean aggression. On this latest Eritrean adventure, Prime Minister
Meles told to leaders of the Sana'a Forum, "The Eritrean move against
Djibouti --- which has been only mildly condemned by the Security Council
--- is a naked aggression and destabilization attempt which has absolutely
no justification." Mindful of Eritrea's repeated deceptive statements on
its behaviour toward Djibouti, Prime Minister Meles said, "The Eritrean
aggression against Djibouti should not be mixed with, or linked to, any
other issue, including the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea." "Despite
the mendacious insinuation by Eritrea to the contrary, Eritrea has
absolutely no justification for its hostile act against Djibouti.
It is also this same attitude
and behavior of Eritrea which explains its conspicuous absence from
Khartoum for the Summit of the Sana'a Forum for co-operation. It is not,
in other words, the nature of the Forum that one should look into to try
to understand the reason behind Eritrea's non-membership of the Sana'a
Forum, but rather into what the Eritrean leadership has made Eritrea to
stand for in our sub-region --- a symbol of lack of decency in inter-state
relations, of divisiveness rather than harmony, of proclivity for tearing
each other down rather than building one another up, and of all disrespect
for all those principles that are the foundation for civilized intercourse
among nations and for mutual trust and understanding. These same reasons
also explain why Eritrea has suspended itself from IGAD.
* * *
*
·The
International Crisis Group (ICG) recently released its No 147 Africa
report entitled, “Somalia: To move beyond the Failed State”. Largely
building on its own previous reports on Somalia, the report purportedly
seeks to point to possible ways forward in the quest for lasting
resolution of the Somali conflict. As a long time observer of events in
the Horn of Africa sub-region, the ICG have generated reports on a regular
basis on a range of topics that have far-reaching implications on peace
and security both at regional and international levels.
Despite its widely professed
expertise and first hand knowledge on the Horn, however, the ICG’s record
has often been a modest one at best—not so much for lack of expertise
per se as the propensity to succumb to entrenched predispositions
towards one party or another. With pre-conceived ideas and hardly
substantiated claims finding their ways all-too-easily into the corpus of
ostensibly well researched studies, a great many ICG reports have many
times fallen widely off the mark. As the Week in the Horn have remarked a
number of times, ICG reports have often been a source of much
consternation among many. In the past few years, the Ethiopian Government
has had to take more than its fair share of the pain to point out the
often egregious analytical errors and inaccuracies every ICG reports are
replete with.
It was therefore with much
interest that we received the most recent report as it comes at the time
of growing uncertainties regarding the fate of the TFG and the peace
process following Ethiopia’s irreversible decision to pull its forces out
of Somalia. Its previous records on the issue having been far from being
objective and reassuring, we have every reason to keenly follow all
reports coming their way. True, there have been some indications of
improvement—or the semblance of it—over the last year or so; as the
arguments and conclusions in the most recent report amply indicate,
however, the ICG has yet a long way to go before it seriously addresses
what appears to be a predisposition to allowing itself to be used by
certain actors on a number of issues.
Most of these inaccuracies
largely owe, more than anything, to the failure on the part of the ICG to
consult equally all the parties to a given conflict and its apparent
weakness for repeating itself again and again on issues that involve a
fast changing dynamics. Equally important, the composition of its research
team—more particularly its Africa division—has been contributing
significantly to the problem. As the Week in the Horn indicated a couple
of times, the ICG has certain elements among its ranks the presence of
which should by now have been clear to constitute a typical case of
conflict of interest—preside as they do over issues with which they are
all too personally involved.
Needless to say, the report
provides a very good description of the TFG’s ‘flaws’—namely, failure of
the TFG forces to hammer out a working relationship amongst themselves and
the role external actors played—though not the extent to which they did—in
precipitating the crisis all in the name of aiding the peace process. The
report also repeats the same allegations the likes of the Human Rights
Watch used to level against the Ethiopian defense forces almost on a daily
basis. It has become fashionable to spice up such reports with some grim
images of all sorts so much so it would be pointless to even try to
address such issues. But at least in this report, there are more curious
issues to take stock of.
The report may have overstated
its case in some areas and understate in yet others; but generally
speaking, most of what constitutes the body of the report could largely be
considered fairly acceptable. But some of the recommendations the ICG has
made are extremely strange and hardly supported by the premises on the
basis of which they are purportedly made. We have found some of these
recommendations widely off the mark. That, of course, is the part we have
found a bit startling hence this response. In fact, one recommendation is
so irrelevant that it makes one wonder if the report was doing other
parties’ bidding. As will be briefly explained below, there are reasons to
suspect that this is indeed part of a pattern rather than just an honest
misreading of situations on the ground.
One of the recommendations has
to do with whether to include the Al Shabaab as a genuine partner for
future negotiations in the peace process possibly in the aftermath of an
Ethiopian pull out in the event that it really happens. This is
the same agenda the Government of Eritrea has been pushing all along. The
ICG seems to believe that calling terrorists by their names—terrorists—is
to blame for the escalation of the insurgency in Somalia. The decision of
the US government to include Al Shabaab in the list of terrorist
organizations is what emboldened the extremists into vowing to establish a
Taliban like Islamic Caliphate in the entire region. It is ironic that the
ICG seriously believes Al-Shabaab, which they know would seek to impose a
harsher version of Sharia as is already happening in Al-Shabaab-controlled
areas, would play a constructive role in the peace process which it has
vowed to vehemently oppose. The ICG’s hope is pinned on the self-serving
claim that Al Shabaab is already “mutating ideologically” from a
self-radicalizing national group into a moderate one. The report naively
suggests that “If Al-Shabaab consolidates its control and imposes the
puritanical brand of Islam it espouses (salafi/Wahhabism), it would
quickly alienate many Somalis.” The question is not whether or not the
kind of extremism the Al Shabab espouses will alienate many Somalis which
it already has; the question is whether a group with a declared objective
of extremism the entire region—with some of its leaders vowing to take
their Jihad all the way to Alaska—could indeed be counted on as a reliable
partner for a round table negotiation. No euphemism whatsoever would
mellow out the crass realities of terrorism and ruthless killing
perpetrated by the same group throughout Somalia. Why Eritrea would
adamantly champion the cause of the extremists could be understandable,
since after all they will stop at nothing to settle their score with
Ethiopia; the unqualified support the ICG appears to tender to such an
idea, however, is far from comprehensible.
The report also mentions a few
countries as having played a role in aiding the insurgency to get stronger
by the day; but it also offers an explanation that amounts to an attempt
to extenuate the level of guilt of some over that of others. While
acknowledging the obvious role Eritrea had in this, for example, it
nonetheless goes out of its way to suggest that its role was limited to
serving as a conduit through which other Middle East countries extended
support to the Islamists. While the ICG’s ‘suspicion’ that some Arab
parties may be using Eritrean channels to supply the insurgents,
principally Al-Shabaab can be just about the truth, to assume that Eritrea
is only serving as a conduit is to miss the point. But more importantly,
the ICG calls upon the international community to bring the likes of
Eritrea on board in the peace process in what amounts to rewarding them
for their recalcitrant behavior. According to the ICG, support for the
peace process needs to be sought from countries that have “moral authority
or influence over the militias”, such as Eritrea. Whatever the meaning of
the moral authority the ICG alludes to, the most appropriate thing to do
would be to call upon this party to stop its meddling in Somalia’s affairs
in a manner that has militated against peace and stability in that
country. Little wonder then the Government of Asmara fancies itself as
peacemaker par excellence in crises that are all its own making. It
is an open secret that Eritrea has done more to scuttle the peace process
among Somalis than any other actors in the region—state and non-state
alike. This it has done not only through its brazen support to the
insurgency in defiance of the UN arms embargo; but also by arm-twisting
the likes of the ARS into boycotting the Djibouti process. That Sheik
Sheriff’s faction was the result of such bullying could not be lost on the
ICG either. Ironically though, the report not only spares Eritrea from the
kind of strong condemnation its bellicose behavior so richly deserves, but
it also seeks to provide it with a diplomatic leverage as a potential
peacemaker with a ‘moral authority’ over the insurgents. To the extent
that Eritrea can play a role in the peace efforts in Somalia, it is by
leaving the Somalis alone. According to the ICG, however, “Eritrea holds
the key to a long-term resolution of the Somalia conflict, as well as to
movement on the Ogaden issue”. That is President Isaias almost verbatim.
Could Eritrea ask for a better defense than what the ICG report seems to
offer any way? This of course leads us to another interesting
recommendation put forth by the ICG.
The ICG report urges the
international community “to enhance the
efforts to implement the Ethiopian-Eritrea border settlement, in part to
reduce the "proxy war" impact of this dispute on Somalia”. On the face of
it, this seems to suggest that there is a proxy war of sorts between
Eritrea and Ethiopia that has played itself out in Somalia. But the most
important message of this recommendation is even more interesting.
Preposterous as it may sound, the ICG people seem to be convinced that the
Ethio-Eritrean Border issue is to blame for Eritrea’s staunch support to
Islamic insurgency in Somalia and in the Ogaden. The ICG claims that “due
to its acrimonious behavior, the resolution of the border dispute between
the two countries has been abandoned by the international community in
favor of Ethiopia.” The Border issue
obviously is President Isaias’ stock in trade in diplomacy and it is the
cause of just about everything that goes wrong in Eritrea. To suggest even
remotely that the border issue has to do with why Eritrea has to work day
and night to sabotage peace thousands of miles away would normally sound
plain stupid. Even if that were to be the case, there was no time when
Ethiopia dragged its feet on the resolution of the border dispute. It is
the government in Asmara that has refused to be part of any dialogue that
such a process presupposes. But the ICG—it seems—has more important
reasons to assume other wise.
So we say, the ICG
would do justice to the cause of peace if it took the pain to put the
blame where it belongs. If it insists on serving as an alternative
platform for Eritrea’s failed diplomatic shenanigans, that also is its
choice.
* * *
*
·It
was not without reason that the Week in the Horn took up a few weeks ago
the issue of unconstitutional change of government and how the phenomenon
is being handled by the African Union. It was at the Summit of the
Organization of
African Unity in Algiers in 1999 that Africa began to tighten the screw
against those who are inclined to resort to illegal changes of
government. At that July 1999 summit in Algiers what African leaders said
was that "… Member states whose Governments came to power through
unconstitutional means after the Harare Summit (July 1997) should restore
constitutional legality before the next Summit. This same Decision of the
summit under the designation AHG/Dec. 142 (XXXV) also requested "the OAU
Secretary -General to be actively seized of developments in those
countries and to assist in programmes intended to return such countries to
constitutional and democratic governments."
But though Algiers indeed marked
a clear change of attitude against coup makers in Africa, one cannot
consider that Summit Decision of the OAU as a serious move against those
who carry out unconstitutional change of government. It did not have any
workable enforcement mechanism. As such it was a mere hortatory
enunciation of position with little practical effect.
It was the Declaration that the
OAU adopted in July 2000 in Lome, Togo, which constitutes a real and
effective instrument against unconstitutional change of government.
The Lome OAU position on illegal
change of government bearing the official title of Declaration on the
Framework For An OAU Response To Unconstitutional Changes of Government
(AHG/Dec L.5 (XXXVI) not only does it take a far tougher line
against what it called "the resurgence of Coup d'etat," but it also
provides for implementable guidelines facilitating sanctions against those
engaging in unconstitutional change of governments. In its preamblular
part, the Declaration says, inter alia, that "… these developments are a
threat to peace and security of the continent and they constitute a very
disturbing trend and serious set back to the on-going process of
democratization in the continent. " After setting out what the
Declaration characterizes as principles and values to be adhered to by OAU
Member States with the view to strengthening democratic governance, the
Declaration sets forth a definition of situations that would qualify as
unconstitutional change of government---military Coup d'etat against a
democratically elected Government; intervention by mercenaries to replace
a democratically elected Government; replacement of democratically elected
Government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; and the refusal
by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after
free, fair and regular elections.
The Declaration further says
that "Whenever an unconstitutional change as provided for in the
definition… above takes place… our current Chairman of the OAU and our
Secretary-General, on behalf of our Organization, should immediately and
publicly condemn such a change and urge for the speedy return to
constitutional order". Following condemnation, a period of up to six
months is given to the "perpetrators" of the unconstitutional change to
restore constitutional order --- during which various efforts are expected
to be made by officials of the OAU, neighboring countries and others to
persuade the culprits to reverse their illegal decision --- failing which
" a range of limited and targeted sanctions "would be instituted against
the regime that "stubbornly refuses to restore constitutional order…" The
sanctions include, "visa denials", " restrictions of government
-to-government contacts", "trade restrictions."
The above explains why the AU
took a strong position against the Coup makers in Mauritania, and why now
it is also adopting a rather tough line in opposition to the Coup
d'etat in Guinea. The AU Peace and Security Council at the end of its
165th meeting held on 29 December 2008, adopted a communiqué which, among
other things said that it has decided "to suspend the participation of
Guinea in the activities of the AU until the return to constitutional
order in the country, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the AU
Constitutive Act and the Lome Declaration of July 2000…" It further said
that the "Council reaffirms its determination to take, in due course, all
other measures prescribed in the Lome Declaration to accelerate the return
to constitutional order. It should be recalled also that the Peace and
Security Council had in fact earlier, at its 164th meeting held on 24
December already "strongly condemned" what it called a Coup attempt in
Guinea following the death of President Lansana Conte.
No doubt, the position being
taken by the AU, and in this instance, by the Peace and Security Council,
is correct, as far as principles go and as far as the commitment of member
states to those principles is concerned. Obviously, it would be
impossible to ensure that the rule of law is fostered in Africa if the
continent is once again allowed to descend into situations reminiscent of
the 60s and 70s when unconstitutional changes of governments were the
order of the day. It is against this background that some of the
statements coming from a few member states of the AU in support of the new
situation in Guinea become unavoidably a source of some concern, including
with respect to the credibility of the Organization and of positions taken
at the highest level by consensus.
It would perhaps be useful to
recall what the Week in the Horn had said on this same issue on 17
October, 2008:
"Democratization in
many African countries is being undertaken under conditions of
extreme poverty and in the absence of any democratic political
culture. Poverty and democracy do not make a good mix. This
does not mean to suggest that democracy should wait until
poverty is overcome, but it does highlight the seriousness of
the challenges both pose. This is the basis of the AU position
on democratic government and unconstitutional changes of
government. The difficulty of reconciling strict adherence to
AU principles, and sustaining democracy, with stability is,
however, demonstrated by the difficulty some African states have
had in sticking to AU principles on this matter. While it is
always necessary to be pragmatic and non-dogmatic on these
issues (all the more so given the problems referred to earlier),
Ethiopia believes it is critical that African states do remain
committed to the decisions taken at Lome, based on the
Constitutive Act of the AU, to reject unconstitutional changes
of government. This is in the interest of both deepening
democracy in Africa and of protecting the credibility of the
African Union."