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The
Security Council meeting on Somalia last week
The United
Nations Security Council was briefed on the situation in Somalia
on Thursday January 14th, after UN Secretary-General,
Ban ki-Moon, presented his latest report on Somalia to the
Council. The Council also heard the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative, Mr. Ould-Abdallah, and the meeting was also
addressed by representatives of the African Union and the Arab
League as well as Somalia’s Permanent Representative to the
United Nations. As we detailed in the last Week in the Horn, the
Secretary-General recommended a continuation of his current
strategy to protect the Government and AMISOM, and invited the
Council to renew the authorization of the UN Political Office
for Somalia and AMISOM. The main emphasis of Mr. Ould-Abdullah’s
message to the Council was that the Somali Government had made
significant progress in recent months and deserved greater
commitment and assistance from the UN and international
partners. He called on the international community to translate
its political and verbal support into the necessary material
assistance. His recommendations included coordinated
international policy objectives, a clear signal to extremists,
increased international support for AMISOM, and an integrated UN
approach. He emphasized that a failure to act now in a decisive
manner would dramatically increase the ultimate costs of
resolving the problems of Somalia.
The African
Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Mr. Ramtane Lamamra,
told the Council that 2009 had been a difficult year for
Somalia. The enemies of peace and reconciliation had stepped up
their aggression to try to undo the Djibouti Peace Process.
Commissioner Lamamra said the link between Al-Shabaab and
international jihadism had been confirmed as had Al-Shabaab’s
relations with Al Qaeda. There had been an influx of foreign
fighters into Somalia leading to an upsurge in terrorist
activities. Equally, the past year had also seen positive
momentum in terms of the rebirth of the state and the expansion
of the Government. He pointed out that although AMISOM had lost
twice as many soldiers in 2009 as over the whole of its previous
existence, it had also been reinforced in size, capacity and
experience. Its mandate had been extended on January 8th
by the AU Peace and Security Council for another twelve months.
He called on the Security Council to extend its authorization of
AMISOM, and repeated the request of the Peace and Security
Council that AMISOM should be integrated into a UN peacekeeping
operation for Somalia. Commissioner Lamamra also underlined the
need to impose a no-fly zone as well as control of Somalia’s sea
ports to deny extremists the use of Somalia's air and maritime
space, and help resolve the problem of piracy which was fueling
extremism.
The Permanent
Observer of the League of Arab States to the UN, Mr. Yahya
Mahmassani, described the crisis in Somalia as the main
challenge to peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He said
inaction by the international community had contributed to a
further worsening of the situation. The solution must be based
on the Djibouti process, and AMISOM should be given full
support. He said the Arab League called on states and regional
groups to participate and help complete AMISOM deployment,
including the provision of financial and logistical support. He
also urged closer cooperation among humanitarian agencies to
meet the challenge of humanitarian assistance. He noted that
while the international community should be mindful of the need
to end piracy, it was also necessary for the Security Council to
take the necessary measures to tackle the root causes, among
which he included the absence of strong state institutions.
The Permanent
Representative of Somalia to the UN, Mr. Elmi Ahmed Duale, also
stressed the importance of security to the Council. Without it,
he said, meaningful progress in economy and development would be
difficult to achieve. He emphasized the need to rebuild Somali
national security forces, and to strengthen AMISOM and make it
an integral part of a larger UN peacekeeping effort. He pointed
out that the Government had received only a small portion of the
pledges made in Brussels last April, and appealed urgently for
states to release their pledged contributions. He said the
Government’s strategy for 2010 would focus on reconciliation,
security, the international conference on recovery and
reconstruction, and effective cooperation with neighboring
states. He said the Government considered the three-phase
incremental approach by the UN might prove inadequate, given the
dire humanitarian situation. What Somalia needed now was not a
‘light United Nations footprint’ but a heavy one.
These
briefings preceded a closed session of the Council, but member
states did express similar views in support of the TFG and of
AMISOM as well as their concern about the situation in Somalia
which it was agreed needed closer, more coordinated and concrete
support to produce further improvement. It was decided to hold a
follow-up session on Somalia before the end of the month when
the Council is expected to produce another resolution on
Somalia. The Council is, in fact, scheduled to consider the
future status of AMISOM on January 28th. The UN
authorization for AMISOM expires on January 31st as
does the current UN support package for the Mission.
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Human Rights
Watch and a “deteriorating human rights trajectory”
On Wednesday,
Human Rights Watch published its World Report 2010, covering
human rights around the world in 2009. In his introductory
essay, Director Kenneth Roth argues that the effectiveness of
the human rights movement to exert pressure on governments has
grown enormously in recent years and, as a result, there was a
growing reaction from abusive governments which had been
particularly intense last year, with numerous attacks on human
rights monitors. Mr. Roth said the way to stop this was for
governments to make human rights a central part of their
diplomacy, “to make respecting human rights the bedrock of their
diplomacy”. In an assumption of righteousness, ignoring the
ongoing international discussion and even dissension over the
issue, the introduction attacks African states for refusing to
support the ICC’s controversial arrest warrant against President
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. It claims many African democracies even
chose the comfort of regional solidarity rather than staking out
a credible position of principle in support of international
justice.
In this
context, we have to say that the credibility of Human Rights
Watch is itself an issue, certainly in its report on Ethiopia.
Its country summary repeatedly suggests Ethiopia is “on a
deteriorating human rights trajectory”, sliding “towards deeper
repression”, that the space for independent civil society
“already extremely narrow, shrank dramatically in 2009”, and a
“worsening human rights record” is sliding “deeper into
repression”. It talks about “measures to control the elections
in 2010” though, not surprisingly, none of these are specified –
there are, in fact, none to specify.
One can of
course argue about how much human rights may or may not have
improved, but it is surprising that Human Rights Watch chose
totally to ignore the single most significant development in the
electoral process in Ethiopia last year. This was the signing of
a Code of Conduct for Political Parties, negotiated by 65
political parties, and its subsequent adoption into law. This by
any standards is an impressive document, binding political
parties, candidates, members and supporters of political parties
to ensure that elections are guided by ethical rules of conduct,
and are transparent, free, fair, peaceful, democratic,
legitimate and acceptable to the voters. The Code lays down the
regulations for the National Electoral Board, the mass media,
and the judiciary, and their ability to function independently
and impartially, free of all party pressures. It lays out the
details for fair utilization by all parties of government
resources for the election; and underlines the responsibility of
the parties for a successful election. A procedure for
grievances is provided and a Joint Council of Political Parties
is being set up to implement the Code.
The Code was
signed last November so there can be no excuse for Human Rights
Watch to have ignored it. Similarly, one might note that
Engineer Hailu Shawel, one of those most involved in the
problems of 2005, was a central figure in the drafting of the
Code. These are surely promising developments by any standards.
Aren’t they at least worth a mention, however brief? It is
frankly dishonest (and certainly unfair) to talk about a
deteriorating trajectory and efforts to control the elections
while making no reference to the Code which is a major
development to the contrary. Similarly, although the report does
indicate that Human Rights Watch has for the first time been
prepared to read one of the reports of Ethiopia’s Human Rights
Commission (a new Commissioner, Ambassador Tiruneh Zena, was
approved by acclamation by all parties in Parliament last week),
the reference is no more than disparaging. It all suggests that
Human Rights Watch has no interest in, and no time for, any
promising developments, that its criticisms in fact are not made
in good faith. At this point we can’t go into further detail
about this issue or Human Rights Watch’s repeated failures to
evaluate recent legislation with any care, though it did,
grudgingly, allow that the 2008 media law was an improvement.
The Asset Registration and Anti-Corruption bill might have been
worth a mention? Its largely inaccurate assertions about the
provisions of the recent civil society and anti-terrorist laws
need more space and time to respond.
Two other
points do however need to be raised. Human Rights Watch refers,
rather ungenerously, to the inquiry that the Ethiopian
government did “purport to launch” into allegations of serious
abuses by the military against the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) in the Somali Regional State. These were, in fact,
allegations made in one of Human Rights Watch’s own reports.
Human Rights Watch says the inquiry was sponsored by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lacked independence and concluded
no serious abuses took place. That is not strictly true. The
inquiry, which was independent, actually found that many of the
allegations were unsubstantiated, and lacking in substance or
proof. Numerous villages that Human Rights Watch claimed to have
been burnt down were found to be undamaged, and a significant
number of people, described as killed or tortured, were found
alive and unharmed. It also found that Human Rights Watch had
ignored many abuses committed by the ONLF. The inquiry concluded
that Human Rights Watch’s methodology, which involved no effort
to investigate on the ground, and its evaluation of allegations
made by dissidents in exile, were seriously flawed. Human Rights
Watch has still to respond to the questions raised about its own
procedures and practices.
The second
point is that Human Rights Watch in the country summary on
Ethiopia, as on a number of other countries, complains that
major donors are unwilling to confront countries over what Human
Rights Watch claims is a worsening human rights record. In the
case of Ethiopia, it is particularly critical of the UK. Human
Rights Watch argues that donors remain silent for fear that
Ethiopia would discontinue or scale back their bilateral aid and
development programs. This is an unusually bizarre suggestion,
particularly since there is another very obvious reason why
major donors say little – it may be that they do not entirely
agree with Human Rights Watch. Given some of the errors and
mistakes Human Rights Watch has perpetrated over the years that
would hardly be a surprise.
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They ought
to know better: a misguided response to sanctions
Last month
the United Nations Security Council following Eritrea’s
continuous and flagrant violations of numerous Security Council
resolutions that called upon the regime in Asmara to desist from
supporting terrorist groups whose declared aim has been to
overthrow the legitimate Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia by force, and in consequence of the aggression committed
by the Eritrean government against Djibouti and its continued
occupation of the sovereign territory of Djibouti, finally
adopted Resolution 1907 imposing a set of sanctions against the
Eritrean regime. The resolution calls for travel restrictions on
individual members of the political and military leadership of
Eritrea, a freeze on the assets of specific individuals and
entities designated by the sanctions committee, and thirdly, an
arms embargo.
These
sanctions have been carefully considered and as carefully
targeted to avoid compromising Eritrea's sovereignty or
seriously undermining it in any way. The main intent of the
resolution, as it clearly stated in its provisions, were
twofold: one to reverse Eritrea's aggression against Djibouti by
compelling it to withdraw its occupation forces and thereby
create conducive conditions to start a dialogue, and secondly to
encourage the Eritrean leadership to stop its efforts to
destabilize Somalia through the support it has been giving to
terrorist groups determined to forcibly remove the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia and undermine efforts to restore
peace and stability in Somalia.
The reaction
of the leadership in Asmara - blaming a long list of enemies for
its own predicament – has hardly been a surprise. What has been
more unexpected has been the reaction of some declared opponents
of the regime who have inadvertently lent credence to the
insinuations of the government in Asmara. As we mentioned last
week, some commentators have suggested that the UN Security
Council resolution, far from achieving its intended purpose,
would have the unintended consequence of making Ethiopia the
main beneficiary from the sanctions. One such commentator was
Saleh Younis in an article entitled "Change We Can't Believe
In", (10.1.2010). Mr. Younis is not opposed to sanctions against
Eritrean leaders as such, and agrees with both travel
restrictions and an asset freeze. However, he argues that the
arms embargo is intended to seriously undermining the
sovereignty of Eritrea, to “emasculate Eritrea for generations”,
to use his own words, denying it the right to self-defense
through the acquisition of weapons even after the fall of the
current regime. He attempts to prove his case by comparing it
with the sanctions imposed on Iraq which have not yet been
lifted despite the demise of the Saddam regime some years ago.
This is a
substantial distortion, misrepresenting the intention of the
Security Council's resolution and deliberately ignoring the
Council's care to avoid any unintended impact on Eritrea and its
people. The Council took the decision on sanctions because of
the Eritrean regime's irresponsible behavior. A cursory glance
at the text of the resolution reveals the Iraq parallel is not
only untenable but seems deliberately contrived to cast
aspersions not only on the advisability, if not the legitimacy,
of the sanctions, but more surprisingly on Ethiopia’s intentions
with regard to Eritrea’s sovereignty. The sanctions have been
imposed to provide the regime in Asmara with the incentives to
change its behavior, to refrain from destabilizing the region.
The Security Council made it clear they will either be scaled up
or down according to the extent Eritrea’s leaders control their
destructive urges. Mr. Younis should know perfectly well that
the sanctions are targeted at the principal figures in the
regime simply because they are the ones who have been busy
trying to destabilize the entire region, including their own
country.
It is, in
fact, intriguing that Mr. Younis still appears to believe that
Ethiopia has been and will remain the arch-enemy of Eritrea’s
sovereignty. This is the linchpin of the nationalism that
President Issayas and his Peoples Front for Democracy and
Justice (PFDJ) have worked tirelessly to instill in the minds of
Eritreans. It indicates, in fact, that Mr. Younis, despite his
opposition credentials since 2001, still holds the same outdated
siege-mentality that has permeated the thinking of many PFDJ
acolytes for so long. Any rational analysis of the recent
history of the region underlines the fact that Ethiopia is the
natural ally of the peoples of Eritrea and that the incumbent
government in Ethiopia has consistently displayed respect for
Eritrea’s sovereignty. Ethiopia has never been and never will be
a threat to Eritrea’s sovereignty. This has little or nothing to
do with Eritrea’s military strength, real or imagined. It has to
do with Ethiopia’s principled position on questions of good
neighborliness. Whatever Eritrea’s oversized war machine and its
mountain of weaponry have contributed to, it does not include
maintenance of Eritrea’s sovereignty. All increased
militarization has done is to prolong the suffering of the
peoples of Eritrea and of the region.
Mr. Younis’
article in fact appears aimed to embolden the regime in Asmara
to continue its defiance of the Council's Resolution. It
provides a clearly false interpretation of the Resolution rather
than supporting the Council’s efforts to get Eritrea to change
its unacceptable behavior and abide by the international laws
and norms that govern inter-state relations in line with a
country's national interest. In effect, the sovereignty of
Eritrea will be safeguarded when the current regime in Asmara
fully abides by international laws and complies with the recent
resolution and the other resolutions and decisions of the United
Nations Security Council. Sovereignty in Eritrea cannot be
secured through unprovoked aggression against its neighbors or
through the supply of arms to terrorist groups to destabilize
their own government. The legitimate interests of Eritrea,
including sovereignty, can only be protected through responsible
behavior and cooperation with its neighbors, with the
international community, and with the United Nations Security
Council.
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Politically motivated opposition to agricultural investment
“Agro-imperialism”, “neo-colonialism”, “the scramble for Africa
- round two”: these are some of the epithets that have been used
to criticize the current wave of agricultural investment in
Africa, and in Ethiopia. At last year's FAO World Summit on
Food Security in Rome, a few leaders criticized what they called
‘farmland invasion’; others were more positive about ‘foreign
direct investment’ in agriculture in Africa. The emphasis of the
criticism was on Africa. Curiously there has been much less
criticism about foreign investments made in agriculture in
Russia or Ukraine, two of the largest beneficiaries in Europe,
or in South East Asia or even in Brazil, all of which have also
been targeted by external agricultural investors. ‘Farmland
invasion’ in Africa is a subject that has proved popular with
the western press, and the UK’s Guardian newspaper has been one
of those highlighting what it claims are the dangers of large
scale foreign owned commercial farms in Africa, and in Ethiopia,
running a number of articles on the subject. Ethiopianist
Professor Donald Levine in a recent newspaper article joined in
the chorus of undue criticism, expressing worries about what he
claimed were recent deals handing over land to Saudi Arabia,
India and Egypt, and painting a gloomy scenario in which old
anti-colonial sentiments in Ethiopia might be used to resist the
‘invasion of Ethiopian farmlands’ by foreign investors. This is
inaccurate, of course, as any deals, leases not sales, are
granted to companies not other countries.
The current
wave of agricultural investment began a year or two ago as
international food prices began to rise sharply, particularly in
2008. In the previous thirty years or so, since the significant
increase in grain supplies in the mid-1970s, accompanied by the
“Green Revolutions” in China and India. International food
prices fell steadily. Many experts believed, despite occasional
famines and natural disasters, that humanity had the capacity to
provide enough to feed itself. This changed last year when food
prices rose so high that surplus-producing countries, concerned
about feeding themselves, placed restrictions on exports.
Concern has been intensified as the dangers of global warming
have become apparent. Food import-dependent states took alarm.
Many of these were in the Middle East and have substantial
surplus capital. The logic was clear: Instead of buying
expensive food on the world market, lease unused land abroad and
grow the food there to provide their own food security.
This provides
major advantages for both sides. It removes the risk of
restrictions, and offers developing countries a reversal of the
disastrous under-investment agriculture has suffered over many
years, providing for new seeds and new techniques. The deals
also allow for major overall investment, including improved
marketing as well as better jobs, and related infrastructural
developments, including schools, clinics and roads. These
aspects, for example, will provide major advantages for the
regional governments in Ethiopia which will benefit from such
investments. There is the potential to increase crop yields.
China, as part of its investments in agriculture in Africa, is
setting up eleven research centers to improve staple crop
yields. The investments will also allow for a greater use of
fertilizer. In some cases, as in Ethiopia, some of the deals
will cover land that has not been used before because of the
prevalence of problems like malaria. Now, because of the
extension of malaria eradication schemes, such land is becoming
available for use for the first time.
The whole
idea of investing in foreign agriculture is hardly new despite
the current publicity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, foreigners were quick to acquire former state-owned and
collective farms, though interest was more in cash crops. They
bought up over half a million hectares, and nearly 400,000 in
Ukraine. The figures today, however, are much larger. In Sudan,
South Korea has deals covering nearly 700,000 hectares, and the
UAE and Egypt both have 400,000 hectare deals. China has a deal
with the Republic of Congo to grow palm oil for bio-fuels which
covers 2.8 million hectares. As the recent Saudi-East Africa
Forum in Addis Ababa emphasized, Saudi Arabia is looking at a
number of countries in the region, planning to invest in
hundreds of thousands of hectares. The Saudi Minister of
Commerce and Industry, Abdullah bin Ahmed Zainal Alireza,
underlined Saudi Arabia’s commitment to combating hunger and
providing support for the host country as well as generating
exports. Production on these lands will be sold internally or
exported in the usual way.
Land is
always a sensitive issue of course, but this is not land that is
being given away, it is being leased, and the investment will
remain when the lease is ended. The head of the UN International
Fund for Agricultural Development makes the point: “It is wrong
to call [these investments] land grabs. These are investments in
farmland like investments in oil. We can have a win-win
situation”. In fact, these projects could be classified as more
valuable than oil because agricultural development will not run
out. It remains usable after the lease is ended, and can be
indefinitely renewed. Many experts are, cautiously, hopeful that
big agri-businesses could feed millions, and as the FAO
Representative in Ethiopia, Mafa Chipeta, says “If these deals
are negotiated well, it will change the dynamics of the food
economy in this country.”
Ethiopia has,
as Dr. Aberra Deressa, State Minister for Agriculture and Rural
Development points out, vast land resources and a lot of water
resources. The Investors Support Directorate is headed by the
State Minister and has the responsibility for providing land for
investors. It has identified more than 7 million acres available
now for lease. In total, Ethiopia has 74 million hectares of
land suitable for agriculture out of its total 115 million
hectares, but less than 15 million hectares is currently in use
agriculturally.
Ethiopia has
implemented a whole series of policies, strategies and programs
in recent years designed to encourage sustainable agricultural
growth and work towards the eradication of poverty. It has
achieved some success through the Agricultural Development-Led
Industrialization Strategy (ADLI) and the Plan for Accelerated
and Sustained Development to End Poverty 2005-2010 (PASEDP).
Increasing the efficiency of small-holder farmers through higher
yielding crops, and drought and pest resistant seeds, remains a
viable option. Equally, much remains to be done and the need, as
last year’s drought underlined, is clear. The implementation of
a large-scale land investment policy will be a valuable
supplementary addition to existing options. In the past,
Ethiopia has been criticized for not making land available for
large-scale commercial farming. Now it is being attacked for
ignoring the small farmers. Damned if you do; damned if you
don’t.
In fact, as
Ethiopia is well aware, nobody can afford to ignore any options.
The world is in danger of running out of food. By 2050, the
population is likely to be over 9 billion. World food production
according to the FAO needs to rise by 70%. Africa is going to be
the hardest hit by the effects of these figures – partly because
it was largely bypassed by the Green Revolution of the 1960s and
1970s, and partly because the expected effects of global warming
seem likely to affect Africa more than anywhere else. The FAO
estimates Africa will need an investment of 11 billion dollars a
year to deal with this. Africa needs all the help it can get.
This sort of agricultural investment, on the scale envisaged,
offers the very real prospect of genuine progress in the
eradication of poverty.
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Professor Donald Levine and foreign influence
Western commentators on Ethiopia, or indeed other states in
Africa, are regrettably all-too-often prepared to criticize
policies on the basis of unverified allegations or unchecked
claims. Professor Donald Levine is the latest to raise his voice
about foreign influence in Ethiopia, even making the obnoxious,
and false, suggestion that Ethiopia is prepared to accept food
aid, while consistently refusing advice. In his recent article
“Selective Acceptance of Foreign Influence”, he refers to
“recent leases of expanses of [Ethiopian] land to Saudi Arabia,
India and Egypt [and] reports that 50pc of Chinese businesses
allegedly operate in Ethiopia illegally”. Professor Levine is
quite right to add “allegedly” as the figure appears to have
been plucked out of the air. The most superficial check would
have found that there hasn’t yet been any lease of land to
Egypt, nor to Saudi Arabia. Nor has Egypt even asked for any. It
might be added that the issue isn’t
about selling Ethiopian land. That simply isn’t happening.
Professor Levine appears to have been listening to opposition
exaggerations, half-truths and outright falsification.
Much
of Professor Levine’s piece is a critique of a recent article by
Ambassador Tesfaye Habisso “Free elections for Democracy or
creating Client Regimes” in which Ambassador Tesfaye argues that
the chaos and disruption after the May 2005 election in Ethiopia
can clearly be ascribed to the effects of foreign interference,
a possible
attempt
to encourage the removal of the present government. Professor
Levine, rather condescendingly notes in passing that Ambassador
Tesfaye cannot be faulted for alluding to incidents in which
foreign actors certainly did intervene in inappropriate and
harmful ways in the political process in 2005, though he
criticizes the Ambassador’s comments, rather unfairly, for
vagueness. He rapidly moves on to the real point of his piece –
that foreign influence on Ethiopia, notably western, US and EU,
influence has (despite Ethiopian suspicions) been all to the
good. He lists a number of often specious examples. He mentions
the Portuguese intervention in the 16th century to
assist against Ahmed Gran, but then ignores the responsibility
of Portuguese Jesuits for the religious and civil wars of the
early 17th century. He mentions British involvement
in helping to oust the Italians in 1941 but does not refer to
the sometimes questionable post-war activities of British
advisers in Ethiopia, or to British efforts to redraw boundaries
in the region. Incidentally, Professor Levine claims the US was
opposed to the Fascist conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. This is
hardly accurate, given the US refusal to support calls for an
oil embargo against Italy which could have forced Italy to think
twice about its invasion. The “protection” of priceless
Ethiopian manuscripts in the British Museum, most loot from
Magdala and the Emperor Tewodros’ treasury, is also rather more
controversial than Professor Levine would care to admit.
Professor Levine’s argument is that the effect of Ambassador
Tesfaye’s article might be to discredit the effect of
international players in seeking to promote a free and fair
electoral process. This begs several questions not least
whether such international players really do want a free and
fair election in Ethiopia or whether they want to see a
particular result – not of course necessarily the same thing.
Some, in 2005, certainly wanted the latter. Professor Levine’s
point also raises the
question
of whether Ethiopia should necessarily be beholden to the moral
pressures of foreigners. Electoral processes have, after all,
not been entirely above reproach in the western world in recent
years. It might also be noted in this context that another
element in Professor Levine’s argument is the sense of
exclusivity that permeates it. Ethiopia should have its foreign
influences but it must apparently be western interest and
investment. In fact, of course, Chinese or Indian investment or
interest doesn’t preclude western involvement – or vice versa.
Professor Levine says we live in a world where it is not
possible for any country to hide behind national sovereignty to
defend practices that do not hold up to universal standards –
especially in human rights. He adds that any support for
universal human rights in Ethiopia should be provided with
“tact, respect and knowledge of Ethiopian sensibilities”. Yes,
indeed, and one aspect of this must surely be to acknowledge
that not everything from the west is actually wonderful. If we
are talking
of a lack of sensibility and tact then we might start with
lectures about the necessity of acceptance of international
advice, and of a partial critique of national sovereignty.
Professor Levine criticizes Ethiopia today for refusing to
listen to outside influences over election processes and human
rights, looking back at a highly selective list of historic
examples of “good influence” to support his view. He is arguing
for a more immediately responsive attitude to western pressures
about the election and/or human rights. He identifies Ambassador
Tesfaye’s arguments as a “rejectionist sentiment”. This is
hardly fair to the Ambassador who was after all,
quite
accurately and specifically, criticizing the behavior of certain
individuals in 2005. It can hardly be classified as
“rejectionist” of all foreign influences.
Acceptance or rejection of foreign influences and advice is not
necessarily a matter of national sovereignty or even national
pride, but rather of their use and validity for Ethiopia, its
people
or its government. Ethiopia can, and always has, accepted
foreign influences but always on its own terms – not those of
Professor Levine.
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Ensuring
the integrity of the upcoming election: a campaign to
de-legitimize the election
The basic and
universally accepted tenet of any genuine democratic election is
that it be free and fair, with well known ground rules which the
contesting parties observed in their campaigns. This may sound
obvious and straight forward but the actual operation may have
problems if only because of the way political parties conduct
themselves both before and after an election.
In this
regard, political parties fall into two broad categories. In the
first are those which have faith in the ground rules and conduct
themselves accordingly, irrespective of the outcome of the
election. In other words, they have full confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process and accept that the election
will be free and fair. By contrast there are political parties
which engage in a campaign well before the election to
invalidate its outcome even before any ballots are cast.
Although perhaps paying lip-service to the ground rules and the
electoral process as a whole, these groups claim the elections
will not be free and fair. For such political parties, the
election can only be free and fair if they win. When they sense
the outcome may not meet their expectations, they try to
discredit the results in advance of the elections.
It is clear
that some in Ethiopia fall into this latter category. For some
months already, several opposition politicians have been
involved in a propaganda campaign to try to invalidate the
election results in advance by claiming, without any plausible
evidence, the election will not be free and fair. In pursuit of
this aim, they have employed numerous outright fabrications and
wild allegations to deflect attention from their own internal
weaknesses and policy failures. They are, in effect, already
trying to portray themselves as victims, blaming the alleged
activities of the ruling party or the Government for what they
already believe will be their failure in a free and fair
election next May. This is why they are trying to de-legitimize
the results of the election several months before it is due to
take place. They seem to have had some effect in misleading
commentators, including the Economist, providing them with an
excuse for disparaging Ethiopia’s democratic process.
Their
campaign will not succeed. It is doomed to fail for two main
reasons. First, with the exception of the small group involved
in this attempt at de-legitimizing the election, the
determination of all other political parties which have a stake
in a free and fair election is beyond question. These
‘spoilers’ should, therefore, be under no illusion that they can
succeed in their intent despite the encouragement offered to
them by the likes of Human Rights Watch. Secondly, the vast
majority of stakeholders in the political process have
demonstrated in no uncertain terms their commitment to a free
and fair election by subscribing to the recent Code of Conduct
for Political Parties. It is this that the ‘spoilers’ who
cannot live up to its stringent standards have been trying, in
vain, to disparage.
In fact, this
Code of Conduct, now enshrined in law, is the most distinctive
feature in the evolution of the Ethiopian electoral process, and
indeed the legislation is unprecedented. It is designed to
ensure that the forthcoming election, as well as all future
elections, will be free, fair and credible. The result of an
historic agreement by 65 political parties who have a genuine
stake in the success of the upcoming election, it expresses the
very clear determination by nearly all the main actors in the
Ethiopian political process that the electoral process should
succeed. In these circumstances we are confident it will be next
to impossible to de-legitimize the election.
Nevertheless,
complacency is never advisable however small the number of
antagonists or ‘spoilers’. It remains important to make sure
that the activities of a few politicians do not mislead the
electorate or any other target groups. We may be certain that
the electorate itself will not be taken in by the machinations
of these elements, but other target groups in or outside
Ethiopia need to be aware that these efforts are the intrigues
of a small coterie of politicians bent on derailing the current
electoral process. Certainly, in their propaganda against the
forthcoming election, these politicians have clearly been trying
to influence foreign observers. As we enter the final phases in
the electoral timetable, everyone should be aware of such
efforts to undermine the validity of the election. It is not
uncommon, of course, for parties to cry foul after an election,
however free and fair it may have been. Some in Ethiopia,
however, are doing this, far in advance of the election,
primarily in order to influence foreign third parties.
We believe it
is important that such observers should be careful not to give
any credence, wittingly or unwittingly, to the machinations of
these opposition parties intended to nullify the election
process. While we know nothing can prevent the electoral process
from proceeding properly, we also believe the need for third
parties to exercise extra caution is justified to avoid
conveying the wrong messages about the integrity of the
election. These parties, out of sheer desperation, can be
expected to continue with all sorts of deceptive tactics and
pretexts over the next four months to try to deprive the
election of legitimacy. Acting as if any of their fabrications
are valid, and giving spurious allegations credibility will be a
disservice to the fast evolving democratic process in Ethiopia.
We hope interested third parties, some of whom were involved in
the elaboration of the legislation of the Code of Conduct, as
well as all stakeholders, will continue to stand behind the new
ground rules to provide for a free and fair election, and that
they will reject any and all attempts to undermine the
legitimacy of the vote in May.
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