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The
High-Level Group Meeting on Education for All and the Addis
Ababa Declaration
The Ninth High-Level
Group Meeting on Education for All (EFA), focusing on the impact
of the global economic crises on education and on challenges
related to marginalization, was held in Addis Ababa from 23 to
25 February. The meeting was organized by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in
collaboration with the African Union and the Government of
Ethiopia, bringing together Ministers of Education,
representatives of international and regional organizations,
civil society and other associations. The meeting was opened by
Ms. Irina Bokovo, Director General of UNESCO, in the presence of
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ms. Lalla Ben Barka, Deputy
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa and Mr. Erastus Mwnecha, Deputy Chairperson of the
African Union Commission.
Speaking at the opening
ceremony, Prime Minister Meles said Ethiopia had addressed the
issue of access to education in a comprehensive fashion. As a
result, 85 percent of the primary schools needed have been built
in the rural areas and over 96 percent of primary school-age
children have been enrolled. He spoke of the efforts exerted to
expand secondary and tertiary education, including programs for
technical and vocational training, and the special attention
given to the marginalized sectors of society. The Premier said,
however, that the country has not fully been able to overcome
the challenges it faced in expanding access to education in the
pastoralist areas. Referring to a lack of commitment by donors
in realizing the pledges made on various occasions, the Prime
Minister said the country had to continue to mobilize its own
resources to further expand both the education service and its
coverage and to address other education-related challenges.
However, he concluded by expressing his confidence that Ethiopia
would reach the Millennium Development Goals in the education
sector.
In the opening sessions,
technical meetings of senior officials evaluated the activities
and progresses made since the eighth meeting of the High-Level
Group on Education For All and discussed the report on the key
outcomes of the tenth meeting of the working group of Education
For All. Different panel discussions and debates were held both
at technical and Ministerial levels. The meeting concluded with
the adoption of the Addis Ababa Declaration which notes that it
is essential that national governments should further develop
adequate and evidence-based education policies linked to a
broader development framework, and they should identify, target
and respond to the needs of the marginalized in a flexible and
innovative way, enhancing the quality and relevance of
education. The declaration calls on governments to multiply
their efforts in the current global context to safeguard recent
gains in education and increase current levels of budget
allocation to at least 6% of GDP or 20% of public expenditure.
It recommends governments to link education policies to broader
development strategies, and calls upon EFA partners and
development partners to honour their aid commitments and support
innovative education funding. It requests UNESCO to continue to
monitor the impact of the financial and economic crisis on
education, and to propose measures at the September Millennium
Development Goals’ summit to enhance the effectiveness of the
High Level group.
During her stay in Addis
Ababa, the UNESCO Director General also held bilateral meetings
with the Ministers of Culture and Tourism, Education and Foreign
Affairs. Together with Education Minister, Ato Demeke Mekonnen,
Director General Bokovo laid the foundation stone for an
International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa. She
also had fruitful discussions with President Girma Woldegiorgis,
and with Prime Minister Meles. In their meeting, the Prime
Minister emphasized the Government’s belief that science and
technology had a key role to play in reducing poverty and
bringing about rapid and sustainable economic development. It
had re-established the Science and Technology Commission at a
ministerial level to boost the development of the sector. He
noted that the Government had increased the number of state
higher learning institutions to twenty two. Director General
Bokovo said that UNESCO would be continuing to assist Ethiopia
in ensuring quality education and in improving the enrollment of
girls at all levels of the education system. This would be part
of UNESCO’s efforts to assist Ethiopia to meet the Millennium
Development Goals.
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The
EU’s exploratory election observation mission in Ethiopia
A seven-member European
Union technical team conducted an extensive fact-finding mission
from 15th to 25th February, assessing all aspects of preparation
for the upcoming national elections and evaluating the situation
for possible deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission.
The technical team held meetings with a number of government and
political party officials as well as the National Electoral
Board and carried out field trips to different regions. Ato
Seyoum Mesfin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, met the team on
Wednesday last week. During their discussions, the Minister
explained the commitment and determination of the Ethiopian
Government to make the upcoming National Election free, fair and
peaceful, as well as credible in the eyes of the Ethiopian
people. He noted that the Government was doing everything
possible to ensure a level playing field for all political
actors and to make the process believable and transparent. He
emphasized that the Government believed that independent and
impartial election observers had an added value for the process
of democratization in Ethiopia. He also emphasized the need for
election observers to demonstrate complete impartiality and
independence. This would be all the more critical in light of
the negative experiences that Ethiopia had had in the aftermath
of the 2005 elections.
The exploratory team
held discussions with officials of the National Electoral Board
both at federal and regional levels. The discussions focused on
the reform process undertaken after a thorough evaluation of the
2005 election and on the preparations for the upcoming election.
The team also held extensive discussions with state law
enforcement bodies, including the Federal Police Commission and
the Ministry of National Defense. They had meetings with the
Supreme Court of Ethiopia and the Speaker of the House of
People's Representatives. They met with officials of the ruling
party and with representatives of opposition parties. The team
also went on field trips to a number of places including Ambo,
Nekemete, Gonder, Bahar Dar, Arsi-Negele and Hawasa, meeting
with officials from the Electoral Board’s regional offices and
representatives of political parties as well as regional state
administration officials.
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Somalia: the need to implement the TFG/Ahlu Sunna agreement as
soon as possible
For most of the
international community it is now clear that the conflict in
Somalia is no longer a war among Somalis. Only the Government of
Eritrea and its few allies appear to disagree. Somali extremists
like Al-Shabaab have acknowledged their links to Al Qaeda, and
Al Qaeda has publicly flaunted its involvement in Somalia. The
day to day fighting in Mogadishu is between the forces of peace
and reconciliation, on the one hand, and those bent on promoting
a foreign agenda as part of what they call an international
jihad, on the other. As the recent meeting of the International
Contact Group on Somalia emphasized there is no other option
than to increase the level of practical support to the TFG and
its allies in Somalia.
Indeed, the Italian
Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General of the Arab League
recently issued a joint statement emphasizing that the
international community could no longer afford to ignore Somalia
now that the world is facing a chain of crises that links the
Horn of Africa with the Arabian Peninsula and on to
Afghanistan. In their joint statement, Italy and the Arab
League underlined the fact that Somali groups have established
close links with groups in Yemen, and pointed out that Somalia
has become a theatre for clashes between extremists and the
forces of, and aligned with, the legitimate TFG led by President
Sheikh Sheriff. They called on the African Union, the League of
Arab States, the European Union, IGAD and the UN to pursue joint
and integrated action in support of peace in Somalia.
The stance taken by
Italy and the Arab League still needs to be put into action.
What is lacking on the ground is just the kind of joint and
coordinated effort on Somalia which the two parties have called
for. Here, the recent negotiations between the TFG and Ahlu
Sunna wal Jama’a can be considered one step in the right
direction, helping to produce a conducive atmosphere for such
concerted efforts. The TFG and Ahlu Sunna initialized an
agreement to work towards integrating their administration and
their security forces two weeks ago in Addis Ababa. It is hoped
that the understanding reached between the two will soon be
fully implemented. Such an alliance could go a long way towards
facilitating success for the struggle of moderate forces in
Somalia against extremists. Equally, for this to happen, their
agreement needs to be implemented as soon as possible. Efforts
should be exerted by all stakeholders and the international
community to assist in bringing the negotiations to a successful
conclusion.
This agreement, yet to
be ratified by the two constituencies, is a follow-up to an
earlier declaration made by the two parties last June in
Nairobi. Now the TFG and Ahlu Sunna have once again committed
themselves to working together, it is necessary to make good
their promises. It is encouraging that they have already made it
clear that they will work to bring other forces of peace on
board, using the Transitional Federal Charter and the outcome of
the Djibouti Peace process. This requires willingness on the
part of all parties to embrace a spirit of cooperation and
reconciliation and the rejection of any resort to military
option to settle any differences that might arise.
Meanwhile in Nairobi,
the AU’s Deputy Special Representative on Somalia, Mr. Wafula
Wamunyinyi, said this week that more funding was beginning to
reach the TFG as it became clear the Government was making
progress in re-establishing state institutions, and working to
some specific budgets for the first time. Half of the funding
pledged to help Somalia's security forces and AU troops
providing security to the government has been released. Mr.
Wamunyinyi said more troops from Uganda and Burundi were waiting
to be airlifted to AMISOM with both countries sending an
additional battalion each as soon as logistical arrangements
have been completed.
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Eritrean demonstrations against sanctions
Over the last week the
Government of Eritrea has been engaged in orchestrating a
campaign against the sanctions recently imposed by the United
Nations Security Council over Eritrea’s destabilization in the
Horn of Africa. This has involved a media blitz by President
Isaias personally and a number of demonstrations around the
world. There was no sign, however, of any effort to take any of
the steps requested by the Security Council nor has there been
any indication of changing policy. Indeed, as both Djibouti and
Somalia made it clear during the recent AU summit in Addis
Ababa, Eritrea’s support for extremist elements has continued
unchecked. And indeed, this week, the US Ambassador to Eritrea
made it clear that there had been no change in Eritrea’s
regional destabilization activities.
Eritrea, in fact, has
continued its usual approach of complete denial of all
allegations against it even when faced with the incontrovertible
facts produced by the Security Council. This of course is
nothing new. Shortly before this week’s demonstrations President
Isaias gave an interview to Al Jazeera, which gave the concept
of denial a whole new meaning. He denied he had any enemies at
all, insisting his government is friends with the entire world
“except with few liars.” He denied that problems with Ethiopia
were serious, contradicting all previous remarks by implying
that any difficulties between the two countries could easily be
resolved. He denied that he had supported Islamists in Somalia.
Allegations about his destabilizing role in the region were “all
lies”, and he claimed there was no evidence for any actions of
that kind. He denied Eritreans were seeking asylum abroad in
their thousands, apparently forgetting he usually accuses the
CIA for organizing a mass exodus from Eritrea. He said it was
news to him that a dozen players from the Eritrean football
squad absconded in Kenya. Eritrea, he said, was a law-abiding,
peace-loving, prosperous and benevolent state. Any allegations
to the contrary were “all lies” and any claims that Eritreans
faced problems like food shortages, famine or forced military
service were pure fabrications. Eritrea, he added was in fact,
“number one in the continent” in terms of its quality of life.
The actual
demonstrations this week in a few cities in Europe and North
America were well-choreographed. Participating were those
government supporters who share President Isaias’ rosy picture
of Eritrea if from a considerable distance. The demonstrations
were intended to protest Eritrea’s innocence, but they included
extensive attacks on the countries in which the demonstrations
were taking place. The turn-out was invariably reported by
Eritrea’s official media outlets in incredible numbers, with
reference to hundreds of thousands. Observers mostly put the
numbers in the low thousands.
Several observations
might be made about these demonstrations. One is that the
demonstrators were availing themselves of the democracy in those
countries to attack their hosts; something they would be totally
unable to do in Eritrea of course. And the demonstrations were
in defence of a leader who only three days earlier had publicly
declared that his people had no use for “a commodity called
democracy”. Another point was that a number of the
demonstrators were quoted as saying they appeared because of
threats against their families back in Eritrea if they did not
turn out. It is common knowledge that the government in Asmara
has always relied on a network of intimidation and extortion to
raise money from Eritreans in the Diaspora.
It is far from clear
what the demonstrations were meant to achieve at all. They are
aimed, of course to try to push the international community into
reconsidering its position on Eritrea. Apparently, Eritrea’s
leaders believe the demonstrations will drive home a message
that Eritreans are united in opposition to the “unfair and
illegal” sanctions, largely imposed through the actions of the
US. They are unlikely to have any such effect, not least because
of the many Eritreans in the Diaspora who have welcomed
sanctions. In fact, if the rhetoric of Eritrea’s leaders is any
guide, President Isaias is also trying to rebuild support among
the Diaspora whose remittances have for so long been the main
financial support of the Government. With growing opposition to
repressive domestic policies and heavy-handed treatment of
critics, the level of support from the Diaspora has been
steadily declining. The claim of sanctions being the US response
to Eritrea’s defiant international stance is apparently meant to
encourage as many people as possible to support the Government
again, and lift some of the mounting domestic pressure it is
currently facing. It is unlikely to succeed.
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Chatham
House revisited: Eritrea’s Road to Isolation
Last week we reviewed a
volume of papers on Eritrea’s foreign policy, published by Chatham
House and edited by Dr. Richard Read -“Eritrea’s External
Relations: Understanding its regional role and foreign policy”. The
papers were updated for publication from a workshop held in 2007. In
addition to the more general issues raised by this publication, we
wanted today to look in more detail at Dr. Redie Bereketeab’s “The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict and the Algiers Agreement: Eritrea’s road
to isolation”; and Dan Connell’s “Eritrea and the US: towards a new
US policy”, as these specifically address the issue of Eritrea’s
diplomatic isolation and its estrangement from its neighbours and
the wider international community.
Dan Connell argues that
Eritrea’s relations with the US have always been shaped and
overshadowed by US/Ethiopian relations, and almost always to
Eritrea’s disadvantage. The US, he says, has always seen Ethiopia as
its prime strategic ally in the Horn of Africa, and Eritrea as a
lesser asset, even an afterthought. At worst it was an obstacle to
be constrained or sacrificed when its interests ran counter to those
of Ethiopia. In fact, this was hardly true during Haile Selassie’s
time. It certainly wasn’t the case during the military dictatorship
(1974-1991) or during the early 1990s with President Clinton
characterising Eritrea as emblematic of an African renaissance and
defining it as a front-line state in containing Sudan. The US was
even prepared to shut its eyes to Eritrea’s propensity to conflict
whenever it had disputes with its neighbours (Sudan -1994; Yemen
-1995; Djibouti – 1996). It was only when Eritrea invaded Ethiopia
and initiated a full-scale war, coupled with President Bush’s
changes of regional strategy towards Sudan, that things began to
change. Eritrea blamed the US in vitriolic terms for supporting
Ethiopia during and after the war although the US continued to
supply humanitarian and development aid. Connell notes that as the
US moved closer to Ethiopia on a regional level, as the war on
terror began to intensify, so Eritrea deepened its involvement with
Islamic political groups in Somalia. One might note incidentally
that Connell’s assertions that Ethiopia “goaded the Somali Islamists
into providing a pretext for an invasion, much as [it] had done with
Eritrea in 1998” is entirely false. It is completely contradicted by
the facts, as the preliminaries for the Khartoum talks between the
TFG and the ICU make quite clear.
Connell’s suggestions for a
new approach by the US towards Eritrea (and one wonders why he
doesn’t consider it might be more appropriate to reverse the
process) relies on the common assertion that the border issue lies
behind all Eritrean frustration/aggression, a claim that totally
ignores the long record of Eritrean attacks on its neighbours well
before the Eritrea-Ethiopian Boundary Commission reported in 2002.
The pattern of aggression makes nonsense of Connell’s assertions
that it is the failure to demarcate, rather than Eritrea’s defeat in
2000, which underlies Eritrea’s subsequent foreign policy actions.
His suggestion is that an improvement should start with the US
moving “aggressively” to end Ethiopia’s alleged refusal to
demarcate. This, he suggests, on little or no evidence, would open
the door to political change in Eritrea; elsewhere he noted
President Isaias will never change his negative views towards
political development in Eritrea.
Dr. Bereketeab sees the
conflict in 1998 as essentially concerned with Eritrea’s
independence, a claim whose implausibility is highlighted by the
fact that Eritrea invaded Ethiopia. Quoting President Isaias almost
verbatim he claims Eritrea has a different meaning to Ethiopia as a
whole than to the region of Tigrai in particular. Neither Dr.
Bereketeab nor President Isaias appear to have a realistic
understanding of Ethiopian history or of the attitudes of the TPLF
or Ethiopia in general towards Eritrean independence. Like President
Isaias himself, Dr Bereketeab manages to confuse possible ideas for
future co-operation with alleged threats to the independence of
Eritrea which, for Ethiopia, became permanent and non-negotiable in
1993. Dr. Bereketeab repeats EPLF/PFDJ propaganda, if in a rather
more nuanced and academic way, over what he calls “numerous other
provocations” leading up to the attack at Badme. He even returns to
the long exploded myth of Greater Tigray, an idea which briefly
surfaced in the mid 1970s to be subsequently ignored by all except
President Isaias and a few Eritrean academic propagandists. He
raises the allegation that Ethiopia sees Eritrean independence as a
threat to its historical and national identity. If anyone holds such
to such nonsense it is no more than a tiny minority and it has never
had any impact on policy or government thinking. It should not be
necessary to remind Dr. Bereketeab that it was the Government of
Ethiopia which accepted the concept of a minimal referendum in
Eritrea alone to allow acceptance of Eritrea’s independence; without
the acquiescence of central government in Addis Ababa, Eritrea would
have found itself in the position of Somaliland today. He even
repeats discredited Eritrean claims that it was not responsible for
starting the war, that Ethiopia’s aims included regime change in
Asmara and the seizure of Assab and its failure to achieve them
meant it had essentially lost the war, and that Ethiopia’s call for
dialogue for normalization of relations is intended to provide a
settlement outside the Algiers Agreement. These claims of course
ignore the evidence of the Claims Commission that Eritrea invaded
Ethiopia, the fact that Ethiopia very obviously won the war, and
that it has been the activities of Eritrea that has effectively torn
up the Algiers Agreement.
Dr. Bereketeab suggests the
EPLF/PFDJ was accorded legitimacy in Eritrea because it won
independence ‘against all odds; and secondly because it promised
stability, security, socio-economic development, liberty and
democracy. He argues the Eritrea-Ethiopia war endangered the first
and undermined the second. In fact, it was hardly the war that had
this effect. It was clear much earlier that President Isaias and his
Government was largely uninterested in liberty or democracy. The
President refused to implement the multi-party constitution adopted
by the National Assembly in 1997, claiming later that a constitution
had nothing to do with the formation of parties. He was on record as
saying he saw no chance of political programmes functioning “in the
very near future” and even if they did, “it may still take a very
long time before [parties] can become mature enough to play
productive roles in the political life of the country." There is no
indication that he has changed his views. If anything they appear to
have hardened.
In fact, neither Dr.
Bereketeab nor Dan Connell actually mention the fundamental problem
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or analyze the major impact of
Eritrea’s defeat in 2000. It is left to Sally Healy (“Hard and Soft
Power: some thoughts on the practice of Eritrea’s foreign policy”)
to provide a dose of realism. “Implausible as it may now seem,
Eritrea apparently saw itself as the leader of a joint political
enterprise, a progressive partnership between two countries in which
Ethiopia’s standing as a major power in the region would be shared,
or even shaped, by Eritrea.” This was never a practical possibility,
nor, unsurprisingly, was it acceptable to Ethiopia’s leaders. It
might be added that Eritrea’s vaulting ambition was not confined to
Ethiopia. Its regional aims in the early 1990s extended to the
overthrow of the Government of Sudan, involvement in the collapse of
Zaire, attempts to seize Yemeni islands to project itself into the
Red Sea, and threats against Djibouti as well as the destabilization
of Ethiopia, both directly and through Somalia.
To achieve these ambitions,
President Isaias saw Eritrea as the major military power in the
region, and he was prepared to use this power. Defeat in 2000 was,
therefore, a major shock because the PFDJ leadership and President
Isaias believed their own myths of victory in the independence war,
achieved “single-handedly and against all odds”. This of course
ignored all the external, and internal, enabling factors which
contributed to their victory, including the critical assistance of
the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front and other anti-Derg
organizations in Ethiopia, the demoralization of the Ethiopian
military government, the end of Soviet military support, and the
EPLF’s own direct and indirect support from the Arab World and even
from the United States. Ignoring all this allowed Eritrea’s leaders
to believe in their own seriously exaggerated invincibility. As a
result, as Sally Healy puts it “Eritrea’s capture of the border town
of Badme in 1998 marked the end of the independence honeymoon and
the start of a nightmare for Eritrea.” Eritrea was finally brought
face-to-face with the reality of Ethiopia’s military superiority and
its willingness to use it if necessary. The result of the war and
post war developments demonstrated clearly that there was no issue
between Ethiopia and Eritrea involving Eritrean sovereignty or its
independence, only Eritrea’s overweening ambition.
When Eritrea failed to
achieve the quick results it wanted diplomatically, it abandoned the
whole idea of diplomacy and co-operation with the international
community. As Sally Healy emphasized “Eritrea stopped engaging
internationally and turned its attention instead to undermining
Ethiopia. Returning to practices that were familiar from the years
of struggle [for independence], it has sought to rebuild
relationships with Ethiopia’s internal adversaries…”, irrespective
of their means of operation. Sally Healy adds that “such an approach
suggests the persistence of an old belief that Ethiopia is nothing
more than an unhappy amalgam of oppressed nations that could be
unravelled with time and patience.” It is indeed an old, and an
irrelevant idea, and one that is easily negated by the process of
democratization and the federal constitution.
The central problem for the
region is precisely the fact that Eritrea’s leader still has
hegemonic aspirations far beyond his own or Eritrea’s ability. They
never were achievable even in the 1990s. They are even less
plausible today after Eritrea’s persistent claims, over the last few
years, that its international predicament is the result of American
hostility. President Isaias’ has repeatedly denounced the US
Government and the CIA for everything that has gone wrong. Nor has
he made any effort to cultivate good relations with Europe which he
claims has also let down Eritrea, like the AU and the rest of the
international community. Eritrea’s diplomatic isolation today,
underlined by the imposition of targeted sanctions by the UN
Security Council rests squarely and entirely on the result of the
actions of its leadership, and those of its President whose latest
effort has been to accuse an Al Jazeera journalist of insanity for
asking difficult questions.
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Ensuring the integrity of the elections: the regional context
The Horn of Africa is
widely seen as a region in crisis and as one of the most
disturbed areas of the world today. This is certainly an
exaggeration but almost all the regional states continue to face
major political and socio-economic problems, including the
threat of extremism and terrorism, as well as piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and with the added danger of
climate change looming over all and one of the regional states
committing itself to regional destabilization as a central
element of its foreign policy. This view of the region has been
reinforced by the recent election problems in Kenya, the
resonance of Sudan’s upcoming Presidential election for the
future of both north and south Sudan and for next year’s
referendum on the future of Southern Sudan, and the delays in
holding Somaliland’s overdue Presidential elections, now
expected later this year. Eritrea, of course, has no plans to
hold any national elections or presidential elections in the
foreseeable future. Ethiopia is, of course, holding its national
and federal state elections in May.
The establishment of
democracy in any country in the region is all the harder in the
face of widespread under-development, problems of unemployment
and the lack of literacy. As important is the failure of
politicians to demonstrate any clear or genuine commitment to
democracy, to accept its values, its rules, procedures or
ethics. This brings us back to something we have referred to
before here in Ethiopia, the failure of members of the
opposition to play their necessary role within any democratic
system; that is the concept of the loyal opposition, opposition
functioning within the democratic and constitutional framework.
Opposition parties have as much responsibility as a government
or a ruling party to make a democratic system work effectively.
Multi-party democracy is difficult to root in societies which
are largely rural, non-industrial, poor, under-developed or
pastoral. Even producing an accurate voters’ roll is in itself a
problem. There can be difficulties in the provision of
information, and here again responsibility is central to any
understanding of the role of the press and the media. The need
to educate party members, in or out of power, and the media, in
their roles is central to the development of democracy. It is a
lengthy process and one that requires hard work from all to
encourage the embrace of democratic concepts, as well as
democratic rules and procedures. Successful, non-violent
elections are a vital part of this; they are the responsibility
of all parties and of all politicians.
Ethiopia failed to
achieve non-violent elections in 2005. Despite a successful
election itself, a combination of circumstances including the
failure of responsibility at all levels led to severe
post-election problems. The result was that the 2005 national
and federal state election was not the example for the region
that the Government might have hoped for. This time around, the
Government anticipates that it will go better. It has done its
best to ensure this will be the case with the Code of Conduct to
regulate party behaviour and the agreements on media balance and
usage and on campaigning.
All in all this should
provide an impressive example for other states in the region,
and one that will have particular resonance in neighbouring
Eritrea where the Government has consistently refused to allow
any manifestations of multi-party democracy. Genuine democracy,
even if flawed, is anathema to dictators, and democracy in a
neighbour is particularly unwelcome. Eritreans will be able to
hear and (partially) see a democratic multi-party electoral
process which President Isaias has made it clear he will never
allow the Eritrean people to aspire to. Control, and indeed
personal control, remains central to the mechanics of government
in Eritrea. This is one reason why the example of a genuine
multi-party vote in Ethiopia is so important, providing a real,
visible and alternative option for the most militarized state in
Africa, if not the world. The economic costs of Eritrea’s
long-term mobilization have been crippling but the continued
insistence of national service does allow for a critical
mechanism of control reinforced by a refusal to implement the
Constitution or allow any national elections.
Given Eritrea’s past
record of efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, it is no surprise
that it is continuing its attempts to upset Ethiopia’s
democratic process, trying to take advantage of the relaxation
in security which necessarily accompanies the operation of
democratic procedures. Eritrea has already attempted to
infiltrate members of some unregistered political opposition
groups committed to armed struggle into Ethiopia. It has put
considerable effort into support for Al-Shabaab in Somalia in
order to try and impact on Ethiopia’s policies, and in backing
ONLF and OLF military and terrorist operations in southern
Ethiopia. More can be expected.
None of this provides
any excuse for not having a free and fair election (nothing can
excuse that), but it does mean that President Isaias will
continue to “fish in troubled waters”. The combination of
encouraging regional instability and Islamic radicalism in
Somalia is a highly dangerous strategy with significant
international implications; it resonates dangerously in the
region even if it provides no serious threat to Ethiopia’s
stability. As Sally Healy notes the Eritrean Government may not
have a stated policy to try to overthrow the Ethiopia
Government, but “the main thrust of its regional action is
building alliances with non-state rebel groups working against
Ethiopia”. There is no indication that Eritrea has any intention
of suspending such activities during Ethiopia’s elections.
Even the functioning of
a mature consolidated democracy requires vigilance; how much
more so in the case of an ongoing democratic process which is
still fragile. Establishing a democracy in the absence of
developed technology, socio-economic development, industrialism,
universal education and other factors prevailing in Western
Europe or North America will always be difficult. It requires
knowledge and commitment – and responsibility – from all those
involved, government and opposition alike. The result, however,
should be an example that will reverberate beyond the confines
of Ethiopia and provide a model and a precedent for the whole
region.
With its aim of regional
destabilization, and its own negation of democracy, Eritrea is
currently the antithesis of Ethiopia, even if the latter’s
democratization process is still a matter in progress. The
forthcoming elections among 80 million people, in the Horn of
Africa’s largest state, can and should provide a real and
valuable alternative scenario and an example for the whole
region. This didn’t happen in 2005 when events conspired against
it and a significant element of the opposition refused to accept
the role of ‘loyal opposition’. This time round the omens are
more propitious; and the potential rewards, within a more
advanced democratic process, considerable.
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