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Somalia:
AMISOM Troop-Contributing Countries and Partners meet; the TFG
and Ahlu Sunna reach agreement
A
consultative meeting of the Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs)
of AMISOM, separately and together with partners, took place at
AU headquarters on Wednesday this week. The meeting reviewed the
political, security and military situation in Somalia, and the
status of capacity building and training programs, equipment and
sustenance for Somali security forces. The meeting was given
extensive briefings from the TFG’s Defense Minister and AMISOM’s
Force Commander. With the situation in Somalia of concern to
all the meeting called on partners to provide all necessary
support to the TFG urgently.
Somalia’s
Minister of Defense made it clear that the TFG was making
progress in reorganizing its forces. These now numbered 13,300
soldiers and were located in strategic locations right across
southern Somalia, but the Minister emphasized the need for the
international community to continue to provide support to the
TFG to sustain these forces. He emphasized that the ongoing
training provided by contingents from AMISOM and others in
Mogadishu was critical to enhance the capacities of the TFG
forces. The meeting welcomed the other training taking place in
neighboring states, in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya as
well as elsewhere, and underlined the need for strategic
coordination and harmonization to increase effectiveness on the
ground. Successful completion of the current training will
provide further opportunity to strengthen TFG security
institutions.
The meeting
noted that the efforts to impose a foreign agenda on the people
of Somalia were connected to events in Yemen: in a recent
engagement with Houthi rebels, Yemeni Government forces captured
27 fighters from Somalia. It identified major challenges to the
TFG and AMISOM efforts to create a secure environment in
Somalia. These included maritime threats, the present Al-Shabaab
mobilization in Mogadishu, extremist attacks on civilians and
the deteriorating economic and social situation as well as
weakening infrastructure. The meeting called on the
international community to assist in providing better security
as well as basic services, and on all those supporting the TFG
to provide assistance without strings or conditions so the
meager resources could be used effectively and flexibly. The
need to handle the issue with vigor and urgency was emphasized,
and it was suggested that an AU Peace and Security Council
Summit might be called to evaluate the situation further and
produce a clear plan of action.
In the joint
TCC and partners’ meeting, Dr. Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopia’s State
Minister of Foreign Affairs also gave a briefing on the current
situation of Somalia and the negotiations that had been taking
place between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a in Addis Ababa
over the last week or so. He emphasized the need for close
coordination among all those involved in the efforts to produce
peace and stability in Somalia. Most, he said, were not living
up to expectations. He noted that while there was complete
agreement that there were efforts going on to impose a
non-Somali agenda on Somalia, and indeed it was apparent that
this challenge extended both to the Horn of Africa and also
beyond it to the region at large, the problem of a satisfactory
response remained. The assessment of this complex situation was
clear enough, but now the international community needed to ask
itself whether the assistance given to the TFG, and other
supporters of peace, was commensurate with what the situation
actually demanded. Dr. Tekeda emphasized that the efforts made
against piracy needed to be duplicated on the ground if the
situation inside Somalia was to be changed.
He said the
absence of coordination and cooperation had seriously affected
Somali effectiveness, but this might now be changing. There have
been positive developments in the dialogue between the TFG and
Ahlu Sunna, following up their declaration in Nairobi last June.
Dr. Tekeda said that a major breakthrough had been achieved in
the recent negotiations. The TFG team had been headed by Sherif
Hassan Sheik Aden, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, and the Ahlu Sunna delegation by Ahlu Sunna’s spiritual
leader, Sheikh Mahamoud Sheikh Ahmed. Both parties have agreed
to mobilize Somalis inside and outside the country to fight
jointly against the onslaught of extremism, to preserve Somali
tradition and custom. They have agreed to establish a National
Advisory Council of Ulamas to produce a framework for the
protection and preservation of the traditional Somali Islamic
faith. Both sides will now take the agreement back to their
respective constituencies and carry out extensive discussions.
The final agreement will be signed during the first week of
March. Dr. Tekeda called on the international community and all
who want to see the realization of peace and stability in
Somalia to support this endeavor.
Subsequently,
Dr. Tekeda also briefed the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) Partners Forum at the Italian Embassy
premises on the outcome of the negotiations between the TFG and
Ahlu Sunna. He detailed how the agreement provided for an
effective mechanism for strategic cooperation. Since there is no
reservoir of goodwill for Al-Shabaab on the ground either inside
or outside Mogadishu, the understanding reached between the TFG
and Ahlu Sunna can be expected to bring about real change on the
ground in the fight against extremism. Dr. Tekeda called for
unambiguous and unanimous support from the Partners Forum, for
concrete political and material support to ensure that the TFG/Ahlu
Sunna agreement can be sustained. The IGAD Partners, noting that
Ahlu Sunna reflected public opinion in Somalia towards the
extremists, expressed their readiness to provide support. The
Royal Danish Embassy offered an immediate US$150,000 from its
Africa Peace Program through the existing framework of
cooperation with IGAD.
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Prime
Minister Meles to co-chair the UN High-Level Advisory Group
On Friday
last week, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban
ki-Moon launched a High-Level Advisory Group to mobilize finance
for climate change. The High-Level Advisory Group will be
co-chaired by Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom
and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi; other members of the Group will
include President Bharat Jagdeo of Guyana and Prime Minister
Jens Stoltenberg of Norway. Launching the Advisory Group, the UN
Secretary-General said its mission was to mobilize the financial
resources pledged at the recent United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen to provide scaling up both short-term
and long-term financing for mitigation and adaptation strategies
for developing countries. It will in effect look at how to
“jump-start’ the efforts to raise the promised funds. The Group
will work with governments, central banks, and finance experts
to find innovative ways to co-operate with public and private
companies to raise the funds. Prime Minister Brown, who said he
very much looked forward to working with Prime Minister Meles
and other members of the Group, described their task as
“daunting” but “one of the most important we face – combating
climate change by ensuring that the poorest countries have the
finance that is necessary to do so”. The Group is expected to
prepare preliminary suggestions for the May/June meeting of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Final
recommendations would be drawn up and issued before the next UN
Climate Summit in Mexico in December.
The scale,
source and mechanism of financing for the response to climate
change was one of the contentious points in the negotiations
leading up to Copenhagen. And financing is a crucial component
of the Copenhagen Accord. Much of what Prime Minister Meles
proposed regarding financing for developing nations was included
in the Copenhagen Accord. The developed countries agreed to
provide funding approaching 30 billion US dollars between 2010
and 2012, and a hundred billion US dollars by 2020. It was
agreed that there would be a balanced allocation for mitigation
and adaptation activities, and that adaptation resources would
particularly be allocated to poor and vulnerable regions and
countries, particularly the small island states, and to Africa.
The governance mechanism for adaptation funding proposed by
Prime Minister Meles was also accepted together with a
commitment to put a significant part of the resources into a
Trust Fund to be administered by a board with equal
representation from developed and developing countries. This
indeed explains why the recent African Union Summit of Heads of
State and Government endorsed the provisions of the Copenhagen
Accord.
The point of
establishing the High-Level Advisory Group now is to translate
the political agreement on financing into detailed and practical
measures. The Secretary-General has acted in a timely manner to
implement what was agreed in Copenhagen in an urgent and
credible manner. This will allow the international community to
pave the way for a satisfactory conclusion of the climate change
negotiations with a legally binding outcome by the end of the
year in Mexico. Some at Copenhagen also felt that what had been
promised might not be delivered, but it is clear financing for
climate change cannot and must not be dealt with on the lines of
“ business as usual”. As Prime Minister Gordon Brown has stated
fast-track financing of 30 billion dollars has to begin to flow
now in order to provide the support for developing countries to
tackle the impact of climate change and implement mitigation
activities effectively.
In this
sense, the establishment of the Advisory Group is a significant
start to address the challenges of climate change faced by
developing countries, particularly Africa. A lot will be
expected of the Group, and of Prime Minister Meles. He was given
the role of leading the climate change negotiations on behalf of
Africa by his peers, allowing Africa to speak with a single
voice. Their trust and confidence enabled the African voice to
be taken seriously into account at the Copenhagen Summit. Now
the selection of Prime Minster Meles as a co-chair of the
High-Level Advisory Group will enhance the continued reflection
of Africa's views over the key issue of financing for climate
change. It is a responsibility on behalf of Africa, and an honor
for Ethiopia.
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A
successful Ethiopia/Kenya Joint Border Administrators and
Commissioners meeting
The 26th
Ethio-Kenya Joint Border Administrators and Commissioners’
meeting took place on Tuesday and Wednesday this week, in
Hawassa, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian delegation was led by Ato
Mulugeta Mekonen, head of the Main Department of Immigration and
Nationality Affairs, and the Kenyan delegation was led by Ms.
Claire Omolo, Provincial Commissioner of Eastern Province. The
meeting was officially opened by Ato Shifraw Shigute, President
of Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’
Regional State. Discussions covered a wide variety of issues
including cross-border cooperation and trade, security including
cattle rustling and cross-border clashes as well as the illegal
circulation of small arms, human trafficking and the maintenance
and inspection of the border pillars. The activities of the
cross-border sub-committees were reviewed; they were commended
for their cooperation in managing cross-border clashes and
cattle rustling. The meeting also appreciated the efforts made
by the Southern Regional State and Rift Valley Province to
contain the problems arising in the Karamoja cluster. It was
decided that a meeting of the relevant sub-committee should take
place in two weeks in order to arrange for the exchange of
rustled animals from both sides of the border. It was also
agreed to introduce the branding of cattle in an effort to cut
back on rustling.
In the
security sector, the meeting noted the level of cooperation
between the adjacent administrations in tackling threats to
local peace and security. It applauded the role of Boran elders
and the local Kenyan administration in assisting in the recent
surrender of a number of OLF fighters. The meeting called for
further strengthening of cooperation in security and in sharing
of information as well as for joint operations to address any
remaining security threats. It was agreed to set up radio links
between the police on both sides of the border. Illegal
immigration also figured on the agenda, and it was agreed to
enhance existing cooperation between immigration offices on both
sides of the border to help control human traffickers and
illegal cross-border movements. Both sides agreed to take action
to stop the circulation of small arms; Kenya will be starting a
campaign of disarmament in due course. The meeting also took
note of the efforts of both countries to improve their road
links. The road to Moyale on the Kenyan side of the border is
currently under construction and it is expected to provide
significant economic development when finished. The meeting,
considered as highly successful by both parties, concluded by
emphasizing the need for increased cross-border cooperation over
health, livestock, agriculture and education.
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“Eritrea’s
External Affairs” reviewed
“Eritrea’s
External Affairs”, subtitled “Understanding its Regional Role
and Foreign Policy” is the title of a book published by Chatham
House in London. In 2007 a workshop on this subject was
organized at Chatham House, and the papers delivered there have
now been updated and published in a book edited by Dr. Richard
Reid, author of one of the papers.
Following
Eritrea’s independence (de facto 1991; de jure 1993), Eritrea’s
leaders spent a good deal of time and effort underlining the
myth that they had won independence ‘against all odds’ and
without any assistance. This was coupled with the idea that
Eritrea was destined to be a beacon of hope for both its own
people and, more importantly, for the whole region. Few doubted
that the commitment that Eritreans had made to the independence
struggle would be turned to achieve significant and rapid
development, in a bold experiment in nation-building. Its
president was seen as an example of a new style of African
leader. Now nearly two decades later, Eritrea is widely regarded
as a pariah state, the most militarized state in the world, and
is regarded as a central factor in, indeed a major cause of,
instability in the Horn of Africa. The papers in this book
attempt to explain what has gone wrong with Eritrea’s foreign
relations and explore Eritrea’s aggressive relations with all
its neighbors and indeed most of the rest of the world. The
authors attempt to explain the policies and motives of President
Isaias and what underlies his “belligerent isolationism”.
The book is a
collection of seven articles on Eritrea’s foreign policy: four
are by foreign scholars, two with a long previous association
with the Eritrean leadership; three others are by Eritrean
scholars now engaged in teaching or research in European or
American universities. They focus on a number of topics linked
to the major challenges of and prospects for Eritrea’s foreign
relations. The nature of Eritrea’s foreign relations and its
policy towards its neighbours, Eritrea and the international
community, Eritrea-US relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean ‘border’
conflict are some of the issues dealt with at length by the
authors. There has always been a dearth of critical intellectual
discussion on the policies of the Eritrean leadership. Economic
or political decisions in Eritrea have largely been devoid of
serious debate. Even today, many of the former supporters of
President Isaias find it difficult to see clearly where he is
taking Eritrea. There has been very little critical analysis of
either the domestic or the external policies that Eritrea’s
leadership has relentlessly pursued, and these articles do not
go far enough to fill the gap.
Sally Healy
(“Hard and Soft Power: some thoughts on the practice of Eritrean
foreign policy”) and Dan Connell (“The EPLF-PFDJ experience: how
it shapes Eritrea’s regional strategy”) look at the influence of
the long guerrilla struggle on current policies. Their analyses
of the historical-psychological settings, on which these
policies are based, are close to being realistic. Dan Connell
details President Isaias’ methods of control, and his efforts to
implement his two major external concerns, which he identifies
as President Isaias’ vision of Eritrea as a major player in the
region despite the fact that it is a small and vulnerable state,
and his belief that Eritrea’s best defense against the hostility
of others is to create and support effective opposition forces
to assist Eritrea in destabilizing and weakening its neighbors.
Eritrea’s intent, says Connell, is “to be a player in regional
politics that local and global powers ignore at their peril”.
Kidane Mengisteab (“What has gone wrong with Eritrea’s foreign
relations?”) also sees Eritrea’s foreign policy goals as mostly
misguided or poorly conducted, though he notes some of these
goals were undermined by external factors. The one possible
success story in Eritrea foreign relations is identified by Dr.
Gaim Kibreab (“Eritrean-Sudanese relations in historical
perspectives”), but even he suggests that whether current “warm
relations will endure in the future is an open question”.
At the same
time much of this book fails to dispel the various myths and
misleading assumptions that have accumulated around President
Isaias’ destructive domestic and external policies. There is
considerable re-writing of history apparent, and a number of
serious errors. Richard Reid, who edited the book and wrote the
introduction, as well as a paper (“Eritrea’s role and foreign
policy: past and present perspectives”) has been strongly
attacked by defenders of President Isaias because he is “known
to harbor anti-Eritrea, anti-EPLF and anti-Government of Eritrea
sentiments”. Bizarrely, the book has even been called “an insult
to the people of Eritrea”. It’s certainly not that. Dr. Reid
says “It has never been more important to understand Eritrea’s
foreign Relations,” because, he explains, “Eritrea represents a
concatenation of the most pressing issues of our era:
undemocratic power structures, low levels of socio-economic
development, a highly militarized political system increasingly
given to armed adventurism and to a tendency to disregard
international opinion in its search for local solutions.” Dr.
Reid acknowledges Eritrea’s propensity to try to “punch above
its weight” and its “readiness to employ force as the first
resort”, even admitting to admiration for such ambition. His
advice to the international community is that Eritrea, despite
its abnormal behavior, must be treated with kid gloves because
“it is a state that requires more nurturing than normal.”
There is
little or no condemnation of President Isaias’ open contempt for
the international community or his perennial invective against
international opinion. All is excused because Eritrea won its
independence “against all odds.” This myth is called upon by
Redie Bereket-Ab (“The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict and the Algiers
Agreement”) to suggest that that the root of the conflict was
about Eritrea’s sovereignty and independence, and the subsequent
failure to reach a settlement, and any threat of sanctions, has
more to do with “Eritrea’s defiance against the US” than
anything else, though Dr. Bereket-Ab does allude to Eritrea’s
offer in 2001 to work closely with the US in the latter’s war on
terror. Indeed, these suggestions fit in remarkably well with
President Isaias’ current allegations that the UN Security
Council sanctions against Eritrea for its invasion of Djibouti
and its support for Somali terrorists and extremists, is all
part of a US/CIA conspiracy to obstruct Eritrea’s development.
He even claims the CIA is responsible for the fact that last
year 11,650 refugees fled across the border into Ethiopia, over
4,000 of them soldiers. The current rate of influx into Ethiopia
now, at the beginning of 2010, is actually over 2,000 a month,
or some 70 a day. As many or more are crossing into Sudan.
Like Dr.
Reid, Dr. Bereket-Ab fails to acknowledge that Eritrea started
the war, a point that the Claims Commission of course
underlined. Dr. Reid simply refers to “an exchange of fire in
the contested area of Badme” having swiftly led to a full-scale
war, without bothering to mention who in fact initiated
hostilities. Dr. Reid claims to find evidence of Ethiopia’s
“deep resentment and bitterness regarding the state to the
north” in vitriolic language used by the Ethiopian government as
well as in what he calls “the new front” Ethiopia opened by
deporting Eritreans from Ethiopia. Eritrea’s equally extensive
response he simply downplays as “a small scale” measure. In
fact, several of the authors either put the blame for initiating
the conflict on Ethiopia or indulge in amnesia to insinuate it.
Dr Bereket-Ab even attempts to recast Eritrea as the victor in
the war because Ethiopia failed to achieve what he claims was
the objective of regime change. There is, in fact, no evidence
in any Ethiopian statements or actions of hegemonic ambitions or
alleged desire for regime change in Asmara.
Overall, this
attempt to clarify the “frequently misunderstood and too often
underestimated” policies of Eritrea is a disappointment. In
places, it comes close to being little more than an effort to
restore the image of Eritrea’s leaders, failing to make
sufficient scrutiny of failed policies. There are too many
errors, and from the Horn of Africa it is difficult to accept
references to the “otherwise sound” foreign policy of Eritrea,
or to Eritrea’s “ambitious” aims of “checking Ethiopia’s
hegemonic aspirations”. There is far too much uncritical
acceptance of official Eritrean propaganda about Ethiopia, about
regional US policies, and about Eritrean relations with Somalia
or other regional states. The aim of the book according to its
editor is not to castigate, or caricature, but to evaluate and
understand, to identify the parameters and circumstances within
which Eritrea operates.
Dr Reid tries
to explain Eritrea’s foreign policy today by looking at the
history of the last hundred years or so. He fails. His arguments
completely neglects the central point that it is in fact the
dictatorial and erratic behavior of President Isaias himself
which provides the most obvious explanation for the way Eritrea’s
foreign policy is carried out. Dr. Reid’s advice on how to deal
with Eritrea today is dangerously misleading, and distracts
attention from focus on the major element that would help analysts
make sense of Eritrea’s bizarre foreign policy actions. Sociological
and political analysis based on the behavior of individuals
might sound shallow, and usually is, but in the case of present
day Eritrea there is no better explanation than that. The Eritrean
Government today, unfortunately, can hardly be described as
a normal government.
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Ensuring
the Integrity of the Upcoming Elections: the Responsibility of
Electoral Observer Missions
Last
week, an AU exploratory mission to assess deployment of an AU
Election Observation Mission arrived in Addis Ababa. This week,
it was the turn of an EU technical team to evaluate the
political situation and make recommendations for an EU Election
Observer Mission. They came in response to invitations from the
Government to observe the national and federal elections in May.
The National Electoral Board has now announced it has drawn up a
code of conduct for international election observers following
discussions with the political parties. Board Chairman,
Professor Merga Bekana, said the directive lays out the
procedures observers should follow and was prepared in order “to
enable election observers to discharge their responsibilities in
accordance with the rule of law [and Ethiopia’s] election law.”
Responsibility is the key word. In 2005, the Government was
forced to make a formal complaint to the European Commission
over the behavior of the Head of the EU Electoral Observation
Mission and her failure to follow the EU’s own code of conduct
for observers. It is perhaps worth underlining the main elements
of the guidelines that the EU provides for its election
monitors. These include: the
maintenance
of strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and at no
time expressing any bias or preference in relation to national
authorities, parties, candidates, or with reference to any
issues in contention in the election process; to undertake their
duties in an unobtrusive manner, and not disrupt or interfere
with the election process, polling day procedures, or the vote
count; they may bring irregularities to the attention of the
election officials, but they cannot give instructions or
countermand decisions of election officials; they must base all
conclusions on well documented, factual, and verifiable
evidence, and refrain from making any personal or premature
comments about their observations to the media or any other
interested persons; they must comply with all national laws and
regulations. At all times during the mission “each election
observer should behave blamelessly, exercise sound judgment, and
observe the highest level of personal discretion”. These are
excellent guidelines and full compliance with them will
certainly deepen the mutual confidence and trust which is so
important to both Ethiopia and the EU.
Elections are
a crucial element in any democratic process. Election observers
have a significant role to play in increasing the available
information about the process and in making it harder for either
incumbent or opposition to commit fraud. They also have the
responsibility of certification, an important element in
providing support for the development of a country's democratic
institutions and procedures, and assisting in the objective of
holding elections of a high standard. The EU Commission has
described the principles of election monitoring as based on full
coverage, impartiality, transparency and professionalism, with
the main goals being “the legitimization of an electoral
process, where appropriate, and the enhancement of public
confidence in the electoral process” as well as deterring fraud
and strengthening respect for human rights. And indeed election
monitoring can certainly help to build confidence in the
electoral process, and provide conflicting parties with
confidence that the election will be conducted fairly. At the
same time, election observers need to remember that the
electoral process remains in the ownership of the country
holding the elections. If that is taken away then the whole
process becomes meaningless.
Democracy
involves a number of factors, and one of the most important
elements is the role of the loyal opposition. Any democracy
needs a loyal opposition, and in a real democratic electoral
process, parties with a real political platform can be genuine
contenders for power. Most opposition parties have confidence in
the overall integrity of the electoral process, and will accept
electoral rules and are prepared to accept the results of the
election and play the role of a loyal opposition should they
lose. A minority, however, often resorts to a propaganda
campaign, making wild allegations to deflect attention from its
own political failure, and essentially demonstrating a lack of
commitment to the principles of a loyal opposition. Parties of
that type assume
they must win before they will consider the process
fair. That is contemptuous and arrogant, as well as
anti-democratic. Any election must have losers as well as
winners. For instance, the problems in previous elections in
Ethiopia have largely come from the refusal of a small minority
of politicians who are prepared to threaten a violent option
rather than accept defeat. This applies to the first election in
1992 after the overthrow of the military dictatorship.
All
opposition parties have an equally shared responsibility to
deepen and expand democracy. It is not just a question of
rights, as Election Observation Missions often seem to think. It
is not only rights that opposition parties have. They also have
responsibilities, just as much as the government or any ruling
party, to make the election free, fair and peaceful. And at the
heart of this responsibility lies the necessity of respect for
the rule of law. This is usually overlooked by election
observers, by academics and human rights organizations and, most
of all, by the media.
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