|
A Week in the Horn 13/02/2009 |
|
It was clear from the
discussions of the Special Summit to consider the report of the AU
Commission on the "Implementation of the Sharm El-Sheik Assembly Decision
on the Union Government", that progress has been made. After a
constructive debate, the Assembly decided to transform the AU Commission
to an African Union Authority which would have a President, Vice President
and Secretaries in place of Commissioners. The Commission was to make
specific recommendations on the setting up of the AU Authority to the
Executive Council. It suggested the principles involved should be
recognition of, and respect for, the sovereignty of member states, and
that existing institutions should be the basis for the new Authority. It
also suggested that this did not need any amendment to the AU Constitutive
Act, but this led to considerable debate. The ministers unanimously
disagreed, insisting the transformation of the AU Commission did require
amendment of the Constitutive Act. In its evening session on February 3 These discussions and the outcome of this Assembly make it clear that the debate on the Union Government is now going in the right direction. Originally, the “grand debate” at Accra in 2006 was expected to bring finality to the issue. This wasn’t achieved, and since then three Committees of Heads of State and Government have submitted reports on how to deal with the issue. At the centre of the debate has been the concept of Union Government itself and member states have had difficulty in reaching consensus on this at the continental level. The agreement to transform the Commission into the AU Authority has opened the door for more fruitful deliberation. The majority of member states have adopted a realistic approach over moving the issue forward; most delegations made it clear they felt the best way to accelerate continental integration was by strengthening the Regional Economic Communities to serve as the building blocks. On the international and global financial crisis, the Assembly came up with the Addis Ababa Declaration which highlighted the need for Africa to be effectively represented at any global discussions. Following the suggestions of Prime Minister Meles, the Assembly also agreed on a formal resolution to outline Africa's necessary demands, and for the Commission to be mandated to pursue these at the up-coming G-20 summit. Most importantly, the Assembly agreed that Africa should be represented by a single delegation both at the G20 and at the UN Conference on Climate Change to be held in Copenhagen in December, thus allowing one delegation to present a united front on behalf of the continent, and empowering it to negotiate on behalf of all member States. It will have a mandate to ensure that resource flows to Africa are not reduced and significantly contribute to Africa’s quest to benefit from globalization and withstand its negative consequences. Africa’s position at the G20 summit in London next month has to be in conformity with the Decisions by the Assembly and with the conclusions of the Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Finance, held in Tunis last November. If implemented as suggested, this decision to have one single delegation to coordinate, harmonize and represent the continent, does provide a concrete example of the way in which Africa can develop. It is a real and visible manifestation of the way African states can work together, and for the integration of the continent. It can certainly provide a clear demonstration of progress in that process; and it is not a dream. It can be an example of the way regional organizations can and do operate. It makes the whole idea of African unity and integration realistic – if properly pursued step by step and with the necessary commitment. The African Union is a building which needs to be built brick by brick to ensure its strength and stability. It does not need any slap-dash, unsafe and un-necessary rush for completion. Among other things, as Prime Minister Meles indicated at the summit, there is a great need for conceptual clarity with respect to the road map on the process of African unity. The 12 th Assembly also took a firm decision on the matter of coups d’état, with the seats of Mauritania and Guinea being left vacant. There was a worrisome development, while the Summit was on, that the situation in Madagascar continued to deteriorate. Madagascar was represented at the Summit by its Prime Minister. Although not articulated, there was considerable concern over the position in Antananarivo where the next Summit is scheduled to take place; indeed the Assembly adopted a resolution to that effect and agreed dates. The consensus of the Assembly and of almost all delegations was that unconstitutional changes of government should not be accepted. This was something that had been left behind in the 1960s and the 1970s. Today we are in the 21st century. The outgoing AU Chairperson, President Jakaya Kikwete, a former colonel in the Tanzanian armed forces, was particularly emphatic on this point. Attendance at the Summit was not as substantial as expected. There were only 22 Heads of State as opposed to the 35 Presidents attending in January last year. Given the importance of the issues being discussed this was hardly satisfactory. However, all arrangements went well, there were no security incidents, not even a single case of pick-pocketing. All deployed in that capacity should be congratulated. **********
There are a few, clear and unambiguous assertions that can be made about Ethiopia's policy towards the outstanding issue between it and Eritrea. Ethiopia is committed to peace with Eritrea and to putting the crisis between the two countries behind them. This Ethiopian position has been presented and explained ad nauseam, with sufficient clarity and without resorting to obfuscating terminological gymnastics. Peace is in the interest of the two peoples and countries and everything necessary should be done to secure it, and to do so in a sustainable manner. Ethiopia can certainly live with the status quo as long as necessary, but it is not the ideal form of coexistence, nor is it the best option that one might hope for. The question is how can one make progress; what is the proper, legally correct and universally acceptable approach, to create a momentum for progress towards peace between the two countries? Here, Ethiopia's position has been equally unambiguous. Ethiopian officials, at all levels, and using more or less the same language, have repeatedly made the same point. The only sane, and legal approach, is through talks, negotiation and dialogue. The alternative cannot be taken as a realistic option for either country. The obstacles to peace - no matter how those obstacles are defined - can only be removed by negotiation and dialogue with the aim of normalizing relations. The Security Council has repeatedly told both parties one thing whose validity Ethiopia has never questioned: this is that Ethiopia and Eritrea have the primary responsibility for creating the conditions for peace between them. Others can only assist. This has continued to be a difficult proposition for Eritrea to accept. This is why the ball remains firmly in Eritrea's court. Reacting violently and recklessly to this proposition, which Eritrea felt was being propagated in lieu of pressure on Ethiopia, Asmara proceeded to do everything possible to destroy the very foundations for a resolution to the boundary dispute. And Eritrea’s actions over the past year or so have made the situation all the more complicated today than was the case two years ago. Equally, none of this changes in any fundamental manner the strategic objective of Ethiopia in respect of what needs to be done to achieve real peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: this must be done through negotiation and dialogue, and by way of talking, that Eritrea and Ethiopia can move towards peace and towards securing the conditions for normalization of relations between the two countries. The question therefore remains: has Eritrea decided to behave like any other state and act in a sensible manner? Only time can tell whether this news of the AU Chairperson’s initiative will have any substance in terms of a return to normalcy by Eritrea, something that Ethiopia would, of course, welcome. ***********
Security, of course, is an absolute necessity to bring in stability through negotiations with the right people on the ground, building institutional capacity, fulfilling the remaining objectives set out in the Transitional Charter over the next two years as well as promoting peaceful and constructive engagements with neighbors and the international community at large. There are some reasons for optimism. The co-operation of the TFG, the ARS, and Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamma as well as a majority of the people of Somalia at large on one hand and the positive response of the neighbors and international community towards the new government on the other, does provide for a positive beginning. One immediate task is to secure a safe place for Parliament and Government. Any failure to move quickly to establish this, whether in Baidoa or in Mogadishu will have a poor effect. The new regime needs to keep up its momentum. Making tangible difference on the ground will be critical. For this to occur, the government needs to generate revenue internally to reduce undue external dependence. Progress on the ground will boost confidence in the new government, start to meet people's expectations and continue the drive towards achieving the objectives of the peace process. ***********
In his three day visit to Turkey, Minister Seyoum met with Turkish high ranking officials, including Mr., Abdullah Gul, President of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Babacan, and other ministers and officials. In talks both sides expressed their satisfaction at the level of economic and diplomatic cooperation that Ethiopia and Turkey currently enjoy. At the same time, there was a common understanding that the level of cooperation on investment and trade areas between the two countries should be expanded further. In this respect the Turkish side recognized the need to encourage Turkish entrepreneurs to invest more in Ethiopia. On diplomatic and security matters, taking note of Turkey’s current position as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it was agreed to conduct periodic consultations on regional and continental peace and security issues. It is apparent that both sides share a common position regarding the current political and security situation prevailing in Somalia, in the Sudan and in the DRC. During his visits, Minister Seyoum also held discussions with a number of Italian and Turkish entrepreneurs who showed an encouraging response to the possibility of engaging in business activity in Ethiopia. **********
Minister Sufian Ahmed for his part noted the strong historical and cultural links between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia would greatly enhance their joint efforts to consolidate the basis of bilateral cooperation in all areas of mutual interest. He stressed the need to finalize the negotiations of various draft agreements exchanged between the two parties. He underlined the importance of cooperation and coordination between their respective financial and banking institutions to help promote trade and investment, and noted the existence of ample opportunities in both countries for cooperation. Minister Sufian called upon both sides to exert maximum effort to create an enabling environment for the expansion of trade and investment, and stressed the need to establish a mechanism to monitor and follow-up the implementation of the agreements and understandings reached. During the three day meeting there were detailed discussions and exchanges of views on the possible further expansion of existing trade relations, investment and development assistance, as well as on cooperation in the fields of civil aviation, health, higher education, youth affairs, tourism and antiquities, and labor. During his visit, Minister Sufian held separate meetings with Dr. Ibrahim Abdul Aziz Al-Assaf, Minister of Finance, Mr. Abdullah Ahmed Zainal, Minister of Commerce and Industry and Mr. Yousef Al-Bassam, Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Saudi Fund for Development. Saudi officials expressed their desire to further strengthen the strategic partnership between the two countries. They commended the results of the recent experiment by Sheikh Mohammed Al-Amoudi for planting rice in Ethiopia which they described as being of top quality. The Minister of Commerce and Industry, who visited Ethiopia last June, expressed his appreciation for Ethiopia’s commitment to allocate areas of agricultural land to Saudi investors. The Managing Director of the Saudi Fund for Development, currently co-financing two road construction projects in Ethiopia, promised to consider financing several other projects including a water supply project, a hydro-electric power plant and another road construction project recently submitted to the Fund. He encouraged the Ethiopian side to submit more projects for financing. During his visit, Minister Sufian also met with Saudi businessmen and investors to explain available business opportunities in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is a strategic partner and among the top three trading partners of Ethiopia; and its nationals are among the leading investors in the country. Both history and geography bind the two countries together. Relations between the two countries started before the time of the Prophet Mohammed. They were strengthened at the time of the Hijira. Ethiopia is known to many in Saudi Arabia as “Bilad al-Hijratein”, the Country of the Two Hijiras, referring to the flight from persecution of early converts to Islam who were given refuge in Ethiopia. The geographical proximity of the two countries, and the fact that their resources are complementary, also helps to strengthen the strategic partnership. **********
It would be recalled that the NBI was established in 1999 by Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, with Eritrea as an observer. It has a governance structure comprising the Nile Council of Ministers in charge of Water Affairs (Nile-COM) and a Nile Technical Advisory Committee (Nile–TAC). The Secretariat is based in Entebbe. Other elements of the initiative are the NBI- Shared Vision Program (SVP) for confidence and capacity building, and Subsidiary Action Programs (SAP) to undertake investment projects and cooperation at the sub-basin level. These are made up of the Eastern Nile Countries-Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan; the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) managed by the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), located in Addis Ababa; and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) managed by the NELSAP Coordination Unit (NELSAP-CU) located in Kigali, Rwanda. **********
These activities need to be seen separately from any dispute Eritrea has with Ethiopia, a dispute going back to 1998, when as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission found, Eritrea violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations “by resorting to armed force to attack and occupy Badme, then under peaceful administration by Ethiopia, …in an attack which began on May 12, 1998, and is liable to compensate Ethiopia, for the damages caused by that violation of international law.” The two countries did not, of course, just quietly end ‘their war’ as the European Parliamentary resolution suggests. Ethiopia successfully reversed the aggression for which the Claims Commission found Eritrea liable. This led to the signing of the Algiers Agreements which included a number of obligations far broader than those mentioned in the resolution. Among them was an undertaking to permanently terminate hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia; to renounce the use of force in resolving any disputes that might arise between them; agreement that all disputes should be resolved peacefully; and the establishment of a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) to provide the necessary environment for delimitation and demarcation of the boundary and for the comprehensive settlement of the disputes between the two countries. Omitting all these cardinal aspects of the Algiers Agreements, and the findings of the Claims Commission, indicates the selective approach adopted by those who drafted the resolution. It should be added Eritrea did not simply “obstruct” UNMEE as indicated in the text of the resolution. It deliberately took a whole series of illegal actions which led to the eviction of the UN Peacekeeping Mission from Eritrea in an unprecedented and humiliating manner. All this is well documented in the Reports of the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council and in the resolutions of the Security Council itself. The failure of the EU resolution to note these misrepresentations and factual errors has led to serious inconsistencies in its recommendations. It is, for example, absolutely unacceptable that the resolution asks Ethiopia to endorse the Boundary Commission’s “virtual” demarcation, by map coordinates, as final and binding. These coordinates cannot constitute a valid demarcation because they are not the result of a valid process recognized by international law. Similarly, the maps issued by the Commission cannot be considered as an acceptable, final and binding demarcation on the ground. Ethiopia and Eritrea have the responsibility to resolve their disputes peacefully. The resolution calls for dialogue and physical demarcation while, bizarrely, at the same time advocating acceptance of invalid demarcation by map coordinates. It is equally regrettable that the resolution makes unwarranted allegations regarding a number of developments in Ethiopia. The Government is doing everything in its power to continue to provide humanitarian assistance in the Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia, and in close collaboration with international and national humanitarian agencies. Any contrary implication intended in the resolution is simply unwarranted, and unhelpful. It is disappointing that the resolution takes the position that the recently adopted Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies has reduced the political space in the country and could restrict the activities of international and Ethiopian associations working for equality, justice, human rights and conflict resolution. It calls for changes to the law and its application. As the drafters of the resolution should well know, the new legislation is intended to enable civil society groups to make meaningful contribution to the democratization process in the country and the fight against poverty. It promotes the rights of citizens to organize independently in ways of their choosing. The restrictions relate only to political activities. As in any democratic setting, political activities in Ethiopia are restricted to the citizens. To this end, foreign money received by Ethiopian civil societies for political activities should not be more than 10%. This can hardly be called an undue restriction by any manner of means. The fact is that the new law does not impose any restriction whatever on domestic or foreign NGOs engaged in economic and social development areas. It does not restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, but only foreign funding for those groups wishing to engage in political activities. Despite the allegations of some international advocacy groups, there is no narrowing of political space. This and other laws mentioned in the resolution, including the press law, and law on party registration, have been passed by the House of People’s Representatives after thorough and extensive discussions with the relevant stakeholders and with opposition political groups in parliament. In practice, these laws have shown tangible contributions to the increasingly vibrant political discourse in Ethiopia. The composition of the National Electoral Board was arrived at through scrupulous implementation of the constitutional provisions about its independence and the selection of members. It also involved the active and full participation of opposition groups in parliament. The suggestion in the resolution that any of this has negatively affected the political process is simply unjustified. Any impartial judgment of these laws will see that together they help to lay additional foundation for the further entrenchment of democracy in Ethiopia. In this context, we would note that the resolution openly questions the entirely lawful, and understandable, arrest of Ms Birtukan Midekssa. She was tried and sentenced by a court of law for a number of offences. She was then released, on a conditional pardon, after she had asked for pardon admitting her guilt and promising not to engage in illegal activities in the future. Despite this, after her release she publicly denied that she had asked for pardon, implying that the pardon had been given under false premises. She was given the opportunity to re-affirm her pardon but she refused to do so leaving the Government no alternative but to revoke her pardon and reinstate her sentence. Her first conviction, her pardon, and its eventual revocation due to her public denial, were done in full public view and in full compliance with the Ethiopian law. We would expect a resolution of the European Parliament to support the rule of law rather than take a false political position on a very clear legal case. One might also add that it is deeply regrettable that despite mentioning recent terrorist attacks in Somaliland, and Puntland, the resolution fails to include any paragraph condemning these appalling attacks. ***********
The EU Presidential Declaration was, as usual, the outcome of a consultation process among all EU member states. Ethiopia respects the views of its EU partners even if it does not necessarily agree with them. It believes that this is what partnership is all about, but it is this spirit of partnership between Ethiopia and the EU that HRW is apparently so angry about. Indeed, on Tuesday it went so far as to circulate an angry and intemperate protest letter to EU member states denouncing the Declaration for timidity, for being unprincipled and for failing in what HRW claims are the EU’s responsibilities and obligations, indeed for being balanced. HRW, characteristically making false allegations of “a deeply chilling environment” for civil society, of intimidation, and of a “brazen attack on independent civil society”, demands the EU should punish Ethiopia with severe economic sanctions just because of the way HRW claims to know what the “intentions” of the law actually are. Bizarrely, in its letter, HRW even expresses dismay that some elements in earlier drafts of the proclamation were actually amended after consultation with Ethiopia's partners and with civil society organizations. This sort of negative attitude makes HRW’s political motives clear. HRW is objecting to a legitimate law passed by Ethiopia’s sovereign, and democratically elected, institutions. Indeed, by calling for “severe economic sanctions”, HRW is actually attempting to try and divert the attention of the government from its focus on poverty reduction. Exactly how depriving Ethiopia of access to EU development assistance, something certainly critical for poverty eradication, can help protection of human rights is a secret known only to HRW. HRW is trying to drum up support for what can only be described as a wicked scheme, calling the primary purpose and result of the CSO Proclamation the intimidation and prevention of civil society engagement. It is unashamedly urging the EU to force the Ethiopian Government to repeal Ethiopian parliamentary legislation, legislation which has been the subject of discussion and consultation of those who might be affected for months, even years. HRW has not participated in these discussions. Now it is trying to insist that should Ethiopia refuse to oblige HRW, then the EU should impose sanctions and carry out actions that would have serious effects on human rights in Ethiopia, not least poverty reduction. HRW knows very well that poverty has been identified as the main national security threat for Ethiopia and is its major priority. For reasons best known to itself, HRW is apparently opposed to this. It is trying to water down the intensity of our national struggle against poverty by attempting to neutralize some of Ethiopia’s international partnerships. Whatever the political motives behind HRW’s actions, the Ethiopian Government remains determined to forge ahead with its successful drive against poverty. It will not allow it to be sabotaged by HRW. Other African countries might wish to draw lessons from HRW’s behavior and its deliberate attempts to interfere in Ethiopia’s relations with its partners. None of this lies within HRW’s professed mandate and indeed appears to work in contradiction to its supposed aims. |
|
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
A