A Week in the Horn December 19, 2008

A Week in the Horn

19/12/2008

A new UN Security Council piracy resolution; no peace-keeping for Somalia
Concern, but no practical commitment by Somalia’s International Contact Group
Somalia’s PM sacked by the President, reinstated by Parliament
The ISS gets Ethiopia-Eritrea very wrong
A knowledge-sharing forum on Migration, Diaspora and Developments.

On Tuesday, the Security Council met to address the situation in Somalia. The Council was considering a US draft resolution on piracy. It was passed unanimously as Resolution 1851. It calls on all states to take an active role against piracy and deploy ships and planes to seize boats involved in piracy or those for which there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. It encourages the establishment of an international cooperation mechanism to act as a point of contact between states on all aspects of action against piracy, and recalls that further recommendations for action will be produced by the Secretary-General within three months. It encourages member states to cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and decides that for the next twelve months those involved in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea might take “all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia”, that is onshore, inside Somalia, to suppress these activities, consistent with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. This is a considerable advance on the Council’s previous resolution on piracy, (Res. 1846 2.12.2008) which calls on states to provide technical assistance to Somalia to enhance coastal security, welcomes the efforts to escort ships, decides such ships can enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use all necessary means to repress piracy as long as authorization has been provided, calls on all to cooperate in investigating and prosecuting of those involved, and urges states to implement their obligations under the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. By contrast Resolution 1851 allows for all necessary means .... in Somalia, that is on land as well as at sea.

In connection with this Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon, after reiterating that responsibility for peace and security in Somalia rested primarily with Somalis, and referring to the problems of humanitarian access to the estimated 1.5 million IDPs, outlined his unsuccessful efforts to investigate possibilities for the deployment of a Multinational Force in Somalia. He said he had approached 50 nations and three international organizations for contributions. No one had been prepared to play the lead role, and only thirteen countries had even agreed to provide anything at all. He therefore proposed three measures to provide security support for the Djibouti peace process. The first was to provide the AU with substantial and credible resources to reinforce AMISOM, including means to deploy the additional battalions pledged by Uganda and Burundi. He stressed that financing would be a major problem, but with the liquidation of UNMEE some assets could be donated to AMISOM. The Secretary-General emphasized that he thought the strengthening of AMISOM rather than any UN peacekeeping deployment was the current realistic option. Secondly the Security Council could consider provision of training for joint TFG/ARS forces, and capacity building for police and judiciary under an overall UN co-ordinated security sector reform strategy. The third suggestion was to add a quick reaction component to the current anti-piracy operations, to be able to launch operations into Somalia in support of UNPOS and AMISOM. The Secretary-General stressed that any such efforts should be placed in the context of a comprehensive approach which encouraged an inclusive peace process and assist the parties to rebuild security and governance capacity. The UN, the international community, must, he said, send a positive signal that it was willing to provide a security path to complement the political consequence of the Djibouti peace process.

The significance of the Secretary-General’s suggestions is that any agreed UN commitment imposes a formal requirement on UN member states; anything else remains voluntary. This, in fact, underlines both the failure of the international community to agree on any policy for Somalia, and its lack of commitment. In the following Security Council discussions, it was clear that while a majority of those present agreed that piracy in Somali waters was a symptom of the problems and situation of Somalia, and while all classified this as extremely serious, it was not considered serious enough for the UN Security Council to authorise any UN force. It demonstrates yet again why Ethiopia decided to withdraw its forces by the end of the year. The current situation is a combination of neglect and disinterest by the international community and the total irresponsibility of Somali leaders. Ethiopia had hoped that any shortfall in Somali action would be made up for by international action. With that lacking, everything has to depend upon the Somali leadership. Somali leaders, both inside and outside the country must now rise to the occasion. They must take the lead, must be made to take the lead. The international community has consistently failed for the last two years to put its money where its mouth is. Piracy must be stopped, and on land where the origins lie. Real effort must be put behind the Djibouti peace process.

Somalia’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Ahmed Jama, also addressed the Security Council, calling for a comprehensive and holistic strategy to cover piracy, terrorism and the humanitarian problem, and to include the authorization of a robust peace-keeping operation. AMISOM, he said, could be the nucleus of any such force. AMISOM’s mandate is, of course, to be reviewed on December 22 by the AU Peace and Security Council’s ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa. The Peace and Security Commissioner, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra also addressed the Security Council. Noting that the announced withdrawal of Ethiopian forces was fully consistent with the Djibouti Agreement and should be seen as a significant contribution to the resolution of the conflict, he said it provided an opportunity to be taken advantage of. He underlined the importance of a robust mission capable of stabilizing the area. He therefore called on all friends of Somalia to pledge troops, logistics and equipment for a UN-authorized force to stabilize the country and be an integral part of a UN operation. Turning to piracy, Ambassador Lamamra underlined that piracy was part of the larger problem of lawlessness in Somalia. He stressed that AMISOM needed renewed political support and a clear vision from the international community. He wanted to see a strong and clear signal of the commitment of the international community to the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia and the full implementation of the Djibouti Agreement, authorization of a UN international support force in Somalia to include and complement an enhanced AMISOM, the necessary support for AMISOM to reach its authorised strength of 8,000, and assistance to put in place the national unity government and the expanded parliament envisaged in the Agreement. He looked to the Council to take firm and decisive action. This, he pointed out, would have a direct bearing on the ministerial meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on the renewal of AMISOM’s mandate. This would be held next Monday, the day after the IGAD Ministerial meeting to be held on Sunday. Kenya announced on Tuesday it would impose travel sanctions on President Abdullahi Yusuf and his family for obstructing peace, as threatened by the October 29 IGAD summit. These could include a ban on travel and a freeze on any assets in Kenya. Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, announcing this on Tuesday, said a date for activating the sanctions had yet to be decided. It will be recalled that IGAD ministers will be meeting in Addis Ababa on Sunday.

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Currently, considerable confusion remains over the intentions of the AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries. Both Uganda and Burundi have made it clear they would be prepared to send another battalion but this will depend upon assistance in logistics and support, and probably on whether or not there will be sufficient to raise force levels to the originally mandated 8,000. This should be possible and Ethiopia certainly hoped it will be achievable. It should, of course, be underlined again that the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops will be carried out without fail by the end of December. Indeed, this week, Ethiopian troops have begun to make preparations for their withdrawal. This has not, however, prevented continuing clashes with Al-Shabaab forces. On Wednesday, a senior Al-Shabaab figure, Abdullahi Salad Farah, was killed in a clash with Ethiopian troops in the Towfiq district of Mogadishu; Al-Shabaab have admitted his death. Abdullahi had been a key figure in recent Al-Shabaab operations in Kismayo and Merca, and there were reports that he had replaced Adan Hashi Ayro as the overall military commander of Al-Shabaab, after Ayro’s death in a US airstrike in April.

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Also on Tuesday in New York, the International Contact Group on Somalia met at UN headquarters under the chairmanship of Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. In a communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the Contact Group made clear its concern over the continued disputes within the TFG leadership and called on all parties to implement the Djibouti Agreement and the constitutional process in the Transitional Federal Charter. It welcomed the declaration of October 26 between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia to form a unity government, the ceasefire agreement and the setting up last month of a verification and monitoring mechanism. The Contact Group reiterated its commitment to provide financial and political support for this agreement and for the work of the Joint Security Committee established under the Djibouti Agreement. It also recognized the need to support the UN trained police force. The Contact Group expressed its great appreciation for the work of AMISOM and recognized the need for more resources and material support for the mission. It urged the international community to address this need, recalling its support for the deployment of a stabilization force as requested in the Djibouti Agreement. The communiqué noted that there had been discussion within the ICG on various proposals and there had been significant support for a UN Peacekeeping Operation, but a few delegations wanted more discussion on this. As in the Security Council discussions later there was no agreement on the issue of what sort of force might be involved in Somalia, or on any practical steps that Contact Group members might actually take. That again explains the dilemma that Ethiopia has been facing for the last two years.

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If it wasn’t serious, it would be laughable: a Prime Minister sacked by the President on Sunday, reinstated by Parliament on Monday, replaced by the President on Tuesday, and two prime ministers available on Wednesday. The lack of even a modicum of sense and decorum points up the sense of Ethiopia’s decision to withdraw its forces. Time and again, the TFG leadership has failed to co-operate and problems have emerged between the President and other TFG leaders. Last Sunday, President Abdullahi dismissed Prime Minister Nur Hassan. The Prime Minister pointed out that under the Transitional Charter the President had no constitutional right to fire him, only Parliament could do that. Parliament, however, supported the Prime Minister in a confidence vote, by 143 to 20 with seven abstentions. It then endorsed the Prime Minister’s choice of ministers, and he was able to hold a swearing-in-ceremony for his nominated cabinet. The President, on the other hand, persuaded some MPs to ask him to nominate another Prime Minister which he did. This was Mohamed Mahmoud Gamadhere, a former Minister of Interior under the premiership of Nur Hassan’s predecessor, Mohamed Gedi. One of the issues between President and Prime Minister has been the Djibouti Agreement and Peace Process which the president has been reluctant to endorse, classifying it as no more than “a clan deal”. Parliament, however, on Wednesday unanimously supported the agreement between the TFG and the opposition ARS led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Sheikh Sharif and over thirty of his supporters returned to Mogadishu last week after a two year absence. Just how much support Sheikh Sharif actually has in Mogadishu and within the Benadir Administration has yet to be seen.

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At the beginning of the month, the South African Institute for Security Studies published a Situation Report on the current relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the “implications for peace and security in a troubled region”. From the headline it appeared the author had a somewhat curious view of the Horn of Africa: “Ethiopia and Eritrea in turmoil”. There are lot of things that might be said about Ethiopia and its relations with Eritrea but that it is in turmoil can hardly be one of them. This is a seriously flawed document containing numerous errors and even more fallacious interpretations. The author for example appears to believe that the risk of renewed conflict by either Ethiopia or Eritrea increased dramatically with the formal termination of the UN Mission (UNMEE) mandate on July 31. This ignores the fact that Ethiopia has repeatedly made it clear it will not start any conflict with Eritrea whatever the provocation. It also ignores the fact Eritrea had forced UNMEE out several months earlier and over the previous couple of years had steadily violated the Temporary Security Zone, virtually abrogating the Algiers Agreements. It is simply nonsense to suggest that Ethiopia has used the threat of renewed conflict to justify political repression and done this at the expense of democracy and human rights, and cancelled or postponed elections. The case of Eritrea, however, is a very different matter as the author does note. Eritrea has certainly used the excuse of deciding to remain on a war footing to carry out thousands of arrests, close down all independent media, to refuse to ratify its constitution, allow political parties or hold elections. Indeed, senior Eritrean officials have made it clear they do not expect to hold any elections in their lifetime.

The author goes on to look at what he calls the challenges facing Ethiopia, claiming the government has no support in the Oromo region and in urban areas and relies upon force, and that dissent is growing within the military and among government officials, even talking of a “steady flow” of senior figures into exile. His lack of knowledge of Ethiopia is underlined by references to a “vacuum” left in the Ogaden by Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, which the ONLF exploited. Not quite: ONLF activity last year was the result of Eritrean assistance. In this context, the author completely manages to misunderstand what proxy wars are. Ethiopia is not involved in any proxy war in Somalia. It had genuine national and security interests in relation to a neighbour suffering from terrorist forces making irredentist claims, disturbing peace and security and violating the rights of Ethiopia’s Somali population. This had nothing to do with Eritrea, and could not have. Eritrea never has, or has had, any security interests in Somalia; it has no boundary with Somalia or any direct contact. It has, however, tried to use Somali organizations, notably the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 and more recently the terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab, as its own proxies to attack Ethiopia. None of this, it might be noted, has anything to do with the border problem.

In fact, the author even fails to notice that Ethiopia fully accepted the Boundary Commission’s Decisions in November 2004, and has spent the last four years supporting all efforts by the UN and other states to try to produce a settlement of the dispute in accordance with international law, supporting all suggestions for further discussions or dialogue, the appointment of mediators and any other possibilities. The author manages to ignore the illegality of the Boundary Commission’s final, rather petulant, “virtual demarcation”, just as he ignores the Eritrean government’s abrogation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Algiers Agreements. The question of renewed international mediation, appointing a new envoy, bringing an end to regional rivalry between Eritrea and Ethiopia or to Eritrea’s “spoiling” activities in the region may all be sensible, even desirable, but the author ignores the fact that the problem in every case has been the refusal of Eritrea to even consider any such actions. Indeed, this report ignores the real problem at issue: the refusal of Eritrea to hold any dialogue with the present government of Ethiopia and consider the normalization of relations (the original aim of the Algiers Agreements). The problem is no longer a border issue, if indeed for Eritrea it ever has been. As a result this report in fact provides further encouragement for Eritrean intransigence, in practice suggesting ways for Eritrea to avoid committing itself to sustainable peace along the border or indeed in the whole region where it continues to act as a regional “spoiler” as in Djibouti and Somalia, and elsewhere.

The Institute for Security Studies is one of the premier research institutions in Africa. This kind of study must make its readers, in Ethiopia or elsewhere, doubtful of the value or relevance of the work the ISS is producing or sponsoring.

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On December 15, this week, the United Nations Country Team in Ethiopia convened a knowledge-sharing forum on Migration, Diaspora and Developments. Resident Ambassadors, diplomats and representatives of various regional and international organizations as well as civic societies participated in the forum. Presentations were made on three thematic issues: migration, challenge or opportunity; Diaspora and development; and experiences of the Diaspora and the development process. Making the point that migration must be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity, Ato Demeke Atnafu, Acting Director of the Ethiopian Expatriates Directorate General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasized the importance of the link between migration and development. The nexus could only benefit both the countries of origin and destination when it becomes a win-win rather than a zero-sum game. To enable both sides to maximize their benefit, there is a need for regular consultation and dialogue on issues of mutual concern. Among the most frequently voiced concerns of migrants are the question of having an extensive period of absence from either country without affecting residence rights, the portability of social welfare benefits from a host country, and the question of career breaks, of flexibility in the work place. These concerns need to be addressed if the brain drain is to be converted to a brain gain. Ato Demeke went on to explain a number of directives and proclamations that have been issued by the government to encourage Diaspora participation and engagement in Ethiopia and enable it to strengthen their ties with their country of origin. These include the proclamation providing foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin with certain rights to be exercised in their country of origin, as well as directives on the establishment and operation of foreign currency accounts, on tax and duty-free privileges for returnees, on arrangements for international remittances, and on provision of land plots for constructing residential houses. To encourage engagement further, the National Bank of Ethiopia has now finalized the preparations for a Diaspora bond, the EEPCO Millennium Bond. This will allow those in the Diaspora to purchase bonds to enhance participation in development efforts in their country of origin. Ms Doerthe Welker, Head of Government Unit, the European Commission, noted that both the European Commission and member states had made major progress in building a consolidated agenda on migration and development. She stressed the need to support action to reduce the negative effects of migration, like the brain drain, on developing countries. She indicated the commission is currently preparing a document on improving policy coherence for development focusing on the problem of the brain drain, and proposing a number of concrete actions, including training, the portability of acquired social rights, and the negotiation of employment agreements. Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal, State Minister of Finance and Economic Development, elaborated on the role of Diaspora in the economic development of their country of origin, emphasizing the importance of creating a data base and the public-private-partnership as well as increasing the flow of remittances, strengthening of institutional frameworks, and coordinating and facilitating Diaspora participation. Mr Kenichi Ohashi, the World Bank’s Country Director to Ethiopia and the Sudan, emphasized the critical importance of the Diaspora in transmitting social capital, remittances and new ideas, new values and new ways of thinking. The discussions in the Forum underlined that the Diaspora's financial contribution to the development of their country of origin goes beyond the sending of remittances, and includes foreign direct investment and trade exchange as well as knowledge and technology transfer.

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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs