A Week in the Horn
(11.12.2009)


  • IGAD’s Council of Ministers meets in Djibouti

    The IGAD Council of Ministers, chaired by Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, held its 33rd Ordinary Session in Djibouti this week. Present were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, of Kenya, Moses Wetang’ula, and of Somalia, Ali Ahmed Jama; the Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Dr. Tekeda Alemu, and of Uganda, Issac Isanga Musumba; the Minister of State for Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries of Uganda, Bright Rwamirama, the Ambassador of Sudan to Djibouti, Hassan Eisa Eltalib, and the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub M. Maalim. Other partners and invited guests included Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the TFG of Somalia, Karl Wycoff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central African and East African Affairs (USA), Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, United Nations Secretary General Special Representative to Somalia, Dr. Maxwell M. Makwezalamba, Commissioner for Economic Affairs of the African Union Commission, Wafula Wamunyinyi, Deputy Special Representative of the AU to Somalia, Ambassador Raffaele de Lutio, Italian Ambassador to Ethiopia and the Co- Chair of IPF, and Ambassador Salim Alkussaibi, Special Envoy of the League of Arab States to Somalia. The Council meeting followed a meeting of the Expert's Committee between 5th and 6th December which put forward recommendations for the Council.

    Opening the meeting, Minister Seyoum noted IGAD had fallen behind schedule in its intended revitalization and transformation. It had to make up for lost time. He emphasized the need for the Secretariat to become an effective instrument for IGAD’s collective effort. It was a complex and difficult region and needed an organization that was above average and highly effective. Minister Seyoum singled out Somalia as needing the “determined, effective, consistent support of the international community”, particularly in the area of security, expressing IGAD’s disappointment that the UN Security Council had not yet responded to the calls by IGAD and by the African Union for effective measures to be taken against those endangering peace and security in Somalia. He noted the danger of continued appeasement of those who defied the regional and international consensus. The Security Council’s failure to insist on implementation of Security Council Resolution 1862, he said, demonstrated a lack of concern about its credibility and was an invitation to “spoilers” to continue with their irresponsible behavior. Minister Seyoum referred to the need to support the activities of the TFG in Mogadishu and the necessity for effective implementation of the CPA in Sudan. Referring to the Copenhagen World Summit on Climate Change, he stressed it was impossible to address the problems of poverty, food insecurity and environmental degradation without dealing with climate change. He was, however, encouraged that Africa had arrived at a common position to defend its interests at Copenhagen. Minister Seyoum reminded member states that the success of IGAD depended upon their commitment to the organization; he thanked the Government and people of Djibouti for hosting the session.

    The meeting reviewed the progress made in implementing the resolutions and directives of the previous session of the Council of Ministers and of the 12th Summit of Heads of State and Government, and adopted a number of decisions and recommendations. The Council was given a frank and comprehensive evaluation of the situation in Somalia which underlined the role of the TFG and the Djibouti process as the sole basis and framework for peace in Somalia. It called on the International Community to take the challenges facing Somalia and the region seriously and not to encourage the view that it didn’t care about violations of the principles of international law in the sub-region. The Council emphasized that the reason extremists continued to thrive in Somalia was not because they were popular but because the TFG had received insufficient support from the international community. The Council stressed it was crucial that the TFG be supported and this should begin with IGAD Council support for the TFG budget for 2010. The Council decided to set up a Ministerial Committee which will meet in January to assist the TFG in its relations with partners to encourage concrete support.

    The Council also considered the Minimum Integration Plan (MIP) and reaffirmed it as a critical factor for the integration efforts of IGAD Member States. It decided to designate experts to finalize the plan as well as put forward a realistic and acceptable Peace and Security Strategy that could take into account the realities of the sub-region. The AU Commission expressed its readiness to assist IGAD in this. The Council held extensive discussions on administrative and financial matters, and endorsed the budget of the Secretariat at over US$ 4.7 million. It instructed the Secretariat to improve its methods of work in coordination with the IGAD Ambassadorial Committee. The Council concluded with the issue of communiqués on overall IGAD activities and on the situation in Somalia. Participants felt the session had been held in a spirit of friendship and understanding, and with genuine efforts to move IGAD forward as the vehicle for regional integration and to address the challenges of poverty and of climate change which has most seriously affected the region. Partners pledged their readiness in the Council sessions to assist the efforts of IGAD member states to bring peace and stability to the sub-region.

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  • Somalia: IGAD deliberations and the failure of the International Community.

    Much of the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting this week was devoted to consideration of Somalia. The Council was given extensive briefings by Somalia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Somalia’s Foreign Minister and the IGAD Facilitator for Peace and Reconciliation. Sharif Hassan, the Deputy Prime Minister presented and explained the TFG budget for 2010. Entitled “Keeping Our Heads Above Water", the budget is the first of its kind for a decade and half, detailing government plans to mobilize resources from within Somalia as well as from partners. The TFG intends to solicit 20% of needed funds internally and hopes the international community, including IGAD member states, would contribute the remainder. The TFG intends to increase the internal resources to 40% as the government’s activities expand. He made it clear the TFG would be transparent and put in place structures to ensure accountability. It had an agreement with accountants Price Waterhouse Cooper for this purpose. The Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the TFG was not “trigger-happy” and it was prepared to address differences through dialogue. At the same time it would be pushing ahead with the elections prescribed under the transitional arrangements. Foreign Minister, Ali Ahmed Jama, underlined the security priority of the TFG and its emphasis on laying the foundations for the functioning of TFG institutions. He hoped Somalia’s partners would be supportive of its efforts and requested IGAD assistance. The IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation detailed current developments in Somalia and the status of the international community’s follow up to the pledging conference held in Brussels. Donors had promised then to provide more than US$ 213 million for Somalia and for AMISOM. Disbursement of the funds has been very slow with the TFG so far receiving no more than a mere US$ 3 million in cash. The Facilitator detailed the activities of his office, including coordination with partners, and highlighted security problems.

    In its discussions the Council agreed on the need to make the TFG the fulcrum of all activities in Somalia. It urged others to follow suit. The need to focus on security as well as on the constitutional process was emphasized. The Council recognized the need for necessary levels of confidence between international actors and the TFG, and the requirement for frank discussions. Partners made clear their support for the TFG efforts, and IGAD members agreed to contribute directly to these. The Council, as already indicated, decided to establish a ministerial committee with a mandate to alert friends of Somalia to TFG needs, and to help mobilize resources for the proposed TFG budget.

    In its concluding communiqué on Somalia, the Council endorsed the strategic plan presented by the Facilitator to re-establish effective government institutions in Somalia (2009-2011) and the proposal to strengthen his office, and called upon all organizations to assist, appealing to partners and organizations to fund the plan. It noted the inadequacy of the international response to the challenges in Somalia as demonstrated by inactions and delays in taking measures against those supporting, directly or indirectly, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. It was alarmed that extremist groups in Somalia were increasingly foreign driven with the full support of international terrorist groups, and of some states, in particular Eritrea. The Council paid tribute to the AMISOM troops and their actions in Mogadishu, and commended those assisting the training of TFG forces and police. It urged the leadership of the TFG and members of the Parliament to demonstrate an enhanced sense of commitment. It called upon partner countries to make resources available to the TFG as a matter of urgency. It also noted with concern the deteriorating humanitarian situation and appreciated the efforts of humanitarian organizations despite the serious obstacles posed by Al-Shabaab.

    The Council of Ministers also condemned, “most vehemently”, the suicide attack carried out on December 3rd. This was a bombing that bore all the hallmarks of an Al-Shabaab attack, though faced by a wave of anger from Somalis of all political persuasion at the deaths from last week’s bombing, and in particular the killing of almost the first medical students to graduate in twenty years, Al-Shabaab denied responsibility, as did the other main extremist organization, Hizbul Islam. Indeed both, unconvincingly, deplored the explosion which killed four TFG ministers as well as journalists, civilians and students. In fact, Al-Shabaab is the only Somali organization to have been responsible for suicide bomb attacks of this kind, and indeed has frequently boasted of it. It has published suicide videos on the Internet, and has carried out nine suicide bombings since April 2008. Nor have Al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam hesitated to set off roadside bombs aimed at civilians. Al-Shabaab’s denials are hardly a surprise given the enormity of the tragedy and depth of outrage among the population shown by unprecedented anti-Shabaab demonstrations in Mogadishu and in other towns. This week there was also a demonstration against Hizbul Islam in Mogadishu following its attempt to replace the Somali flag by the black flag it and Al-Shabaab favor. Few in Mogadishu have any doubt about Al-Shabaab’s responsibility for an attack which underlines a nihilism which cannot be considered Islamic in any shape or form.

    Last week’s outrage gave added urgency and point to a letter by Somalia’s Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, to the Times newspaper of London. Prime Minister Omar noted that President Obama’s new Afghan strategy marked a “sea-change in international support to troubled countries”, suggesting that all President Obama’s conclusions about Afghanistan were equally true for Somalia. “Piracy and the growth of Islamic extremism are not the natural state of being”, the Prime Minister wrote, “they are but symptoms of an underlying malaise – the absence of government and hope”. He underlined that it would only take a quarter of what was being spent upon fighting piracy to fund the TFG’s plans and actually solve the problems of Somalia rather than ineffectually chasing pirates round the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Omar said the TFG needed help to restore effective government and train its security forces. The international community should restore and enforce Somalia’s economic exclusion zone to benefit from its own potential wealth of fish, oil and gas; thirdly, he called for a large scale civil program to train young Somalis and set up legitimate commercial enterprises.

    Prime Minister Omar’s concerns sounded a far more realistic note about Somalia than the all-too-often claims by US academics and even FBI agents that “most of the well-established Islamist training camps are not Salafi-jihadi training camps” but are run by “nationalist Islamists who want a Somali Islamist Government for ethnic Somalia”. Support for Al-Shabaab may not be widespread in Somalia, indeed it is widely disliked and feared, but the dangers of its terrorist activities, as recent events have proved, are very real. To suggest that Al-Shabaab, or Hizbul Islam, might be prepared to accept limited participation in some kind of national unity government, flies in the face of everything known about Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam or other extremists, their programs, activities and ambitions. Al-Shabaab controls through fear and has made it clear it is prepared to use terrorism without constraint, in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Bosasso, and against Somalis and civilians, not as it tries to claim just against foreign troops. It relies on suicide bombings, political assassinations, intimidation, a harsh interpretation of Sharia’a law and desecration of the majority Sufi culture and traditions in Somalia. To dismiss the threat of Al-Shabaab on the basis that there are an insufficient number of foreign mujahedeen in Somalia or that Somalia is not the place for a major confrontation with the West, as a recent ISN Report does, ignores the history of extremist groups in Somalia, and the statements and actions of Al-Shabaab itself, as last week’s explosion underlines.

    In fact, according to the AU’s Special Representative in Somalia, there are now up to 1,200 foreign fighters in Somalia, and all the evidence is that Al-Shabaab is trying to extend its international profile and reach. It has been recruiting in the US and the UK. The FBI has recently charged 14 US nationals with helping some 20 American Somalis to travel to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab. The UK’s MI5 has warned of an increasing number of young British Somalis travelling to Somalia for training, possibly as many as a hundred, though some believe this is an under-estimate. Indications are that last week’s suicide attack was carried out by a Danish citizen of Somali origin. Al-Shabaab has recently threatened a number of countries, in addition to Somalia’s neighbours, including the US, South Africa and Ghana, and in August an Al-Shabaab cell attempted to attack an Australian military base in Sydney. President Obama’s National Security Adviser said recently that the US had evidence that Al Qaeda was moving at least in some part to Yemen and Somalia. Al Qaeda, he said, always looks for ungoverned spaces or areas where they think they can operate “under the radar.” Indeed, with the weakening of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan following increasing pressure from the US and its allies, it appears Al Qaeda is moving some of its operatives to Somalia, Yemen and similar areas. Al-Shabaab now appears to be preparing Somalia for an increased Al Qaeda presence, strengthening its presence in the Juba regions and aiming to continue future operations in central Somalia and encircle Mogadishu.

    The threat posed by Al-Shabaab was dramatically underlined by last week’s bomb. It is a threat that will become all the more menacing if it continues to be ignored, if its backers are freely allowed to provide support to terrorism, and if the international community continues to disregard the ominous and alarming dangers posed by Al-Shabaab, its Al Qaeda allies and its backers within the region. It is not surprising that IGAD’s Council of Ministers noted “with dismay” the inadequate response of the international community in general and of the UN Security Council in particular to the challenges facing Somalia, and called upon the Security Council to take the situation in Somalia “seriously”. IGAD categorized the danger facing Somalia today, with extremism backed by Eritrea as “a direct threat to the peace, security and stability of the sub-region, the African continent and the world at large.” It is hard to disagree.

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  • IGAD reiterates its call for sanctions against Eritrea

    In his opening address to the IGAD Council of Ministers, Minister Seyoum reminded the meeting that there was no greater danger than appeasement of those who defied regional and international demands. He noted that the failure of the Security Council to act over its own Resolution 1862 was an invitation to “spoilers” to continue their irresponsible behavior. Security Council Resolution 1862 was passed on January 14. It urged Djibouti and Eritrea to resolve their dispute peacefully; emphasizing it was the primary responsibility of the two parties to set up the appropriate diplomatic and legal methods. It welcomed the fact that Djibouti had withdrawn its forces to the status quo ante as called for in the Security Council Presidential statement on June 12 2008, and condemned Eritrea’s failure to do the same. The Resolution categorically demands that Eritrea withdraw its forces to the positions of the status quo ante, that it acknowledge its border dispute over Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island and that it engage actively in a dialogue to defuse the tension and in diplomatic efforts to lead to a mutually acceptable solution. The Resolution also demands that Eritrea abides by its international obligations as a member of the UN and respect the principles of the UN Charter and co-operate fully with the Secretary-General. The Security Council put a time limit of five weeks on its demands for Eritrean compliance, and requests a report from the Secretary-General on progress and on the compliance of the parties within six weeks. The Resolution says the Security Council will review the situation in six weeks, on the basis of the Secretary-General’s report, with a view to taking further decisions as appropriate. Today, some 40 weeks later, Djibouti is still waiting.

    The IGAD Council of Ministers was briefed by Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, on the present state of Djibouti’s relations with Eritrea. He outlined the history of Eritrea’s aggression, noting that Djibouti had been the victim of Eritrean invasion in June 2008 when the Island of Doumeira and Ras Doumeira on the mainland had been occupied. They still were in Eritrean hands though Eritrea continued to say there was “no problem” and to refuse to open any negotiations or hold any dialogue. It had also refused to provide visas for any fact-finding missions, whether from the AU, the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference or the ACP. Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf outlined the calls for Eritrean withdrawal made by the AU Summits in January and July this year, by the League of Arab States at Doha in March and by IGAD. Eritrea, he said, had firmly refused any calls to engage from all international bodies just as it has totally ignored Security Council Resolution 1862. Minister Mahamoud pointed out that matters had now escalated as Eritrea was trying to export anarchy to the region. It was equipping and training guerrilla groups and terrorists in Djibouti, and was planning to try and cut Ethiopia’s links to Djibouti and the sea. Eritrea, he said, was not only troubling the Horn of Africa; it was now sending arms and ammunition to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and it was still arming the Eastern Front in Sudan as well as supporting extremists and terrorists in Somalia. Eritrea’s top priority could only be described as the export of anarchy. This, he said, was why the Security Council must act immediately on the draft resolution now before it.

    The IGAD Council of Ministers agreed with Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf. In its final communiqué, the Council deplored the fact that Eritrea has not responded positively to the calls from IGAD, the AU and the international community to withdraw its troops from Djibouti territory. It expressed its “deep concern” at the unlawful behavior of Eritrea in its continued acts of destabilization of Djibouti, and the region at large. It also called on the United Nations Security Council urgently to adopt the draft resolution tabled at the Security Council, calling, among other actions, for the immediate imposition of sanctions on Eritrea. Similarly, in its communiqué on Somalia, the IGAD Council of Ministers singled out for condemnation Eritrea’s support, together with that of international terrorist groups, for extremist groups like Al-Shabaab.

    Meanwhile, a letter from Eritrea’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Osman Saleh to the President of the Security Council complaining about the draft resolution put forward by Uganda for sanctions against Eritrea was made public this week. Alleging that the text was “a collection of unfounded grievances of its authors” which he said were Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, Mr. Osman claimed the call for sanctions made by the AU Peace and Security Council has been done in a “hush-hush manner” in the absence of any Heads of State and Government, and that the initiators of the resolution had “tiptoed around the AU Chairman in passing the decision to the Security Council”. In fact, the Peace and Security Council passed the call for sanctions at one of its regular meetings in May (when Heads of State and Government do not attend), and the call for sanctions was subsequently passed unanimously, without even the necessity of a vote, at the AU Heads of State and Government Summit chaired by Libya’s Head of State as AU Chairman at Sirte in July. Mr. Osman goes on to reiterate Eritrea’s claim that it is the only country that works for the reconstitution of Somalia, and that any interference by Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti “should not be welcomed.” Despite the detailed available evidence of Eritrean logistical and military support for extremist anti-Somali Government forces, Mr. Osman says Eritrea doesn’t favor any particular party and has been engaged with key countries and regional and international organizations to work for what he calls an inclusive process in Somalia. These alleged interlocutors do not, of course, include any of Somalia’s neighbors, nor IGAD as the regional organization nor the AU. Mr. Osman, who makes the usual allegations against Ethiopia, claims that sanctions against Eritrea “might exacerbate the instability of an already conflict-ridden region”. In an openly threatening conclusion, Mr. Osman adds that if ‘the draft text is taken seriously and leads to the intended punishment, it would simply be counter productive to the peace and security of the region.”

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  • The NBI’s 10th anniversary but no agreement on Nile Basin Commission

    The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) celebrated its 10th Anniversary in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, this week, with three days of celebration, December 6th to 8th. The event also included a Shared Vision Program Showcase, one of the two programs of the Initiative established in Dar es Salaam in February 1999 by Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. Eritrea is an observer. The other program is the Subsidiary Action Program with its two sub-programs - the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program. The whole occasion took place under the theme “Celebrating 10 Years of Cooperation and Progress”, and the first day was marked by a procession from Tanzania’s Ministry of Water and Irrigation to the Mlimani City Complex, and the opening of an exhibition as well as cultural performances. The event was attended by over 500 participants and stakeholders from the countries of the Nile River Basin, among them government leaders, parliamentarians, media, academia, the business community, civil society representatives, lawyers and international development partners.

    The anniversary celebrations were followed on Thursday and Friday by the 2nd Joint Meeting of Nile Technical Advisors and Negotiators, opened by Tanzania’s Deputy Minister for Water and Irrigation. The Meeting was held according to the decision of the 17th Regular Meeting of the Nile Council of Ministers in Alexandria in July. At the opening session, it was explained that the mandate of the joint meeting of technical advisors and negotiators was to recommend the basis for moving forward, to consider and advise on the transitional arrangements changing the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) into the Nile River Basin Commission, according to the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement after this has been signed and ratified by the Nile River Basin States, to advise on the signing procedures and any other related matters. Most of these items were discussed at the 1st Joint meeting in Kampala in September.

    The 2nd Joint Meeting was able to agree that studies should be undertaken on the transitional arrangements setting up the Nile River Basin Commission as a permanent river basin organization. The Joint Meeting was not, however, able to agree on proposals by Egypt and Sudan over the issue of previous colonial agreements and the 1959 Agreement. Ethiopia and other upper riparian countries maintained their position that they could not accept suggestions of ‘historical and acquired rights’. They are convinced that the Cooperative Framework Agreement is based on the international legal principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of Trans-boundary Rivers. Despite this, it was agreed the 3rd Joint Nile Technical Advisors and Negotiators Meeting will now be held in February next year at Sharm el-Sheik. This will prepare a report to be submitted to the Extraordinary Session of the Nile Council of Ministers responsible for the water resources of the Nile Basin countries. The Ministers will then decide on the signing procedures for the Cooperative Framework Agreement including the venue and date of the signing. There is a good possibility that this can be done by consensus.

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  • First field exercises for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade

    Last week, Djibouti hosted the first field training exercises for the Eastern African Standby Force. The five days of training began on November 29 and involved nearly 2,000 troops, police and civilian support staff. They came from ten of the thirteen Eastern African states in the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), now the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) – those participating were Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, with Tanzania as an observer. Eritrea, Madagascar and Mauritius declined to take part. The exercises were designed to develop multi-dimensional command, control and staff duties, and operational capabilities and to broaden the peace-keeping capacity of the region. They included ambushes, dealing with disabled vehicles, a helicopter crash and convoying of displaced people through conflict zones. The troops involved came from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda with others providing military observers, police and civilians. EASBRICOM is expected to reach initial operating capacity next year and become a fully operational, 7,000 strong force, by 2015. The Director of the EASBRICOM, Peter Marwa, said the main objective of the exercises had been to demonstrate an ability to work together, and to move a large force into a mission area. At the concluding ceremony, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti congratulated the participants, and expressed his certainty that the Eastern African Standby Force, with its commitment and experience, would play a positive role in the region.

    EASBRICOM is the Eastern African element of the planned African Standby Force, established under the AU Peace and Security Council, as part of the need for a common African Defense and Security Policy agreed at the inaugural Summit of the AU in July 2002. The African Standby Force will be made up of five standby brigades from south, east, north, west and central Africa. EASBRIG (now EASBRICOM) became operationalized following the approval of the 1st Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Eastern African Region in January 2007.

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  • The Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change: Africa’s interest and expectations

    The long awaited Copenhagen Summit on climate change is already underway and all eyes and ears are fixed on the developments in the Danish capital. Given the issues at stake, it’s hardly surprising the Summit should attract this heightened interest. With the survival of the planet hanging in the balance, it is altogether fitting that the Summit should command our undivided attention. The next few days will test whether the countries of the world can come together on an agenda which will really provide for a step forward in the efforts to rally humanity behind a practical solution to the challenge of climate change. There will no doubt be a flurry of deals and counter-deals and delegations will have their hands full with a wide array of questions to consider. Easy answers or quick-fixes will be hard to come by. Nor will all the negotiations over the next week lead to an idyllic outcome equally agreeable to all parties. Equally, however, the negotiations are expected to come up with a blend of practical approaches and of principles to serve as stepping stones to a full and binding agreement. Expectations are not for any partial accord filled with empty promises but rather for a comprehensive agreement to cover all the issues to be canvassed in the negotiations, and one that can readily be transformed into specific operational results.

    The Summit has most relevance for Africa. As Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has repeatedly stated, climate change will hit Africa first and hardest—despite the fact that “[Africa] has done virtually nothing to bring it about.” In the words of Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, the Summit “is an opportunity for Africa to secure benefits from stepped up action on climate change, action that can contribute to both poverty eradication and sustainable development.” Africa is keenly aware of what is at stake at the Summit and the AU’s decision to be represented by a unified negotiating team led by Prime Minister Meles underlines the importance of the Summit for Africa. Africa will participate in the negotiations with a clear understanding of the kind of political leadership required to achieve the best outcome possible.

    At the very least, there are two major areas that the Summit should focus on in order for the negotiations to achieve a meaningful result for Africa. The first has to do with adaptation, with finding ways to ensure that developing countries get the necessary funding and support to deal with the effects of global warming. In compensation for the injustice that these countries have suffered from the activities of developed countries, Prime Minister Meles argues that the latter are “morally obliged to help poor and vulnerable countries and regions to cover part of the cost of the investments needed to adapt to climate change.” Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark, which is hosting the Summit, agrees that in addition to cutting carbon dioxide emissions, the Summit is also expected to “provide funding for less developed nations to assist them in curbing the harmful effects of global warming.” Apart from the allocation of resources, this calls for the introduction of appropriate governance structures in which developing countries can have equal say. Existing Clean Development Mechanism structures, for example, do not allow Africa to participate meaningfully. Funds must be clearly earmarked for enhanced adaptation projects. These will have to include, among other things, the provision of funding for maintaining existing forests; support for reforestation programs; appropriate financial compensation for the costs of not using resources; funding for African efforts to develop alternative energy sources with a low carbon foot print such as hydroelectric power; support for adaptation efforts involving drought resistant seeds and for irrigation infrastructure. Equally important, is the need for support for Africa’s capacity building efforts. Any adaptation to climate change must include the opportunity to experiment with alternative livelihoods to replace agriculture.

    Ethiopia, one might add, has made an excellent start in this regard, embarking on a development path that was environment friendly and mindful of the challenges that climate change poses. Its Agricultural development-led Industrialization policy, and the focus on the generation of power from renewable sources, including hydroelectric, geothermal and wind resources, is a clear testament to the Government’s commitment to a viable and sustainable route to development. Ethiopia’s experience could, indeed, serve as a model on which negotiations at Copenhagen might build in terms of the need to support the adaptation efforts of poor and vulnerable countries.

    The second major focus of the Summit will be the need to hammer out an agreement on a mandatory emissions cap to help hold in check the further worsening of the consequences of global warming. At the very heart of the Copenhagen talks, therefore, is the need for pledges from the countries that are the largest contributors to global warming. According to Prime Minister Meles, first and foremost this requires “reducing global warming to the apparently inevitable increase of two degrees Celsius”. He added that beyond that level lies “an environmental catastrophe that could be unmanageable for poor and vulnerable countries.” In addition to advanced countries like the US and Japan, emerging economies like China and India have a pivotal role in any agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Major players in this category have already indicated their commitment to achieve a meaningful result and the negotiations are expected to narrow differences over the specifics. US President Barack Obama has been quoted as saying that countries have agreed that “each of us would take significant mitigation actions and stand behind these commitments.”

    The central point is that the political will that so many nations have expressed must be harnessed into a practical outcome. The role of leadership is key in making sure the negotiations lead to meaningful results. Africa can play such a role in this Summit and can secure benefits that will be in the best interests of its development aspirations.

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          Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

                     Ministry of Foreign Affairs