A Week in the Horn

      05/12/2008 

• Ethiopia confirms troops will leave Somalia by end of year

• Ethiopia-Kenya Border Security

• Integrating African hydroelectric projects

• Ethiopia’s non-violence prevails over Eritrea’s aggressive belligerence.

• Following last week’s statement that Ethiopia’s troops will withdraw from Somalia by the end of December, Dr. Tekeda Alemu, Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Chairman of the AU’s Peace and Security Commission, on Wednesday. Dr. Tekeda reiterated Ethiopia’s position that its troops would be living Somalia at the end of the year. They would not stay after December 31, 2008. As Foreign Minister Seyoum’s Letter to the UN Secretary General last week emphasized, by then Ethiopian troops would have been in Somalia for two years. This had not been intended and was only the result of Ethiopia’s conviction that redeployment of these forces should not create a vacuum.

Ethiopia was not leaving because it was frustrated, nor because its forces had been defeated. It had carefully analyzed the situation in Somalia and come to the conclusion that the international community was still not prepared to take the situation in Somalia seriously enough, and that this was unlikely to change in the next few weeks, or indeed over a longer period, when it had, after all, failed to take the necessary action during the last two years. Ethiopia was no longer prepared to work on the basis of what any third party might or might not do. It could only operate on the basis of past experience. There was no sign of any progress on an international stabilization force or of a UN Peacekeeping force. There had been little indication of bringing AMISOM up to its mandated level. With respect to the Transitional Federal Government and the TFIs, Ethiopia does not see any indication of any real light at the end of the tunnel. There had been some movement with the Djibouti Agreement but this was certainly not commensurate with the internal challenges facing the TFG. Indeed, President Abdullahi has been quoted by Al Jazeera as rejecting the latest phase of the Djibouti process, involving the doubling of the size of the Parliament, because it focused on the interests of only one clan. This demonstrates just how much difficulty the peace process faces. It looks unlikely to make a breakthrough. Ethiopia had this partly in mind when the Foreign Minister wrote to the UN Secretary–General and the AU Commission Chairperson informing them that Ethiopia would be withdrawing its troops from Somalia at the end of December. It had been obvious that not everybody within the TFG, even at the highest level, was enthusiastic about the Djibouti process. It was no secret, in fact, that some had been trying to scuttle the process. What the President is quoted to have said now confirms this. Given the TFG’s continuing problems, it is difficult to be optimistic of any real progress now or in the indefinite future.  

Dr. Tekeda emphasized that this meant it was now time to leave, and no consideration was going to make Ethiopia change its mind. The decision was not based on speculation but on experience. Suggestions that Ethiopia might extend the withdrawal were wide of the mark. Ethiopia accepted it had a moral obligation to AMISOM, and it would do whatever necessary to see that its withdrawal did not harm AMISOM. This did not imply any delay in withdrawal but might allow for some flexibility in terms of a few days, if necessary, but this would be for AMISOM to assess.  

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• Last week, IGAD’s Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) organized a one day workshop in Addis Ababa on the management of the Ethiopia Kenya border. ICPAT aims to contribute to the security of member states by enhancing their capacity to counter terrorism through a number of programs to improve national legal capacity, strengthen border management and control, harmonize interdepartmental cooperation, and improve the capacity building of institutions. The Kenyan delegation was led by the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern Province, and included the Undersecretary of the President’s Secretariat, the District Commissioner of Moyale, and other officials among them a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  On the Ethiopian side, the delegation included representatives from the Federal Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Customs as well as officials from the Southern Nations and Nationalities, Oromia and Somali Regional States. The workshop was opened with a statement from Ambassador Sahlework Zewde, African Affairs Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Sahlework indicated the good working relationship between the border authorities as a measure of the excellent bilateral relations existing between Ethiopia and Kenya. She emphasized the importance of border cooperation to give confidence to those living along the border and for the development of infrastructural development such as roads and railways. The Ambassador noted that both countries have a common approach to Somalia. She stressed the need for periodic bilateral meetings of this kind to provide practical solutions to common problems. Ambassador Hiruy Amanuel, head of ICPAT, provided detail on the role of ICPAT in conducting studies of the border management of IGAD member countries, organizing forums on the findings of these individual studies, and coming up with recommendations to help members arrange joint field studies on the ground. The workshop, he underlined, was to discuss recommendations from both Ethiopia and Kenya and to come up with joint priority recommendations to be presented to both governments during the upcoming Joint Border Commission meeting to be held in mid-December. At the workshop the summary findings of field researches conducted in each country by expert researchers were presented and discussed in detail. Suggestions for recommendations to be given priority were agreed by participants. It should be emphasized, in conclusion, that Ethiopia and Kenya happen to have one of the more peaceful borders in Africa. It is, of course, a border that has been demarcated on the ground.

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• Last week the AU Commission organized a workshop to consider a legal and institutional study on establishing a continental coordination structure for cross-border integrative hydroelectric projects. The workshop was held 26-28 November in the UNECA Hall in line with the Declaration of the African Union Conference of Ministers in charge of electrical energy, issued after their conference in March 2006. As the Ministers pointed out hydroelectricity must be considered as a 'vital source of renewable energy to foster sustainable development, regional integration, energy security and poverty alleviation’. It was in this context that the African Union Commission undertook a legal and institutional study on the management of the major integrative hydroelectric projects in Africa with the aim of setting up a coordination structure for these projects. Participants at the workshop included experts from AU Member States, representatives from the Regional Economic Communities, Regional Power Pools, and specialized institutions as well as development partners, and energy sector professionals. Mr. Baba Moussa, Director of Infrastructure and Energy of the African Union Commission and Dr. Elham M.A. Ibrahim, AU Commissioner in charge of Infrastructure and Energy opened the workshop.

Power point presentations were given on key areas of the AU’s Electric Energy Policy and Strategy as well as an Overview of African and International Practice as related to development of major hydroelectric projects. Mr. Meheret Debebe, EEPCO General Manager gave a presentation of the Ethiopian Experience on Hydropower Integrative Project. It should be noted that the delay in the commissioning of the Gilgel Gibe 2 hydroelectric project because of geological problems has caused power shortages in Ethiopia. With its anticipated commission in April and the completion of the Takezze Dam as well as Gilgel Gibe 3 and other projects, the full hydroelectric potential of Ethiopia will become close to realization. Ethiopia has already been extensively involved with Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti in the last year or two over possible supplies of Ethiopian power to its neighbors, and the revitalization of IGAD will enhance this regional cooperation.  

The various presentations highlighted the objectives of the study, the methodology used to collect relevant documents and data in the African energy sector in general and hydroelectricity in particular; and the legal and institutional aspects of the study. In this respect, various projects were regarded as exemplary among them: Akosombo, the Nile Basin Initiative, Cabora Bassa, Manantali, Rusizi 11 and Kariba. Among other major cross-border integrative hydroelectric projects identified in the AU study were the Tekeze project in Ethiopia and the Grand Inga project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The study and the implications for the legal and institutional aspects of the major cross-border integrative hydroelectric projects raised considerable debate. There were disagreements over the implications of the recommendations, over aspects of costs and of ownership issues, and on how the proposed new coordinating body, yet to be named, would relate to existing bodies like the African Energy Commission (AFREC) and NEPAD. There was a strong feeling that insufficient consideration had been given to the justification of the study, and that the consultants should have made direct contact with AFREC and NEPAD to consider possible duplication. In view of this, participants agreed to give the consultants another 15 days in order to consider the issues further and allow more discussion among those present.   

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• Since May 1998, when Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, and earlier, Ethiopia has consistently maintained any and all differences with Eritrea should be resolved peacefully, and in accordance with international law. Even after Eritrea’s invasion, Ethiopia only exercised its right to self-defense after exhausting all avenues to try to persuade Eritrea to withdraw its troops. Mediators at the time tried to persuade the Eritrean Government to return to the status quo ante and deal with any claim or grievance it might have through the normal diplomatic channels. The Eritrean Government chose to ridicule these efforts and deny Ethiopia’s capacity to drive Eritrean troops out of Ethiopia. It invited international actors to visit its fortifications, boasting they were impenetrable. It claimed that its unparalleled experience of war during the independence struggle ensured it could not be defeated by what it called the divided state of Ethiopia. It was a grave miscalculation. Ethiopia carried out an unprecedented and self-initiated mobilization for its defense. Eritrea was not only evicted from the Ethiopian territories it had seized, it was obliged to accept a peace agreement which included the creation of a 25 km wide Temporary Security Zone within Eritrea. This was necessary to provide a genuine environment for implementation of the peace agreement, including demarcation of the boundary. Eritrea, in signing the Algiers Agreements, accepted the obligation to keep any military forces out of this zone of separation. This was regarded as essential for any peace process largely because of Eritrea’s record of belligerent behavior, a pattern of aggression and interference demonstrated consecutively by Eritrea in its relations with its neighbors including Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. Since independence in 1993, Eritrea started wars in breach of international law on three separate occasions, with Yemen, Ethiopia and most recently with Djibouti. Equally, by backing extremists and known terrorists, it has consistently attempted to destabilize Ethiopia and Somalia.  

Given this record of aggression, it was hardly possible to allow Eritrea to return immediately to the areas from which they had been evicted in 2000. Under the peace agreement of 2000 both countries did accept to resolve all disputes peacefully, and to renounce the use of force, concretizing this with the obligation that “The parties shall permanently terminate hostilities between themselves. Each party shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the other.” This undertaking, together with the security arrangements under the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, is the basis of the entire peace process. These security arrangements included the creation of the Temporary Security Zone and the deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to monitor this and the ceasefire. UNMEE was also given the additional task of providing logistical assistance to the demarcation exercise to follow the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission’s delimitation of April 2002. The Boundary Commission was one of two such bodies envisaged by the Algiers Agreements, the other, the Claims Commission being set up to investigate compensation claims arising out of the conflict. The Claims Commission has yet to complete its work but it has made a number of preliminary and partial decisions, the most important of which was to find Eritrea liable for its unprovoked aggression against Ethiopia in violation of the United Nations Charter in May 1998. In paragraph 16 of the Claims Commission’s Partial Award Jus Ad Bellum (December 19, 2005), the Commission said “Consequently, the Commission holds that Eritrea violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations by resorting to armed force to attack and occupy Badme, then under peaceful administration by Ethiopia as well as other territory…in an attack that began on May 12, 1998…”  

The failure to proceed to boundary demarcation rapidly after April 2002 is often, though wrongly, seen as the fault of Ethiopia. Ethiopia certainly raised a number of concerns over the inconsistencies in the EEBC’s Decisions, and tried to work with the Commission to look for legal ways to resolve its complaints. In the end, despite failing to get any satisfaction from the EEBC, Ethiopia resolved to accept the Decisions of the EEBC in November 2004 making it clear it was prepared to proceed to demarcation in conformity with international practice. This would also be consistent with the Algiers Agreements in respect to bringing about sustainable peace.  Eritrea baulked at this, and responded to it with a series of increasingly blunt demands rejecting dialogue and displaying no interest in normalizing relations or providing for sustainable peace.  

Eritrea’s actions from the outset in fact made it quite clear it had wider ambitions than the border or any normalizing of relations. As soon as Ethiopia accepted the EEBC Decisions in November 2004, Eritrea openly and consistently began to flout the Algiers Agreements, putting pressure on UNMEE, pressure that eventually led to UNMEE’s enforced departure from the Temporary Security Zone and beginning its violation of the Zone. When this met with no more than mild critical comment from the UN Security Council, Eritrea steadily expanded its activities until it had taken over the whole TSZ, rendering essentially null and void the core of the whole Algiers Agreements, and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. As Eritrea gradually expanded its activities in the TSZ, the Security Council did pass a number of resolutions demanding Eritrea remove all the restrictions it had imposed on UNMEE. It never went any further than this and in February, this year, a situation had been reached in which UNMEE was, humiliatingly, forced to withdraw. This demonstration of UN weakness merely encouraged Eritrea in its bellicosity and its disregard for international norms.  

Any attempt to break the impasse was simply ignored or rejected by Eritrea. The Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement, for example, proposed a neutral facilitator be brought in to assist the Commission and provide technical assistance for discussion between the parties. The Security Council supported the idea; Ethiopia accepted it; Eritrea rejected it, as it did all other initiatives. It was at this point that the Boundary Commission, blaming both sides for the lack of progress, turned around and adopted the unheard of concept of “virtual demarcation”. Ethiopia had to reject this as ultra vires; and the Security Council made it clear the border needed physical demarcation on the ground. The Boundary Commission, however, dissolved itself, leaving the parties with no mutually acceptable or implementable guidance. It was then that Eritrea forced out the Peacekeeping Mission, declaring it was taking back its own territory in despite of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the whole peace process as specified in the Algiers Agreements.  

None of this had anything to do with so-called Eritrean frustration over Ethiopia’s alleged failure to comply with a legal ruling. Eritrea continuously placed roadblocks in the demarcation process, demonstrating clearly it preferred the continuation of the dispute rather than the resolution. Ethiopia, however, has continued to maintain that the dispute with Eritrea can only be resolved through dialogue. It has offered to meet with Eritrea at any level at any time. Ethiopia’s position has received support, not because of any skill in diplomacy or any alliances, but because it is compatible with the behavior normally expected of states in international relations. Its actions have everything to do with the need to normalize relations and produce the sustainable peace to which it is committed through dialogue and discussion. Eritrea’s interest in the border issue has always been subordinate to its wider ambitions to destabilize Ethiopia. This has led Eritrea consistently to carry out “spoiling” activities in the region, to try and weaken neighboring states, especially Ethiopia, and to back a whole series of opposition groups in the region, again targeting Ethiopia in particular. In Somalia, this has included Al-Shabaab as well as other extremist groups. There has been, and still is, a consistency to Eritrean strategy, a strategy that has nothing to do with any border dispute, or with supporting peace, security or regional stability. Again and again, Eritrea has passed up possibilities that might lead to peace. Again and again it has refused to accept UN or international assistance or good offices, to solve the problems that have resulted from its intransigence, most recently over the situation it has caused along the Djibouti border.  

Thus with respect to any movement in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the ball is in Eritrea’s court. Mutual friends and others should have no illusions, and fully understand Ethiopia’s position. As already said, the reason why Ethiopia appears to have had the upper hand in the peace process is not because of support it might have been getting from this or that force, or the sophisticated diplomacy it might have been using, but rather because it has had a consistently constructive attitude towards the peace process and a firm and visible commitment to sustainable peace with Eritrea. Nothing will change that, even though Ethiopia may have reached the end of the road in terms of what can be expected of its contributions to peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The lack of movement is now the responsibility of Eritrea, and Eritrea alone. All those interested in contributing to peace in the Horn of Africa must now realize that Ethiopia can only wait for a change of attitude in Eritrea.