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The death of
close to thirty people, including nine medical students, and three
Somali Government ministers, in yesterday’s cowardly suicide
bombing of a medical student graduation ceremony by the terrorist
Al-Shabaab organization, should help to concentrate the minds of
the UN Security Council as it considers the issue of sanctions
against Eritrea. The African Union and the regional organization
of the Horn of Africa, IGAD, continue to wait for Security Council
action on sanctions against Eritrea for its support of terrorist
activity in Somalia, first requested by the AU in July. The
Council is now considering a draft resolution calling for targeted
sanctions against Eritrea, the main support of the extremist
terrorist organizations currently attempting to overthrow the
Government of Somalia. In a documentary on Eritrea this week, Al
Jazeera quotes President Issayas of Eritrea telling the
international community, not for the first time, that there is no
such thing as terrorism in Somalia: “If what’s happening in
Somalia is terrorism, then so be it”. One notes the telling
coincidence of President Issayas’ comments with the latest suicide
terrorist attack in Mogadishu.
The Eritrean
Government’s efforts at destabilization in the region, including
most recently the active arming, training, and supporting of
groups opposed to the Djibouti Government, and its support for the
overthrow of the TFG in Somalia, have been consistently and
factually detailed beyond any reasonable doubt by the UN
Monitoring Group and other sources, including even Eritrean
Government statements. In the last week or two, in response to the
draft resolution, Eritrea has apparently been trying to suggest
that it is moderating its behavior. As on previous occasions when
under serious threat, it has tried to give the impression that it
is prepared to behave as a normal state. There has, however, been
no indication of any change of policy, as President Issayas’s own
comments underline, and as the letter of the Permanent
Representative of Eritrea to the UN made clear last week. When,
earlier this year, the African Union took the unprecedented
decision to ask the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on one
of its members, this was necessitated by Eritrea’s unprecedented
behavior of engaging in covert and overt efforts to overthrow
legitimate Governments across the region, and by it deliberate
choice to work with extremists and terrorists to achieve its
objectives. There is every indication that this remains Eritrean
Government policy.
When the
draft resolution was put forward two weeks ago it was referred to
UN experts for further consideration. It appears that all Council
members have found it difficult to argue against the draft in
light of the fact that it is based on the request, without
dissent, of the AU at the highest level. But, it also appears that
not all Council members have found it easy to act in line with
their principles and with the heavy responsibilities vested in
members of the Council, most particularly those that are permanent
members. The P5 assume extremely heavy responsibility for
international and regional peace and security. It is not always
easy to discharge these responsibilities without fail, if only
because individual concerns sometimes come into the picture
distracting attention for these responsibilities. It is during
times like these that the mettle of countries is tested.
The fact that
this latest terrorist attack took place at a time when the
Security Council is considering sanctions highlights once again
the critical importance of speedy and effective action by the
Council. It needs no emphasis that whatever the Council does in
respect to the draft sanctions resolution, it cannot be seen to
disregard what the non-implementation of SC Resolution 1862
symbolizes – the loss of credibility by the Council and the lack
of respect for its authority demonstrated by Eritrea.
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Ahlu
Sunna wal-Jama’a, the Community of Followers of Sunni (ASWJ),
is shortly preparing to celebrate the anniversary of its
efforts to respond to the activities of Al-Shabaab, and will
be using the occasion to hold its first Congress. Ahlu Sunna
dates back to the early 1990s as a movement, but it was only
a year ago that it began to organize militarily in response
to the activities of Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups
who had been deliberately desecrating the graves of revered
Sunni clerics, claiming these were idolatrous and
non-Islamic, and specifically assassinating Ahlu Sunna
leaders. Ahlu Sunna is the main Sufi movement in Somalia,
and the more moderate Sufi version of Islam is that followed
by virtually all Somalis. It is in response to these attacks
that Ahlu Sunna has been able to put itself at the head of a
popular and widespread reaction to extremist violence of Al-Shabaab.
In its
year of existence as an organization, Ahlu Sunna has raised
a substantial militia force to resist Al-Shabaab, though its
chairman, Sheikh Sharif Muhieddin Eli, says this is not a
regular army but a force dedicated to defending itself and
other Somalis whose way of life is threatened by Al-Shabaab
which he describes as “misguided people who have
misunderstood the true values of Islam”. Despite the
apparent limitations of Ahlu Sunna’s forces, they have won a
substantial number of victories over Al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam fighters, taking control of Galgudud region, as well
as much of Mudug, Hiiraan and Middle Shebelle. Ahlu Sunna
fighters are also operating in Gedo and in Bay and Bakool.
During the year, they have become a formidable and rather
better organized force. As with the TFG itself, Ahlu Sunna
does however need logistical and military training and
support if it is to continue with its successes against Al-Shabaab.
Early last month, it held an unprecedented and very
successful conference in Nairobi to discuss its further
responses to Al-Shabaab, and to raise support among Somali
Sufi communities overseas, but it cannot overcome Al-Shabaab
by itself.
Ahlu
Sunna has signed a memorandum of understanding with the TFG
and has become the main force operating against Al-Shabaab
in Somalia. Despite occasional uncertainties during the
year, it has a good working relationship with the TFG and
there is a conviction on both sides that their survival
against extremism lies in their cooperation. Consultations
between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna over coordination have gone
well, and more is expected after Ahlu Sunna’s first congress
which will provide for a more structured organization and
make it easier for the TFG to deal with it. The TFG and Ahlu
Sunna represent the moderate face of Somali Sufism, with
which the vast majority of Somali people identify. They
fully deserve support from the international community. Any
failure to provide this leaves the way open to the extremist
elements represented by Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam,
bringing with it the possibility that Al Qaeda and other
spoilers that will turn Somalia into a battleground that
threatens both the country and the region.
The
danger was underlined this week by the latest terrorist
attack in Mogadishu on Thursday at the Shamo hotel. In
addition to the graduating medical students who died, three
ministers, Ibrahim Hassan Addow, Minister of Higher
Education, Qamar Aden, Minister of Health, and Ahmed
Abdullahi, Minister of Education, were killed as well as
three journalists. Seven other journalists were injured, two
critically. A fourth minister, Suleiman Olad Roble, of
Sports and Tourism, was seriously wounded as were dozens of
other civilians.
Meanwhile, on Monday, the United Nations Security Council
voted unanimously to extend for another twelve months the
mandate for states to conduct anti-piracy operations off the
coast of Somalia and take “all necessary measures that are
appropriate in Somalia”. The Security Council said
escalating ransom payments and a lack of enforcement of the
arms embargo were fuelling the growth of piracy. Part of the
remedy for this lies within the orbit of the Security
Council itself of course as it continues to consider
sanctions against Eritrea, the major external supporter of
Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups opposed to the
Government of Somalia. A newly released Canadian
intelligence report gives an account of what it calls an
“Islamist extremism-piracy nexus”, detailing the way Al-Shabaab
provides weapons training and local protection to pirates in
return for part of the spoils either in cash or other
materials.
On
Wednesday, in Kampala, the new AU’s Special Representative
for Somalia, Wafula Wamunyinyi, suggested that following the
announcement of the planned increase of US and other forces
in Afghanistan, there was a growing possibility that more Al
Qaeda might deploy to Somalia. He was speaking as a two day
meeting opened for current and potential troop-contributing
countries for AMISOM. Delegations from Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana
and Malawi attended as well as Uganda and Burundi who
provide the 5,300 troops currently making up AMISOM.
AMISOM’s target is 8,000 troops.
The
need for more AMISOM’s full deployment, and greater and more
immediate international support for the TFG’s own security,
as well as the urgent necessity for sanctions to inhibit
external support to the extremist organizations opposed to
the Government, was shockingly underlined by yesterday’s
suicide bomb. In a joint press statement from Nairobi, the
AU Mission in Somalia, the European Union, IGAD, the League
of Arab States, Norway, the United Nations and the United
States of America, condemned the action in the strongest
possible terms, and stressed that such desperate acts would
not deter the international community from continuing its
support for the TFG and for the Somali people who were
working to restore peace and stability in Somalia. We can
only hope these intentions can be turned into positive and
concrete action in the very near future.
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The
Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response (TCEWR)
and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) of the
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of
IGAD met in Addis Ababa earlier this week. The meetings
reviewed CEWARN activities since the previous meetings in
November 2008 in Kampala, and considered the progress made
in implementation of the Five Year Strategic Plan and the
other activities put in place to strengthen CEWARN’s work.
Ethiopia, as the current chair of IGAD, chaired both
meetings.
The
TCEWR meeting, which preceded the Committee of Permanent
Secretaries’ meeting, was opened by Ambassador Brook Debebe,
who underlined CEWARN’s growing capacity to deliver its
objectives of providing early warning of conflict and
supporting the initiatives of member states in responding to
cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts in the IGAD
sub-region. Clashes among pastoralist communities are
largely caused by competition over limited resources, and
water and pasture is becoming increasingly short in the face
of environmental and climate change. Ambassador Brook
emphasized that pastoral societies require government
support to benefit from the economic and political
development in their respective countries. The TCEWR heard
briefings of CEWARN’s current activities, a mid-term review
of its Five Year Strategic Plan, and of mapping in the
Karamoja Cluster by civil societies and Community-based
Organizations (CBOs). It also received country updates from
all areas in which CEWARN now operates. CEWARN has opened up
additional reporting areas in the Sudan; made significant
progress in implementing the Rapid Response Fund; and made a
joint Study on Livestock Identification and Traceability.
Member states will now consider how best to implement the
recommendations of the study in accordance with their own
country specifics. The increase in financial contributions
of member states to CEWARN's activities was recognized as a
significant step forward for CEWARN.
The
Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) was chaired by
Ambassador Fisseha Yimer, Special Advisor to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia who underlined that the sub
region had to continue to grapple with peace and security
challenges ranging from intra- and inter-state conflicts,
terrorism, the proliferation of illicit arms and weaponry,
and piracy as well as lesser threats of armed violence and
cattle rustling amongst the sub-region’s pastoralist
communities, which, he added, covered sixty percent of the
sub-region's land mass. Ambassador Fisseha emphasized that
Ethiopia much appreciated the developments in CEWARN since
its establishment in 2003, both in documenting the impact of
violent pastoral and related conflicts in the sub-region and
in establishing effective tools to track and monitor such
conflicts. CEWARN had created various forums among
government and non-governmental stakeholders in the
sub-region for effective information-sharing and
collaboration. These should help materially to mitigate
politically violent conflicts. The recommendations of the
meeting would provide policy options and practical guide
lines for CEWARN.
After
holding extensive discussions on the mid-term review of
CEWARN Strategy 2007- 2011, the CPS adopted the report of
the TCEWR. It urged member states to coordinate and
harmonize efforts to disarm pastoral communities. It
commended the work of CEWARN and urged CEWARN staff to
redouble efforts to realize the objectives of the
organization, in collaboration with the Conflict Early
Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) and other elements of
CEWARN, to be able to move towards active mitigation of
conflicts among pastoralist communities. The next meeting of
the Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response (TCEWR)
and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) of CEWARN
is to be held in Nairobi in a year’s time. In the meantime,
the report of the meeting will be submitted to the meeting
of IGAD ministers which opens on Monday next week in
Djibouti.
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The 2nd
Assembly of the IGAD Forum for Non-Governmental and Civil Society
Organizations (NGOs/CSOs) was held in Addis Ababa on Tuesday and
Wednesday this week. The creation of the Forum followed a decision
of the 8th Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government in 2008
for the IGAD Secretariat to conduct a study to explore the
interface between NGOs and CSOs in the region and IGAD. The
Assembly of the Forum was preceded by the 4th meeting of the IGAD
NGOs/CSOs Regional Steering Committee on Monday, November 30th, at
the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa. The main item on the committee’s
agenda was a number of country reports from the NGO/CSO
representatives of member states detailing their activities since
their last meeting in April 2009. The representatives of Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda presented their activity reports but
the Kenyan representative reported that the Kenyan organizations
had yet to elect either their National Steering Committee members
or their Regional Steering Committee representatives for the
Forum. The representatives from Somalia also indicated that
current conditions in their country prevented them from holding
the necessary elections. They requested the IGAD Secretariat to
assist them in fulfilling their obligations and allow them to
participate with properly elected representation. The committee
agreed. The meeting also prepared the draft agenda for the
Assembly for the Forum which was held over the following two days
(December 1st and 2nd) at the same venue.
The Assembly
of the Forum was opened with statements from the Acting Director
of the Peace and Security Division of IGAD, the Chair of the
Ethiopian National Steering Committee, the Chair of the
International Partners’ Forum, Italy, and the representative of
COMESA. The representative of the host country’s government, the
Chief Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ato Fesseha
Tesfu, in his welcoming statement emphasized that the efforts of
the governments of IGAD member states in dealing with poverty,
democratic deficits, good governance and environmental degradation
in the region would only be effective if and when they were
supported by the NGOs and CSOs of each Member State and by
partners fully committed to people-centered development. He
reminded the Assembly that it was expected to contribute its share
to the efforts of the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting next week.
This is expected to take fundamental decisions to introduce
meaningful changes in IGAD to deal with the varied problems and
crises in the region.
The Assembly
deliberated on the role of NGOs and CSOs in the Sudan Peace
Process following the presentation of a paper on this topic by the
IGAD Special Envoy to the Assessment and Evaluation Committee of
the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Ato Lissane Yohannes. It
considered amendments to the Statutes of the Assembly and adopted
them. It discussed its role in the four thematic areas of IGAD:
Peace and Security, Food Security and Environment, HIV/AIDS and
Social Development, and Economic Cooperation. It also prepared its
own Action Plan for 2010-2013. The Assembly of the Forum for
Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organizations concluded its
proceedings by proposing the establishment of a desk to coordinate
the Forum’s activities within the IGAD Secretariat, and by
adopting the report of its two day meeting for consideration by
the Ministerial Council next week.
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It has been
more than seven years since the current Foreign Affairs and
National Security Policy and Strategy was issued by the Government
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It was adopted
following extensive public discussions of the draft document, some
aired and televised. At various times, different institutions have
held discussions on this Policy and Strategy document. It’s been
translated and made widely available in English, and is available
on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is written
in a language accessible to the general public. The fact that the
Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy has been debated
openly and made widely available to the general public is, in
itself, already a radical change for a country that used to treat
all foreign affairs documents and communications as top-secret.
Despite this,
some appear to have found it difficult to grasp the true tenets of
this transparent policy instrument, evaluate its worth on merit or
measure it by implementation. The fact that the document has been
in the public domain from inception has, of course, encouraged
comment, often critical, from all sectors of society. This is
appreciated, and welcome, but constructive criticism of this, as
of any policy instrument, does require it should be read in its
entirety. One has to say, for example, that Alemayehu Fentaw
(Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy: The Case
for a Paradigm Shift, November 2009, www.aigaforum.com) doesn’t
appear to have read the Policy and Strategy Document very closely
or in great detail before indulging in parallels and analogies
with previous regimes in Ethiopia. His comments are in fact widely
disconnected from the content and reality of the policy
instrument. He appears to have drawn from the archives of the past
rather than the current day realities of Ethiopia’s foreign and
national security considerations. It isn’t necessary to treat his
brief commentary point by point, but it does offer the opportunity
to recall the main tenets of Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and
National Security Policy and Strategy, and its achievements.
The Foreign
Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy has two major
parts. The first lays the foundation of the policy instrument. It
contains the principles, values, objectives and strategies that
underpin the entire instrument. The second part explicates and
expounds the historical value and meaning of Ethiopia’s relations
with third parties, and provides guidance on how these
relationships should best be handled. This, the most detailed
section, should of course be tempered by the understanding that
some, if not most of the section, can and will be influenced most
significantly at times by ongoing developments around the world or
in specific countries and organizations.
The first
part of the Policy and Strategy is critical to help refocus the
undivided attention of the country on the attainment of economic
development and democratization as central to ensuring the
stability and continuity of Ethiopia as a country. Democracy and
development are questions of survival. For a country as rich in
diversity of nations, nationalities and religions as Ethiopia, the
establishment of democratic order is a sine-qua-non to avert
disorder and disintegration. Democracy allows for mutual
accommodation and resolution of conflicting interests. Similarly,
lifting the country from abject poverty and underdevelopment is
imperative to avert the disorder and chaos that could follow if
this situation was allowed to continue. The question of national
pride and national heritage are integrated in the policy document
with emphasis on the duty of the present generation to fight
extreme poverty while building on the proud legacy of the
country’s longstanding independence, its past civilizations and
glories. Full recognition is given to the phenomenon of
globalization as an opportunity and also as a challenge. In a
world of increasing interconnection and fierce competition,
Ethiopia also has to devise ways and means of mitigating the
negatives effects of globalization while exhaustively utilizing
the many opportunities it also has to offer.
Ethiopia’s
Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy sets out
specific and realist objectives, easily demonstrating this is
indeed a major paradigm shift for the country. It goes back to
creating an enabling environment for the economic development and
democratization of the country. One major aspect of this is
through a transformation in foreign affairs, that is the
implementation of a policy of economic diplomacy. This allows for
the securing of foreign market opportunities for local goods,
attracting of foreign investment and enhancing development
assistance through grants, loans, technical assistance and
technology transfer, and the promotion of the country as a tourist
destination. Technical and financial support for the vital
institutions to entrench democratic governance in the country is
also critical. The policy instrument seeks to expand the number
and role of Ethiopia’s partners and reduce threats by the
resolution of conflicts peacefully through dialogue and
negotiation. One might add that nowhere in the Policy and Strategy
can one find suggestions of the sort of war-based foreign
relations objectives that Alemayehu Fentaw appears to see. They
simply aren’t there.
The
strategies devised to attain the Policy and Strategy objectives
are further evidence of the radical shift in Ethiopia’s foreign
policy orientation. Unlike the past, the focus is not on any
perceived “siege mentality” or on external factors but on the
dynamics of the domestic conditions. This is the decisive factor.
In other words, this means the determination of Ethiopia’s own
priorities, mobilizing and relying on the country’s own resources
as far as possible, while seeking foreign assistance to fill any
gaps. The strategy also demands that we should minimize threats to
national security, study and identify their source, and reduce any
vulnerability to such threats by concentrating on the fight
against poverty, backwardness, and any absence of good governance.
All this
requires the establishment of strong democratic institutions and
the construction of a national consensus on the vital national
issues of common concern. There has to be a concerted effort to
guarantee the rule of law to the fullest extent. At the same time
as reducing national vulnerability, the country also has to build
a reliable defense and security capability consistent with its
economic level, and in a manner that is sustainable and
complementary to the country’s economic development. Ethiopia’s
strategy has many different nuances including the linking of
military expenditure with the economy and making it cost
effective. Defense, it might be noted, is another area where
Alemayehu Fentaw gets it wrong.
As envisaged
in the Strategy, the Government has also endeavored to enhance the
implementation capacity of the foreign affairs establishment. This
is, in fact, a work in progress. We are continuously working to
enhance equitable gender representation and of nations and
nationalities in the foreign-service. The focus is equally on the
strengthening of the professionalism, commitment and integrity of
public servants in this area. It is important that the effort to
forge a national consensus on the vital issues for the country,
whether inside Ethiopia or outside, should be redoubled while
coordination with all relevant public and private actors is
enhanced. In sharp contrast to the theories advanced by Alemayehu
Fentaw, the Policy and Strategy instrument says that what should
matter most is the internal situation of the country. The
relevance and validity of Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National
Security Policy and Strategy is thus determined by its
contribution to development, democracy and peace in Ethiopia. This
is quite clearly a clean break from the policies of former regimes
in Ethiopia which used to relegate internal objectives to external
considerations. Equally, giving domestic progress the decisive
place does not mean that the defense of the country’s territorial
integrity isn’t given the importance it deserves. In fact, the
first of the external relations principles in the Constitution
provides for the protection of national interest and respect for
the sovereignty of the country. It also refers to mutual respect,
non-interference, respect for international treaties, integration
with neighboring countries and other African states, and the
peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Alemayehu
Fentaw does not just miss these central elements of the Policy and
Strategy instrument. He concocts facts and makes unsubstantiated
allegations. One is the suggestion that US-Ethiopia relations
would cool under the new US administration. In fact, as is
obvious, the relationship between the two countries is thriving.
Another is the claim that Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia
demonstrates a ‘foreign policy through war’ approach. It shouldn’t
need repeating that Ethiopia took action in Somalia following the
appearance of a clear and present danger from terrorist
groups and at the invitation of the legitimate Government of
Somalia. It withdrew as soon as it was in a position to do so when
the current Somali political dispensation was created by the
Djibouti Agreements. Again, Ethiopia has made major strides in the
promotion and protection of human and civil rights, and no
misrepresentation of the concept of human security can conceal
this. In fact, Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security
Policy and Strategy could be said to represent a well-proportioned
human security framework, of human and civil rights. It
encompasses both security in the traditional sense and security in
terms of democratic rights as well as enjoyment of freedom from
hunger and deprivation.
The Foreign
Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy has helped
redefine Ethiopia’s place in the world. The country is now
successfully attracting substantial foreign investment. It has
significantly increased its external trade and is currently
negotiating entry into the World Trade Organization. The new
approach of economic-diplomacy is making tangible progress in
contributing to successive years of economic growth. Ethiopia is
preparing to hold its 4th round of national elections with its
institutions demonstrating impressive implementation capacity, and
with a series of enabling laws creating a conducive environment
for the further nurture of democracy. More and more, Ethiopian
nationals and foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin are engaged in
development activities in the country. Ethiopia is playing an
active role in the African Union’s integration agenda and in the
maintenance of international peace and security through active
participation in the policy organs and peacekeeping operations of
the African Union and the United Nations. Despite many remaining
challenges, these and other achievements clearly demonstrate the
intrinsic and practical value of the Foreign Affairs and National
Security Policy and Strategy.
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