A Week in the Horn

(29.8.2008)

  • Somalia leaders agree a “Road map” for co-operation; the TFG’s MoU with Ethiopia.

  • The AU Declaration on Border Program; Lessons for Ethiopia and Eritrea

  • Double standards are not confined to the western media

  • On Tuesday, this week, the President of Somalia’s TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf, the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sheikh Adan Madobe, and Prime Minister Nur Hassan ‘Adde’, as the leaders of the TFG under the Transitional Federal Charter, signed an agreement to work together. The agreement came after a weeks-long dispute that threatened to wreck the TFG and the deal, to work together, was reached after days of discussion in Addis Ababa. The details were laid out in a road map signed by the three leaders and by IGAD, the AU and Ethiopia as witnesses. At the signing ceremony, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin said that when the leaders of the TFIs had come to Ethiopia ten days earlier the very existence of the TFG was at a critical point but that now the leaders had committed themselves to accommodate each other and work together, and had realized they needed each other to ensure the transitional period was successfully completed. Indeed, Minister Seyoum said they had no alternative and this would be the decisive factor that would make or break the national reconciliation process including the agreement signed in Djibouti.  It needed no emphasis that the Djibouti process had the potential to provide a breakthrough for peace in Somalia, providing the framework to deepen reconciliation by expanding the space for inclusiveness. Equally, this needed the unity of the TFG leadership.  Minister Seyoum also noted that the contribution of partners in the establishment of the TFG was critical. The TFG had not performed as expected; he hoped this would now change. He also emphasized that the TFG had not received all the assistance it expected and deserved. The TFG is the bulwark for national reconciliation in Somalia but without effective support from the international community, it would hardly be possible to restore sustainable peace or achieve genuine national reconciliation. The TFG remains a fledgling and weak administration; it needs all the support it can get. Certainly, the international community should expect the agreement now reached between the leaders of the TFIs will be effectively implemented. Minister Seyoum said he believed it would be, and he emphasized that the international community should now renew its solidarity with the leadership of the TFG as they try to leave behind them the differences that had paralyzed the government and jeopardized the process of peace building in Somalia.

The road map signed on Tuesday insists on a collaborative approach by the three leaders for the strengthening of the TFG, and goes into considerable detail. It allows for agreement that they will not interfere in each other’s spheres of authority and competence as spelt out in the Charter which provides the supreme law for the transitional period.  It will also have the effect of boosting the Djibouti Agreement, signed formally on August 18, though the opposition may feel that further negotiations with a government that is unified might be a little more challenging. Among the areas addressed are the number of ministers, now increased to 23. This means all those who held ministerial posts prior to the crisis will continue as members of the council of ministers, and the three ministers nominated by the Prime Minister will be endorsed by the President. Another five ministers will also be appointed in accordance with the power sharing formula of the Charter. A new Benadir administration will be set up within fifteen days. This replaces the previous administration, including the Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Dheere. The Prime Minister is establishing a Upper Level Committee for Benadir to run the region until a new executive leadership is chosen. The Committee will organize the selection of a Consultative Council and the election of an Executive Administration to be endorsed by the President. It will also establish the criteria for membership of these bodies. On revenue collection and administration, there was agreement that the capacity of the Minister of Finance should be enhanced and that the TFG would in future collect and administer revenues properly. A mechanism for centrally managing revenues will be put in place immediately and Parliament is to endorse a draft budget within two weeks. Under the Memorandum of Understanding also signed this week between the TFG and the Government of Ethiopia, a follow-up mechanism for implementation of the road map has been agreed. As a first step in implementing the Memorandum, a number of Ethiopian experts in public finance management will be sent to Mogadishu to assist in these processes and in capacity building. Ethiopian experts will also be involved in the reorganization and re-deployment of the security forces, another area of agreement in the road map. A clear command and control structure is to be set up and young and competent officers brought into the leadership of the security organs. Logistical and other support will be provided to strengthen their capacity. The agreement allows for the Benadir administration to undertake a disarmament and stabilization mission in Mogadishu immediately, and establish a community based reconciliation and stabilization mechanism. The road map resolves to implement the Djibouti Agreement fully and calls upon the international community to give full support for this. It agrees to finalize the establishment of regional and state administrations during September, October and November on the basis of a clearly defined strategy and action plan, and to expedite the works of the Constitution Commission including the enactment of electoral and party laws, and the national census.

On the role of Ethiopian troops,  the road map says that they will immediately be deployed outside Mogadishu following the establishment of the Benadir administration. The relevant departments of the two governments will now discuss the issues relating to stabilization activities, capacity building and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian contingent, and produce a clear action plan. As Prime Minister Meles said this week Ethiopia would try everything in its capacity to create an environment where its withdrawal would not seriously disrupt the process in Somalia but “that is not necessarily a precondition for our withdrawal”. He stressed that Ethiopia’s obligation towards peace in Somalia was only one aspect. “There are also requirements of our own including financial requirements. The operation has been extremely expensive so we will have to balance the domestic pressures on the one hand and pressures in Somalia on the other and try to come up with a balanced solution.” The Prime Minister also pointed out that Ethiopia “didn’t anticipate that the international community would be happy riding the Ethiopian horse and flogging it a the same time for so long. We had hoped and expected that the African Union would be able to intervene much quicker and that the international community would recognize that this is a unique opportunity for the stabilization of Somalia and capitalize on it and act quickly”.

  • The termination of UNMEE’s mandate at the end of July has led to continued speculation on any future Eritrea Ethiopia relationship. A number of observers and commentators have tried to proffer solutions and draw lessons. The problem is not just about one segment of a boundary but more about the modalities of settling a dispute whose central fact, all too often forgotten, remains the fact that Eritrea launched an unprovoked war against Ethiopia. The Ethiopia Eritrea Claims Commission found Eritrea liable for violating Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter with the illegal use of force when it invaded territories peacefully administered by Ethiopia in May 1998. This remains the fundamental basis from which any discussion must still start. Of course, any international boundary should serve as point for contact and interaction, not designed for separation. Any effective demarcation should take into account the realities of people in adjacent areas. Manageable boundaries allow for effective utilization of shared resources and cross-border links for electricity and telecommunications and other environmental and socio-economic cooperation for the mutual benefits of both sides. Along any peaceful boundary the areas of cooperation are limitless as everybody directly affected is well aware. Indeed, no additional benefit can be more compelling than a boundary demarcation ensuring durable peace, but this can only be done through thorough and meticulous ground work and consultation between representatives of countries. Nothing can replace this tried and tested practice of international demarcation.  

On June 7, the African Union Declaration on Border Program and its Implementation Modalities was adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, at their meeting in Addis Ababa. The Declaration reiterates the conviction of the African Union “…that, by transcending the borders as barriers and promoting them as bridges linking one State to another, Africa can boost the on-going efforts to integrate the continent, strengthen its unity, and promote peace, security and stability through the structural prevention of conflicts;” The Declaration also reaffirms ‘… the principle of negotiated settlement of border disputes…” and “… the shared commitment to pursue the work of border delimitation and demarcation as factors for peace, security and economic and social progress,..” It also contains detailed decisions to implement an African Union Border Program with components on border delimitation and demarcation; local cross border cooperation; capacity building; and on partnership and resource mobilization to implement the Program.   

Ethiopia, of course, actively participated in the discussions that led to the adoption of the Declaration, and fully supports it. Indeed, Ethiopia’s own proposals for discussion and negotiation to resolve the dispute with Eritrea are fully consistent with the aims and purposes of the African Union Declaration. Eritrea’s approach runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the Declaration and makes no effort to provide for a sustainable solution. Commentators making parallels with other boundary disputes clearly understand that solutions reached elsewhere have been achieved through negotiation and dialogue. Ethiopia and Eritrea can certainly learn from others, but the lesson from any particular settlement, including the efforts of the mixed commission Nigeria and Cameroon established with the help of the United Nations, is that dialogue is indispensable for a lasting settlement. A broader lesson to take from the African Union Declaration is that as members of the AU a negotiated settlement of a boundary dispute, on the basis of dialogue consistent with international practice, is not just a choice but a legal requirement.

Here it must be pointed out that the lack of progress in settling the boundary dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia is not the result of differences over technicalities on how demarcation should be conducted. The problem is much more serious and involves differences in strategy over co-existence between the two governments. The Eritrean strategic calculation is that there is no possibility for a government led by the current leadership in Eritrea to co-exist with a government led by the ERPDF in Ethiopia. It is this which explains why the Eritrean leadership spends so much of its resources, its energy and its time, in destabilization activities aimed at creating problems for  Ethiopia, directly and indirectly, throughout the region. Eritrea’s intent is not to bring finality to the boundary dispute in any way to ensure sustainable peace and stability between the two countries, but rather the reverse.

By contrast, the view from Addis Ababa is that the crisis between the two countries is tragic and something that never should have occurred, but once taken place should have been resolved as quickly as possible. The EPRDF’s strategic calculation with respect to the boundary is not to use it as an excuse for prolonging the crisis. It is not a strategy based on the conviction that co-existence is impossible between a government led by the present leadership in Asmara and the Government of Ethiopia. The principled position of the Government of Ethiopia is that it is absolutely unacceptable for any country to demand that it should have the kind of government it wants in a neighboring state, and attempt to get this, and make this a condition for co-existence. This cannot and should not be allowed either for great powers or small states. This is a matter of principle and international law.

This fact, which is at the root of the problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea, has not been sufficiently understood by the international community, and it is equally doubtful of the Security Council has achieved any better appreciation of the problem. What is most important at this juncture, however, is that it should be understood by the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea.  

  • Press TV is the first Iranian international news network. It broadcasts in English on a 24 hour basis and claims to deliver unbiased reporting of controversial global news and provide in-depth and complete analyses of current affairs, particularly portraying viewpoints often ignored by mainstream media outlets. It claims to have a vision of building bridges of cultural understanding and encouraging people of different nationalities, races and creeds to identify with each other. This is admirable but, regrettably, even the most superficial glance at Press TV's coverage makes it clear it comes nowhere near living up to its aims. One of the subjects that Press TV devotes a considerable, indeed perhaps a surprising amount of time to is Somalia and specifically the presence of Ethiopian troops there. Press TV does not have its own correspondent in Somalia. It uses a number of Somali websites for its stories and these have only two things in common. One is their strong opposition to the present government of Somalia, the TFG; the other is their lack of accuracy and indeed, their complete disinterest in unbiased or accurate reporting. One only has to look at a number of recent stories, everyone either seriously exaggerated or simply invented as their headlines make clear: UIC push Ethiopians back home; UIC kill 40 Ethiopian soldiers; 2000 Ethiopian troops enter Mogadishu; Bloodbath of Somali Presidential guards; Ethiopians withdrawing from Mogadishu (and heading for Somaliland); Forty Ethiopians die in Southern Somalia; 24 Ethiopian troops killed in Somalia.

One of the most egregious inventions came only yesterday with a story headlined “Ethiopian troops are to leave Somalia and withdraw their support for the country's interim government urgently, says the Ethiopian premier”. The story, which is complete rubbish, then claims that “Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, confirmed the news about the urgent withdrawal adding that the pullout was bound to take place even if the Somali government was incapable of standing on its own two feet, a Press TV correspondent reported.” The story also claimed that “Zenawi has arranged for a meeting with the tribal elders of the Hawiye. So he can plead for safe passage for the troops.”  The first part of this is clearly quite deliberate manipulation of what Prime Minister Meles said earlier this week in an interview with the London Financial Times. The whole transcript of the interview is available, and in actual fact Prime Minister Meles said that while Ethiopia could, technically, bring back its troops from Somalia at any time, it felt it had obligations to the AU to hold the ring until either the AU could deploy more forces or Somalis could sort out their own problems. Ethiopia, he said, would prefer to see full AMISOM deployment or as near that as possible. “We will try everything in our capacity to create an environment where our withdrawal would not seriously disrupt [a stable and functioning] TFG.” The Prime Minister made it clear that Ethiopia would not stay for ever. It would try to avoid any withdrawal that left the TFG in danger, but, he added, the two were “not joined at the hip”. This is a point he has made before. Given the inaccuracy of the first element in this account; it is no surprise that the second claim is a complete and outright invention.

Erroneous reporting and double standards are a perennial issue in journalism. They can sometimes be extremely obvious. This refers not only to Press TV but also to other news outlets around the world. The whole of Africa, Ethiopia included, has been the subject of unbalanced and insensitive reporting all too often. What is disappointing about Press TV is that it is from the developing world which has sound reasons to be most disturbed by this type of reporting, more so than elsewhere. And Press TV is from a country with which Ethiopia has good relations, relations which it would like to maintain.