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Somalia:
The AU’s Peace and Security Council meets
On
Wednesday the Peace and Security Council held a session in Addis
Ababa on current developments in Somalia. It was extensively briefed
by the Deputy Representative of the AU Commission to Somalia, by
Ambassador Mahiga, the new Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General to Somalia, by Ambassador Kongit Sinegiorgis, the
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU, and by a
representative of the TFG.
The AU Commission’s Deputy Representative detailed the challenges
facing the TFG and AMISOM forces on the ground, and emphasized the
need for the AU and the international community to swiftly provide
support. The TFG’s representative focused on the dangers from the
onslaught of terrorism, underlined by the terrorist atrocity at the
Mona Hotel the previous day in which 6 parliamentarians had died as
well as twenty civilians. He stressed the need for immediate action
to support TFG forces materially and logistically and called on the
AU and the international community to contribute to the efforts of
the TFG and AMISOM in a concrete way.
Ambassador Mahiga noted that there were signs of growing
cooperation and coordination among members of the international
community. He said destabilization activities against those areas
which had had peace and stability for quite some time should be a
concern to the region, to Africa and the international community. He
emphasized the critical role to be played by IGAD member states and
AMISOM; and emphasised the need to expeditiously implement the
issues that had been discussed at the sideline meeting in Kampala.
He informed the Council about the meeting scheduled between the AU
Commission’s Special Representative on Somalia, UNPOS and AMISOM’s
field commander in New York on September 13th. .
Ambassador Kongit Sinegiorgis, speaking on behalf of the current
IGAD Council Chair, Ethiopia, recalled that the AU Assembly in
Kampala had endorsed the decisions of IGAD Heads of State and
Government in July including the decision to deploy another 2000
peacekeepers for AMISOM immediately. She expressed IGAD's belief
that the Council would encourage the relevant bodies to make the
necessary efforts for its timely implementation. Ambassador Kongit
said that while the leadership of the TFG had yet to show the
necessary determination and resolve to work together, the
consultations between the TFG and Ahlu Suna wal Jama’a earlier this
month, evaluating the implementation of their Agreement, had been
constructive; the two parties had come a long way. They had held
extensive discussions on how to implement their agreement fully and
shown determination to move forward.
An
important development, Ambassador Kongit noted, was the
international community's current activity. Immediately after the
Kampala sidelines’ meeting, a US-led demarche, involving Somalia’s
partners and neighbours, was carried out in various capitals, with a
view to soliciting support for the TFG and AMISOM in terms of
equipment, logistical support and troop contributions. This was an
encouraging development and would continue to help concretize
necessary support for Somalia. As the IGAD Summit in July made
clear, the fighting in Somalia is no longer between Somalis but
rather between the people of Somalia and international terrorism.
Ambassador Kongit took the opportunity to underline that IGAD was
committed to continue to work closely with the AU and the UN.
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The need for constructive engagement, not
disengagement
The suicide bombing
and shoot-out on Tuesday at the Mona Hotel in Mogadishu killed
thirty people, six of them MPs and four government officials. The
remainder of those who died were innocent civilians. The attack came
only a month after the atrocity in Kampala when 76 people watching
the World Cup final on Television died in two suicide bombings. In
both cases Al-Shabaab did not just admit responsibility; it boasted
of it, as indeed it normally does when it has carried out an
atrocity of this nature. The deaths for which it has been
responsible in Mogadishu alone now run into thousands. They have
even included on more than one occasion, dozens of women involved in
street cleaning, as well as commuters attempting to get to work on
buses, and children on their way to school. The only occasion when
Al-Shabaab appeared reluctant to admit to such action was when a
suicide bombing in December last year killed 20 people at a
graduation ceremony at a hotel in Mogadishu – among the dead were
four ministers, and a number of the first doctors to graduate in
Somalia for over 20 years. The wave of anger was so great that even
Al-Shabaab originally refused to acknowledge what it had done.
A recent report on
Al-Shabaab’s activities summed these up: “Men are forced to grow
beards. Women can’t leave home without a male relative. Music,
movies and watching sports on TV are banned. Limbs are chopped off
as punishment, and executions by stoning have become a public
spectacle.” Those that try to speak out against the activities of
Al-Shabaab are routinely killed. Following some severe losses in
fighting against the government in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab, now
largely run by foreign fighters trained in Afghanistan, is demanding
that households in areas it controls must contribute a boy to the
ranks of its fighters. Those that have no children have to pay $50 a
month, a sum equivalent to the average annual per capita income of
Somalis.
And Al-Shabaab is
the organization to which some commentators, with their oxymoronic
concept of “constructive disengagement”, want to hand over Somalia.
Questions can legitimately be raised about the internal disputes of
the TFG and the TFIs. It is pertinent to look at the international
community’s lack of support for Somalia and its government. None of
this, however, can provide any justification for handing the
population of Somalia over, lock, stock and barrel, to Al-Shabaab
which subjects those it controls to “unrelenting repression and
brutality” and whose leaders have no roots in Somalia. Al-Shabaab
has, in fact, neither an Islamic nor a Somali agenda. It has no
respect for humanity, nor indeed for the religion it professes to
follow, as it demonstrated with its latest atrocity, murdering
innocent Muslims during the month of Ramadan.
One reason for the
calls for “constructive disengagement” comes from the facile
acceptance of claims by Al-Shabaab and its supporters that it
controls most of Somalia. It doesn’t. This is a description
routinely made with no reference to reality. The frequent associated
description of the TFG as holding no more than a few streets in
Mogadishu is also highly misleading. In both cases these claims
ignores the reality of Somali politics and the situation on the
ground. The Puntland administration, for example, is in full control
of the northern areas, including the regions of Bari, Nugal and part
of Mudug, though it is currently facing a small insurrection by an
Al-Shabaab warlord in the Galgala mountains along its border with
Somaliland. Ahlu Suna wal Jama’a, an organization now participating
in the TFG, controls most of the central region of Galgudud, as well
as large parts of Hiiraan and Middle Shebelle. Al Shabaab does
operate in other areas and controls a number of towns including
Kismayo, Baidoa and Bardera but in the regions of Gedo, Middle Juba,
Bakool and Lower Shebelle, they face opposition from various
sources, including clan militias, and warlords as well as pro-TFG
forces.
The major focus of
most reporting and comment has been on Mogadishu where Al-Shabaab
has certainly been making considerable efforts to oust the TFG. It
has so far failed, and with AMISOM building up to its mandated 8,100
strength, and TFG security forces currently increasing with the
arrival of hundreds of troops and police trained outside Somalia by
IGAD members and by the EU, Al-Shabaab is unlikely to succeed. At
the moment, AMISOM actually holds 8 of Mogadishu’s 16 districts and
is currently expanding into another 4. Al-Shabaab controls no more
than a quarter of the city, four of Mogadishu’s districts (Wardiglei,
Yaqshid, Hiruwa and Karan), though they regularly lob shells and
fire mortars into other areas. Some commentators endlessly repeat
Al-Shabaab propaganda suggesting that AMISOM troops are “inflicting
thousands of civilian casualties, indiscriminately shelling
neighborhoods in Mogadishu”, just as they used to claim that
Ethiopian soldiers did the same. Even proponents of “constructive
disengagement” should be able to see these allegations for what they
are: exaggerated and inaccurate propaganda from an organization
which has itself publicly and proudly carried out the slaughter of
thousands in Mogadishu.
This is the
background against which proponents of “constructive disengagement”
like Ms. Bruton and others, including the Council for Foreign
Relations, want the international community to withdraw all support
for the TFG and hand Somalia over to an extremist organization led
by terrorists from the battlefields of Afghanistan and guided by Al
Qaeda. Those who support this negative scenario consistently claim
that no military solution is possible. They apparently believe a
political solution will simply appear in a puff of smoke out of a
possible post Al-Shabaab collapse. Given that Somalia’s political
crisis began 19 years ago with just such a collapse after the fall
of Siad Barre, it is hard to see how such a scenario can generate
any optimism.
A central point is
that none of these analyses appear aware that IGAD, the neighboring
states and the African Union and the TFG, do in fact all agree that
deploying military forces in isolation will not resolve Somalia’s
problems. Everybody is fully conscious of the need for the TFG to
extend the process of peace and reconciliation. This indeed is what
led to the Djibouti Agreement in August 2008, to the TFG/Ahlu Suna
wal Jama’a agreement earlier this year and to the memorandum of
understanding between the government of Puntland and the TFG. As we
have noted before, proponents of “constructive disengagement” have
no understanding of either local politics or IGAD policies, nor
indeed of Al-Shabaab’s aims and intentions. If Somalia is simply
abandoned, as Ms. Bruton suggests, the whole of East Africa will be
threatened with destabilization, as Al-Shabaab has already made
clear. Not content with bombings in Uganda, in the last couple of
months it has launched a number of cross border raids into Kenya.
Nobody denies that
the TFG could do more to implement its policies and agreements, nor
that the international community needs to demonstrate the political
will to provide the necessary resources. The required shift in the
balance of power in Mogadishu still depends upon the donors
producing and supporting a committed plan of action. Boosting AMISOM
and TFG security is one aspect of this in order to establish control
in the capital, other elements include the ongoing capacity building
for the TFG and the TFIs, constitutional drafting for the end of the
transitional period and the widening of the peace and reconciliation
process. All this, as IGAD has frequently emphasized, must be
coupled with a vigorous and realistic response from the
international community, not the abandonment of 10 million Somalis
to international terrorism.
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A
cautionary note on Eritrea’s conduct
Just over ten years
ago in June 2000, Eritrea, reluctantly, acknowledged that it had
been defeated in the war that it had launched two years earlier when
Eritrean troops seized the town of Badme in May 1998. Subsequently,
the Claims Commission, set up under the Algiers Agreement which
ended the war, found Eritrea liable for its unprovoked aggression
against Ethiopia in violation of the United Nations Charter. In its
Partial Award Jus Ad Bellum (December 19, 2005), paragraph
16, the Commission stated categorically “Consequently, the
Commission holds that Eritrea violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of
the Charter of the United Nations by resorting to armed force to
attack and occupy Badme, then under peaceful administration by
Ethiopia as well as other territory…in an attack that began on May
12, 1998…”
A decade ago, the
war was brought to an end by the Cessation of Hostilities in June
2000 and the Algiers Agreement of December that year. The former set
up a Temporary Security Zone, a 25 kilometer wide zone inside
Eritrea to provide a buffer between the two armies, to be patrolled
and monitored by a United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).
The zone was created by the voluntary withdrawal of Ethiopian troops
following their successful counter-offensive against Eritrea’s
invasion of Ethiopia. The Agreements also set up the Claims
Commission to investigate compensation claims arising from the
conflict, and the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission to delimit
the border and to demarcate it. UNMEE was given the additional task
of providing support and security for the demarcation.
The EEBC’s
Delimitation Decisions were announced in April 2002. While Eritrea
accepted them immediately, Ethiopia raised a number of concerns over
inconsistencies in the Decisions, and tried to work with the
Commission to look for legal ways to resolve its complaints. In the
end, despite failing to get satisfaction from the EEBC, Ethiopia
accepted the Delimitation Decisions in November 2004 making it clear
it was prepared to proceed to demarcation on the basis of dialogue
and in conformity with international practice, and with respect to
bringing about sustainable peace.
Sir Elihu Lautherpacht, the EEBC Chairman, subsequently put
on record at a meeting of the EEBC that “we have taken note of
the fact that Ethiopia has accepted the delimitation decision. At
one time there was a qualification of that acceptance by the
expression ‘in principle’ and we understand that this has now been
dropped so it is a complete and unconditional acceptance, so there
is no doubt that Ethiopia is willing to move on to the complete
demarcation of the boundary and all we are trying to do is to figure
out how to go about that.”
However, Eritrea’s
response to Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Delimitation Decisions was
increasingly blunt refusals to normalize relations or hold any
dialogue to lay the basis for sustainable peace. Indeed, as soon as
Ethiopia accepted the EEBC Delimitation Decisions in November 2004,
Eritrea openly and consistently began to flout the Algiers
Agreements, beginning a series of violations of the TSZ with the
infiltration of its forces into the zone. When these violations met
with no more than mild critical comment from the UN Security
Council, Eritrea steadily expanded its activities until it had taken
over the whole TSZ, eventually forcing out UNMEE by withdrawing all
facilities for the Mission. As Eritrea expanded its activities in
the TSZ, the UN Secretary-General noted that Eritrea’s actions
“represent a serious violation of the Agreement on Cessation of
Hostilities of 18 June 2000”. In a report of July 2007, the
Secretary-General referred to President Isaias’ comment two months
earlier that the TSZ had been rendered “obsolete and meaningless”
and noted UNMEE’s assessment that “thousands” of Eritrean Defense
Force personnel were now “actively constructing new defenses in the
Zone”.
The Security Council
did in fact pass a number of resolutions demanding Eritrea remove
the restrictions it imposed on UNMEE, including the restriction of
night patrols and supply routes, banning the use of helicopters even
for medical emergencies, and finally cutting off fuel supplies, but
it did nothing else. By February 2008, UNMEE was, humiliatingly,
forced to withdraw from the Zone completely, thus rendering the
central element of the Algiers Agreement, and the Agreement on
Cessation of Hostilities null and void. The Security Council
formally terminated UNMEE’s mandate on July 31st 2008, in
Resolution 1827, noting that Eritrea’s actions had “reached a level
so as to undermine the basis of the Mission’s mandate”.
Since that time,
Eritrea has continued its refusal to respond to any and all UN
Security Council resolutions, including, for example, Resolution
1827 (30 July 2008) when the Security Council, “recalling [its]
previous condemnation of Eritrea's lack of cooperation”, demanded
the “full and expeditious implementation” of the Algiers Agreements
“as the basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between
Ethiopia and Eritrea”, and reaffirmed the integrity of the TSZ.
Eritrea has continued to claim all its actions, including rather
surprisingly its invasion of Djibouti in mid 2008, have been caused
by its “frustration” over Ethiopia’s alleged refusal to demarcate.
In fact, Eritrea’s deliberate efforts to unpick the Algiers
Agreements long post-dated Ethiopia’s full acceptance of the EEBC
Delimitation Decisions. Following that acceptance, it has been
Eritrea that has continuously raised barriers to the demarcation
process, violating the Agreement on the cessation of Hostilities,
and the TSZ, and clearly demonstrating it preferred the continuation
of the dispute rather than its resolution.
Indeed, Eritrea’s
interest in the border issue has always been subordinate to its
wider ambitions to destabilize Ethiopia and to weaken neighboring
states. Right from the outset, it was not the border issue that
caused problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The origin of the
crisis lay in Eritrea’s destructive conduct, its irresponsible
leadership. This remains the case, and until this is resolved,
something that Security Council Resolution 1907 tried to address,
there appears to be little chance that Eritrea will change its
policies. Any attempt to reduce the mischief caused by Eritrea in
the region to the level of bilateral conflict between Ethiopia and
Eritrea can hardly serve the interests of peace.
This is precisely
what the Eritrean leadership has been trying to promote for some
time, but it ignores exactly what Eritrea has been doing in the
region. In Somalia, for example, this has included support for Al-Shabaab
as well as other extremist groups. There has been, and still is, a
consistency to Eritrean strategy, a strategy that has nothing to do
with any border dispute, or with supporting peace, security or
regional stability. Eritrea has been the major source of instability
in the IGAD region for the last decade. Again and again, Eritrea has
used conflict as an element of foreign policy, passing up
possibilities that might lead to peace, consistently refusing to
accept the good offices of the UN or any other international
assistance to resolve its problems whether with Ethiopia or any of
its other neighbors. Equally, there is no indication that its recent
acceptance of Qatar’s mediation in its dispute with Djibouti
actually represents anything other than an attempt to persuade the
Security Council to withdraw last December’s Resolution 1907
imposing sanctions.
In conclusion, what
A Week in the Horn wants to reiterate is that the achievement of
peace, security and stability in the Horn of Africa will continue to
be problematic until the Eritrean leadership is brought to realize
that destabilization of the region cannot be permitted. Assisting
terrorism, directly or indirectly, cannot be tolerated by the
international community. Eritrea should realize this. Any indication
given to the Eritrean leadership that there is any justification for
its behavior can only perpetuate the crisis of the Horn of Africa.
All states in the region, including Ethiopia and the IGAD countries,
have every reason to accommodate an Eritrea which is committed to
peace and stability and regional co-operation. One has to admit,
however, that this possibility still appears remote.
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Core principles of Ethiopia’s Foreign
Policy: Relations with Neighboring Countries
Ethiopia enjoys warm
relations with all its neighbors with the exception of Eritrea. This
reflects the mutual interests of the counties of the region, and it
also highlights the objectives of Ethiopia’s foreign policy as laid
out in the Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy which
emphasized the government’s priorities: fighting poverty and
backwardness and the promotion of democratization. The strategy
makes clear that Ethiopia values relations with its neighbors and
has a keen interest in advancing bilateral and regional relations on
the basis of mutual interest. In this regard, the revitalization of
IGAD was, and remains, a top priority in Ethiopia’s efforts to bring
together neighboring countries in the quest for peace, stability and
economic development. Similarly, Ethiopia’s active participation in
the AU as well as IGAD has contributed to the creation of a
cooperative framework among countries in the region on issues of
common concern including peace initiatives, conflict early warning
systems and economic integration.
On the bilateral
level Ethiopia enjoys good relationships with all of its neighbors
with the single exception of Eritrea. As we noted in the previous
item, this is not a situation of Ethiopia’s choosing. Ethiopia
continues to hope that Eritrea will stop its efforts to destabilize
its neighbors, act to normalize relations with Ethiopia, and resume
its rightful place in IGAD. It has to be said that little progress
is apparent at the moment.
With Somalia,
Ethiopia has been active in working on the resolution of conflicts
there. Since the early 1990s it has hosted successive peace
conferences aimed at bringing together different parties to the
conflict. Ethiopia has done everything possible to support any
effort by regional organizations as well as by the international
community to resolve Somalia’s problems. Despite security threats
from armed and extremist groups in Somalia, Ethiopia has always
remained a friend to the peoples of Somalia. Indeed, it has welcomed
hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia. It was in this
spirit, and in the face of an intolerable level of extremist threat,
that the Ethiopian government accepted the request of the Somalia
Transitional Federal Government to send troops to Somalia in
December 2006. The performance of the Ethiopian Defense Forces while
in Somalia demonstrated the level of respect and friendship that
Ethiopia has for the peoples of Somalia. In addition to cooperation
with, and support for, the Transitional Federal Institutions,
Ethiopia also maintains close cooperation with both Puntland and
Somaliland on a range of issues of concern. It has made it clear
that it will continue to extend every support it can to help find a
lasting solution to the conflicts in Somalia.
With Sudan, Ethiopia
shares thousands of kilometers of border. In the past relations have
not always been as good as they might have been, and misguided
policies on both sides of the border for a long time complicated
relations. The coming to power of the EPRDF opened a new chapter of
cooperation which has been characterized by friendship and mutual
respect. Apart from security cooperation and the continuing joint
effort to properly demarcate their common boundary, both countries
are aware of the potential for mutually beneficial economic
cooperation. Ethiopia now imports 100 per cent of its benzene from
Sudan, and exports cereals and sesame to the Sudan. Ethiopia’s use
of Port Sudan is particularly significant for increased investment
in the northern parts of the country. All this has created a real
opportunity to leave any difficulties behind. Also important in
Ethiopia’s relations with the Sudan is the fact that Ethiopia has a
close friendship with both the North and the South. It has always
supported peaceful resolution of conflicts between the two regions.
It remains a committed supporter of the CPA, and has frequently
expressed willingness to use its close ties to both areas to help
resolve any differences over post-referendum issues. There may still
be areas that need improvement, but Ethio-Sudan relations will
continue to thrive whatever the outcome of the referendum.
Another neighbor
with which Ethiopia enjoys excellent bilateral relations is Kenya.
Both countries are active members of IGAD and play a significant
role in the African Union. They have steadily deepening economic
cooperation and people-to-people relations. Joint commissions are
active in resolving any disputes that arise between trans-boundary
communities over scarce resources or as a result of cattle rustling.
Cooperation in security and in infrastructure is growing steadily.
Ethiopia fully appreciates the value of further strengthening
relations in the areas of road transport, the use of ports and in
energy. Both countries have spent millions of dollars in
infrastructural development aimed at further extending the benefits
of their long-term relationship. The building of the Gilgel Gibe III
dam, for example, is seen by both as another milestone in enhancing
bilateral relations. There are clear indications that these will
continue to expand.
With Djibouti, of
course, Ethiopia shares long-standing cultural, historic and
economic ties because of the railway linking Djibouti port with
Addis Ababa which has now been operating for nearly a century. There
are fraternal links of the peoples on both sides of the border. The
Port of Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s largest outlet to the rest of
the world; Ethiopia’s is Djibouti’s biggest customer. The two
countries have close ties in security and other areas. Both are
committed to bringing about economic integration in the region and
have co-operated in other regional problems including Somalia. As in
any such relationships, misunderstandings can arise, but there are
mechanisms in place which can quickly address these. Today, Ethiopia
and Djibouti have an excellent relationship cemented by common
economic interests. Nor should one overlook the very good relations
Ethiopia has with Yemen. Ethiopia along with Yemen, Sudan and
Djibouti, is involved in the Sana’a Forum for Co-operation, now a
major factor for stability in the Red Sea.
Ethiopia’s relations
with its neighbors are now far more solid than ever before. Apart
from Ethiopia’s declared policy of peaceful relations based on the
principle of mutual respect, the existence of enduring security,
economic and political ties has made these relationships closer and
more dependable. The role of the regional organization, IGAD, in
this respect is significant, and its current revitalization is hoped
to be a major factor for improving relationships and development in
the region. Obviously, extremism and terrorism remain a growing
threat requiring regional co-operation. This is in the vital
interest of all countries in the region. Others outside the region,
and the international community as a whole, may have
responsibilities in fighting extremism; however, in the last resort
it is the responsibility of the regional countries to take the lead
in addressing this threat. This, indeed, is reflected in the common
position taken by the IGAD states with respect to the problem in
Somalia and their support for the TFG and the Djibouti process.
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