• Somalia’s TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, Prime Minister Nur Hassan ‘Adde’ and Sheikh Adan Madobe, the speaker of Parliament, arrived in Addis Ababa today for consultations on the current challenges facing the TFG, as well as discussions on how best TFG leaders should coordinate their efforts to move the peace process forward. This week, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ould-Abdallah, asked the Somali Parliament to postpone any debate on these issues until the first meetings of the Joint Security Committee and the High Level Committee, set up under the Djibouti Agreement signed on June 9, had been concluded. These are due to start in Djibouti tomorrow, Saturday. Delegations from the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia will attend. Those expected in Djibouti include TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan ‘Adde’ and the leaders of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. Representatives from the international community and regional organizations including France (current chair of the EU), the US, the UK, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the EU, the European Commission, the Organization of Islamic Conference, IGAD and UNDP will be present.

In the meantime, Mr. Ould-Abdallah himself was in Addis Ababa for talks this week, meeting with Foreign Minister Seyoum and Minister of State, Dr. Tekeda. They exchanged views on the current crisis within the TFG and Mr. Ould-Abdallah briefed the Ethiopian officials on the upcoming Djibouti meetings. It is clear there is widespread support for Prime Minister Nur ‘Adde’ to have full authority in spearheading the peace and reconciliation process. Indeed, there is general agreement among the international community and interested parties that divisions within the TFG leadership do not help the peace process. Mr. Ould-Abdallah also briefed the Ethiopian officials on the ongoing discussions among Security Council members on possible UN involvement in any peacekeeping mission to Somalia. The three options that have been under discussion are for a separate multi-national stabilization force  to which different countries might be prepared to contribute, a possible UN peacekeeping force, or the strengthening of AMISOM. If the first option was adopted, some council members would prefer for it to divide its activities between dealing with piracy and establishing security in and around Mogadishu. Others prefer the idea of strengthening AMISOM and possibly turning it into a blue helmet (UN) peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council is expected to hold a meeting on Somalia on August 20, after the meetings of the Joint Security and the High Level Committees have concluded their sessions in Djibouti.

• Following the United Nations Security Council termination of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, there has been considerable speculation about what action either country might take. With the dispute unsettled, and with Eritrea's unilateral seizure of the Temporary Security Zone which is supposed to keep the two armies 25 kilometres apart, there has been concern that a new conflict might break out. For Ethiopia, at least, the answer has always been very clear: a peaceful and negotiated settlement of disputes is the norm and it is the only serious option available to both Ethiopia and Eritrea for a resolution of their border problem and other issues. This is not just the deliberate foreign policy decision and choice of the Government of Ethiopia. It is the only viable and legal option for the two countries as well as a fundamental norm of international law.

By signing the Algiers Agreements in 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea reiterated their commitment to this fundamental aspect of international relations. Subsequently, Eritrea committed numerous material breaches of this cardinal undertaking and of the security arrangements laid out in the Algiers Agreements. Through these breaches, Eritrea has, in fact, deliberately and repeatedly flouted international law and made a mockery of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Peacekeeping force-UNMEE. This unprecedented behavior went unchecked for so long and developed to such an extent that the Security  Council had no option but to take the decision not to renew UNMEE’s mandate.

The untimely termination of UNMEE, as well as the demolition of the Temporary Security Zone by Eritrea, effectively undermined the aim of the Algiers Agreements to produce a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the restoration of normal relations between them. This situation, and the implication of the latest UN Security Council resolution, now leaves both countries with no option but to talk to each other. This, of course, is why third parties have raised questions about what can be done to assist either country for a resolution, and why some have expressed concern that conflict might be reignited. In fact, despite the excessive mobilization of Eritrea, now apparently the most militarized state in the world, Ethiopia does not believe Eritrea would be so stupid as to attack Ethiopia again. And that is the only way another war would start. As Ethiopia has repeatedly made clear, it will not start any conflict.  

Certainly, it is unsurprising for friendly countries to have raised such concerns if only out of concern for the peoples of the region. It is equally unsurprising that they should insist some viable option must be found. Ethiopia would agree. As the Security Council has repeatedly made clear, the primary responsibility for the resolution of the problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea rests entirely with they themselves. Ethiopia agrees and has therefore made it clear that negotiation is the only way forward to settle all the outstanding issues with Eritrea. Ethiopia remains entirely committed to this principled position. At the same time, given the continuously belligerent actions of the Eritrean regime, Ethiopia is forced by necessity to remain vigilant and prepared. Regrettably, the words and actions of Eritrea appear to be as distant as possible from any peaceful approach. Indeed, Eritrea still appears to indulge in wishful thinking, believing some external actor is going to impose on Ethiopia an Eritrean version of mechanical demarcation which is contrary to all accepted international practice and international law. It is no help when organizations like the International Crisis Group (ICG) tries to propagate ideas that are not constructive. Certainly, this is hardly a surprise. The ICG role in the Horn of Africa, and perhaps in Africa as a whole, has seldom promoted or supported the objectives to which it professes to be committed. 

Eritrea needs to wake up to the realities of bilateral relations and engage in a civilized discussion with Ethiopia directly or through facilitation provided by the UN or some third party. Eritrea should understand that a matter of such great importance as the current disputes between our two states is fundamentally, and inescapably, a matter of bilateral import. Eritrea should also weigh the long-term interest of the peoples of the two countries rather than working for some imaginary short-sighted political gain from attempting to destabilize Ethiopia. Eritrea's current conduct in our sub-region has demonstrated persistent belligerence against all its neighbors. Unfortunately, there has been no indication that Eritrea is prepared to realize that the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea offers a win-win outcome for both. Eritrea's conduct of foreign relations seems only to be based on the idea of a win/lose mode. It is approach that has led to trouble with all its neighbors. It appears Ethiopia can only wait, in patience, for Eritrea to realize what almost all other countries in the world now understand: peaceful discussions and negotiation are the way forward. Indeed, they are the only viable, legal and cost-effective option available for Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their differences. 

• Next week, the first Africa-Turkey Partnership Summit will be held in Istanbul, from 18-21 August. Preliminary meetings of African and Turkish officials were held last month and a draft Istanbul Declaration and a draft Framework of Cooperation drawn up, embodying a joint consensus of common values, interests and strategic objectives. A meeting of Senior Officials will be held on August 18, to be followed by a Ministers’ meeting. The Summit itself will be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, leaving the following day for bilateral discussions. Prime Minister Meles will be attending in his capacity as the current chairperson of IGAD as well as Prime Minister of Ethiopia. This Summit follows the decision of the Africa Union Summit, of January 2008, to declare the Republic of Turkey a strategic partner of Africa, and the declaration by Turkey that 2005 should be The Year of Africa.  

The Istanbul Declaration will stress that the Africa-Turkey partnership will provide a suitable framework for collective dialogue to produce concrete programs based on equality, mutual respect and reciprocal benefits, and on the need to establish a long-term partnership based on equality and mutual benefit. The Framework of Cooperation will cover inter-government cooperation, trade and investment, agriculture and related areas of rural development, water resources and small and medium scale enterprises, health, peace and security, infrastructure, culture and education and media and communications. A process of implementation and follow-up mechanisms will also be agreed between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Commission of the African Union working with the Multi-lateral Cooperation Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee.

Of course, Ethio-Turkish historical relations go back to several centuries. Official diplomatic relations were established in 1925 and Turkey opened her Embassy in Addis Ababa a year later, although the Turkish Consulate in Harar was opened fourteen years earlier. Turkey was one of the few countries that condemned the 1936 fascist invasion of Ethiopia, and supported Ethiopia at the League of Nations. High level visits have been conducted by both sides. Emperor Haile Sellasie visited Turkey in 1967 and 1971, and the President of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Cevdet Sunay, came to Ethiopia in 1969. More recently, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia in March 2005 and January 2006, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi went to Turkey in February 2007. These visits opened a new chapter in the friendly relations between the two countries which cover a wide range of aspects including trade, investment, technical cooperation, counter-terrorism, people-to–people relations, culture and health. Strong political will and commitment on both sides has paved the way for this enhanced cooperation, reinforced by the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission in 2000. Since then, the Commission has held four meetings. The next will be held in November 2008, in Addis Ababa. The trade between the two countries reached over a billion Birr in 2006 from its low base of  200 Million birr in 2001. The two countries have set a joint target to scale up total trade to 500 Million USD by 2010. Ethiopia currently imports $145 million worth of goods from Turkey, and its exports to Turkey were valued at $42 million in 2007.  Turkish investment in Ethiopia as of July 2008 amounts to 3.5 Billion Birr out of which Ayka Textile, one the largest textile companies in Turkey, accounts for 100 Million Euros. The construction of an integrated textile complex is scheduled to be completed by the beginning of 2009, and the company plans to export finished products to Europe and America worth up to 70 million USD annually. Meanwhile this week the Turkish-Ethiopian Business Council has been incorporated under the umbrella of the Turkish Economic Relations Board (DEIK). Turkey now has eight business councils operating in Africa. Plans for a Turkish-Ethiopian council were first mooted during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to Ethiopia in 2005. Details were worked out following Prime Minister Meles’ visit to Turkey in February last year.

• It is perhaps not surprising, given political developments in Somalia in recent years, that a few in the international community with little goodwill towards Ethiopia have claimed Ethiopian aims and intentions towards Somalia have been negative, even hegemonic. Some have even argued the fanciful notion that Ethiopia has been aiming to get control of Mogadishu and turn it into a port for Ethiopia. The briefest knowledge of the behavior of the current Ethiopian leadership, of geography or of history, gives the lie to such exaggerated fantasies, but it has not stopped propagandists repeating, and expanding, such claims: President Abdullahi Yusuf is alleged to be under Ethiopian control; the numbers of Ethiopian troops are to be numbered in tens of thousands; Ethiopia wants Somalia either broken into fragments, or rendered weak and enfeebled, or conversely is aiming to take over the whole country. It is true that Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia under Siad Barre, between 1969 and 1991, could hardly be described as friendly, not surprising since Ethiopia was a major target of irredentism, notably during Siad Barre’s invasion of eastern Ethiopia in 1977 and the subsequent year-long war. Nor should it be overlooked that the nature of pre-EPRDF governments in Ethiopia did not provide the necessary basis for the resolution of problems related to the quest for democratic and national rights for nations and nationalities in Ethiopia. With the advent of a new government in Ethiopia in 1991, and the overthrow of Siad Barre, the way was open for a change in relationship; the EPRDF took every opportunity to try and encourage the creation of a government in Somalia, beginning that same year.

Indeed, most appear to have forgotten that Ethiopia began to focus on the need for peace in Somalia long before the Eldoret/Mbagathi conference (2002-2004), indeed from the time the EPRDF took over in May 1991. Soon after the Transitional Government had been set up, President Meles Zenawi opened a series of consultations with all neighboring states in October and November. Among the issues discussed were peace initiatives for Somalia whose civil wars escalated the very month Siad Barre fled from Mogadishu in January 1991. This led to an Ethiopian initiative, supported by neighboring countries, to organize a broad-based Somali conference to which all parties were invited. It failed, largely because the international community and the UN were not prepared to become effectively involved at that time. Ethiopia made another effort the next year. In April 1992, a Summit on Humanitarian Problems in the Horn of Africa, attended by government representatives, NGOs and civil society groups, was held. A Horn of Africa Standing Committee was set up with Ethiopia in the chair. The following month the first all-party Somali faction meeting was held in Bahr Dar. Political and humanitarian issues were discussed and the Bahr Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspects of the Problem in Somalia was agreed in June. This allowed for unhampered distribution of humanitarian assistance and the opening of all ports, airports and roads. It was also agreed the Horn of Africa Committee should maintain consultations with all factions.

This initiative, however, was overtaken by the well-intended actions of the UN and the US to organize appropriate conditions for the arrival of UNITAF and then UNISOM 1 in Somalia. Ethiopia, as chair of the Horn of Africa Committee,  remained closely involved with these efforts and with the UN efforts in early 1993 to organize the Informal Preparatory Meeting of Somali factions (January 14/15) and the subsequent Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Conference March 15-27. This produced the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed by 15 factions. Agreement, however, was only reached after a twelve hour meeting between delegation leaders and Ethiopian officials. Not for the first or last time, the international community failed to put its weight behind the agreement. The Addis Ababa Agreement was rapidly overtaken by events in Mogadishu, including clashes between the forces of General Aideed and the US/UN troops.

Later that same year, Ethiopia was given the mandate to facilitate a political settlement in Somalia, in coordination with neighboring states, by an IGAD summit which committed attendees and IGAD itself to work for peace in Somalia. Shortly afterwards at the Organization of African Unity Summit in Cairo, the OAU endorsed a similar mandate for Ethiopia. It might be recalled that the most insistent supporter of this was Eritrea. Indeed, President Issayas recommended it in the most fulsome terms. During the conference, the Central Organ of the OAU for conflict prevention, resolution and management was inaugurated. This facilitated the implementation of Ethiopia’s mandate help the Somalis to achieve peace in their country. 

Following this, Ethiopia carried out a series of consultations with all Somali factions and these efforts at facilitation finally bore fruit in the high-level consultation meeting at Sodere (22 November-31 December 1996). Twenty six Somali parties, factions and movements participated and agreed to establish a National Salvation Committee of 41, and a National Executive Committee  of 11. The meeting also agreed to convene a National Reconciliation Conference to be held originally in June and then in Bossaso in November 1997. In fact, this never happened because of  the opposition of the USC/Somali National Alliance of Hussein Aideed, and the holding of the Cairo conference which regrettably resulted in a loss of momentum in the Somali peace process because of division among the factions. Although Ethiopia had been mandated by IGAD, the OAU and in effect by the UN, other interested parties were also active. Neither the OAU nor IGAD managed to coordinate such efforts, and unilateral and uncoordinated activities by other states and organizations has been one reason why attempts to resolve Somalia’s problems did not succeed. All that has changed now, and that is why the prevailing lack of cohesion within the TFG is so regrettable and damaging. Unlike the past, there is today a greater opportunity for Somalis to count on some support from the international community to achieve a breakthrough in the peace process. 

The problems of Somalia had, of course, and still have a regional dimension going back to the irredentism of Siad Barre, exploited as it has been by third parties including terrorists to undermine the peace and stability of Ethiopia. Moreover, geographic and ethnic proximity raised the possibility of a spill-over of conflict to other states in the region, though the security threat posed by a collapsed Somali government was of particular interest to Ethiopia. In this sense Ethiopia’s concern has not, of course, been driven solely by altruistic considerations. It can best be described as rational and enlightened self-interest in the re-creation of a Somali state which is peaceful, stable and prepared to co-exist with its neighbors on the basis of principles of international law governing inter-state relations. It has always been obvious that a revived Somali state would be in Ethiopia’s own national interests which involve ensuring that no threat emanates from Somalia, and that there should be a peaceful and mutually managed border which would not be a wall separating the two peoples. It has always been Ethiopia’s consistent position that even a bad government is better than no government. Anarchy in Somalia is not in the interest of Ethiopia. This is why the suggestion, among other things, that Ethiopia’s role in Somalia is at the behest of others, is so ridiculous.  

It is also these principles which underpinned Ethiopia’s support for the Arta Conference in Djibouti in 2000. Despite subsequent allegations to the contrary, Ethiopia played a significant role in getting Arta off the ground, pushing the Rahenweyne Resistance Army and others to attend. Even though this is usually overlooked, Prime Minister Meles attended the inauguration as President of Mr.  Abdikassim Salad Hussein. Like most of the international community, including the OAU and IGAD, prior to 2000  Ethiopia saw the concept of building blocks as perhaps the best way forward, providing for the recreation of a Somali state from the bottom up. With the success of the Arta conference and the establishment of the Transitional National Government in 2000, Ethiopia accepted the alternative of a government organized from the top down. 

It isn’t necessary to get into the subsequent complications that arose between Ethiopia and President Abdikassim. IGAD’s Khartoum Summit in November 2000 gave conditional recognition to President Abdikassim’s government in a resolution stressing that “the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed by dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force.” It did not, however, materialize, though this was no fault of Ethiopia. Within a few months it became clear the TNG did not have the capacity to survive.  This led to the calling of the Eldoret/Mbagathi conference which eventually set up the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in November 2004, which, together with the associated Transitional Federal Institutions, Ethiopia has consistently supported as currently the only viable solution for Somalia’s problems. It responded to the TFG’s requests for assistance against internal and external enemies in 2006, and has subsequently worked to provide support and training for the effort to recreate an administrative structure in Somalia.

With the advent of the renewed effort for peace in Somalia intended to broaden the TFG by undertaking reconciliation between the TFG and the ARS under UN auspices, Ethiopia has been able to demonstrate its full support for the process and the Djibouti Agreement. Ethiopia, in fact, has been quite consistent over seventeen years in its efforts to bring back peace, national reconciliation and security in Somalia. Of course, it is always mindful of its own national interests, and which country is not, but these in no way conflict with the interests of the peoples of Somalia, or of those of the sub-region. Ethiopia has never had any inclination for, and has never demonstrated any proclivity towards claiming regional hegemony. Incidentally, when Ethiopia first began to be involved in Somalia, to help the Somali search for peace in 1991, it had not even any standing army. Ethiopia has never had sufficient arrogance for thinking in such a way. It has never overestimated its capacity to influence or control others. Nor has it ignored or over-looked the interests of others even when it may disagree with them. Ethiopia has never been driven by a zero-sum game; it has always pushed for win-win solutions for the peoples of both Somalia and Ethiopia. This applies to its relations with Eritrea as well. This has always been the basis of Ethiopian policies in the sub-region. It will continue to underline Ethiopia’s support for the TFG and for all efforts for peace and security in our sub-region.