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A Week
in the Horn |
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Following reconnaissance by Djibouti armed forces, a series of diplomatic
contacts were made, culminating in a telephone conversation between the
Heads of State of Eritrea and Djibouti. They had agreed to a meeting today,
Thursday, of the military authorities on both sides to look at border
claims. If they could not reach any agreement, then both sides would solicit
international arbitration. The Djibouti Foreign Minister had been expected
to visit Asmara yesterday in preparation for this meeting but Eritrea
apparently thought his visit would be premature. As a result no military
meeting took place today. In his press statement on Tuesday, the minister
said Djibouti forces have taken up positions on the heights of Ras Doumeira,
but the military forces on both sides of the border were expected to take up
their original positions a few kilometers from the border to minimize the
possibility of any incident. Eritrea created a similar crisis in the same
area in 1994 when Eritrean artillery units shelled a Djibouti border post at
Ras Doumeira apparently as the preliminary step to articulating a claim to
part of Djibouti’s coastline south of Ras Doumeira.
A great deal of publicity has been given to alleged events at the Al Hidaya Mosque in the Wadar Ade area of Heliwa district, with Amnesty International putting out a statement which is almost totally wrong in all respects. Amnesty clearly made no effort to verify what really happened before rushing into print at the behest of anti-government forces or Al-Shabaab supporters. The actual facts could have been easily verified from independent sources and local people, including observers of the fighting last weekend. There was in fact no massacre at the Mosque, not by Ethiopian troops and not even by Al-Shabaab. What actually happened is that as Al-Shabaab fighters fled from the fighting on the second day, one or two tried to take refuge in the Al Hidaya Mosque, a Tabliq mosque. The Sheikh at the Mosque refused because of the threat this might pose to the numbers of students studying in the Mosque at the time. He was immediately shot and killed. Al-Shabaab then ordered the local people to collect bodies from the area, including several Al-Shabaab fighters, as well as two or three civilian casualties, a total of thirteen in all, and dump them into the Mosque. They may also have killed several others to make a total of around 20. These bodies were mutilated in various ways, some indeed having their throats cut. None of these were members of the Mosque apart from the Sheikh who had been killed originally. Almost the only accurate element in Amnesty International’s statement is that Ethiopian and TFG troops did detain students who had been studying in the Mosque and who had subsequently taken refuge in the basement on the arrival of Al-Shabaab. They are being questioned as part of the enquiry into what actually happened at the Mosque; a number have already been released.
One further point should be made. Amnesty International claimed that Ethiopian troops had been responsible for cutting throats, describing this as a form of extra-judicial execution practiced by the Ethiopian forces. As Amnesty is fully aware, Ethiopian troops have never carried out this sort of activity or the kind of mutilations it claimed had happened at the Mosque. In fact these sorts of atrocities have persistently been the hallmark of Al-Shabaab and its terrorist actions. Indeed, Al-Shabaab is well known for such activities, killing and mutilating its enemies in this way as a matter of policy, and makes no secret of it. It has, over several years, executed hundreds of moderate Islamic leaders and politicians opposed to its extremist views. Those who have been killed by Al-Shabaab in the past include scholars of more moderate views including members of Tabliq, a Sufi movement. Tabliq is known to be opposed to the activities of Al-Shabaab, and it is no surprise that Al-Shabaab murdered the Sheikh at the Al Hadaya Mosque last weekend.
The first talks between the TFG and the Asmara-based opposition, the
Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia are due to start in Djibouti on
May 10, as part of the reconciliation efforts launched by Prime Minister Nur
Hassan ‘Adde’ and supported by the UN Secretary-General’s Special
Representative Mr. Amedou Ould-Abdallah. Al-Shabaab, designated as a
terrorist organization by the US last month, has made it clear it is
strongly opposed to any talks. It has said it would ignore any agreement
reached and continue its terrorist activities. “The participating sides
…will not be able to guarantee a cease-fire in Somalia even if they reach an
agreement” said Sheikh Muktar Roobow, a spokesman for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab
remains committed to oppose any attempt by its ex-allies in the former
Islamic Courts Union to talk to the TFG, and has made it clear it will use
any means to disrupt any talks. The claims of killing at the Al Hadaya
Mosque, which have already led the ARS to question the basis of any talks
with the TFG, have come remarkably conveniently for opponents of the peace
process.
The failure of last year’s deyr/ hageya rains in most pastoral areas of
Somali Region and in the Borena and Guji Zones in Oromia Region, followed
by the currently very poor belg rains have resulted in extreme food
insecurity in the south and south eastern pastoral and agro-pastoral areas
of the country. The deyr rains run from September to December, and the
belg from March to May. It is already clear that the shortage of belg
rains will affect the belg crop-producing areas of the north eastern
highlands, the central and southern parts of Tigray and Amhara regions,
and the SNNP Region. This year’s emergency situation is associated with
the unfavorable weather situation in the country, which in turn relates to
prevailing global climate changes. The document suggests a total amount of US $67.7 million is required to implement humanitarian responses for both food aid and non-food requirements, including health and nutrition, water and sanitation and agriculture aid. An emergency health and nutrition response plan will address the population at risk from acute malnutrition, measles, malaria, meningitis, acute watery diarrhoea, hygiene and sanitation, and similar emergencies that have been caused by the drought conditions in parts of Somali, Oromia and SNNP Regional States. The main objective of these emergency programs is to minimize the effect of the water shortages. The government, with its partners, has already launched coordinated response measures, including relief food aid, emergency water supplies, sanitation support and emergency assistance for agriculture and livestock. A total of 25,577 MT of food items were delivered to Somali, Oromia and SNNP regions during the months of January, February and March. So far, a total of 288,000 quintals of food aid have been sent to the Somali region out of which some 240,000 have been distributed. Additionally, the government is currently providing emergency water support in the drought affected areas of Somali, Oromia and SNNP regions including the use of water tankers to distribute supplies, encouraging rationing of water, and the maintenance and rehabilitation of wells and water tanks. [More information is available on the DPPA’s own website at: www.dppc.gov.et]
The only exception to general agreement about the pre-election campaign of 2005 came from Human Rights Watch, which put out only a few days before election day a report entitled: Suppressing Dissent: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region. The timing of the report, following a brief research mission, of three weeks in March, was deliberately, and admittedly, geared to the election, and apparently intended to affect the results. The report made a series of allegations against the government party in Oromia State, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization, (OPDO), specifically alleging there was a “persuasive pattern of repression and abuse documented in this report [ensuring] that voting on May 15 will be a hollow exercise for most of Oromia’s population”. In fact, as HRW admits, it had made little effort to contact “most of Oromia’s population”. It actually interviewed no more than 115 people in only five of Oromia’s zones (East and West Shoa, East and West Wollega and Jimma), and a majority of those were identifiably members of opposition parties.
A good deal of the report was also taken up with critical comments on the local administrative structure, claiming that this was only a vehicle for organizing forced labor, interfering with freedom of association, expression and movement, and organizing punishment without due process. There was no indication that the kebeles and other local government structures were the basis for local development efforts. Since then, of course, kebeles and woredas, have been the subject of a massive devolution of power, and as they are both elective now, inevitably strengthening the democratic element.
As we noted last week, HRW appears to be displaying a pattern of attempted interference and of inaccurate predictions in Ethiopia’s electoral processes. Its comments about the pre-electoral processes in Oromia in 2005 were wide of the mark (the post electoral problems there had no relation to HRW’s comments.) Similarly, this time round, two weeks ago HRW was predicting more problems arising from similar allegations about the OPDO. This time, however, it was basing its predictions on an even smaller sample than its previous 115 interviewees, in an even smaller number of zones. Oromia is the largest state in the Ethiopian Federation.
Once again, the conduct, and probable results, of the elections provide a very different result to HRW’s attempts to tell the future. The city council, local and district elections, despite HRW comments, have proved a great success. As even Fortune newspaper, which can hardly be accused of a pro-government bias, noted there had been an overall 80 percent turnout, and higher registration than in 2005. Fortune noted that the EPRDF, the Revolutionary Democrats, had started to work after their electoral embarrassments in 2005 in “a manner that was well designed and orchestrated, while their political rivals immersed themselves in a bitter internal struggle to the confusion and utter frustration of their supporters here and abroad.” While results will not be available until mid-May, it is generally agreed that the ERPDF will sweep the elections and as Fortune concluded: “..the Revolutionary Democrats worked hard and invested so much to grab these votes by appealing to voters to consider their track record in attempting to fulfill the provisions that people are desperately in-need: housing, employment, good services, infrastructural expansion, and business opportunities for small businesses. If indeed voters believed them, and that would be part of the reasons why they turned out to vote, albeit in a quiet manner, this, in itself, is a major victory for the Revolutionary Democrats.”
This is the sort of comment of which HRW should consider taking note. In the last two years, HRW has issued a number of press reports and statements on Ethiopia, and on Ethiopian involvement in Somalia. In general, these can be defined by their lack of accuracy, a failure to try for any impartiality, a refusal to acknowledge admitted abuses committed by terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and ONLF in Ethiopia, an apparently deliberate refusal to speak to Ethiopian officials about their allegations, and a continuous acceptance of any and all claims by any opposition movements without any attempt to investigate the reality of such allegations or their source. HRW claims that “its reports are objective, balanced and evenhanded”. This is very obviously not the case. HRW continues to demonstrate extreme bias in the selection of material; it treats “media reports” (one of its major sources) as if they were, necessarily, acceptable and accurate when they are frequently and obviously not; it refrains from reporting fully, or at all, on human rights abuses committed by terrorist groups in Africa; it frequently fails to provide any balanced analysis of situations. It seemingly ignores all criticism, apparently remaining unconcerned, though objecting strongly whenever it is the subject of informed and critical comments. |