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A Week in the Horn 11.4.2008 |
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The Summit concentrated on the modalities to strengthen cooperation between Africa and India in numerous areas, including the fields of economics, politics, science, technology, research and development, social development and capacity building and tourism, as well as infrastructure, energy and environment, and the media and communications. The Summit adopted the Joint Declaration of the Africa–India Partnership containing the political commitments of both sides, as well as an Africa–India Framework for Cooperation. This framework is expected to reinforce regional cooperation over a wide range in support of already existing bilateral cooperation between African countries and India. The Delhi Declaration is a demonstration of a broader political commitment to cooperate on regional and international issues including the fight against terrorism, UN reform, climate change and WTO negotiations. Both sides have agreed to support each other in their quest to get a seat in an expanded UN Security Council. The Africa–India Framework for Cooperation outlines detailed possible areas of cooperation between the two parties to include human resources and institutional capacity building and education, science and technology, agricultural productivity and food security, industrial growth including small and medium enterprises and minerals, as well as development in the health sector, development of infrastructure, ICT and establishment of judicial systems together with training for police and security. Without prejudice to India’s on-going and future programs at the bilateral, regional and other levels, the two sides agreed to develop, within a period of one year, a joint plan of action at a continental level and an appropriate follow-up mechanism to implement the Framework for Cooperation. During the Summit, Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, unveiled several new initiatives for Indian cooperation with Africa. One is a Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme, providing for a new package in its cooperation with Africa. India offers a preferential market access for exports from 50 Least Developed Countries (LDC), of which 34 are in Africa. The scheme is expected to cover 94% of India’s total tariff lines. India has also disclosed plans to more than double existing lines of credit to the continent in the next five years and offer additional credit lines amounting to $5.4 billion both bilaterally and to the regional economic communities of Africa. India plans to boost its aid to Africa with a focus on critical areas such as human resource development and capacity building. Prime Minister Singh announced more than $500 million worth of grants for the implementation for such projects in the next five to six years. He has also committed to double the number of scholarships India provides to African Students and increase the number of training positions available from 1100 to 1600. India will also work towards the establishment of an Indian-African volunteer corps. In his speech to the Summit Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, noting the historical partnership between Africa and India in the struggle against colonialism, urged that the partnership should be re-established "based on transforming the current reality which is patently unjust and untenable". He also called on India to join the African continent in its endeavor “in partnership to transform Africa and thereby transform the world". Finally he expressed his hope that this" partnership which has a glorious past, [would] have an even more glorious future". On the side lines of the summit, Prime Minister Meles held talks with his Indian counterpart, Dr. Manmohan Singh. They exchanged views on bilateral issues and other matters of mutual concern. Prime Minister Meles also held meetings with potential investors who had expressed a keen interest in the possibilities of investment in Ethiopia.
Previously, the ARS made Ethiopian withdrawal as a pre-condition for any dialogue with the TFG. This seems to be no longer the case, partly because Ethiopia has made its position clear. In an interview with Newsweek, Prime Minister Meles said this week that Ethiopia had stayed in Somalia longer than originally anticipated in order to allow the African Union more time to replace Ethiopian forces, to avoid the creation of a vacuum. Ethiopia, however, he said was “most certainly not going to wait for another year”. The Prime Minister said he hoped that several things would happen to make it possible for Ethiopia to withdraw. These included the full deployment of the proposed 8,000 African Union troops, as well as the continued consolidation of the TFG security forces and progress in the local process of reconciliation in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. The Prime Minister said that he believed the main threat posed by al-Shabaab had been neutralized during the first weeks of Ethiopia’s intervention, but an Ethiopian withdrawal at that time would not have left a stable situation in Somalia. A stable situation is in the interest of everybody in the long-term, and this is the main aim of Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the International Community is currently considering an Ethiopian proposal for a significant capacity building project for the TFG. This will involve the training of 10,000 police for deployment in all areas of the country including Mogadishu. The training is expected to last for six months and will provide for the major part of the police force needed by the TFG. However, it is still clear that al-Shabaab remains committed to try to undermine any peace process and the stability of Somalia. It launched an attempted suicide mission on April 8, targeting, largely unsuccessfully, the Burundi contingent of AMISOM. Al-Shabaab was also involved in the temporary seizure of Adado at the end of March, a move condemned by members of the opposition Hawiye Leadership Council in Mogadishu. The attack on Adado is the only attack on a town outside Mogadishu carried out by al-Shabaab. A number of other towns have been briefly seized in recent weeks as a result of intra-sub-clan conflicts, and a desire for looting. The attacks point up the need for increased security capacity. Ethiopia strongly believes in the importance of the reconciliation process at this critical moment. National reconciliation at a national level is important. But what determines the fate of Somalia in terms of peace making is what takes place internally both in terms of institutional building as well as reconciliation. For this to happen, strengthening the capacity of the TFG by restructuring the security sector, and in service delivery, as well as other areas, is vital. Ethiopia therefore hopes the international community, and all parties interested in stability in Somalia, will fully support the TFG’s efforts in local peace-making as well as assist in providing the resources for institutional development. This will help offset the danger that Eritrea, and others apparently disinterested in the stability of Somalia and the region as a whole, will try to undermine the process. As Prime Minister Meles emphasized, Ethiopia fully supports all moves that will speed up the possibility of withdrawing its forces from Somalia, and which bring peace and stability to the country; it remains fully committed to support the TFG and the TFIs through capacity building and all other possible means.
The report, which largely provides a narrative rather than any critical examination of events since the establishment of UNMEE, falls far short of suggesting any creative solutions that might be considered compatible with the tenets of the Algiers Agreements. The Secretary General does specify that Eritrea’s military occupation of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and the restrictions Eritrea has imposed on UNMEE are “a violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and have undermined the very basis of [UNMEE]’s mandate” in monitoring the TSZ, but in fact, Eritrean actions do very much more. They threaten the very basis of the Agreement. This is a bilateral ceasefire treaty under which Ethiopia and Eritrea defined the TSZ, and guaranteed the freedom of movement and supplies for the peacekeeping mission (UNMEE) which had the responsibility for monitoring the zone. It also allows for Chapter VII action by the Security Council “should one or both parties violate the commitments of the Agreements”. The Agreement provides the core of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed six months later in Algiers in December 2000 under which Ethiopia and Eritrea committed themselves to permanently refrain from military hostilities, and from any threat or use of force as well as to respect and fully implement the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The Secretary-General does make it clear that Eritrea has in fact been consistently unhelpful over the situation and status of UNMEE since March 2004. It has also consistently failed to respond to Security Council demands, dismissed the most recent SC Resolution, 1798 (2008), as “irrelevant”, refused to accept a UN Technical Assessment Team in February, and continued its violations of the TSZ and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. It has also refused to accept all efforts by the Secretary-General to use his “good offices” or those of others to mediate. The Secretary-General also notes without comment President Issayas’ rapid change of view on “virtual demarcation”. Originally, he claimed that “virtual demarcation” did not represent completion of the demarcation process and he requested the EEBC to persist until the “erection of pillars [could] bring the process to its natural conclusion”. This was on November 19, 2007. Once it became clear a few days later that Ethiopia rejected “virtual demarcation” as a process unrecognized by international law, Eritrea promptly changed its tune. On November 30, President Issayas was claiming “virtual demarcation” was as binding as any other EEBC decision. This rapid change of direction once again underlined Eritrea’s disinterest in any settlement of its dispute with Ethiopia and its apparent determination to cause problems for Ethiopia whenever possible. Indeed, Eritrea has steadily refused to work for any restoration of normal relations with Ethiopia or take any steps in this direction ever since it launched its attack on Ethiopia in May 1998. The Secretary-General manages to gloss over the complete violation of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) by Eritrea. The unprecedented humiliation of a UN peacekeeping force by Eritrea, its harassment of UNMEE’s international personnel, and the seizure of its properties, are brushed aside by the report. Eritrea goes virtually scot-free of criticism despite its egregious efforts to violate the integrity of the Algiers Agreements, its defiance of Security Council resolutions and its insults to the United Nations. Indeed, overall the report downplays the responsibility of Eritrea in virtually tearing up the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. As a result the four-point options suggested by the Secretary General for the United Nations peacekeeping presence in Ethiopia and Eritrea bear little or no reference to the Agreement, and little to the need for the restoration of the TSZ, the integrity of which has been entirely violated by Eritrea. Of the Secretary-General four options the first is that there is still the opportunity for Eritrea to “reconsider” its position, to lift all restrictions on UNMEE and allow it to perform the tasks laid down for UNMEE in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This would, by definition, have to involve Eritrea’s complete withdrawal from the TSZ. Second, UNMEE could be terminated leaving no UN presence in the area, which the Secretary-General categorized as dangerous. Third, a small observer mission could be deployed in the border area with the agreement of both countries. This is the only option which allows for any continued peace-keeping presence. Finally, liaison offices could be established in Asmara and Addis Ababa to maintain UN readiness to assist in the implementation of the demarcation of the border should Eritrea and Ethiopia agree to progress with the physical demarcation process. The Secretary-General makes it clear that he feels “prevailing circumstances seriously limit the available courses of action”. This is presumably why he failed to explore the options now clearly available under the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. He does note that his second, third and fourth options raise fundamental issues with regard to the Algiers Agreements, and emphasizes that the relocation of UNMEE has taken place without prejudice to the Agreement or to the sanctity of the TSZ. He suggests, implausibly, that options three and four together could preserve the integrity of the Cessation Agreement, if accompanied by full and active Security Council involvement. He therefore suggests the Security Council authorize him to explore implementation of either the first option or a combination of the third and fourth options. The Secretary-General insists upon the need for the Security Council to take decisions as a matter of priority, but curiously, the Report makes no direct reference to the effect that recent Eritrean actions against UNMEE might have on the whole future of UN Peacekeeping operations. UNMEE’s future has now been thrown into serious doubt by its enforced withdrawal from Eritrea because of Eritrea’s unilateral and restrictive actions against UNMEE. Surprisingly, this Report makes no attempt to address these issues despite the effect Eritrean actions may have on the future of other UN peacekeeping missions.
Meanwhile, this afternoon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Press Statement on the UN Secretary-General’s latest Report. Following is the full text of the statement:
Our relationship has been, over many decades, a relation of friendship. This is why we value it. Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia does not have the arrogance to regard itself as a rival of the United States. We are grateful to the United States for its generosity and unfailing provision of humanitarian aid in times of crisis, even when relations between our two countries were temporarily less than friendly during the Derge period. One expects more from the Economist than a simplistic who-needs-more comparison based on wealth. Surely Economist correspondents are more aware of the intricacies of inter-state relations in an increasingly inter-dependent world. The Economist, reporting from Nairobi, not Addis Ababa, appears to be deliberately trying to stir up problems where they do not exist. Ethiopia and the US do have some common foreign policy concerns, notably the threat of the growth of terrorism in Somalia, and in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has good reason to be concerned, as has the US, after the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The current terrorist activities of al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as the support provided by Eritrea for terrorist organizations in Ethiopia and Somalia, explain why. Incidentally, as the Economist knows perfectly well, Ethiopia did not invade Somalia. It responded to an appeal by the government of Somalia for aid against a militant and aggressive Islamic Courts Union, supported and funded by an external power. Ethiopia’s support, and the defeat of the ICU, has meant that the government of Somalia has been able to launch a program of national reconciliation which is making increasing progress. The US, like most of the international community, supports the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu. In its effort to discover problems between the US and Ethiopia, the Economist suggests that the local elections this month are an example of a bad human rights record disliked by the US. It is hard to see how it manages to work this out. The opposition is certainly not expected to do very well, though there is no evidence that an EPRDF victory will be “a stitch-up”. In fact as even the Economist manages to admit the opposition has been seriously weakened by its own divisions. Additionally, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) was certainly surprised by the number of seats won by the opposition in the 2005 assembly elections, though the now collapsed opposition Coalition for Democracy and Justice (CUD) came nowhere near winning the elections as it still likes to claim in defiance of all the evidence. This time the EPRDF has pulled out all the stops, campaigning vigorously. It expects to do extremely well. It probably will. Human rights in Ethiopia is a policy in progress. We are fully aware that not everything has yet been achieved, but trying to stir up enmity between us and the US, presumably at the behest of opposition in the Diaspora, will hardly help. As with any mutual relationship, there may be differences. We don’t, of course, agree with the US about everything: Ethiopia certainly believes the murderous actions of the ONLF and the OLF provide ample evidence that both should be declared terrorist organizations. It is hardly surprising that the Economist can’t identify those Ethiopians it claims “do not like American soldiers trampling on their soil”. Actually, there aren’t any Americans trampling on Ethiopian soil, nor have there ever been. There are no “secret” US bases in Ethiopia. Nor does the US contribute to Ethiopia’s defense budget. The Economist claims the US may be paying for “the rising costs” of the Ethiopian army. This use of “may”, ignoring the equal possibility that it “may not”, is obviously deliberately intended to give a false impression. It is purely speculative, and indeed the Economist knows very well (and admits elsewhere in the article) that the only assistance the US provides is non-lethal. No US money has ever gone into funding the Ethiopian National Defense Force budget. As so often, the Economist could easily have verified this, but failed to do so. It is an example of sloppy, even dishonest, journalism.
Aljeezera’s announcement, as indeed the first program yesterday, makes it clear that it has no intention of making any effort to produce either a balanced or accurate production. The whole purpose of the programs is clearly and deliberately intended to tarnish Ethiopia's image. It is already obvious that Aljeezera is using inaccurate and misleading information, fabricated by opposition elements backed by a state which makes no secret of its efforts to destabilize not only Ethiopia but also the entire sub region. Aljeezera even makes it quite clear in its announcement that accuracy will play no role in these programs. The Somali Regional State is an autonomous region of the Ethiopian federal state, one of the nine states in Ethiopia. It has its own elective legislative, executive and judicial organs and its own locally elected local administrations. It decides all essential matters itself. Aljeezera is content to ignore all the realities of government in the region, putting itself at the service of enemies of the region. Aljeezera has a considerable reputation in the Arab World as an international media outlet. However, its track record on the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia and the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, has always displayed a serious bias. It is hard to ignore the fact that Aljeezera broadcasts out of Doha, the capital of Qatar. Qatar is a close ally of Eritrea. It would be totally unrealistic to imagine that any Aljeezera program on Ethiopia could be anything other than seriously biased. The introduction to these programs and the first segment demonstrate all too clearly that Aljeezera, regrettably, has made no effort to produce even a partially balanced program. |
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