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Ethiopia’s Foreign
Minister in Kuwait
Foreign Minister Seyoum
Mesfin paid an official working visit to the State of Kuwait on
Sunday and Monday (4th-5th April) this week. During his stay in
Kuwait, he made courtesy calls on His Highness Sheikh Sabah
Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, and on Prime
Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, delivering
messages from Prime Minister Meles, and exchanging views on
matters of common interest. Minister Seyoum also held bilateral
talks with Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. They
exchanged views on bilateral and regional issues of common
concern and agreed to work closely to further enhance the
relations and cooperation between the two countries. It was also
agreed that the two sides should hold regular consultations on
regional and international issues. The meeting was cordial and
conducted in a spirit of friendship.
During his visit,
Minister Seyoum also held discussions with senior officials of
the Kuwait Fund, the Kuwait Investment Authority, the Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation and board members of the Kuwait Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. The talks centered on ways and means of
further enhancing the economic, investment and trade cooperation
existing between the two countries. Minister Seyoum encouraged
the Kuwait private sector and business organizations to exploit
the substantial investment and business opportunities that are
now available in Ethiopia. The Minister also met with the Kuwait
press and gave a number of interviews in the course of his visit
which he described as very fruitful.
On leaving Kuwait,
Minister Seyoum is visiting Scandinavia, making official visits
to Finland and Norway, before visiting Italy on his way back to
Ethiopia at the weekend.
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Sudan elections: IGAD sends an Observer Mission; the ICG
rejects the process
IGAD member states have
sent an Observer Mission to the Sudan to observe the Sudanese
elections being held this weekend. IGAD member states were each
asked to nominate five representatives to be part of the
observers provided under the umbrella of the African Union. IGAD
organized training for the mission in Mombassa last month. The
IGAD Observer Mission is led by the Hon. Wondimu Gezahegn, a
member of Ethiopia’s House of Representatives. In addition to
observer missions from the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), the European
Union (EU) and others are also sending missions to the Sudan to
observe the elections for the Presidency and the National
Assembly. In fact, the mission from the EU involves the largest
number of observers in its history of engagement with election
observance in Africa. The African Union Observer Mission is
being led by the former President of Ghana, Mr. John Kufor.
There is considerable interest and anticipation of the results.
Equally, there are some
who have already made up their mind about the results even
though the vote has yet to take place, and at least one
organization has even gone so far as to suggest what the
international community should do in response to these
“results”, despite the highly dangerous implications for the
Sudan and for IGAD as a region in making such suggestions in
advance of the vote. The International Crisis Group (ICG)
released its latest policy briefing at the end of March, looking
at the election in the Sudan. The briefing makes its view of the
elections quite clear in the title: "Rigged elections in Darfur
and the consequences of a probable NCP victory in Sudan". This
concentrates on the implications for and the participation of
Darfur in the election, but it is easy to see from the most
superficial reading that the ICG has produced a highly critical
report, aimed at dismissing the results of the elections in
advance. Indeed, in its dismissal of the electoral process, it
actually appears to have the objective of inciting a return to
violence and war in the Sudan in general and Darfur in
particular.
Inevitably, this raises
the question as to why the ICG should issue such a report just
at this time and so shortly before the elections are due to be
held. Its recommendations to the United Nations Security Council
and to the African Union’s Peace and Security Council call on
these bodies to take up positions that can only be described as
unhelpful to the Sudan and indeed to peace and stability in the
IGAD region in general. The ICG suggests that the electoral
observation missions in Sudan take note of what it calls a
“severely flawed process” and even goes so far as to suggest
that “governments and international organizations, especially
the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council, state
that whoever wins will lack a genuinely democratic mandate to
govern”. The ICG apparently reached this highly negative
conclusion about elections in Sudan as a whole on the basis of
what it believes has been happening in Darfur.
The fundamental
contradictions in this ICG position are seriously disturbing, as
are the implausibility of its suggestions. The report, of
course, is issued just as the elections are due to take place,
and must be seen as a very deliberate attempt to try to
influence the results and the actual conduct of the vote. By
contrast, the IGAD mission, the AU, and the EU, will certainly
want to wait for the election results to be known before
reaching any conclusions. As IGAD ministers underlined at the
Nairobi summit, IGAD is committed to do all it can to support
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, an integral
part of which is the election this month and the referendum next
January.
The ICG has been
involved in issuing reports and policy briefings on the Horn of
Africa over a number of years. Without exception, its reports
are all almost exclusively negative, making no contribution
towards the possibility of any positive assistance, for example,
in building peace and stability in Somalia, resolving problems
between Ethiopia and Eritrea or in the Sudan. One only has to
look at the ICG's reports on Somalia since 2005 and at the
negatively titled "Ethiopia: Ethnic Federation and its
discontents" to see just how deliberately destructive the ICG’s
view for the region actually is. This latest report on Darfur
and the Sudanese elections fits precisely into this sequence. It
concludes “...the result is an almost certain victory for the
NCP. And the consequences for Darfur are catastrophic.
Disenfranchising large numbers of people will only further
marginalize them. Since the vote will impose illegitimate
officials through rigged polls, they will be left with little or
no hope of a peaceful change in the status quo, and many can be
expected to look to rebel groups to fight and win back their
lost rights and lands.” This is frankly little more than a call
to re-igniting war and nullifying all recent efforts to
encourage negotiations to produce a settlement in Darfur.
While it is difficult to
see what benefit the ICG can get in trying to exacerbate war and
mayhem in the IGAD region, the fact is that the ICG has been
prominent in opposing IGAD efforts to encourage peace and
stability in the sub-region, not just in Sudan. It might be
recalled that IGAD’s efforts to send a peace, support and
protection mission for the TFG in Somalia after it had been
established in Mbagathi in Kenya in December 2004, were thwarted
by the ICG’s calling on the international community not to
support the mission. The ICG sent letters to all IGAD leaders
criticizing the attempt. The IGAD Council of Ministers, in its
March 2005 meeting, felt obliged to issue a communiqué attacking
the ICG moves. If it had not been for the action of the ICG,
there is little doubt IGASOM would have been a reality;
subsequent events in Somalia might well have been very
different.
In September last year,
we commented on the report-cum-propaganda piece that the ICG had
issued on Ethiopia. It contained a significant number of
extremely serious errors and it was disturbing, disappointing
and even dangerous because of the entirely negative tone it took
towards government policies. We don’t want to return to that
discussion, but it is important to understand the direction from
which the ICG is coming and why it wants to conclude that a
process is ‘illegitimate’ even before it takes place. The
approach fits into the continuous media propaganda in the
international press that all elections in Africa are rigged,
that Africans are incapable of holding genuine elections, and
hence all elections should be considered illegitimate. This is
apparently the case wherever they are being held, north, south,
east or west Africa. The reality, of course, is very different.
Electoral processes may often have difficulties. Florida in the
US in 2000, and Ohio in 2004 are examples. But the sort of
blanket denial of electoral processes in Africa that the ICG
puts forward, should be rejected by all those who support
Africa’s attempts to establish the foundations of democracy and
good governance.
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Security Council Resolution 1907: the need for full and urgent
implementation
It has been now more
than 3 months since the Security Council of the United Nations
passed resolution 1907/2009 on 23 December 2009, imposing an
arms embargo, travel restrictions and a freeze on the assets of
Eritrea's political and military leaders, and entities
affiliated to them. The resolution was passed because the
Security Council had come to a (long-overdue) conclusion that:
"Eritrea's actions undermining peace and reconciliation in
Somalia as well as the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea
constitute a threat to international peace and security." The
Security Council adopted that resolution by a vote of 13 in
favor, with 1 against and with 1 principled abstention,
reiterating its demand that Eritrea withdraw its forces to the
positions of status quo ante in the area where its conflict with
Djibouti had occurred, acknowledge its border dispute and
cooperate fully with the Secretary General's good offices. It
further demanded that Eritrea cease all efforts to destabilize
or overthrow, directly or indirectly, the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia. The Council reaffirmed that the Djibouti
Peace Agreement and the Peace Process represent the basis for a
resolution of the conflict in Somalia. It reiterated its
commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the
situation in Somalia based on the Transitional Federal Charter,
and for the urgent need for all Somali leaders to take tangible
steps to continue political dialogue.
It is in this light that
the recent agreement signed between the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) allowing for
the integration of their administrations and security forces on
the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter and the Djibouti
Agreement, should be seen, as an impressive and satisfactory
response to the call of the Security Council “for all Somali
leaders to take tangible steps to continue political dialogue".
The official signing of this agreement is obviously the most
significant achievement since the Djibouti Agreement of August
2008 which paved the way for the creation of the present TFG. It
is to be hoped that it will also provide a basis for other
Somali forces to further broaden the TFG.
It would of course be an
understatement to emphasize here that prompt and meaningful
support from the international community is necessary to provide
the required resources. Indeed, without them the agreement might
be faced with real obstacles from its detractors. The
international community must encourage this important
development, providing assistance politically and in terms of
resources to put the TFG into a position to defeat extremism,
fanaticism and the external agenda extremists are attempting to
impose on the people of Somalia.
Both Security Council's
resolution 1907/2009 and the agreement between the TFG and ASWJ
demonstrate the fact things are changing in Somalia, and that
the international community has at last realized the need to
curtail the destabilizing actions of Eritrea in the region by
the imposition of sanctions. Now, the next important step is to
see that there is full compliance and implementation of the
resolution by member states of the UN. Resolution 1907 details
the major elements of the sanctions and the required obligation
of all states to comply fully with the measures imposed by
Resolution 733 (1992) as elaborated and amended by subsequent
relevant resolutions, including Resolution 1844 (2008) and
Resolution 1907 (2009).
It is understandable
that some member States might find it a little difficult to
immediately put into effect those parts of the sanctions dealing
with travel restrictions and a freeze on the assets of Eritrean
political and military leaders, governmental and parastatal
entities, and entities privately owned by Eritrean nationals
living within or outside of Eritrean territory, as these have
yet to be designated by the sanctions committee. But what is
called for in Resolution 1907 (2009), particularly paragraphs 5,
6,7,8,9 and 12, are not all issues that reflect such
difficulties. They can be acted upon immediately to implement an
arms embargo and freeze assets and put a stop to travel. Indeed,
some states have already begun to operate an arms embargo.
Switzerland, Australia, Brazil, the EU and Japan, for example,
have taken the lead in demonstrating their seriousness to comply
with Resolution 1907, by initiating certain preliminary measures
to implement an embargo on arms supplies to Eritrea.
This is to be applauded,
but it isn’t enough. The Security Council, which established the
Monitoring Group, has now, with Resolution 1916 (2010) of March
19th, added another three more experts to the Group, in order to
fulfill the Group’s expanded mandate. It is the Monitoring Group
which is responsible for producing the details which will allow
the UN Sanctions Committee to designate the names of political
and military leaders and others who should be subject to travel
restrictions and a freeze of assets. The Monitoring Group
submitted its first report (S/2010/91) on March 12th with
observations and recommendations on how to implement Resolution
1907 fully. It is expected to produce monthly reports as well as
a mid-term report in six months. This makes it clear that
progress is being made at Security Council level, and it can be
expected the activities at the Council level will continue to be
strengthened further.
Equally, it is the
actions requested of member states to comply with, and implement
fully Resolution 1907 that need to be most closely monitored and
encouraged. This indeed, is something at which both IGAD and the
AU should be at the forefront - in producing the necessary
information specifically requested by the resolution, that is
the list of individuals and entities to meet the criteria set
out in paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008) and in
Resolution1907 (2010) as well as entities owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, or acting on behalf of or at the
direction of such entities.
All members of the
United Nations are required to see to it that both Resolution
1844 (2008) and Resolution 1907 (2009), are duly implemented,
and to report the steps they have taken to implement the
measures outlined in Resolution 1907. This is all the more
critical given the danger of losing momentum and focus in the
collective effort to comply fully with these resolutions. Any
failure, in fact, would ultimately involve the danger of having
a Security Council resolution withering away without
implementation. Given the dangers to peace and security in
Somalia, and in the Horn of Africa, neither the region, nor
Africa as a whole, or even the world, can afford the failure of
this resolution.
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Ensuring the integrity of the upcoming elections: the regional
context revisited
It has been quite some
time since the ideals of multi-party democracy, good governance
and human rights spread around the world. Today, there’s a
growing consensus that democracy, far from being a matter of
choice, is indeed the most effective form of government
better-suited to create a well-ordered, just and stable society,
ensuring the fullest possible representation and the protection
of interests of the disparate sectors of society. The
indispensability of these ideals for a region bedeviled by
recurrent conflicts between and among various diverse peoples
and groups, the result of a lack of good governance, cannot be
overstated. Our sub-region is certainly no exception to the
increasing realization of the necessary role of good governance
and democracy, but the level of progress achieved so far has
been modest. There are numerous challenges that have played
havoc with the democratization processes of particular
countries. There are also clear fault lines among the major
players, state or non-state alike, regarding the relevance of,
and the commitment to, ideals of democracy and good governance.
Indeed, two major competing trends can be seen in the region,
and their interplay has significance far beyond the sub-region
and indeed Africa.
Despite the growing
consensus among the international community for the need to
embrace the ideals of democracy and good governance, there are
still some who continue to hold to time-honored practices of
governing that fly full in the face of these imperatives. It is
a view that often finds expression in the form of a stubborn
refusal to abide by the notions of democracy and toleration,
open disdain for the rule of law in both domestic and
international contexts, and by an unbridled insistence on
belligerency as a means of settling differences. According to
proponents of this rejectionist approach, democracy is no more
than a mere cliché, elections are a sham, political opposition
intolerable, good neighborly relations anachronistic, and the
rule of law no more than an irritant to be dispensed with.
Instead, citizens are subject to appalling treatment, dissenting
voices suppressed, constitutions suspended or not implemented,
elections deferred or totally dispensed with, and the rule of
law scorned. Even more, the international rules and norms
governing inter-state relations are sacrificed on the altar of
expediency and deliberately generated crises are exported
throughout the region. Many of the region’s conflicts result
from these attitudes, and there appears to be no immediate end
in sight to this trend, personified as it is by the Government
of Eritrea. Eritrea may be the most vigorous of rejectionist of
state actors in this context, but it is hardly alone. The region
has more than its fair share of elements, both state and
non-state which thrive on fratricidal conflict or terrorist
atrocities, or even the sort of open aggression carried out by
Eritrea against its neighbors.
At the same time, there
are developments that stand in marked contrast to these
dangerous trends. There is a growing realization by many in the
region that democratic ideals are a matter of survival and must
therefore be encouraged wholeheartedly whatever the odds.
Nurturing multi-party democracy, the promotion of good
governance and the protection of human rights are choices that
are not only unavoidable but vital in ensuring that the
interests of the peoples, of individual countries or of the
whole region, are better served in a political environment of
democratic governance. Followers of this trend put a high
premium on respect for international law and on the promotion of
good neighborly relations as well as meaningful regional
cooperation and dialogue. These are the best mechanisms of
protecting peoples’ interests on the basis of mutual respect and
benefit. A lot of energy and political goodwill has already been
expended to stem the tide of pessimism, to ensure this path will
triumph over the insanity and nihilism of rejectionism.
In this respect we can
confidently assert that Ethiopia has been steadily leading this
campaign for good governance through the number of measures it
has taken both in the domestic political sphere as well as in
the context of activities to strengthen cooperation among the
countries of the region in the pursuit of peace and stability.
In this context, Ethiopia has taken a highly significant and
affirmative role in seeking peaceful solutions to the regional
conflicts. It has frequently gone that extra mile to resolve its
differences with others in a civilized and constructive manner.
Its role, as part of the efforts of IGAD and the AU to find
solutions for conflicts throughout Africa, has been commendable.
It remains the most significant partner of the Somalis and the
Sudanese in their efforts to resolve their conflicts amicably.
It has time and time again displayed its full support for peace.
Its participation in peace-keeping operations in various problem
areas has been widely welcomed.
In the domestic sphere,
the various political, economic and social policies that have
been implemented by the government have provided growing
empowerment of the peoples of Ethiopia, in political and
economic growth, affecting millions. Ethiopia is currently
growing at an impressive speed largely due to the full
participation of people in the political process made possible
by the political reform undertaken nearly two decades ago. The
protection of human rights, the building of democratic
institutions and a multi-party system, the provision of public
services and the strengthening of unity as well as the building
of peace and stability have been gathering momentum year by
year. Despite some setbacks, unavoidable given the original lack
of democratic culture, and the efforts of the competing trend of
rejection, there’s been very significant progress. There can be
more. With the right support from partners, the political
stability and economic development that the government has
produced in Ethiopia could go a long way to strengthen those in
the region and throughout the continent who believe in the
efficacy of democratic institutions in resolving conflicts
between and among peoples. Ethiopia’s role in regional efforts
to seek peaceful solutions to conflicts reinforces optimism and
provides an excellent example.
It isn’t yet possible
today to say with mathematical certainty which of these trends
will finally dominate, but the result will determine whether
democracy is indeed viable in a conflict-ridden region such as
ours still is. It will, of course, largely depend upon the
determination of regional actors themselves, for which there is
no substitute. Equally, there are those who consider it their
business to lend support to the cause of democracy and good
governance. These may be development partners or other
international actors who claim to have a stake in the
development of democratic institutions in the region, but whose
contributions can sometimes demonstrate an entrenched bias that
seems to reinforce, perhaps inadvertently, the continuation of
rejection. The contribution of these partners and self-professed
promoters of democratic ideals do not always appear to provide
the right incentive for the right cause. The ambivalence, even
open antagonism, of some actors towards positive developments in
the region and an almost messianic resolve to impose their own
orthodoxy root and branch, have all-too-often vindicated the
claims of rejectionists and spoilers in the region. The
experiences have been sobering indeed.
Much of the support
Ethiopia has received from such actors for its democratization
efforts and for its role in the region has been lukewarm at
best. Relations with self-appointed ‘democracy promoters’ have
often been punctuated by acrimonious allegations. Most of these
criticisms come from elements which, constrained by their own
prejudices and misguided assumptions, are unwilling to accept
that the basis of democracy might be local rather than foreign.
By trying to insist on a political orthodoxy far removed from
the reality on the ground, they distract attention from
questions that really matter, and in the process dilute the
significance that such positive developments could have on
others making similar efforts in the region. Ethiopia’s
encouraging advances in the process of democratization, despite
the efforts of rejectionist forces, go unnoticed. As we saw
during and after the May 2005 elections, a smear campaign
denigrating the election and its results, emboldened
rejectionist elements in the region and within Ethiopia. These
were led by Eritrea, the least democratic state in the region,
if not Africa, in a campaign to try to bring about the collapse
of Ethiopia’s democratization process. What might have been a
real watershed, promoting the ideals of democracy and good
governance in the region and throughout the continent, was
nearly swallowed up by a cacophony of accusations that came
close to seriously compromising the gains Ethiopia has made in
development, peace, stability and democracy. It was an
opportunity lost to those who might have drawn a lesson from the
experience.
This time around, we can
expect the election will rekindle such possibilities. There is
every reason to believe, given Ethiopia’s regional and wider
involvement, that the election will provide a highly successful
impetus for the region and the continent. Unfortunately, there
is no guarantee that the forces that did everything they could
to tarnish Ethiopia’s image five years ago, won’t try it again
this time. Indeed, some have already begun to do so; more can be
expected. The failure to appreciate the significance of such
positive developments, reinforcing the faith of the peoples of
the region in democratic ideals, can only assist elements of
rejectionism and extremism. The success of the electoral process
will not only benefit the peoples of Ethiopia but will represent
a major step forward for democracy in the Horn of Africa and in
Africa.
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