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A Week in the Horn 18/04/2008 |
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This directly leads to the second point that should inform any consideration of Security Council action, the conditions for demarcation of the international boundary which arise out of this. Ethiopia has accepted the delimitation decision of the EEBC without precondition and expressed readiness to embark on the demarcation exercise in accordance with accepted international practice. This is not a precondition for demarcation but as the necessary part of any valid demarcation exercise. Once the EEBC ended its activity, it has become even more imperative for the two sides to find ways to physically implement the delimitation decision as directed by the Security Council Resolution 1798(2008). Physical demarcation, however, is only practical once the obligations above are fully met, particularly with reference to UNMEE. It should be recalled that surveyors and other experts of the Boundary Commission always insisted on the necessity of UNMEE guaranteeing a safe environment for the demarcation teams to be deployed along the border. It goes without saying that the full restoration of the Agreement on Cessation Hostilities is necessary for a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict through the delimitation and demarcation of the border. The Council should bear in mind that the feasibility of the physical demarcation is directly affected by the continued viability of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the role of UNMEE. The third and equally important issue to be weighed seriously is the treatment Eritrea has meted out to UNMEE. Ethiopia has emphasized to the Security Council the need to take punitive measures against Eritrea for this humiliation of UNMEE and for putting the safety of its personnel at grave risk. The Security Council and the Secretary General have given this matter attention. The Council has condemned Eritrea’s actions. If the Council makes good on its promises to take appropriate measures against Eritrea, this should ensure that Eritrea’s actions are not taken as any precedent. Certainly, resolute action should be considered in the context of the gravity of Eritrea’s illegal actions. The Council should consider action against the backdrop of Eritrea’s breaches of the Temporary Security Zone. These are blatant violations of the United Nations Charter and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. The Council cannot afford to make a general condemnation of Eritrea yet again without backing its stance with meaningful and punitive measures. Eritrea should not be emboldened to believe that it can commit such egregious violations of international law with impunity.
In fact, the report failed to cover the more recent developments. It included no reference to Eritrea’s continued violations of the June 2000 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, or Eritrea’s responsibility for the enforced withdrawal of UNMEE from the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). The Ethiopian delegation emphasized that the critical focus of the report had to rest on these major issues rather than anything else. The delegation also brought to the attention of the committee the recent report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation and future of UNMEE, issued last week. The Eritrean delegation, attempting to divert attention from these outstanding issues, argued that there was no border dispute as the boundary had been ‘virtually demarcated’ in accordance with the decision of the boundary commission (EEBC). It claimed that the “the so-called” UNMEE was sitting on sovereign Eritrean territory, namely the Temporary Security Zone, and that it was irrelevant and there was no need for any monitoring of the border; its removal from the TSZ was tangential in the eyes of the Eritrean Government, and hence justified. The delegation further claimed the issue had no relevance for the COMESA Peace and Security committee. The next meeting of the COMESA Policy Organs, including Ministerial and Summit levels, was scheduled to take place at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, at the beginning of May under Kenya’s chairmanship. It has, however, now been postponed to an unspecified later date due to “prevailing political situation in Zimbabwe.”
The Chairman of the Commission of the African Union, Professor Alpha Oumar Konare agreed that the responsibility for peace on the continent was first and foremost, Africa’s, and, underlined the need to build up capacity to strengthen the African Union’s new peace and security architecture. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, said that African issues constituted a very significant part of the Security Council’s deliberations, and pointed out that there was a lot of room for fruitful collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union, particularly in light of the Security Council’s prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Prime Minister welcomed the Secretary-General’s report, particularly his proposal to establish a joint UN/AU panel to ensure predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Union peace operations. He urged the Council to consider the recommendations for such a panel quickly. Equally, as such a proposal would take some time to implement, he urged the Council in the meantime to support the African Union’s peace keeping operations, particularly in Somalia. He pointed out that the African Union was unable to deploy a full contingent of peacekeepers in Somalia because of the lack of funding. With Security Council support, however, the African Union would be better able to support the people and Government of Somalia in their search for peace. UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, describing the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union as strong and broad, said that he would spare no effort in making their partnership complementary, effective and inclusive. At the end of the Security Council’s day-long debate, the Council recognized the need to enhance financing of regional organizations’ peacekeeping operations under a United Nations mandate. It therefore endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal to set up, within three months, an African Union-United Nations panel to consider the modalities of such support. Resolution 1809 (2008) was adopted unanimously.
Another item on the agenda involved a review of African conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cote d’Ivoire. On the Sudan, discussion focused on the necessity for full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and on the need to fully deploy UNAMID. The need to re-energizing the political process in Darfur was emphasized. On Somalia, some delegates felt that the step by step approach and progressive involvement of the United Nations was acceptable; others questioned why the experience of the African Mission in Sudan could not be applied to AMISOM. There was agreement that all threats to international peace and security should be treated in the same way; and that strengthening AMISOM could be a testing ground for the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations. In response to whether UN peacekeepers should be deployed in Somalia before there was peace, the example of Lebanon was provided as a case where the UN has been deployed while conflict continued.
Meanwhile, in Djibouti, Sheikh Sharif, the chairman of the Asmara based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) has been meeting with members of the Hawiye Leadership Council. This is in part an attempt to strengthen his own position within a divided ARS which has only limited support on the ground, though it does have links to some terrorists groups in Mogadishu. In fact, ever since Prime Minister Nur ‘Adde’ announced his aim for national reconciliation, there has been a division among members of the ARS. There have also been efforts among elements of the international community to patch up these divisions. At the same time there are concerns over what the response of Asmara might be if and when the ARS opens negotiations with the TFG. Questions have been raised as to whether Asmara can be seen as a credible actor in peace making while it is also working to undermine the Government of Somalia by harboring terrorist groups. It is difficult to see how Asmara can support reconciliation if it continues to work against peace and stability in Somalia. In fact, because of its links with Asmara, the ARS has been given unnecessary weight in terms of peace making and reconciliation. Indeed, because of its lack of support on the ground, it is now trying to ally with the Hawye Leadership Council. The HLC claims to represent the Hawiye as a whole, although in fact it represents only a handful of business interests and a few politicians from some of the sub-clans within the Hawiye. It is doubtful if this attempt by two weak organizations can add much value towards stabilizing Somalia. In Mogadishu, the TFG cabinet is expected to hold a meeting tomorrow to endorse the Draft Budget for 2008. It will also announce the modalities for establishing the Benadir Council through broad based participation of the inhabitants of the region. It is also expected to discuss the situation in Beletweyn, and Jowhar, and come up with a solution acceptable to the inhabitants living in these areas. The cabinet has made it clear this will be done in full consultation with members of parliament and elders.
There have, of course, been significant changes in decentralization in the last three years, and a consequent empowerment of woreda administrators, appointed by elected woreda councils. There have also been changes in the methodology of the National Electoral Board operations. HRW ignores all this, as it does the very substantial work carried out by the Human Rights Commission or the Office of the Ombudsman; or even the internationally funded work in improving the judicial system. In fact, HRW makes no effort to investigate the reality of local democracy in local administrative organizations, merely claiming these are no more than mere devices to provide for OPDO control. HRW provides no evidence for its assertions that there is a pattern of abusive cooperation among officials across all levels of local government, nor does it make any effort to evaluate its sources depending upon admittedly partial, doubtful or all-too-often unidentified sources. A few days after the May 2005 elections, the Head of the EU's Election Monitoring Mission, told leading members of the opposition that they had won the election. She based her unfounded, and inaccurate remarks, on returns from less than two percent of polling stations in two largely untypical areas. It was a disastrous mistake, allowing the opposition to make claims of victory which had no validity. Much of what happened later in the year can be laid at her door. HRW, as in 2005, have done the same thing, building skyscrapers of criticism on the basis of severely limited examples. The African Director of HRW in New York, Geogette Gagnon, just two days before voting, was even prepared to claim on the basis of what HRW admitted were highly limited samples, that: “it is too late to salvage these elections, which will simply be a rubber stamp on EPRDF's near-monopoly on power at the local level.” There can, of course, be no excuse for violations of human rights but the fact is that HRW, despite its claims, has not managed to document these. As Ethiopia has repeatedly said: human rights is a work in progress. It has not yet gone as far or as fast as necessary, but it is moving forward, though the continuous repetition of exaggerated and inaccurate opposition claims, without effort to investigate their reality, provide no help to the process. A Week in the Horn will have more to say about Human Rights Watch and its reporting on Ethiopia, next week.
The ONLF’s claims of support, as made in these films bear little relation to reality. The same is true of the claims repeated by ONLF members in these films about development in the region. It is true that the Somali Region was greatly neglected under the previous governments, but since 1991, the region has been one of the nine federal states with its own elected government, in which a majority of the ONLF actually participate. The present terrorist ONLF began as a small breakaway group in the mid 1990s when they failed to win control of the local administration. Supported by Eritrea, they launched a renewed series of terrorist operations last year. In recent months, following substantial security operations, ONLF activities have virtually disappeared, but they still retain the capacity for small-scale attacks on civilians and villages. In fact, development in the region has sharply increased, in particular in the last two or three years, and notably since federal block grants have been distributed down to local level administrations and woredas. In one woreda (Gursum) for example, since decentralization, the woreda has built 10 basic alternative schools, three junior and primary school, two veterinary clinics, a health post and a farmer’s training centre, 45 kms of roads, electrified two towns and provided wireless telephone services to 14 rural kebeles. It is not alone in these developments. On the larger scale, Jijiga airport has been tarmaced, a university built in Jijiga, the regional capital, which also has a Teacher Training Institute, a Management Insitutue, and a secondary school. Satellite education is reaching most woredas now. Under the current budget, the Somali Regional State administration hopes to raise health coverage from 50% to 64%, access to water from 27% to 33%, raise education participation from 35% to 43%, animal health coverage to 29% from 25%. The budget allows for the hiring of over 600 health staff, over 2,000 teachers and 555 agricultural experts. The Somali Regional State administration itself would be the first to admit there is along way to go, but a lot has been achieved since 1991, and there have been some significant improvements in budget utilization in the last two or three years. There is no hint of any of this in Alzajeera’s films, and it is clear that Aljazeera was not in the least bit interested in trying to find out if there had been any developments in the region, or in checking on any of the allegations made by ONLF members to camera. Nor did Aljazeera appear to have considered that the plausibility of some of those on film appeared very doubtful. Many looked surprisingly young; and one young woman who claimed to have been in the bush as a guerrilla fighter for three years, had carefully painted nails which would not have been out of place in a Dubai Hotel. Aljazeera has made a propaganda film for a terrorist organization, a film which will do little for its reputation. |
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Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs |